obligations, with respect to other states, as individuals with respect to other individuals. Among the most important of these natural rights, is that of acquiring, possessing and enjoying property. And this right applies not only to property of the state, as exclusive of other states, but to such property as exclusive of individuals. But international law generally considers only the former kind of property, or international domain. When, however, we consider the rights of conquest and cession, the rights of maritime capture and of capture on land, it becomes necessary to consider the interior or municipal rights of property in the state, and to distinguish between the absolute and paramount rights of the state, in respect to property considered in its interior relations under municipal laws, rather than its exterior relations under international laws. As a general rule, the property of a state, of whatsoever description, is marked by the same characteristics relatively to other states, as the property of individuals relatively to other individuals; that is to say, "it is exclusive of foreign interference, and susceptible of free disposition." (Ortolan, Domain International, §§ 15-22; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 34; Heffler, Droit International, §§ 64, 69, 70; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 150; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Wheaton, Elem, Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 4, § 1; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 5.)

§7. A state may acquire property or domain in various. ways; its title may be acquired originally by mere occupancy, and confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time; or by discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grant, cession, purchase, or exchange; in fine, by any of the recognized modes by which private property is acquired by individuals. It is not our object to enter into any general discussion of these several modes of acquisition, any further than may be necessary to distinguish the character of certain rights of property which are the peculiar objects of international jurisprudence. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 4, §§ 1, 4, 5; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, § 221-277; Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 2, cap. 4; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 2, chs. 7 and 11; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. 1, ch. 3; b. 2,

ch. 9; Puffendorf, de Jur. Nat. et Gent., lib. 4, chs. 4, 5, 6; Moser, Versuch, etc., b. 5, cap. 9; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 35, et seq.; Schmaltz, Droit des Gens, liv. 4, ch. 1; Kluber, Droit des Gens, §§ 125, 126; Heffter, Droit International, § 76; Ortolan Domaine International, §§ 53, et seq.; Bowyer, Universal Public Law, ch. 28; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 4; Riquelme, Derecho, Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome 4, pt. 3, ch. 5.)

§ 8. A sovereign state has the same absolute right to dispose of its territorial or other public property, as it has to acquire such property, but it depends upon its own municipal constitution and laws, how, and by what department of its government, the disposition shall be made. This is sometimes a question of peculiar interest to foreign states, who may acquire such property by purchase, exchange, cession, conquest, and treaties of confirmation, and especially where such acquisitions are made from states continually subject to revolutions and fluctuations in the character of its government and in the powers of its rulers. The act of a government de facto, a government which is submitted to by the great body of the people, and recognized by other states, is binding as the act of the state; and it is not necessary for others to examine into the origin, nature and limits of that authority. If it is an authority de facto, and sufficient for the purpose, others will not inquire how that authority was obtained. (Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 283, et seq.; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. 1, p. 166; Webster to De la Rosa, Aug. 25th, 1851; Cong. Doc., 32d Cong., 1st sess. Senate, Ex. Doc. No. 97; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 1, cap. 4, § 2; Heffter, Droit International, § 71; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2.)

§ 9. Nevertheless, in order to make such transfer valid, the authority, whether de facto or de jure, must be competent to bind the state. Hence the necessity of examining into and ascertaining the powers of the rulers, as the municipal constitutions of different states throw many difficulties in the way of alienations of their public property, and particularly of their territory. Especially, in modern times, the consent of the governed, express or implied, is necessary, before the

transfer of their allegiance can regularly take place. But formerly, what Grotius calls patrimonial kingdoms were considered in the light of absolute property of particular families, who, having received the blind submission of their subjects, sold and bartered them away, like any other property which they possessed. And such transfers of sovereignty included, not only the right of eminent domain, and the absolute property of the sovereign or state, but all private lands, and the property and services of the subjects, who were transferred with the soil, in the same manner as a slaveholder may transfer his slaves and all they possess, together with the title to his plantation. (Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. 3, ch. 11, §4; Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 256-258; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. 2, cap. 4, § 2; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2.)

§ 10. There are numerous examples of such treaties of sale. In 1301, Theodoric, Landgrave of Thuringia, sold the Marquisate of Lusatia to Burchard, Archbishop of Magdeburg, for six hundred marks of silver,-"insuper cum ministerialibus, Vasalis et Mancipiis, et aliis hominibus cujuscunque conditionis in jam dicta terra commorantibus," etc. In the same manner, in 1311, Dantzic, Derschovia and Swiecae, were sold by the Margrave of Brandenbourg to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, for ten thousand marks. In 1333, the city and territory of Mechlin was transferred for one hundred thousand reals of gold, by a treaty of sale between its sovereign and the Earl of Flanders, the fealty being reserved. About the same time, the city and county of Lucques were sold by John of Luxemburg to Philip of Valois, for one hundred and eighty thousand florins; and a few years after, the sovereignty of Frankenstein was sold by the Duke of Silecia, for two thousand marks, to the king of Bohemia. The sovereignty which the Popes so long held over Avignon was purchased by Clement VI., for eighty thousand florins, from Jane, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 258-260; Dumont, Corps Dip., liv. 2, pp. 330, 364, 365; Dupuy, Droits de Roy F. C., p. 70; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., p. 200; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 1, cap. 2.)

§ 11. The practice also extended to the mortgaging of sovereignties, and the sales of reversionary interests in kingdoms. Thus, Robert, duke of Normandy, in order to raise money to engage in the first crusade, mortgaged his dutchy for six thousand six hundred and sixty-six pounds weight of silver, to his brother William, and transferred the possession before his departure for the holy land. In 1479, Louis XI. bought the right of the house of Penthievre, the next male heirs in reversion, to Britanny. And fifteen years later, Charles VIII. purchased, for an annual pension of four thousand three hundred ducats, an estate of five thousand, in lands in France or Italy, and the disposition of the Morea (when conquered,) of Paleologus, the nephew of Constantine, the last Christian emperor, his right to the whole empire of Constantinople. The act of sale being drawn up by two notaries, and ratified, Charles assumed the robes and ornaments of the imperial dignity, and made no scruples in claiming the imperial rights vested in him by virtue of this purchase. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 260–262; Garnier, Hist. de France, liv. 1, pp. 429, 461, 494; Russell, Hist. Modern Europe, vol. 1, pp. 185, 472; White, Hist. of France, p. 208.)

§ 12. It was also the custom to dispose of sovereignties and dominions by deeds of gift, and by bequests. The emperor Lewis V., created the dauphin Humbert king, with the full privilege of disposing of his sovereignty at will, during life, or at his death. In 1343, Humbert ceded his dominions to Philip of Valois, by solemn deed of gift. By similar deeds, and upon a like principle, the emperor Henry VI. conferred upon Richard I. the kingdom of Arles, and the emperor Baldwin gave to the duke of Burgundy the kingdom of Thessalonia. By bequests, not only were whole sovereignties disposed of, but the orders of succession were frequently changed. Thus, Charles II., king of Sicily and count of Provence, changed by will the order of succession to the county, and the claims of Charles VIII. to the throne of Naples were founded upon the adoption of Louis of Anjou, by Jane, queen of Naples, in 1380, which was evidenced to all Europe by a solemn and public deed. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 262-264; Leibnitz, Cod. Dip., pp. 51, 237, 158, 220, 382;

Pfelfel, Droit Pub. d'Allemagne, tome 1, p. 541; Henault, Hist.

Chron, tome 1, p. 315; Dumont, Corps Dip., tome 1, pp. 288, 337, 362.)

§ 13. National territory consists of water as well as land. The maritime territory of every state extends to the ports, harbors, bays, mouths of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea enclosed by headlands belonging to the same state. Within these limits, its rights of property and territorial jurisdiction are absolute, and exclude those of every other state. The general usage of nations superadds to this extent of maritime territory an exclusive territorial jurisdiction over the sea for the distance of oue marine league, or the range of a cannon-shot, along all the shores or coasts of the state. The maxim of law on this subject, is, terrae dominium finitur ubi fiinitur armorum vis, which is usually recognized to be about three miles from the shore. And, even beyond this limit, states may exercise a qualified jurisdiction for fiscal and defensive purposes, that is, for the execution of their revenue laws, and to prevent "hovering on their coasts." It is necessary to distinguish between maritime territory and territorial jurisdiction, which latter will be discussed in another chapter. (Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. 2, ch. 4, § 6; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Puc., lib. 2, cap. 3, § 10; Bynkershoek, Quest. Jur. Pub., lib. 1, cap. 8; Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris, cap. 2; Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 5; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 1, ch. 23, § 289; Valin, Com. sur l'Ord, liv. 5, tit. 1; Azuni, Droit Maritime, tome 1, ch. 2, art. 3,; Garden, De la Dip., tome 1, p. 399; Hautefeuille, Droit des Nations Neut., tit. 1, ch. 3, sec. 1; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, liv. 2, ch. 8; Galiani, dei Doveri, dei P. N., liv. 1; Emerigon, Des Assurances, ch. 12, § 19; Abreu, Sobre Presas, pt. 1, ch. 5, §§ 13, 16; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. 1, tit. 2, § 40; Wildman, Int. Law, vol. 1, p. 70; Martens, Precis du Droit des Gens, § 41; Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des Prises, tit. 2, ch. 1, sec. 1; Hefter, Droit International, §§ 65, et seq.; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. 1, tit. 2, cap. 3; Loccenius, De Jure Maritimo, lib. 1, cap. 4, § 6.)

§14. The term "coasts" does not properly comprehend all the shoals which form sunken continuations of the land perpetually covered with water, but it includes all the natural appendages of the territory which rise out of the water,