this country, and the act of congress of August 2d, 1813, interdicting the use of British licenses, or passes, did not apply to the contract of ransom." (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 105; Chitty, On Com. Law, vol. 1, p. 428; Azuni, Droit Maritime, tome 2, ch. 4, art. 6; Emerigon, des Assurances, ch. 12, sec, 21; Valin, des Prises, art. 66, p. 149; Goodrich v. Gordon, 15 Johns. Rep., p. 6; Girard v. Ware, 1 Peters. C. C. Rep., p. 142; The Saratoga, 2 Gallis. Rep., p. 164; Maisonnaire v. Keating, 2 Gallis. Rep., p. 336; Brooks v. Dorr, 2 Mass. Rep., p. 39; Spafford v. Dodge, 14 Mass. Rep., p. 66; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 432; Bello, Derecho Internacional, p. 2, cap. 5, § 9.)

§ 22. The general authority to capture, which is delegated by the belligerent state to its commissioned cruiser, involves the power to ransom captured property, unless prohibited by the law of the captor's own country. The contract made for the ransom of enemy's property taken at sea, is generally carried into effect by a safe conduct issued by the captor, permitting the captured vessel and cargo to proceed to a designated port, by a prescribed route and within a limited time, and such a document furnishes a complete legal protection against the cruisers of the same belligerent state, or its allies, during the period and within the terms prescribed in the safe conduct. "From the very nature of the connection between allies," says Kent, "their compacts with the common enemy must bind each other, when they tend to accomplish the objects of the alliance. If they did not, the ally would reap all the fruits of the compact, without being subject to the terms and conditions of it; and the enemy with whom the agreement was made would be exposed, in regard to the ally, to all the disadvantages of it, without participating in the stipulated benefits. Such an inequality of obligation is contrary to every principle of reason and justice." (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 105; Pothier, Droit de Propriété, No. 134; Miller v. Miller, 2 Dallas Rep., p. 15; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 110; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 5, §9; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 2, § 29.)

§ 23. As a general rule, the captor, by the safe conduct implied in a ransom-bill, simply guarantees the ransomed vessel against being interrupted in its course, or retaken by

other cruisers of its own nation or of its allies, but not against loss by the perils of the sea. There is no implied insurance in the ransom bill against such losses. If, therefore, the ransomed vessel should founder at sea, or be wrecked, and become a total loss, the contract is still binding, and the ransom bill payable to the captor. But it is sometimes specified in the contract of ransom, that the loss of the vessel by the perils of the sea shall discharge the captured party from the payment of the ransom; such a clause is restrained to the case of a total loss on the high seas, and is not extended to stranding, which might afford the master a temptation to fraudulently cast away his vessel, in order to save the most valuable part of his cargo, and avoid the payment of the ransom. (Whea ton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 28; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 106; Pothier, Traité de Propriété, No. 138; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 5, §9; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, p. 110.)

§ 24. If the ransomed vessel should exceed the time, or deviate from the course, prescribed in the contract, she forfeits her safe-conduct, and is liable to recapture; and if retaken, the debtors of the ransom are discharged from their obligation, which is merged in the prize, and the amount is deducted from the net proceeds thereof and paid to the first captor, whilst the residue is paid to the second captor. But any variation from the course prescribed, or the time limited, by the contract, caused by the stress of weather, or unavoidable necessity, does not work a forfeiture of the safe-conduct. If the captor, after having ransomed an enemy's vessel, is himself taken by the enemy, together with the ransom bill of which he is the bearer, this ransom bill becomes a part of the capture made by the enemy; and the persons of the hostile nation, who were debtors of the ransom, are thereby discharged from their obligation under the ransom-bill. But questions relating to maritime captures and recaptures, will be more particularly considered in the chapter on the rights and duties of captors. (Vide post, chapter xxx.; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 28; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 106; Pothier, Traité de Propriété, Nos. 139, 140; Valin, Com. sur l'Ordon, liv. 3, tit. 9, § 10; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 5, §9; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 29.)

§ 25. Sometimes a hostage is taken for the faithful performance of the contract on the part of the captured. The death or the recapture of the hostage, does not discharge the contract of ransom, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect; for the captor takes the hostage only as a collateral security, and the loss of such collateral security does not cancel the contract, or discharge the debtor from his obligation to pay the ransom. "The practice in France," says Kent, "when a French vessel has been ransomed, and a hostage given to the enemy, is for the officers of the admiralty to seize the vessel and her cargo, on her return to port, in order to compel the owners to pay the ransom debt, and relieve the hostage; and this is a course dictated by a prompt and liberal sense of justice." Vattel and others have given very minute rules in relation to hostages for prisoners. If a hostage be given in order to procure the liberty of a prisoner, and the prisoner die, the hostage should be set free; but if the hostage die, the prisoner is not thereby restored to his liberty. If, however, one prisoner has been substituted for another, the death of one releases the other. If a prisoner be released on condition of procuring the release of another, and that other dies before his liberty has been attained, it is said that the survivor is bound to return to his prison! No civilized nation would now impose such conditions. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 17, §§ 278-286; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 109; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 107; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 28; Pothier, Traité de Propriété, No. 144; Martens, Presis du Droit des Gens, § 296; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 5, § 9, cap. 9, § 5.)

§ 26. Contracts of ransom, like all other agreements arising jure belli, and lawfully entered into between belligerents, suspend the character of enemy, so far as respects the parties to the contract? There can, therefore, be no just reason why the captor should not bring suit directly on the ransom bill. And such appears to be the practice in the maritime courts of the European continent. The English courts, however, have decided that the subject of an enemy is not permitted. to sue in the British courts of justice, in his own proper person, for the payment of a ransom, on the technical objection of the want of a persona standi in judicio, but that the pay

ment could be forced by an action brought by the imprisoned hostage in the courts of his own country for the recovery of his freedom. This technical objection is not based on principle, nor supported by reason, and the decision has not the sanction of general usage. "The effect of this contract," says Wheaton, "like that of every other which may be lawfully entered into between belligerants, is to suspend the character of enemy, so far as respects the parties to the ransom bill; and, consequently, the technical objection of the want of a persona standi in judicio cannot, on principle, prevent a suit being brought by the captor directly on the ransom bill." Lord Mansfield considered this contract as worthy to be sustained by sound morality and good policy, and as governed by the law of nations and the eternal rules of justice. Licenses to trade, which properly belong to commercia belli, will be discussed in a separate chapter. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 107; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 28; Anthon v. Fisher, Doug. Rep., p. 649, note; The Hoop, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 169; Cornu v. Blackburn, 1 Doug, Rep., p. 641; Ricard v. Bettenham, 3 Burr. Rep., p. 1734; Pothier, Traité de Propriété, Nos. 136, 137; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 5, § 9; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 29.)

§ 27. As flags of truce are sometimes sent from the enemy to forces in position, or on the march, or in action, nominally for making some convention, as for a suspension of arms, but really with the design of gaining information, it is proper that restrictions should be placed upon its use. Thus, if sent to an army in position, the bearer of said flag should never be allowed to pass the outer line of sentinels, nor even to approach within the range of their guns, without permission. If warned away, and he should not instantly depart, he may be fired on. Similar precautions may be taken by an army on the march. If the flag proceeds from the enemy's lines during a battle, the ranks which it leaves must halt and cease their fire. When the bearer displays his flag, he will be signalled by the opposing force, either to advance, or to retire; if the former, the forces he approaches will cease firing; if the latter, he must instantly retire; for, if he should not, he may be fired upon. (Scott, Military Dic., p. 304.)

CHAPTER XXVIII.

LICENSES TO TRADE.

CONTENTS.

1. Character of licenses to trade- 2. General licenses- 3. Special licenses- 4. Decisions on their authority and effect— 5. Want of uniformity in British decisions-26. Representations of the grantee - 7. Intentions of grantor-8. Persons entitled to use them-29. Where the principal acts as agent for others- 10. Character of the vessel - 11. Exception of a particular flag- 12. Change of national character during voyage13. Protection before and after voyage-14. Quantity and quality of goods 15. Protection to enemy's goods- 16. License to alien enemy— 17. If cargo be injured- 18. If it cannot be landed- 19. Compulsory change of cargo-2 20. For importation does not protect re-exportation — 21. Course of voyage- 22. Change of port of destination - 23. Intended ulterior destination- 24. Condition to call for convoy-25. Capture before and after deviation- 26. Time limited in license-2 27. License does not act retrospectively - 28. If not on board, or not endorsed - 29. Effect of alteration-30. Breach of blockade, etc., by licensed vessel.

§ 1. A license is a kind of safe conduct, granted by a belligerent state to its own subjects, to those of its enemy, or to neutrals, to carry on a trade which is interdicted by the laws of war, and it operates as a dispensation from the penalties of those laws, with respect to the state granting it, and so far as its terms can be fairly construed to extend. The officers and tribunals of the state under whose authority they are issued, are bound to respect such documents as lawful relaxations