336; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 7, § 4; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 11; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 5, ch. 1; Heffter, Droit International, § 149.)

§15. The next question to be considered, is, whether neutrals may assist a belligerent by money, in the shape of a loan or otherwise, without violating the duties or departing from the position of neutrality? It seems to be universally conceded, that if such loan be made for the manifest purpose of enabling the belligerent to carry on the war, it would be a virtual concurrence in the war, and consequently a just cause of complaint by the opposite party. But Vattel contends that the loaning of money to one belligerent, by the subjects of a neutral state, is not such a breach of neutrality as to be either a cause of war or of complaint, provided the loan is made for the purpose of getting good interest, and not for the purpose of enabling one belligerent to attack the other. Phillimore very properly regards this as a manifest frittering away of the important duties of the neutral; and that it is as much a violation of neutral duty to furnish the one as the other of the

two main nerves, iron and gold,"

for the equipage and conduct of the war. The English courts have decided that such laws are in violation of international law, and that they will take no notice of, or render any assistance in, any transactions growing out of such loans, unless raised with the special license of the crown. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 7, § 110; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 151; De Wurtz v. Hendricks, 9 Moore Rep., p. 586; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 7, § 3; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 5, ch. 1; Heffter, Droit International, § 148; Wolfius, Jus. Gentium, § 683; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 2, tit. 1, ch. 2, § 199.)

§ 16. Armed cruisers, in neutral ports, are not only bound not to violate the peace while within neutral jurisdiction, but they cannot use the asylum as a shelter from which to make an attack upon the enemy. Hence, if an armed vessel of one belligerent should depart from a neutral port, no armed vessel, being within the same, and belonging to an adverse belligerent power, can depart until twenty-four hours after the

former, without being deemed to have violated the law of nations. And if any attempt at pursuit be made, the neutral is justified in resorting to force, to compel respect to the sanctity of its neutrality. (Kent, On Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 122; Azuni, Droit Maritime, tome 2, eh. 5; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 7, § 13; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 310, et seq.; Molloy, De Jur. Mar. et Nav., lib. 1, cap. 3, § 7; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer., tome 2, ch. 8; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 17; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 6, ch. 1; Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises Maritimes, tit. 1, ch. 1, sec. 3; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 13.)

§ 17. If a belligerent cruiser, in acting offensively, passes over a portion of water within neutral jurisdiction, that fact is not usually considered such a violation of the territory as to invalidate an ulterior capture made beyoud it. Permission to pass over territorial portions of the sea is not usually required or asked, because not supposed to result in any inconvenience to the neutral power. For example, in a war between England and Russia, belligerent vessels must pass. the sound over which Denmark claims and exercises imperial rights. So in a war between France and Russia, armed vessels might be obliged to pass through the neutral waters of the Dardanelles; but in neither of these cases would the passage be deemed a violation of neutral rights, nor would a capture by either power be invalidated by the fact of such passage, animo capiendi, to the place where his right of capture could be exercised. "Where a free passage," says Sir William Scott, "is generally enjoyed, notwithstanding a claim of territory may exist for certain purposes, no violation of territory is committed, if the party, after an inoffensive passage, conducted in the usual manner, begins an act of hostility in open ground. In order to have an invalidating effect, it must at least be either an unpermitted passage over territory where permission is regularly requested, or a passage under permission obtained under false representation and suggestions of the purpose designed. In either of these cases there might be an original malfeasance and trespass that traveled throughout and contaminated the whole, but if nothing of this sort can be objected, I am of opinion that a capture,

otherwise legal, is in no degree affected by a passage over territory in itself otherwise legal and permitted." (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 119; The Twee Gebroeders, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 354; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 8; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 7, § 6; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 17.)

§ 18. Such are the general prohibitions, recognized and established by the laws of nations, against any positive or even approximate acts of war in neutral territory. We are not aware that any modern writer on international law has questioned the soundness of the principle upon which they are founded. Moreover, the extent of a nation's sovereign rights depends, in some measure, upon its municipal laws, and other powers are bound, not only to abstain from violating such laws, but to respect the policy of them. The municipal laws of a state, for the protection of the integrity of its soil and the sanctity of its neutrality, are sometimes even more stringent than the general laws of war; the right of a sovereign state to impose such restrictions and prohibitions, consistent with the general policy of neutrality, as it may see fit, is undeniable. And all acts of the officers of a belligerent power against the municipal law of the neutral state, or in violation of its policy, involves that government in responsibility for their conduct. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 123; Marcy's Correspondence, etc., on Recruiting, p. 50; Valin, Com. sur l'Ordonnance, t. 2, p. 274; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 8; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 149– 150; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 6, ch. 1; Azuni, Droit Maritime, tome 2, ch. 5.)

§ 19. The congress of the United States have, by statutes, made suitable provision for the support and due observance of the rules of strict neutrality within American territorial jurisdiction. By the law of June 5th, 1794, revised April 20th, 1818, it is declared to be a misdemeanor for any citizen of the United States, within the territory or jurisdiction thereof, to accept and exercise a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, in war, by land or by sea, against any prince, state, colony, district or people, with whom the United States are at peace, or to enlist, or enter himself, or hire or retain another person to

enlist, or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States, with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, etc.; or to fit out and arm, or to increase and augment the force of any armed vessel, with the intent that such vessel be employed in the service of any foreign power at war with another power, with whom we are at peace; or to begin, set on foot, or provide, or prepare, the means for any military expedition, or enterprise, against the territory of any foreign prince, or state, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom we are at peace. And any vessel, or vessels, fitted out for such purpose is made subject to forfeiture. The President of the United States is also authorized to employ force to compel any foreign vessel to depart, which, by the law of nations, or by treaty, ought not to remain within the United States, and to employ the public force generally in euforcing the observance of the duties of neutrality prescribed by law. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 123; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 17; U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 1, p. 381; vol. 3, p. 447; Dunlop, Laws of the United States, pp. 580–583; The Gran Para, 7 Wheaton Rep., p. 489; The United States v. Quincy, 6 Peters Rep., pp. 445-467; The Alerta, 9 Cranch. Rep., p. 364; The Estrella, 4 Wheaton Rep., p. 309; Legare, Opinions U. S. Att'ys Genl., vol. 3, pp. 738, 741; Johnson, Id., vol. 5, p. 92.)

§ 20. The example of the United States was followed by Great Britain, and the act of 59 George III., chapter sixtynine, commonly called the foreign enlistment act, was passed, supplying the defect of former laws, and extending the prohibition to those who entered the service of unacknowledged, as well as acknowledged, states. The previous statutes of 9 and 29 George II., which were enacted for the purpose of preventing the formation of Jacobite armies in France and Spain, annexed capital punishment as for a felony, to the offense of entering the service of a foreign state. The foreign enlistment act of 1819, provided a less severe punishment, and introduced after the words "king, prince, state, or potentate," the words, "colony or district assuming the powers of government." This act was thoroughly discussed in parliament in 1823, on a motion for its repeal. (Kent,

Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 123; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 17; Annual Register, vol. 51, p. 71; Canning's Speeches, vol. 4, p. 151; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 146; Alison, Hist. of Europe, second series, ch. 4, §§ 96, et seq.)

§ 21. It is not only the right of the neutral state to protect the property of the belligerents, when within the neutral jurisdiction, but it is a part of the duty of neutrality to defend such property while under neutral protection, and to punish any and every offense against the rights of neutrality, even, if necessary, by a resort to force. Livy relates that Syphax enforced peace between the Carthagenian and Roman gallies while lying in a neutral port. The Venetians prevented the Greeks from attacking the Turks in the neutral port of Chalcocondylas. The same may be said of the Venetians and Turks at Tunis, of the Pisans and Genoese in Sicily, and numerous other cases mentioned in history. The Dutch East India fleet having put into Bergen, in Norway, in 1666, to avoid the English, were attacked by them; but the governor of Bergen fired on the assailants, and the court of Denmark complained to the English government of the violation of its sovereignity. England having declared her neutrality between Don Miguel and Donna Maria, in 1828, sent a naval force to intercept the Portuguese armament in its destination to the island Terceira, because it had been fitted out in disguise, and had sailed from Plymouth. It is a well established principle of the law of nations that if the property of belligerents, when within the neutral jurisdiction, be attacked, or any capture made, the neutral is bound to redress the injury and effect restitution. In the year 1793, the British ship Grange was captured in Delaware bay by a French frigate, and, upon due complaint, the American government caused the British ship to be promptly restored. So, in the case of The Anna, captured by a British cruiser in 1805, near the mouth of the Mississippi, and within the jurisdiction of the United States, the British court of admiralty not only restored the captured property, but fully asserted and vindicated the sanctity of neutral territory by a decree of costs and damages against the captor. If a neutral state neglects to make such restitution, and to enforce the sanctity of its territory, but tamely submits to the outrages of one of