Frederick Molke, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 86; The Vrouw Judith, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 150; The Adelaide, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 111; The Hare, 1 Act. Ap. Ca., p. 261; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 300; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 186, 189; Heffler, Droit International, § 156; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, § 5; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 9, ch. 4, sec. 1.)

§ 21. There are many cases where the inference of a knowledge of the blockade is so probable as to create a strong presumption, but a presumption not entirely conclusive, and which may be repelled by unimpeached and positive proof. Thus a public notification to one neutral state, will be presumed, in due time, to reach the inhabitants of a neighboring power not officially notified of the blockade, as such information, generally circulated in one country, must of necessity in time reach the knowledge of the inhabitants of an adjoining country. But as such notification does not, proprio vigore, bind the inhabitants of any state but that to which it is addressed, the presumption of such knowledge, in a reasonable time, may be repelled by positive evidence. So, where a blockade has lasted for such a considerable time as to render it highly probable that its existence must have been known at the port of departure, a knowledge of it will be presumed, and it will rest upon the party to show by satisfactory proof, that he was not apprized of the blockade. Again, where the neutral vessel is intercepted on her egress from a blockaded port, with a cargo shipped immediately after the blockade had commenced, and while it might have been unknown to the inhabitants of the port when the vessel sailed, the party will be allowed to rebut the presumption of law by satisfactory proof, of his ignorance of the establishment of the blockade. In all cases of this kind, where the presumption of knowledge is not absolute and conclusive, the neutral claimant is allowed to prove his own innocence. And the captor can judge from the nature and circumstances of each particular case, whether the neutral vessel is acting in good faith, and is really ignorant of the existence of the blockade, or whether the pretended ignorance is a mere fraudulent attempt to deceive. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 188, 189; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 662; The Adelaide,

2 Rob. Rep., pp. 110, 112; The Calypso, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 298; The Hurtige Hane, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 328; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 301; Manning, Law of Nations, pp. 323, et seq.; Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des Prises, tit. 6, ch. 2, sec. 2; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, § 5.)

§ 22. Where there are no legal or probable grounds for imputing to the master of a neutral vessel the knowledge of the existence of a blockade which he is charged to have violated, it rests upon the captor to establish the fact of this knowledge by positive evidence. To warrant a condemnation, the proof must be clear and definite that such vessel had been duly notified of the blockade, aud had undertaken or prosecuted the voyage in defiance of the notice or warning To be binding, the notice or warning must be clear, and not so ambiguous or insiduous as to be calculated to mislead the neutral master, otherwise it is illegal and void. Where it is expressed in such general terms as to embrace other ports not blockaded, it is not even valid as to the blockaded port, although included in the general language. Where the notice is irregular and insufficient, no penalty is incurred by its contravention. Proof of the actual knowledge of the party at the inception of the voyage, supersedes, in all cases, the necessity of a warning, nor is it of any importance by what means or in what form he received the information, if the information was credible in its nature, and came in such a form and from such a source as to leave no reasonable ground on his mind as to its authenticity; he is not permitted to aver that he placed no confidence in a communication that had just claims to his belief. Again, if the voyage was commenced without a knowledge of the blockade, but he was afterward notified of its existence by a cruiser, or officer of the blockading state, and he continue his voyage with the evident intention of entering the blockaded port, he is liable to condemnation. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 147, 148; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 663; The Mcrcurius, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 80; The Henrick and Maria, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 146; The Vrow Judith, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 150; The Apollo, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 286; The Columbia, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 156; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 302; Heffter, Droit International, § 155.)

§ 23. An actual entrance into a blockaded port is, by no means, necessary to render a neutral ship guilty of a violation of the blockade. Indeed, such a construction would essentially defeat the very object of a blockade, by rendering the capture of a ship lawful, only after such capture had ceased to be possible. Hence it is universally held that an attempt to enter the port, knowing it to be blockaded, completes the offense to which the penalty of the law is attached. It is the attempt to commit the offense, which, in the judgment of the law, constitutes the crime, and is as much a breach of neutrality as an actual entrance into the prohibited port. It would be absurd to say that the penalty is not incurred till the unlawful design is fully accomplished, for the offender would, in most cases, be placed, by its accomplishment, beyond the reach of the law. Nor is the word "attempt" to be understood in a literal and narrow sense. It is not limited to the conduct of the ship at the mouth of the blockaded port, but is applicable to her whole conduct from the moment she has knowledge of the existence of the blockade, and the consequent prohibition of neutral commerce. If she has this knowledge before she begins her voyage, the offense is complete the moment she quits her port of departure, if that knowledge is communicated to her during the voyage, its contiued prosecution involves the crime, and justifies the penalty; if it is not given to her till she reaches the blockading squadron, she must immediately retire, or she is made liable to confiscation. It is not the mere mental intention that the law punishes, but it is the overt act by which the execution of an unlawful intent is begun. This overt act is the starting for, or proceeding toward, the prohibited port, with the knowledge that it is blockaded. The same rules prevails in all analagous cases of unlawful voyages. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 28; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 148; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 330, 331, 586, 666, 688; The Vrow Johanna, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 109; The Neptunus, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 110; The Spes and The Irene, 5 Rob. Rep. p. 76; The Shepherdess, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 262; The James Cook, Edw. Ad. Rep., p. 261; The Betsey, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 332; The Columbia, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 154; The Nereide, 9 Cranch. Rep., p. 440; Vos and Graves v. N. Ins. Co., 1

Caines Cases, p. 7; 2 Johns Cases, pp. 180, 469; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch. Rep., p. 335; Fitzsimmons v. N. Ins. Co., 4 Cranch. Rep., p. 185; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 155, 156; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, § 5.)

§ 24. Several continental writers of authority contend that the inception of a voyage for a blockaded port, with a knowledge of the existence of the blockade, is not such an offense as to render the vessel subject to seizure upon the high seas. Indeed, they regard such seizure as a violation of the liberty of the seas and of the independence of the sovereign state to which the vessel belongs. But English and American publicists have generally held, and the decisions of British and American courts of admiralty seem to sustain the opinion, that the inception of the voyage, with a knowledge of the blockade, and the intention to enter, is sufficient in law to constitute the offense and incur penalty, and that the intention will be presumed from the fact of commencing the voyage with the knowledge of the existence of the blockade. They say that the vessel had no right to commence the voyage with such knowledge, and that the act of inception is, in itself, as a general rule, illegal and punishable as a breach of neutrality, and, therefore, that the master or owners are not permitted to aver that they merely intended to proceed to the blockaded port to ascertain, by due inquiry, whether the blockade still continued, and to enter it only in case the blockade had ceased. (Hefter, Droit International, § 156; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 9; Ortolan, De Diplomatie, tome 2, p. 32; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, §5; Jacobson, Seerecht, etc., p. 682; Pando, Derecho Internacional, pp. 500–503; Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des Prises, tit. 6, ch. 2, sec. 2; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 691–698, note 1; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, pp. 194, 197; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 298; Olivera v. Union Insurance Co., 3 Wheaton Rep., p. 196, note; Vide, also, cases referred to ante, § 23.)

§ 25. But this general rule is subject to some important exceptions, or rather the inference, from the inception of the voyage with knowledge of the blockade, of intention to violate it, may, in some cases, be removed by proof to the contrary. Thus, where the vessel sails from a distant country,

she may clear with a provisional destination to the blockaded port, without incurring the penalty of a breach of the blockade, provided it be clearly and positively proved that she intended to proceed to the blockaded port only in case she ascertained, by due inquiry, during the voyage, that the blockade had been raised. This may be shown by instructions to the master not to pursue the voyage unless, by inquiry at a port of the blockading power, or of some neutral state, be found that the blockade had ceased. These instructions to the master must clearly set forth the necessity of the previous inquiry, and the mode in which it is to be made, in order to furnish satisfactory proof of the intentions of the parties. The presumption is against them, and to repel the presumption the equivocal evidence of ambiguous instructions will not be sufficient. But no matter how distant the country from which the vessel sails, she has no right to proceed to the entrance of the blockaded port with a view to ascertain from the blockading force whether she can be permitted to enter. An inquiry from the blockading force is only justifiable when the master, who finds himself in its presence, was ignorant that the blockade existed. In other cases, a vessel found in a situation to make the inquiry, if destined to the blockaded port, is liable, from her previous knowledge, to instant capture. A neutral merchant, says Sir William Scott, has no right to speculate on the greater or less probability of the termination of a blockade, and, on such speculation, to send his vessel to the very mouth of the blockaded river, or port, with instructions to the master to enter, if no blockading force appeared, otherwise to demand a warning, and proceed to a different port. A rule that would permit this, would be introductory of the greatest frauds. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 303; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 668, 669; The Spes and Irene, 5 Rob. Rep., pp. 80, 81; The Betsey, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 332; The Posten, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 336, note; The Shepherdess, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 262; The Little William, 1 Act. Ad. Rep., p. 141; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, § 5.)

§ 26. "It seems a just inference from the decisions," says Mr. Duer, "that where the blockade has been constituted simply by the fact of an investment, although its existence