power; but its own constitution, or internal laws, must determine by what particular branch of the government this right is to be exercised. When, in 1569, the Prince of Orange issued letters of marque to the gentleman and others, who became so notorious as the Gueux de Mer, many of them were punished as pirates; "not so much," says Martens, "on account of their excesses, as because it was not thought that the Prince of Orange had power to grant such letters of marque." The authority which grants the commission determines what limits shall be imposed upon the exercise by the privateer of belligerent rights; and, if such vessel exceed the limits of its commission, and commit acts of hostility not warranted by the letter which it carries, if such acts be not in violation of the laws of war, it is responsible to and punishable by the state alone from which the commission was issued. "A vessel," says Phillimore, "which takes a commission from both belligerents is guilty of piracy, for one authority conflicts with the other. But a nicer question has arisen with respect to a vessel which sails under two or more commissions granted by allied powers against a common enemy. The better opinion seems to be, that such practice is irregular and inexpedient, but does not carry with it the substance or name of piracy." Kent does not make this distinction, but states the proposition in general terms, "that a cruiser, furnished with commissions from two different powers, is liable to be treated as a pirate." Hautefeuille says, that if a privateer receives commissions from two sovereigns, she is to be treated as a pirate, "even when the letters of marque emanate from two princes allied for a common war." Another question to be noticed, is, what is the character of a vessel of a neutral state, armed as a privateer, with a commission from one of the belligerents? Phillimore says: "That such a vessel is guilty of a gross infraction of international law, that she is not entitled to the liberal treatment of a vanquished enemy, is wholly unquestionable; but it would be difficult to maintain that the character of piracy has been stamped upon such a vessel by the decision of international law." Kent is of opinion that the law of the United States, which declares such an act a high misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, to be "in affirmance of the law of nations."

Ortolan thinks that such an act is not piracy in international law, but that it ought to be made so. Hautefeuille is of opinion that they are not to be treated as pirates, unless made so by interior laws or treaty stipulations of the neutral state. We have already alluded to the recent internal laws and instructions of European states on this question, and will only add here, that, by the law of Plymouth colony, in 1682, it was declared to be felony to commit hostilities on the high seas, under the flag of any foreign power, upon the subjects of another power in amity with England; and the same acts were declared to be felony by the law of the colony of New York, in 1699. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 100; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 358; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 10, note a.; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub. liv. 1, cap. 17; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 15, § 229; Kluber, Droit des Gens, § 260; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 11; Hautefeuille, Des Nacions Neutres, tit. 3, ch. 2; Duponceau, Translation of Bynkershoek, p. 129; Bailre, Historical Memoirs, vol. 2, pt. 4, § 35; Smith, Laws of the Colony of N. Y., vol. 1, p. 25; Manning, Law of Nations, p. 114; Abreu, Tratado de las Presas, pt. 2, cap. 1, §§ 7, 8; Martens, Essai sur les Armateurs, ch. 2, § 14; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 2, tit. 1, ch. 2.)

§ 16. Some states have covenanted, in their treaty stipulations, that they will prevent their subjects, under heavy penalties, from accepting commissions or letters of marque from other states. Such was the character of the treaty of September 26th, 1786, between France and England. In other treaties, it is stipulated that no subject, or citizen of either of the contracting powers, shall accept a commission or letter of marque to assist an enemy in hostilities against the other, under pain of being treated as a pirate. Such is the character of the treaties entered into between the United States and France, Holland, Sweden, Prussia, Great Britain, Spain, Columbia, Chile, etc. Some of these treaties, however, have expired without this provision being renewed in any subsequent treaty. It may be remarked, that whatever be thought of the character, in international law, of a neutral vessel taking a commission from a belligerent, the other belligerent is justified in treating such vessel as a pirate, when it is so stipulated in a treaty with the neutral state, or

when the laws of the neutral state declare such acts to be piracy. This case is readily distinguishable from that in which the slave trade is made piracy by the municipal law of a particular state, for such trade is not considered as prohibited by the law of nations. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 4, ch. 2, § 10, note a; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 100; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 358; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. 3, ch. 2; U. S. Statutes at Large, vol. 8, passim.; Martens, Recueil de Traités, vol. 4, p. 156; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 11; Hauterive et De Cussy, Receuil des Traités, tome 2, p. 88; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 21.)

§ 17. The implements of war, which may be lawfully used against an enemy, are not confined to those which are openly employed to take human life, as swords, lances, firearms and cannon; but also include secret and concealed means of destruction, as pits, mines, etc. So, also, of new inventions and military machinery of various kinds; we are not only justifiable in employing them against the enemy, but also, if possible, of concealing from him their use. The general effect of such inventions and improvements is thus described by a distinguished American statesman: "Every great discovery in the art of war, has a life-saving and peacepromoting influence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder are a familiar proof of this remark, and the same principle applies to the discoveries of modern times. By perfecting ourselves in military science-paradoxical as it may seem we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace, and hastening the approach of that period when 'swords shall be beaten into ploughshares, and spears into pruning-hooks; when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."" The same views are expressed by Ortolan and other recent writers on the laws and usages of war. At one period, however, it was considered contrary to the rules of military honor and etiquette to make use of unusual implements of war. Thus, the French vice-admiral, Marshal Conflans, issued an order of the day, on the 8th of November, 1759, forbidding the use of hollow shot against the enemy, on the ground that they were not generally employed by polite nations, and that the French ought to fight according to the rules of honor. The

same view was taken of the use of hot shot, grape, chainshot, split balls, etc. (De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 2, § 24; Kluber, Droit des Gens. Mod., § 244; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 273; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 94; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 2, § 6; Butler, B. F., Address on the Military Profession, p. 25; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 3, ch. 1; Heffter, Droit International, § 125.)

§ 18. But while the laws of war allow the use of new invention of arms, or other means of destruction, against the life and property of an enemy, there is a limit to this rule beyond which we cannot go. It is necessity alone that justifies us in making war and in taking human life, and there is no necessity for taking the life of an enemy who is disabled, or for inflicting upon him injuries which in no way contribute to the decision of the contest. Hence, we are forbidden to use poisoned weapons, for these add to the cruelty and calamities of a war, without conducing to its termination. We may wound an enemy in order to disable him, but, when so disabled, we have no right to take his life; we, therefore, cannot introduce poison into that wound so as, subsequently, to cause his death. "It is, therefore, with good reason,' says Vattel, "and in conformity with their duty, that civilized nations have classed, among the laws of war, the maxim which prohibits the poisoning of arms." (Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §§ 24, 25; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 8, § 156; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 3, cap. 4, § 16; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, liv. 3, ch. 1; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 94; De Felice, Droit de la Nat, etc., tome 2, lec. 25; Heffter, Droit International, § 125; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Burlamaqui, Droit de Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 6; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 6, § 4; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 2, § 24.)

§ 19. The practice of poisoning wells, springs, waters, or any kind of food, for the purpose of injuring an enemy, is now also universally condemned. In addition to the reasons given for prohibiting the use of poisoned weapons, there is the additional one, that, by poisoning waters and food, we may destroy innocent persons, and non-combatants. The practice

is, therefore, condemned by all civilized nations, and any state or general who should resort to such means, would be regarded as an enemy to the human race, and excluded from civilized society. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 8, § 157; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 3, cap. 4, § 17; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, §§ 24, 25; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome 2, liv. 3, ch. 1; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 6, § 7; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit Nat., etc., liv. 3, ch. 4; Heffter, Droit International, § 125; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 6; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 3, § 24.)

§ 20. The same may be said of assassination, or treacherously taking the life of an enemy. Not unfrequently the success of a campaign, or even the termination of the war, depends upon the life of the sovereign, or of the commanding general. Hence, in former times, it sometimes happened that a resolute person was induced to steal into the enemy's camp, under the cover of a disguise, and, having penetrated to the general's quarters, to surprise and kill him. Such an act is now deemed infamous and execrable, both in him who executes, and in him who commands, encourages, or rewards it. The consuls, Caius Fabricus and Quintus Æmilius, rejected, with horror, the proposal of Pyrrhus' physician, to poison his master, and cautioned that prince to be on his guard against the traitor. The proposal of the prince of the Catti, to destroy Arminius, was rejected, although Arminius had treacherously cut off Varus, together with three Roman legions, both the senate and Tiberius deeming it unlawful to poison even a perfidious enemy. It was on the same principle that Alexander formed his judgment of Bessus, who had assassinated Darius. During the middle ages, however, war degenerated into cruelty and barbarism, and poisons and assassinations were frequently resorted to. The assassination of William, prince of Orange, by the Spaniards, in the war of the Netherlands, is now regarded with universal detestation. But this detestation of the civilized world is not confined to the perpetrators of such acts; those who command, encourage, countenance, or reward them, are equally execrated. And a government, or a general, who should neglect to punish a subject, or a subordinate, for such