404; Stewart's Vice-Adm. Rep., p. 482; Alison, Hist. of Europe, vol. 3, p. 42; Lee, Life of Napoleon, vol. 1; Scott, Life of Napoleon, vol. 3, pp. 58-68; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §25.)

§ 11. But whatever may be the decision of the question respecting the right of the conqueror to sieze or levy upon such works of art and taste, belonging to the hostile state, as come under the denomination of movable or personal property, it is the modern usage, and one which has acquired the force of law, that such works cannot be wantonly, or unnecessarily, destroyed, and that all structures of a civil character, all public edifices, devoted to civil purposes only, all temples of religion, monuments of art, and repositories of science, are to be exempt from the operations of war. "If the conqueror," says Kent, "makes war upon monuments of art and models of taste, he violates the modern usages of war, and is sure to meet with indignant resentment, and to be held up to the general scorn and detestation of the world." As examples under this head, we may refer to the conduct of the British forces, in 1814, in destroying the capitol, president's house, and other civil public buildings, and the naval monument at Washington, and that of Blucher, in 1815, in destroying the ornamental trees of Paris, and planning the destruction of the bridge of Jena, and the pillar af Austerlitz. (Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 6; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1. p. 93; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 6; American State Papers, vol. 3, pp. 693, 694; Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 30, pp. 526, 527; Alison, Hist. of Europe, vol. 4, p. 544; Cassefigue, Hist. de la Restoration, tome 2, pp. 362, 366; Gurmood, Despatches, etc., vol. 12, pp. 318, 518; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 4, § 6; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 12; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 7.)

§12. Private property on land, is now, as a general rule of war, exempt from seizure or confiscation; and this general exemption extends even to cases of absolute and unqualified conquest. Even where the conquest of a country is confirmed by the unconditional relinquishment of sovereignty by the former owner, there can be no general or partial transmutation of private property, in virtue of any rights of conquest. That which belonged to the government of the vanquished,

passes to the victorious state, which also takes the place of the former sovereign, in respect to the right of eminent domain; but private rights, and private property, both movable and immovable, are, in general, unaffected by the operations of a war, whether such operations be limited to mere military occupation, or extend to complete conquest. Some modern text-writers - Hautefeuille, for example,- contend for the ancient rule, that private property on land is subject to seizure and confiscation. They are undoubtedly correct with respect to the general abstract right, as deduced from the law of nature and ancient practice; but while the general right continues, modern usage, and the opinions of modern text-writers of the highest authority, have limited this right by establishing the rule of general exemption. The private property of a sovereign, is considered in the same light as that of any other individual. (Puffendorf, de Jure Nat. et Gent, lib. 8, ch. 6, § 20; Heffter, Droit International, § 133; Isambert, Annales Pol. et Dip. Int., p. 115; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 5; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, pp. 91-93; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 9, § 13; Kluber, Droit des Gens Mod., §§ 250-253; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 282; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 6; Dodsley, Ann. Reg., 1772, p. 37; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 135; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 4, §§ 3, 6; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 12; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 7, ch. 1.)

§13. But it must also be remembered that there are many exceptions to this rule, or rather, that the rule itself is not, by any means, absolute or universal. The general theory of war is, as heretofore stated, that all private property may be taken by the conqueror, and such was the ancient practice. But the modern usage is, not to touch private property on land, without making compensation, except in certain specified cases. These exceptions may be stated under three general heads: 1st, confiscations or seizures by way of penalty for military offenses; 2d, forced contributions for the support of the invading armies, or as an indemnity for the expenses of maintaining order, and affording protection to the conquered inhabitants; and 3d, property taken on the field of battle, or in storming a fortress or town. (Kent, Com. on Am.

Law, vol. 1, p. 92; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 8, §§ 147, 165; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 6; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 279, 280; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 136; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 4, §§ 3, 4; Heffter, Droit International, § 131; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 7. ch. 1.)

§ 14. In the first place, we may seize upon private property, by way of penalty for the illegal acts of individuals, or of the community to which they belong. Thus, if an individual be guilty of conduct in violation of the laws of war, we may seize and confiscate the private property of the offender. So also, if the offense attach itself to a particular community or town, all the individuals of that community or town are liable to punishment, and we may either seize upon their property, or levy upon them a retaliatory contribution, by way of penalty. Where, however, we can discover and secure the individuals so offending, it is more just to inflict the punishment upon them only; but it is a general law of war, that communities are accountable for the acts of their individual members. This makes it the interest of all to discover the guilty persons, and to deliver them up to justice. But if these individuals are not given up, or cannot be discovered, it is usual to impose a contribution upon the civil authorities of the place where the offense is committed, and these authorities raise the amount of the contribution by a tax levied upon their constituents. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 92; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 8, § 147; ch. 9, § 165; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 6; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 279, 280; Manning, Law of Nations, pp. 134-136; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 4, §§ 3, 4; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 12; Scott, Proclamation in Mexico, April 11th, 1847; Cong. Doc., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Ex. Doc. No. 56,

p. 127.)

§ 15. In the second place we have a right to make the enemy's country contribute to the expenses of the war. Troops, in the enemy's country, may be subsisted either by regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized pillage. It is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign. Where this cannot be done, the general is obliged either to resort to military requi

sitions, or to entrust their subsistence to the troops themselves. The inevitable consequences of the latter system are universal pillage, and a total relaxation of discipline; the loss of private property, and the violation of individual rights, are usually followed by the massacre of straggling parties, and the ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and implacable enemies. The system is, therefore, regarded as both impolitic and unjust, and is coming into general disuse among the most civilized nations,—at least for the support of the main army. In case of small detachments, where great rapidity of motion is requisite, it sometimes becomes necessary for the troops to procure their subsistance wherever they can. In such a case, the seizure of private property becomes a necessary consequence of the military operations, and is, therefore, unavoidable. Other cases, of similar character might be mentioned. But even in most of these special and extreme cases, provisions might be made for subsequently compensating the owners for the loss of their property. (Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 6; Jomini, Tableau Analytique, ch. 2, sec. 1, art. 13; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 92; Halleck, Elem. Mil. Art and ·Science, ch. 4, pp. 90, 91; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 280; Marning, Law of Nations, p. 136; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 6, § 12; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 4, §§ 3, 4; Heffter, Droit International, § 131; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int. lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 12; Scott, General Orders, No. 358, Nov. 25th, 1847; Scott, General Orders, No. 395, Dec. 31st, 1847.)

§ 16. In the invasion of the Spanish peninsula, Napoleon had to choose between methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the inhabitants, and regularly paid for, and irregular warfare, supplying his troops by forced requisitions and pillage. The former was adopted for some of the main armies, moving on prescribed lines, and the latter for the more active masses. Soult and Suchet, in favorable parts of the country, succeeded for a considerable length of time, in procuring regular supplies for their armies, but most of the French generals obtained subsistance for their troops mainly by pillage. Napoleon, at St. Helena, attributed most of his disasters to the animosities thus created among the Spanish people.

(Napoleon, Memoires of St. Helena; Napier Peninsular War, b. 24, ch. 6; Jomini, Tableau Analytique, ch. 2, sec. 1; Halleck, Mil. Art and Science, p. 91.)

§ 17. Upon the invasion of Mexico by the armies of the United States, in 1846, the commanding generals were, at first, instructed to abstain from appropriating private property to the public use without purchase, at a fair price; but subsequently, instructions of a severer character were issued. It was said by the American secretary of war (Mr. Marcy) that an invading army had the unquestionable right to draw its supplies from the enemy without paying for them, and to require contributions for its support, and to make the enemy feel the weight of the war. He further observed, that upon the liberal principles of civilized warfare, either of three modes might be pursued to obtain supplies from the enemy; first, to purchase them in open market at such prices as the inhabitants of the country might choose to exact; second, to pay the owners a fair price, without regard to what they themselves might demand, on account of the enhanced value resulting from the presence of a foreign army; and, third, to require them, as contributions, without paying, or engaging to pay therefor. The last mode was, thereafter to be adopted, if the general was satisfied that in that way he could get abundant supplies for his forces. There can be no doubt of the correctness of the rules of war, as here announced by the American secretary, but the resort to forced contributions for the support of our armies in a country like Mexico, under the particular circumstances of the war, would have been, at least, impolitic, if not unjust, and the American generals very properly declined to adopt, except to a very limited extent, the mode indicated. It would undoubtedly have led to innumerable insurrections and massacres, without any corresponding advantages in obtaining supplies for the American forces. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 92, note; Mr. Marcy's Letter to Gen. Taylor, Sept. 22d, 1846; To Gen. Scott, April 3d, 1847; Cong. Doc., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Ex. Doc., No. 1, p. 563; Scott to Marcy, May 20th, 1847; Cong. Doc., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., H. R., Ex. Doc. No. 60, p. 963; Mason to Gen. Scott, Sept. 1st, 1847; Marcy to Gen. Scott, Oct. 6th,