she fulfils her duties toward herself, without violating those which she owes to other nations. The sovereign, who, by inheritance, by free election, or by any other just and honorable means, enlarges his dominions by the addition of new provinces, or entire kingdoms, only makes use of his right without injuring any person. How then can it be lawful to attack a state which, for its aggrandizement, makes use only of lawful means? * * On the other hand, it is but too well known, from sad and uniform experience, that predominating powers seldom fail to molest their neighbors, to oppress them, and even totally subjugate them, whenever an opportunity occurs, and they can do it with impunity. Europe was on the point of falling into servitude for want of a timely opposition to the growing fortune of Charles V. Is the danger to be waited for? Are we to allow the aggrandizement of a neighbor, and quietly wait till he makes his preparations to enslave us? Will it be a time to defend ourselves when we are deprived of the means? Prudence is a duty incumbent on all men, and most pointedly so on the heads of nations as being commisioned to watch over the safety of the whole people." Having thus stated both sides of the question, he proceeds to give us the following solution. Since war is justifiable only where we have actually suffered an injury, or are visibly threatened with one, the increase of power in a neighbor cannot, alone and of itself, give us a right, under the law of nations, to take up arms in order to oppose it. But power alone does not threaten an injury, it must be accompanied by the will to do an injury, and that will must be clearly manifested, before we can resort to so terrible an expedient. If the state, receiving a formidable accession of power, has given proofs of injustice, rapacity, pride, ambition, or an imperious thirst of rule, she becomes an object of just suspicion to her neighbors, whose duty it is to stand on their guard against her. Moreover, they may demand securities, and if she refuses to give any, this may constitute additional evidence that she meditates injury. And when this design is clearly and unmistakably manifest, and all other modes of warding off the threatened danger fail, war becomes inevitable. (De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, §§ 42–49; Grotius,

de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, caps. 22-25; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 9, § 11.)

§ 9. Grotius not only declares, as unjustifiable, a war undertaken through a "fear of our neighbor's increasing strength," without a moral certainty that such strength will be used to our injury, but is of opinion that, in all dubious questions, we are bound to resort to milder means to settle difficulties and remove apprehensions. He enumerates several causes which had been deemed sufficient to justify a declaration of war, and most of them as entirely unsatisfactory, and concludes that, "war is a matter of the weightiest importance, and by it the innocent suffer a great many afflictions, and, therefore, peace should be the end at which all our councils ought to aim." (Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, caps. 22, 23; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens; tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 2; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 3, § 48, Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2. cap. 1, § 3.)

§ 10. The remarks of Chancellor Kent, upon this question, are equally just and appropriate. He adopts the opinions of Grotius, and "condemns the doctrine, that war may be undertaken to weaken the power of a neighbor, under the apprehension that its further increase may render him dangerous. This would be contrary to justice, unless we were morally certain, not only of a capacity, but of an actual intention to injure us. We ought rather to meet the anticipated danger by a dilligent cultivation and prudent management of our own resources. We ought to conciliate the respect and good will of other nations, and secure their assistance, in case of need, by the benevolence and justice of our conduct. War is not to be resorted to without absolute necessity, nor unless peace would be more dangerous and more miserable than war itself." (Kent, Com. On Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 48; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 5, cap. 22; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 2, § 48; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12.)

§ 11. As has already been remarked, it is not sufficient, in the forum of conscience, that we have just grounds for war, or that its objects are justifiable; we must, also, have good and proper motives for undertaking it. Thus, we may have received injuries, and suffered aggressions from another nation, which would, in themselves, have constituted good and

sufficient reasons for declaring war against it, but, through fear or policy, we have not done so. In the meantime, the state from which we received the injury may have been so humbled or reduced as to be utterly unable, either to repeat the aggression, or to recompense us for the harm it formerly did us. What motive have we now for declaring war against that state? Solely that of revenge, which can be considered neither good nor proper. The motives of a war are divided, as already stated, into two classes: 1st, Commendable, and 2d, Vicious. (Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 6, § 5; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 7; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 29; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 3; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 2; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21.)

§ 12. Commendable motives are derived from the good of the state and the protection of the people. If the motive for the war is to prevent an injury, or to repair one by obtaining a just satisfaction, or to provide for our future safety by obtaining a reparation for an injury done, or to recover a right of which we have been unjustly deprived, it is both proper and commendable. And when a war is undertaken from such a motive, and for a justifiable cause, we have not only justice on our side, but the sympathies of all good men,

for

"Thrice is he armed who has his quarrel just."

But although a war might be undertaken for commendable motives, the motives of its continuance may be very different. It may be commenced to prevent or repair an injury, but continued for the purposes of revenge or conquest. Thus, the Samnites had given Rome just cause of war by ravaging the lands of her allies. But when the former had offered full reparation for the damages, and every reasonable satisfaction, the latter, bent on conquest, refused to accept the offers of the Samnites, or to be appeased by their submissions. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, $$ 30, 36; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, ch. 3, § 23; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 2, § 14.)

§ 13. Vicious motives are not derived from the good of the state or the protection of its citizens, but from the sugges

tions of evil passions. Such are the motives which spring from unbridled and wicked ambition,-the arrogant desire for command, the ostentation of power, the thirst for riches, the avidity of conquest, from jealousy, hatred and revenge. In the words of Vattel: "If a nation, on an injury done to her, is induced to take up arms, not by the necessity of procuring a just reparation, but by a vicious motive, she abuses her right. The viciousness of the motive tarnishes the lustre of her arms, which might otherwise have shown as the cause of justice; the war is not undertaken for the lawful cause, which the nation had to undertake in it; that cause is now no more than a pretext." (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, §§ 30, 31; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4,.ch. 2; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit, etc., liv. 3, ch. 1, § 3.)

§ 14. Pretexts are the reasons which are alleged in justification of a war, when the real motives are different. Thus, the true cause of the war which Greece undertook against the Persians, was the experience she had had of their weakness, while the pretext, alleged by Philip, and by Alexander after him, was the desire of avenging the injuries which the Greeks had so often suffered, and of providing for their future safety. "Pretexts," says Vattel, "are at least an homage which unjust men pay to justice. He who screens himself with them, shows that he still retains some sense of shame. He does not openly trample on what is most sacred in human society; he tacitly acknowledges that a flagrant injustice merits the indignation of all mankind." (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 32; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 5, pt. 4, ch. 2; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 3, ch. 1; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit, etc., liv. 3, ch. 1, § 4; Real, Science du Gouvernement, tome 5, ch. 2, sec. 2, § 17.)

§ 15. All modern ethical writers regard an unjust war as as not only immoral, but as one of the greatest of crimesmurder on a large scale. Such are all wars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal power or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from mer

cenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous purpose of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions, whether from the alleged motives of "introducing a more orthodox religion," or of "extending the area of freedom." Such wars are held in just abhorrence by all moral and religious people; and it is becoming the settled conviction of the masses of all nations, that wars should be undertaken only in cases of dire neces sity, and after all pacific measures have been exhausted. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 49; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 3, § 24; Manning, Law of Nations, pp, 94–103; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. 7, § 16; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. 6, §5; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 1, § 3; De Felice, Droit de la Nat, etc., tome 2, lec. 21; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit, etc., liv, 3, ch. 1, §3.)

§ 16. Some of the early fathers of the church went so far as to adopt the principle, that war, in any case, and under any circumstances, is unjustifiable, because contrary to the revealed will of God, and that all christians were forbidden to hear arms. The consequence was that the Roman soldiers, who became converts to christianity, deserted their flags in crowds, and some suffered martyrdom rather than continue in the military service. This extreme doctrine afforded the opponents of christianity good ground for saying that it was destructive of civil government, and that a state composed of true christians could not subsist. Moreover, it became evident, that if christians were not permitted to use arms in self-defense, they must all perish by the incursions and invasion of the barbarians. The question was referred to Saint Augustin, the most learned father in the east. His answer was: "If the christian law had forbidden all wars, it would have been said to the soldies who, in the evangelist, asked the way of salvation, to throw away their arms and abandon the military service. But it had only been said to them: Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages. Let those who think christianity opposed to the state, form an army of such soldiers as our doctrine requires, and then let them dare to say that it is an enemy of the republic, or rather let them confess that, always obedient, it is the salva