strance on the part of the United States. It was said, that if, upon a full investigation of all the facts, it should appear that the owner of the vessel had been governed by a hostile intent, or had made common cause with the occupants of Navy Island, the United States would prosecute no claim to indemnity for the destruction of this boat; but that the lawfulness, or unlawfulness of the employment in which the "Caroline" was engaged, however settled, in no manner involved the higher consideration of the violation of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. In the discussion which followed, Mr. Webster, while claiming absolute immunity of neutral territory against aggression from either of the belligerents, admitted that the necessity of self-defense might justify hostility in the territory of a neutral power; but that it was required of the English government, as the aggressor in this case, "to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelmning, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it." Lord Ashburton agreed with Mr. Webster, on the inviolability of neutral or independent territory, and on the possible exception to which that principle was liable — the necessity of self-defense, as the first law of our nature,— and that the suspension of that great principle "must be for the shortest possible period, during the continuance of an admitted overruling necessity, and strictly confined within the narrowest limits imposed by that necessity." He, however, contended that there was "that necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation," which preceded the destruction of the Caroline while moored to the shore of the United States, that it must be admitted that there was, in the hurried execution of the necessary seizure, a violation of territory," and that it was "to be regretted that some explanation and apology for this occurrence was not immediately made" to the United States, by the British government. These acknowledgments and assurances were received as satisfactory by

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the United States, and the subject was not further discussed by the two governments. (Webster, Dip. and Off. Papers, pp. 112-120; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, §38.)

§ 9. A neutral state, by virtue of its general right of police over its ports, harbors and coasts, may impose such restrictions upon belligerent vessels, which come within its jurisdiction, as may be deemed necessary for its own neutrality and peace, and so long as such restrictions are impartially imposed upon all the belligerent powers, neither can have any right to complain. This right is frequently exercised in prohibiting all armed cruisers with prizes to enter such neutral ports and waters, and, even without prizes, to obtain provisions and supplies. This usage is shown by marine ordinances and text writers of different nations. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 123, 125; Bynkershoek, Quaest Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 15; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 387; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 146-150; Ortolan, Diplomatie de Mer, tome 2, ch. 8; Bello, Droit International, pt. 2, cap. 7, §6; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 6, ch. 2.)

§ 10. This restriction, imposed by neutrals upon the vessels of belligerents which come into their ports, is never extended to deny the rights of hospitality in case of immediate danger and want. Armed cruisers may anchor within a neutral port as a shelter from the attacks of an enemy, to avoid the dangers of a storm, or to supply themselves with water, provisions, and other articles of pressing necessity. Asylum, to this extent, is required by the common laws of humanity, to be afforded to belligerent vessels in neutral ports. But beyond this, there is no right of asylum which the neutral may not withold equally from all belligerents. It may prevent any free communication with the land, and, as soon as such vessels have supplied their immediate wants, the neutral may compel them to depart from its jurisdiction. Such were the restrictions imposed by the king of the Two Sicilies in the wars of 1740 and 1756, and by Sardinia in the war of 1778, and they are supported by the authority of text-writers. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 120, 121; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 14; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 15; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 387; Heffler, Droit International, §§ 146-150; Bello, Derecho

Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 7, §§ 5, 6; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 6, ch. 2; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer., tome 2, ch. 8.)

§ 11. But while the neutral state may, by proclamation or otherwise, prohibit belligerent vessels with prizes or prisoners of war from entering its ports, the absence of any such prohibition implies the right to enter for the purposes indicated, and any vessel so entering neutral waters, retains her right of ex-territoriality, both with respect to her prisoners of war and her prizes. This question was raised in the port of San Francisco, California, in the case of the Russian vessel, The Sitka, a prize of the British navy, during the Crimean war. (Cushing, Opin. U. S. Att'ys Genl., vol. 7, p. 123; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 387; Loccenius, de Jure Maritime, lib. 2, cap. 4, § 7; Hubner, Saisie de Batiments, liv. 2, ch. 2, § 8; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 312; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 8; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 146150; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 6, ch. 2.)

§12. The armed cruisers of belligerents, while within the jurisdiction of a neutral state, are bound to abstain from any acts of hostility toward the subjects, vessels or other property of their enemies; they cannot increase their guns or military stores, or augment their crews, not even by the enrollment of their own countrymen; they can employ neither force nor stratagem to recover prizes, or to rescue prisoners in the possession of the enemy; nor can they use a neutral port, or waters within neutral jurisdiction, either for the purpose of hindering the approach of vessels of any nation whatever, or for the purpose of attacking those which depart from the ports or shores of neutral powers. No proximate acts of war, such as a ship stationing herself within the neutral line, and sending out her boats on hostile enterprises, can, in any manner, be allowed to originate in neutral terri tory; nor can any measure be taken that will lead to immediate violence. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, § 16; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 118; Azuni, Droit Maritime, tome 2, ch. 5; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 312; Chitty's Com. Law, vol. 1, pp. 441-444; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, ch. 8; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 7, §§ 5, 6; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 146-150; The

Twee Gebroeders, 3 Rob. Rep., p. 163; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 17; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 6, ch. 1; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 13.)

13. Publicists make a marked distinction between the duties of neutrals, with respect to the asylum which may be afforded to belligerent ships, and that which may be afforded to belligerent forces on land. This difference, says Heffter, results from the immunity of the flag, and the principle that ships are considered as a portion of the territory of the nation to which they belong. Hence the allowable custom of asylum in neutral waters, and the want of power in the neutral to interfere with internal organization of such vessels, when not armed or equipped within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, troops are not a part of the territory of the nation to which they belong, nor has their flag any immunity on neutral soil. While, therefore, individuals, as such, are entitled, by the laws of humanity, to the right of asylum in neutral territory, such asylum cannot be demanded by, nor can it be granted, without a violation of neutral duty, to an army as a a body. It is, consequently, the duty of the neutral to order the immediate disarming of all belligerent troops which enter neutral territory as an asylum, to cause them to release all their prisoners, and to restore all booty which they may bring with them. If he neglect to do this, he makes his own territory the theatre of war, and justifies the other belligerent in attacking such refugees within such territory, which is no longer to be regarded as neutral. (Heffter, Droit International, § 149; Martens, Droit des Gens, § 307; Kluber, Droit des Gens, § 208, note b; Ortolan, Diplomatie de Mer., liv. 3, ch. 8; Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises Maritimes, tit. 1, ch. 1, sec. 3; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 6, ch. 2; Wheaton, Elem. Int., Law, pt. 4, ch. 3, §§ 6, 7; Pando, Derecho Internacional, p. 465; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 7, § 5; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 17; De Steck, Versuch, oeber Handels, etc., p. 173; Putman, De Jure recipiendi hostes, etc.)

§ 14. At the commencement of the European war, in 1793, the government of the United States took strong grounds against the arming and equipping of vessels within the ports of the United States, by the respective belligerent powers, to

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cruise against each other, declaring such acts to be a violation of neutral rights, and positively unlawful; and that any vessel, so armed or equipped in our ports, for military service, was not entitled to the rights of asylum. The authority of Wolfius, Vattel and other writers on the law and usage of nations, were appealed to, in support of these declarations and rules of neutrality. The ground then assumed by the United States is now generally admitted to be correct. The same objection was made by the United States, in the war of 1793, against the enlisting of men by the respective belligerent powers within our ports, and it was declared that if the neutral state might not, consistently with its neutrality, furnish men to either party for their aid in war, it was equally unlawful for either belligerent to enroll them in the neutral territory. Wolfius says that "it is not permitted to raise soldiers on the territory of another, without the consent of its sovereign." Vattel says that, "As the right of levying soldiers belongs solely to the nation or the sovereign, no person must attempt to enlist soldiers in a foreign country, without the permission of the sovereign. * The man who undertakes to enlist soldiers in a foreign country, without the sovereign's permission,— and, in general, whoever entices away the subjects of another state, violates one of the most sacred rights of the prince and the nation. This crime is distinguished by the name of kidnapping, or man-stealing, and is punished with the utmost severity in every well regulated state. Foreign recruiters are hanged without mercy, and with great justice. It is not presumed that their sovereign has ordered them to commit a crime, and, even supposing that they had received such an order, they ought not to have obeyed it, their sovereign having no right to command what is contrary to the law of nature. If it appear that they acted by order, such a proceeding in a foreign sovereign is justly considered as an injury, and as sufficient cause for declaring war against him, unless he make a suitable reparation." (Wolfius, Jus. Gentium, § 754; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 2, § 15; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 22; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 142, et seq.; Ward, Hist. Law of Nations, vol. 2, p. 291; Manning, Law of Nations, pp. 170, et seq.; Nelson, Opinions U. S. Att'ys Genl., vol. 5, p.

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