the other for a certain destination; it being shown that the second was to be used only on the expiration of the first, the vessel was restored. In the case of La Fredricka, it was held, that the effect of documents was not to be determined by their title, but by their contents, and that, where the instruction du proprietoire to the captain contained everything that the charter-party, invoice, bill of lading and manifest, usually contain, it would serve as a substitute for them all. The character of the vessel, as friendly or neutral, must, as a general rule, be determined by the documents found aboard and the testimony of the captors, but in case of French vessels having similated enemy papers aboard for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, papers not on board have been admitted as evidence to exempt such vessel from confiscation, as was decided in the cases of Le Censor c. L'Enterprise and Les Deux Charlottes c. Le Filibustier. In the case of Le Jonge Cornelis c. L'Actif, et al., the vessel of an ally was allowed to prove her nationality, by documents not on board at the time of capture. In the case of the Swedish vessel L'Elenora, it was held that Lettres de franchise were a good substitute for the passport; and in the case of La Carolina Wilhelmina c. Le Dragon, it was held that, in the Baltic, a certificate of ownership would serve the same purpose. In Le Christiern-Swerin and La Paix c. Le General-Moreau, it was held that a neutral passport, to be available, must be renewed as often as the vessel returns to ports of her own country; but (in Le Quintus c. L'Epervier and La Bagatelle c. Le Basque) this rule does not apply to coasting-vessels or Levant-traders. In the case of La Constance c. Les Deux-Amis, where the passport was found to be null and void, the neutrality of the vessel was determined by other documents found aboard. Passports to vessels absent from the country at the time of their issue, are not, in general, available; vide Le Haabet c. L'Heureux, Le Munster Doris c. Le Brave, La Constance c. Les Deux-Amis, La Famille, Le Zenodore c. La Charitas; but vessels purchased by one neutral, in the ports of another neutral power, are exceptions to this rule, vide L'Engel-Elisabeth c. Le Bon-Ordre, et al., and L'Attention c. Le Deucalion; other special exceptions were made in the cases of La Notre-dame de Bon-Conseil c. Le Coureur, and L'Amitie c. Le Camus. A passport issued

by a public officer of a neutral state, residing in an enemy country, he being part owner, was held, in Le Wikilladge c. L'Emilie, to be null, and the vessel a good prize. A passport from America to Africa and back, is not available for trading voyages between Africa and Europe, and a passport for a neutral port is not good for an enemy's port; vide Le Frederic c. L'Ariege, and L'Ami de Boston c. La Bellone. A passport to a neutral vessel commanded by an enemy captain by birth, although naturalized a neutral after the declaration of war, especially where he had not been domiciled in neutral country; but where an enemy captain had long resided in the neutral country, he was to be regarded as neutral; vide L'Acteon c. Le Friendship, L'Arms c. La Mascarde, and Le Ruby c. Le Baugainville. Bills of lading signed by the shippers, but not by the captain, are available to prove the neutral character of goods, if the captain has signed the duplicate, delivered to the shippers; vide La Constance c. Les DeuxAmis, La Louise-Auguste c. Le Bonaparte, and L'Anna; it was, also, held, in the same cases, that the want of the captain's signature to the duplicates in his own hands, was no cause of capture, as he could have signed them at any time. Where the charter-party does not contain a manifest of the cargo, the bills of lading are necessary to prove its neutral character; vide L'Anna. Where there is no particular bill of lading for a part of the cargo, but the manifest has all the formalities required for bills of lading, it is to be regarded as a general bill of lading, and is sufficient to cover the whole cargo; vide Le Wilhelm c. Le Juste. (Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises, tit. 6, ch. 2, sec. 4; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 2, tit. 1, ch. 2, sec. 3; Merlin, Repertoire, verb. Prises Maritimes, § 3, arts. 3, 4; Dalloz, Repertoire, verb. Prises Maritimes, sec. 3; Pouget, Droit Maritime, tome 1, pp. 423, et seq.)

§ 22. Vessels of discovery, or of expeditions of exploration and survey, sent for the examination of unknown seas, islands, and coasts, are, by general consent, exempt from the contingencies of war, and therefore not liable to capture. Like the sacred vessel which the Athenians sent with their annual offerings to the temple of Delos, they are respected by all nations, because their labors are intended for the benefit of all mankind. Thus, when Captain Cook sailed

from Plymouth, in 1776, in the ship Resolution, accompanied by the Discovery, M. de Sartine, the French minister of marine, dispatched a letter to the admiralties and chambers of commerce throughout the kingdom, to be communicated to the owners and captains of vessels cruising as privateers or otherwise, directing them, in case they met at sea, to treat him and his vessels as neutrals and friends, provided that he, on his side, abstained from all hostility. This praiseworthy example has since been followed by all civilized powers toward vessels similarly employed. It is, however, usual and proper for the government sending out such expeditions, to give formal notice to other powers, describing the character and object of the expedition, the number of vessels employed, the nature of their armament, etc., in order that they may issue the proper instructions to their own vessels on the high seas. Such expeditions must confine themselves most strictly to the object in view; if they commit any act of hostility they forfeit their exemption from capture. (Emerigon, Traité des Assurances, ch. 12, sec. 19; Wilkes, Narrative U. S. Expl. Exp., vol. 1, p. xxix; Paulding, Instructions to Lieut. Wilkes, Aug. 11th, 1838.)

§ 23. Fishing-boats have, also, as a general rule, been exempted from the effects of hostilities. As early as 1521, while war was raging between Charles V. and Francis, ambassadors from these two sovereigns met at Calais, then English, and agreed, that, whereas the herring fishery was about to commence, the subjects of both belligerents engaged in this pursuit, should be safe and unmolested by the other party, and should have leave to fish as in time of peace. In the war of 1800, the British and French governments issued formal instructions exempting the fishing-boats of each other's subjects from seizure. This order was subsequently rescinded by the British government, on the alleged ground that some French fishing-boats were equipped as gun boats, and that some French fishermen, who had been prisoners in England, had violated their parole not to serve, and had gone to join the French fleet at Brest. Such excuses were evidently mere pretexts; and after some angry discussions had taken place on the subject, the British restriction was withdrawn, and the freedom of fishing was again allowed on

both sides. French writers consider this exemption as an established principle of the modern law of war, and it has been so recognized in the French courts, which have restored such vessels when captured by French cruisers. (Wildman, Law of Nations, p. 152; Dumont, Corps Dip., tome 4, p. 352; Martens, Recueil, etc., tome 6, pp. 503-515; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 36; liv. 2, ch. 20; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 2, tit. 1, § 333; Emerigon, Traité des Assurances, ch. 12, sec. 19.)

§ 24. Some have contended that the rule of exemption ought to extend to cases of shipwreck on a belligerent coast, to cases of forced refuge in a belligerent harbor by stress of weather, or want of provisions, and even to cases of entering such ports from ignorance of the war. There are exceptional cases where such exemption has been granted. Thus, when the English man-of-war the Elizabeth had been forced by stress of weather, in 1746, to take refuge in the belligerent port of Havana, the captain offered to surrender himself to the Spanish governor as prisoner, and his vessel as a prize, but the latter refused to take advantage of his distress; on the contrary, he offered him every facility for repairing his vessel, and, on leaving, gave him a safe conduct as far as the Bermudas. Again, in 1780, an English captain entered the Spanish port of San Fernando de Omoa, in Honduras, without knowing that it was belligerent. The Spanish commandant refused to take advantage of his ignorance, but permitted him to provision his ship and to sail unmolested to Jamaica. On the other hand, the French squadron which entered Louisburg, in the Island of Cape Breton, in 1745, ignorant of its hostile character, was captured as prizes, and its officers and crews retained as prisoners of war. The French captain Nalin, entered the port of Granada, in the Antilles, in the war of 1780, ignorant of its hostile character. He was immediately seized as prisoner of war, and his vessel as a good prize. In 1799 a Prussian vessel, La Diana, forced to take refuge in the port of Dunkirk, was restored by the French tribunal on the principle of res sacra miser; but in the analogous case of Maria Arendz, in 1800, the court condemned, in strict conformity with the French ordonnances. A court may be compelled by a sense of duty to condemn in such

cases, but the sovereign power of the state might well exercise its sense of humanity and generosity by restoring even after condemnation. Notwithstanding the plea raised by French writers in such cases that, "le malaheur opère de plein droit une trève," the principle is neither admitted by the general law of nations nor by the maritime ordonnances of France. (De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, §§ 33, 34; liv. 2, ch. 12; Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises, tit. 9, ch. 2, sec. 2; Ordonnance de 1681; Ordonnance de 1696, May 12th; Réglement de 1778, July 26th, arts. 14, 15; Arrête, de de 1800, March 27th, arts. 19, 20.)