would say that the whole state was not justly punishable for these acts of its subjects? or who would think of applying to them the doctrine that the individual alone was responsible? There are, in modern times, and among christian states, Usbecks and Algerines, in practice, if not in principle. If a state should neglect to enact the requisite laws to restrain its subjects and citizens from repeated and systematic aggressions upon the rights of others, or to enforce such laws when enacted, it not only exposes itself to the just hostilities of the parties aggrieved, but virtually becomes an outlaw from the society of nations, and, by the well established principles of international jurisprudence, is liable to be attacked and punished by all, as the universal enemy of mankind. Systematic and organized aggressions upon the rights of independent states, and robbery and plunder upon land, by whatsoever name they may be called, or under whatsoever pretext they may be carried on, are as objectionable in their character, and as dangerons in their tendency, as piracy on the high seas. Piracy, under the law of nations, by whomsoever or wheresoever committed, may be tried and punished in the courts of justice of any nation, inasmuch as all nations have an equal interest in the apprehension and punishment of such offenses against international law. And it has been contended by some, that the same principle is applicable to similar crimes committed on land, and that those who, without the authority or commission of any state, and in defiance of all law, organize and band together for predatory and illegal military expeditions, are equally punishable, under the law of nations, in the courts of any state having custody of the offenders. However this may be, and whether or not such individual offenders are justiciable in the same manner as pirates, there can be no question of the guilt and responsibility of a government which encourages or permits its private citizens to organize and engage in such predatory and unlawful expeditions against a state with which that government is at peace. Nor does it matter much what may be the ostensible or intended object of such unauthorized expeditions; whether it be to overthrow a despotism, or repress anarchy, and to establish a liberal government in their place, or to destroy a liberal government, and to establish a despot

ism, or produce general anarchy, the offense, in international law, is the same. In either case, it is a violatian of the international rights of others, and the state which permits its 'citizens or subjects to commit the offense, or neglects to punish them for it, is responsible for their acts. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 6, § 78; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 15; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 2, ch. 9, § 12; Alison, Hist. of Europe, second series, ch. 12, § 41; President's Annual Message, 1857; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 15; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 2; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 2, ch. 36, §§ 1-4.)

§ 9. Attempts have sometimes been made to excuse the state, or to exempt it from responsibility, for the acts of its citizens who engage in such unauthorized and illegal military expeditions, or who organize, or assist in organizing, "filibuster" expeditions against other nations, on the ground that such citizens are, by the very act of emigration, virtually expatriated, and can no longer be regarded as subjects whose conduct the state can control, or for whose acts it can be held responsible. The right of voluntary expatriation in time of peace, will be considered in another place; it is sufficient for the present discussion to remark that, even admitting this right to the fullest extent which has been claimed by the courts and jurists of the United States, all agree that it can never be pleaded in justification of an offense against law, public or municipal, which was committed or contemplated in the act of pretended emigration. If individuals were allowed to escape punishment for engaging in illegal enterprises, on the ground of expatriation by pretended emigra. tion, the same excuse could be appealed to to cover treason, desertion, and other crimes, and to avoid the performance of local contracts. And if individuals cannot escape responsibility to their own government, for any unlawful act contemplated at the time of emigration, which they may do, it clearly follows that the state cannot escape moral or legal responsibility for the unlawful acts of its citizens, under the plea of their implied expatriation by pretended emigration. Emigration for an unlawful purpose is, in itself, an unlawful act, and may be prohibited by the state; and if such contemplated emigration of its citizens is intended to infringe the rights of

a friendly nation, it is undoubtedly the duty of the state to exercise its right of prohibition and power of prevention. It cannot escape the responsibility of neglecting that duty, under the miserable pretext of the voluntary emigration, and consequent expatriation, of its citizens. (Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 2, p. 49; Cushing, Opinions U. S. Att'ys Gen., vol. 8, p. 139; President's Annual Message, 1857; Alison, Hist. of Europe, second series, ch. 12, § 41; Jefferson, Am. State Papers Foreign Relations, vol. 1, p. 168; Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dallas Rep., p. 133; Sergeant, Constitutional Law, p. 319; U. S. v. Williams, 2 Cranch. Rep., p. 82, note; Murry v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch. Rep., pp. 64, 119; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton Rep., pp. 283, 347; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 15; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 2; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 2, ch. 36, §§ 1-4.)

§ 10. It is the duty of every state to show all proper respect and honor to other sovereign states, whether the dignity of such states be represented in the person of their sovereign, their flag, their ministers, or their subordinate officers. A want of respect to a subordinats officer, however, is not, by any means, to be necessarily construed into a want of respect for the state to which he belongs, for such officers do not, necessarily, nor even by implication, represent the dignity of their state or nation. To be wanting in respect to the representatives and officers of other states is a mark of ill-will, and such conduct is equally contrary to sound policy, and to what nations owe to each other. This most blamable and criminal disposition of states to imagine themselves insulted, where really no disrespect is intended, is thus forcibly described by Dymond: "The wars that are waged for insults to flags, and an endless train of similar motives, are perhaps generally attributable to the irritability of our pride. We are at no pains to appear pacific toward the offender, our remonstrance is a threat, and the nation which would give satisfaction to an inquiry, will give no other answer to a menace than a menace in return. At length we begin to fight, not because we are aggrieved, but because we are angry. One example may be offered. In 1789, a small Spanish vessel committed some violence in Nootka Sound, under the pretence that the country

belonged to Spain. This appears to have been the principal ground of offense, and, with this, both the government and people of England were very angry. The irritability and haughtiness which they manifested were unaccountable to the Spaniards, and the peremptory tone was imputed by Spain, not to the feelings of offended dignity and violated justice, but to some lurking enmity and some secret designs which we did not choose to avow. If the tone had been less peremptory, and more rational, no such suspicion would have been excited, and the hostility which was consequent upon the suspicion would, of course, have been avoided. Happily, the English were not so passionate but that, before they proceeded to fight, they negotiated and settled the affair amicably. The preparations for this foolish war cost, however, three millions one hundred and thirty-three thousand pounds." (Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6. ch. 12; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 3, §47; Dymond, Essays on the Prin. of Morality, essay 3, ch. 19; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 15.)

§ 11. But to fail in matters merely ceremonial, by not rendering the respect and honor which usage and custom have established as properly due to others, is not necessarily an insult to the dignity of a state or of its sovereign. "It is proper," says Vattel, "to distinguish between negligence, or the omission of what ought to be done according to commonly received custom, and positive acts of disrespect and insult. The prince may complain of negligence, and, if it is not repaired, may consider it as a mark of a bad disposition; he has a right to demand, even by force of arms, the reparation of an insult. The czar, Peter I., complained in his manifesto against Sweden, of their not having fired the cannon on his passage to Riga. He might think it strange that they did not pay him this mark of respect, and he might complain of it; but to make this the cause of a war, was being extremely prodigal of human blood." The subject of military and maritime ceremonial, as connected with international etiquette and intercourse, has already been discussed in the chapter on the rights of equality. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 3, § 48; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 15; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 15; Paley, Moral and Pol. Philosophy, b. 6, ch. 12.)

§12. Vattel lays down the general rule that "every nation, in virtue of its natural liberty, has a right to trade with those which shall be willing to correspond with such intentions, and to molest it in the exercise of its right, is an injury. The Portugese, at the time of their great power in the East Indies, were for excluding all other European nations from any commerce with the Indians; but a pretention, no less iniquitous than chimerical, was made a jest of, and the nations agreed to look on any acts of violence in support of it as just causes of war. This common right of all nations is, at present, acknowledged under the appellation of freedom of trade." This right, however, is to be distinguished from the claim. of one nation to trade with the colonies or dependencies of another. (Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 2, § 24; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 4, cap. 5, § 10; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 152, 153; Chitty, Commercial Law, vol. 1, p. 76; Massé, Droit Commercial, liv. 1, tit. 1; De Felice, Droit de la Nat., etc., tome 2, lec. 17; Melon, Essai Politique sur le Commerce, ch. 1; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 4.)

§ 13. To this right of trade there is a corresponding duty of mutual commerce, founded on the general law of nature; for, says Vattel, "one country abounds in corn, another in pastures and cattle, a third in timber and metals; all these countries trading together, agreeably to human nature, no one will be without such things as are useful and necessary, and the views of nature, our common mother, will be fulfilled. Further, one country is fitter for some kind of products than another; as for vineyards more than tillage. If trade and barter take place, every nation, on the certainty of procuring what it wants, will employ its industry and its ground in the most advantageous manner, and mankind in general proves a gainer by it. Such are the foundations of the general obligation incumbent on nations reciprocally to cultivate commerce. Therefore, every one is not only to join in trade as far as it reasonably can, but even to countenance and promote it." (Burlamanqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, tit. 3, ch. 4; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, ch. 2, §§ 21, 22; Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 226-253; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, §§ 149, et seq.; Garden, De Diploma