International Law

§ 1. A state is a body politic, or society of men united to-
gether for mutual advantage and safety. Such a society has
affairs and interests peculiar to itself, and is capable of delibe-
ration and resolution; it is therefore regarded as a kind of
moral person, possessing a will and an understanding, and
susceptible of rights and obligations. From the nature and
design of such a society, it is necessary that there should be
established in it a public authority, to order and direct what is
to be done by each individual in relation to the end and
object of the association. This political authority, whether
vested in a single individual or in a number of individuals,

is properly the sovereignty of the state. This term, however, in international law, is ususally employed to express the external rather than the internal character of a nation, with respect to its ability or capacity to govern itself, independently of foreign powers. A sovereign state may, therefore, be defined to be any nation or people organized into a body politic and exercising the rights of self-government. (Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 1, cap. 1, § 14; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 1, ch. 1, § 4; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 12; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 1, ch. 4; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 16-19; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 1, § 3; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 1, §1; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 16-25; Merlin, Repertoire verb. Souveraigneté.)

§ 2. A state is distinguishable from a nation or a people, since the former may be composed of different races of men, all subject to the same supreme authority. Thus, the Austrian, Russian, British and Ottomon empires, are composed of a variety of nations and people. So, also, the same nation or people may be subject to, or compose, several distinct and separate states. Thus the Poles are subject to the dominion of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, respectively; and the Italians constitute several distinct and independent sovereignties. The terms nation and people, however, are frequently used by writers on international law as synonymous with the term states. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 65; Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §2; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 1, ch. 1, §4; ch.4, § 40; Garden, De Diplomatie, tome 1, pt. 1; Rayneval, Int. du Droit Nat., liv. 1, ch. 4.)

§3. The sovereignty of a state has reference to its political character, rather than to the nature of its territorial possessions. The territory of some states is in one compact body, like Prussia, Bavaria, and Belgium, in Europe, Mexico, and the United States, in America, while the territory of other states, like that of Great Britain, consists of detached parts situate in every quarter of the habitable globe. Under the general appellation of state are included all the possessions of a nation, wheresoever situated, so that a colony, however distant, is, in the eye of international law, as much a part of the state which establishes it as is a city or province belong

Law, vol. 1, § 63; Vattel, Wildman, Int. Law, vol. Pac., lib. 1, cap. 3, §7; Gent., lib. 1, § 231; Puf

ing to its most ancient territory. (Wheaton, Elm. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, §2; Phillimore, On Int. Droit des Gens, liv. 1, ch. 18, §210; 1, p. 40; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Heineccius, Elementa Juris, Nat. et fendorf, Jus. Nat. et Gent., lib. 8, cap. 12, §5; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 1, §3; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit Nat., liv. 1, ch. 4; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 27: Heffter, Droit International, §§ 16-25, 29-31; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 1, §3.)

§ 4 As a colony, a possession, or a dependency, constitutes only a part of the state, it cannot in itself be regarded, in international law, as a distinct political organization. Hence, any public or private corporation, created by, and deriving its authority from a state, cannot of itself constitute a separate and independent sovereignty. Thus, the East India Company, although exercising the sovereign powers of peace and war, with respect to the native princes and people, acted in subordination to the supreme power of the British empire, and was represented by the British government in all its relations with foreign sovereigns and states. (Grotius, de JurBel. ac Pac., liv. 1, cap. 3, § 7; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 1, ch. § 210; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, p. 1, ch. 2, § 2; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 63; Wildman, Int. Law, vol 1, p. 40; Heineccus, Elementa Juris et Gent, lib. 1, § 231; Puffendorf, Jur de la Nat. et Gent., liv. 8, cap. 12, §5; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 16-25.)

§ 5. The mere fact of dependence, however, does not prevent a state from being regarded in international law as a separate and distinct sovereignty, capable of enjoying the rights and incurring the obligations incident to that condition. Much more importance is attached to the nature and character of its connection with other states, and the degree and extent of its dependence. Thus, many European states, which are still regarded as sovereign, do not exercise the right of self-government entirely independent of other states, but have their sovereignty limited and qualified in various degrees, either by the character of their internal constitution, or by the stipulations of unequal treaties of alliance and protection. (Heffter, Droit International, §§ 16-25; Wheaton,

Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 12: Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 1, ch. 1, §§ 5, 6; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 77; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 1, ch. 3, §§ 2, 3, 21; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 20; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., tome 1, p. 104.)

§ 6. Nor is the sovereignty of a particular state necessarily destroyed by its mere nominal obedience to the commands of others, nor even by an habitual influence exercised by others over its councils. Thus, the city of Cracow, in Poland, with its territory, was declared by the congress of Vienna, in 1815, to be a perpetually free, independent, and neutral state, under the protection of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Although its councils were habitually influenced by these great powers, it was nevertheless regarded in international law as a sovereign state; and when, by the convention of 1846, it was annexed to the empire of Austria, the governments of Great Britain, France and Sweden, protested against the proceeding as a violation of the act of 1815, by which it was recognized as an independent state (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 13; Martens, Nouveau Recueil, tome 2, p. 386; Kluber, Acten des Weiner Cong., b. 5, § 138; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1, ch. 2; De Cussy, Precis Historique, p. 7; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 19, et seq.)

§ 7. So, also, tributary states, and those subject to a kind of feudal dependence or vassalage, are still considered as sovereign, unless their sovereignty is destroyed by their relation to other states. Tribute, like that paid by the European maritime powers to the Barbary States, does not necessarily affect the sovereignty of the tributary; nor does the acknowledgment of a nominal vassalage or feudal dependence, like that of Naples to the Papal See, prior to 1818, necessarily impair the sovereignty of the vassal state. Its position in the eye of international law is not necessarily affected by its connections of this kind with others. The law regards the fact of sovereignty rather than the mere name by which it is designated. (Ward, Hist. Law of Nations, vol. 2, p. 69; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 14; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 17; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §21; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 30-31; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., tomo 1, p. 104; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1, ch. 2.)

§ 8. But the character of a state may be legally affected by its connection with others, and its sovereignty will be considered as impaired or entirely destroyed, according to the nature of the compact, the extent of the influence exercised by the superior, and the obedience acknowledged or rendered by the inferior; no matter whether such condition results from political organization or from treaties of unequal alliance and protection. If a state, in either of these modes, parts with its rights of negotiation and treaty, and loses its essential attributes of independence, it can no longer be regarded as a sovereign state, or as a member of the great family of nations. Its legal status is not changed by a loss of relative power, but by a loss of the essential attributes of independence and sovereignty-the right to exercise its volition, and the capacity to contract obligations. (Wheaton Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 13; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch Rep., p. 146; The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 5 Peters Rep., p. 1; The U. S. v. Rogers, 4 Howard Rep., p. 572; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 820; Riquelme, Derecho, Pub., Int., tomo 1, p. 105.)

§ 9. The effect of a protectorate upon the sovereignty of a state must depend entirely upon the character and conditions of the protection afforded. No doubt, one state may place itself under the protection of another without losing its international existence as a sovereign state, if it retains its capacity to treat, to contract alliances, to make peace and war, and to exercise the essential rights of sovereignty. But these rights must be retained de facto, as well as de jure, for although a state may retain the forms of independence, if it be practically and notoriously governed by officers appointed by another state, and incapable of exercising its own volition, it will be regarded as a mere dependence of the governing power. (Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 1, ch. 2; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 1, ch. 2, § 13; Martens, Nouveau Recueil, tome 2, p. 663; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 20; Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 5, 56-60; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac. Pac, lib. 1, cap. 3, § 21; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 67; Vattel, Droit des Gens., liv. 1, ch. 16, § 192; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int.. tomo 1, p. 105.)

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International Law: Or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace ...