to prevent all communication with the port it incloses. If, through motives of civility, or other considerations, it should allow ships, not privileged by law, to enter or depart, the irregularity may be justly held to vitiate the blockade, as it necessarily tends to deceive other parties. Where some are suffered to pass, others will have a right to infer that the blockade is raised. To justify this presumption, however, there must be repeated instances of an improper relaxation, for one or two cases would hardly be deemed sufficient to warrant the belief that the legal restraint on neutral commerce had been wholly removed. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 654; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 28; The Rolla, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 372; Heffter, Droit International, §155; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 295; Jacobsen, Seerecht, p. 683.)

§ 14. A legal blockade can only exist, where its actual force can be applied; hence the legal effect of a maritime blockade, not accompanied by a military investment on land, applies only to a direct communication by sea, and to vessels sailing from, or immediately destined to, the blockaded port, and cannot be construed to prohibit the conveyance of articles, not contraband of war, to or from the blockaded port, by interior communications. A blockade can never be a complete investment of a place, unless its force can be applied to every point by which a communication may be carried on. It is true that, by this construction, a maritime blockade is usually imperfect, as a complete investment, but this imperfection arises from the nature of the force applied; it is now universally conceded that the extent of legal pretensions of a blockade, is unavoidably limited by the physical impossibility of applying ships to obstruct communications by land. The conveyance of goods through the mouth of a river under blockade, for the purpose of being shipped for exportation, is regarded as a breach of blockade, it being perfectly insignificant whether this was effected in large or small vessels. Thus, goods shipped in a river, having been previously sent in lighters along the coast from the blockaded port, with the ship under charter-party proceeding also from the blockaded port in ballast to take them on board, were held liable to confiscation. (Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 180; Wheaton,

Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 28; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 655; The Neutralitet, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 295; The Stert, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 65; The Jonge Pieter, 4 Rob. Rep., p. 83; The Ocean, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 297; The Maria, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 201; The Charlotte Sophia, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 204, note; Heffter, Droit International, § 155; Jacobsen, Seerecht, etc., p. 683; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, § 5.)

§ 15. It might be inferred, by parity of reasoning, that, when a port is under a military siege, neutral commerce might still be lawfully carried on by sea, through channels of communication which could not be obstructed by the forces of the besieging army. But such inference would not be strictly correct, for the difference between a blockade and a siege, in their character and object, have led to a difference in the rules applicable, in the two cases, to neutral commerce. Although the legal effect of a siege on land, that is, a purely military investment of a naval or commercial port, may not be an entire prohibition of neutral commerce, yet it does not leave the ordinary communications by sea open and unrestricted, as a purely maritime blockade leaves the interior communications by land. The primary object of a blockade is, as we have already said, to prohibit commerce; but the primary object of a siege is, the reduction of the place. All writers on international law impose upon neutrals the duty of not interfering with this object. To supply the inhabitants of the place besieged with anything required for immediate use, such as provisions aud clothing, might be giving them aid to prolong their resistance. It is, therefore, a clear departure from neutral duty to furnish supplies, even of possible utility, to a port in a state of siege, although the communication by sea may be open. It would be a direct interference in the war, tending to the relief of one belligerent, and to the prejudice of the other; and such supplies are justly deemed contraband of war, to the same extent as if destined to the immediate use of the army or navy of the enemy. Hence, although the prohibition of neutral commerce with a port besieged be not entire, yet it will extend to all supplies of even possible utility in prolonging the siege. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, pp. 656-658; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub.,

lib. 1, cap. 11; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 7, § 117; Heffler, Droit International, § 155.)

§ 16. The breach of a blockade is viewed, in all cases, as a criminal act; this necessarily implies a criminal intent, and to constitute such intent, a knowledge of the existence of the blockade, and an intention to violate it, are indespensable. These are sometimes a presumption of law which the party is not permitted to repel, in others, an inference more or less probable, but, in many cases, they must be shown by positive evidence. Sometimes one will be presumed, while the other will require positive proof. Although both knowledge and intention must be combined to complete a criminal intent, it is evident that the questions themselves are perfectly distinct, and, in any particular case, may be governed by different rules of evidence. The judicial decisions in England, and in the United States, have given great precision to the rules of law applicable to a breach of blockade, by the clearness of their reasoning, and the equity of their illustrations. They are distinguished, likewise, for general coincidence and harmony in their principles. (Heffter, Droit International, § 156; Wheaton, Elem. Iut. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 28; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 147; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 9; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 658; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 7, 8117; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 298.)

§ 17. It has been held by the English courts of admiralty, that the notification of a blockade to a neutral government, is, by construction of law, a direct personal notice to each inhabitant of that country, and that he cannot be allowed to aver his own ignorance of the blockade, or otherwise contradict the legal presumption of knowledge. To allow individuals to plead ignorance of a blockade which had been notified to their government, would wholly defeat the object of the notification. It is true, that the exclusion of this evidence may operate with severity in particular cases; but an opposite construction would render a notification, in the words of Sir Willliam Scott, "the most nugatory thing in the world." If the neutral government should fail to communicate the information to its subjects, by a prompt aud authorative pub

lication of the notice which it receives, those subjects who suffer from such neglect cannot complain of the belligerent state, but must address their complaints, and demand for compensation, to their own government. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 6, pp. 147, 148; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 290; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 659; The Neptunus, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 110; The Vrow Johanna, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 109; The Jonge Petronella, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 131; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 9; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 2, p. 188; The Spes and Irene, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 79; The Welvaart, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 128; Heffter, Droit International, § 159; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib 1, tit 2, cap. 18; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, § 5; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 9, ch. 3.)

§ 18. A question may here arise as to what constitutes a public notification. This is usually in the form of an official communication from the belligerent to the authorities of neutral states. It may be a notice that a certain port will be blockaded on and after a certain date, or that it is the intention of the belligerent to proceed to blockade certain ports or harbors. The latter form being indefinite as to time would require a subsequent notice of the commencement or time of the actual blockade. Sometimes several notifications are given, such as a notice of intention, a subsequent notice of the sailing of the naval forces for the purpose of carrying that intention into execution, and finally a notice of the actual commencement of the blockade. The two former are given as a matter of courtesy, for the information of neutrals. The French have held that a general diplomatie notice is not sufficient to charge parties with a knowledge of a blockade, but there must be an actual notice by the blocka ding force. This doctrine was distinctly announced by Count Molé in his letter of October 20th, 1838, to the French minister of marine, in relation to the French blockade of Vera Cruz, Mexico, and is strenuously advocated by Ortolan and other French writers on international law. As already remarked, British writers and British courts of admiralty regard a public or diplomatic notice of a blockade, as, by construction of law, a direct, personal notice, to each inhabitant of the state so notified. (Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neu

tres, tit. 9, ch. 5, secs. 1, 2; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 8, §5; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 18; Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 659; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 291; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 9; The Spes and Irene, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 79; The Rolla, 6 Rob. Rep., p. 368.)

§ 19. Instead of a direct official notification to a neutral government of the establishment of, or intention to institute, a blockade of a particular port, a general notice to that effect is sometimes given by official publication in the newspapers. By this means information is distributed among the mercantile community more generally and expeditiously than through the ordinary channels of official communication with the neutral government. Thus, where the vessel intercepted is destined to a blockaded port, and there is clear and positive proof that the existence of the blockade was generally known at her port of departure when she sailed, neither the master nor his owners, nor the shippers of the goods, will be permitted to aver their personal ignorance of that which it is scarcely possible they should not have known, or, at any rate, by due inquiry might have ascertained. To allow proof of personal ignorance in such a case, by admitting the affidavits of the master or his crew, would be a direct invitation to perjury and fraud. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 148; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 1, ch. 3, secs. 1, 2; The Adelaide, 2 Rob. Rep., p. 111; The Frederick Molke, 1 Rob. Rep., p. 86; The Hare, 1 Act. Ap. Ca., p. 261.)

§ 20. Where a neutral vessel is intercepted on her passage, with a cargo from a blockaded port, and the cargo is proved to have been shipped after the blockade had commenced, and was known at the port, the party is precluded from denying his knowledge of its existence. The personal ignorance of the master, in such a case, could only have arisen from a fraudulent determination not to know,- an obstinate exclusion of knowledge it was his duty to have acquired; and if his personal ignorance could be proved, it would not form even an equitable defense. He is, therefore, very justly precluded from denying his knowledge of what it is morally impossible he should have been ignorant, except for a fraudulent intent. (Duer, On Insurance, vol. 1, p. 660; The