sions are, that after the commencement of a blockade, the interposition of a neutral to assist in any way the exportation of the property of the enemy, tends directly to relieve him. from the distress that the blockade was meant to create. It would defeat a principal object of the hostile proceeding; consequently, after the commencement of the blockade, a neutral is no longer at liberty to to make any purchase in the place, with a view to exportation." (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 313; Duer, on Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 681, 682; The Vrow Judith, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 150; The Neptunus, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 170; The Byfield, 1 Edw. Ad. Rep., p, 188; The Juno, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 119; The Calypso, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 298; The Betsey, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 98; The Rolla, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 371; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 9; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 202; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8; § 5; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 9, ch. 4, sec. 2.)

§ 34. There are a number of cases in which the egress of the neutral vessel, during a blockade, is justified or excused: First, If the ship is proved to have been in the blockaded port when the blockade was laid, she may retire in ballast, for such egress affords no aid to the commerce of the enemy, and has no tendency to defeat any legitimate purpose for which the blockade was established. Second, If the ingress was from physical necessity, arising from stress of weather, and the immediate need of water, or provisions, or repairs. Third, Where the entrance with a cargo was authorized by a license, such license is construed to authorize the return of the ship with a cargo. Fourth, Where a neutral ship, arriving at the entrance of a blockaked port, in ignorance of the blockade, is suffered to pass, there is an implied permission to enter, which fully protects her egress. But this implied permission does not, of necessary consequence, protect the cargo, for its owners may be guilty of a criminal violation of the blockade even where the ship is innocent. Fifth, A neutral ship, whose entry into the blockaded port was lawful, is permitted to return with her original cargo that has been found unsaleable, and reshipped during the blockade. Sixth, "Another, and a very equitable exception," says Duer, "is allowed in favor of a neutral ship that leaves the port in

the just expectation of a war between her own country and that to which the blockaded port belongs, In this case, she is permitted to depart, even with a cargo purchased from the enemy during the blockade, if the purchase was made with the funds of neutral owners, and the investment and shipment were probably necessary to save the property, in the event of a war, from a seizure and confiscation by the enemy. But it is not the mere apprehension of a remote and possible danger that will entitle a neutral ship to this exemption. To save the vessel and cargo from condemnation, it must appear that there was a well-founded expectation of an immediate war, and, consequently, that the danger of the seizure and confiscation of the property was imminent and pressing." (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 313; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 682, 683; The Maria Schroeder, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 89, note; The Drie Vrienden, 1 Dod. Ad. Rep., p. 269; The Wassen Hundt, 1 Dod. Ad. Rep., p. 270, note; The Potsdam, 4 Rob. Rep. p. 89; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 202; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 155, 156; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18.

§ 35. "No rule in the law of nations," says Duer, "is more certainly and absolutely established, than that the breach of a blockade subjects all the property, so employed, to confiscation by the belligerent power whose rights are violated. Among all the contradictory positions that have been advanced on the law of nations, this principle has never been disputed. It is to be found in all the writings on public law; is frequently admitted, and never denied, in treaties; is universally acknowledged by all governments that have any degree of civil instruction; and is known to all their subjects, who have any interest to possess the knowledge.

The confiscation of the ship, where a violation of the blockade is justly imputed to the owners, or to the master, acting with or without the authority of the owners, is, in all cases, a necessary consequence. * * * The goods that compose the cargo, so far as they are the property of the owners of the ship, upon the principle stated, necessarily share its fate; and even where they are the property of other shippers, as a general rule, they are involved in the same condemnation. It is only in a few cases, where the

innocence of the owner is apparent and undeniable, that they are exempt. The presumption of law, founded on very probable reasoning, is, that the violation of a blockade is intended for the benefit of the cargo, as well as of the ship, and, consequently, that it is made with the sanction and under the instructions of its owners; and, in all cases, where the innocence of the owners is not manifested by the papers on board, this presumption prevails to exclude the proof. Thus, the rule applies, even where the apparent destination of the ship, judging from her papers, was to a different port, and the attempt to enter that under blockade was a deviation from the regular course of the voyage. Where the only assignable motive for such a deviation is an intention to dispose of the cargo in the blockaded port, and, by such a disposition, to promote the interests of its owners, they are not allowed to contradict the presumption that the master, thus visibly acting for their benefit, was not also acting under their secreauthority." (Phillimore, On Int, Law, vol. 3, §§ 316, et seq.; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 9; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 683–685; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 143; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 7, § 117; The Columbia, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 154; The Vrow Judith, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 150; The Mars, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 87; The Alexander, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 93; The Adonis, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 256; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 203-206; Heffler, Droit International, §§ 154-156; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, §5; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 1, ch. 4, sec. 2.)

§ 36. But if it be clearly established, by proofs found on board at the time of the capture, that, at the inception of the voyage, the owners of the cargo stood clear, even from a possible intention of fraud, their property will be excepted from the penal consequences of the breach of the blockade. Thus, where the illegality consists in the misconduct of the master in attempting to enter a blockaded port, if it be certain that, when the voyage commenced, the existence of the blockade neither was, nor could have been, known at her port of depart ture, the owners of the cargo could not possibly have contemplated a breach of the blockade. In such cases, the act of the master, although it prevail to condemn the ship, will

not condemn the cargo also, for there is no general or necessary relation of principal and agent between its owners and the master. So, also, in case of egress, the ship may be subject to condemnation, and yet the cargo may be restored, although laden during the blockade, if the innocence of its owners be certain and indisputable. Thus, if their orders for the shipment of the goods were given to their agents in the blockaded port before the blockade existed, or was known to exist, and they could not, by any diligence, after the blockade was known to them, countermand their orders in time to prevent their execution, the owners are deemed innocent. In such cases, the agents and owners do not stand in the same relative situation of ordinary agents and principals, for the interests of the former are not only distinct from, but actually opposed to, those of the latter. It must be remarked, however, that, in all cases, whether of ingress or egress, in which an exception is allowed in favor of the cargo, the evidence of the innocence of its owners must be so clear and certain as to exclude any possible imposition on the mind of the court. Another exception, in this relation, deserves notice. A neutral, domiciled in an enemy's country, in itinere, on his return home to reside, was a passenger, with his family, in a neutral vessel, which was guilty of a breach of blockade. The specie which he had with him, for the support and comfort of himself and family, was taken as prize. But the supreme court decreed restitution, on the ground that he had a right to carry with him such property, which was not a mercantile adventure, and that, being personally in no fault, such property was not forfeited by a breach of blockade by the vessel in which he had taken passage. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, §§ 318, 319; Duer, on Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 686, 688; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 151; The Exchange, 1 Edw. Ad. Rep., p. 43; 7he Alexander, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 93; The Mercurius, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 80; The Neptunus, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 173; The Adelaide, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 281; The Manchester, 2 Act. Ad. Rep., p. 687; The United States v. Guillem, 11 Howard Rep., p. 62; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 233–206; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, § 5.)

§37. "To justify a capture for the violation of a blockade," says Duer, "or the attempt to violate it, the offense must continue to exist at the time of seizure. In technical language, the ship must be then in delicto. In cases where the ship has violated the blockade by egress, the delictum continues during her whole voyage, till she has reached her final port of destination. Until then, as the offense consists, not in the mere attempt, but in an actual breach, no change of circumstances, or subsequent repentance, can efface the guilt, It is not cancelled by a mere interruption of the voyage, such as the stopping of the ship at an intermediate port, either from necessity or design; when she resumes her voyage, she becomes again subject to the penalty of the law. But when a ship sails for a blockaded port, with a knowledge of the blockade, and the intention to violate it, the offense is so far complete as to justify her immediate capture; yet, as it exists only in an attempt, the delictum does not necessarily continue during the whole of her subsequent voyage. If, previous to her capture, the blockade had ceased to exist, or the master, from the information of a ship of war of the blockading state, had just grounds for believing that such was the fact, or had altered his destination, with the intention of not proceeding at all to the blockaded port, the offense no longer exists, and that which had existed is no longer punishable. To constitute the offense, three circumstances must be found to coëxist. The fact of a blockade, the party's knowledge of its existence, and his intention to violate it, and in each of the above cases, an indispensable circumstance is wanting. The delictum, therefore, at the time of capture, had wholly ceased, and both ship and cargo will be restored." (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp 688, 689; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 203; The Welvaart, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 128; The Juffrow Maria, Schreder, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 147; The Gen. Hamilton, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 61; The Lisette, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 387; The Neptunus, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 114; The James Cook, Edw. Ad. Rep., p. 263; Manning, Law of Nations, pp. 328, 329.)

§ 38. It may be stated, in general terms, that an insurance, made in the country of the blockading state, is necessarily invalid from the time the property insured becomes liable to confiscation by the violation, or attempted violation, of a