4 of section 1021 of the Political Code, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten dollars.

Rep. Pol. Code, § 1022.

tificates by

cers.

S223. Every public officer who being authorized False cerby law to make or give any certificate or other writ-public offing, knowingly makes and delivers as true any such certificate or writing containing any statement which he knows to be false, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONSPIRACY.

SECTION 224. Criminal conspiracies defined.

225. Conspiracies against the peace of the state.

226. Overt act, when necessary.

S 224. If two or more persons conspire, either:

1. To commit any crime; or,

2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to procure another to be charged or arrested for any crime; or,

3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action or proceeding; or,

4. To cheat and defraud any person of any property by any means which are in themselves criminal or by any means which, if executed, would amount to a cheat or to obtaining money or property by false pretenses; or,

5. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due administration of the laws,

They are guilty of a misdemeanor.

See 2 Rev. Stat., 691, § 8. Instead of the word offense," employed in the Revised Statutes, in subdivisions 1 and 2, the Commissioners have used "crime." In section 3 of this Code the Commissioners have defined "public offense" as synonymous with "crime;" leaving the word "offense" to be used in a broader signification,

Criminal

conspiracies defined

including the graver wrongs towards individuals which are not cognizable by the criminal law. In the section of the Revised Statutes "offense" is plainly used as synonymous with "crime," and the Commissioners, in substituting the latter, have intended no change in the law, but merely to secure a consistent use of terms throughout the Code.

The common law definitions of conspiracy are broader than that given in our Revised Statutes.

Hawkins says that it is a consultation and agreement between two or more persons either falsely to charge another with a crime, punishable by law; or wrongfully to injure or prejudice a third person, or any body of men in any other manner; or to commit any punishable offense by law; or to do any act with intent to prevent the course of justice; or to effect a legal purpose with a corrupt intent or by improper means. (Hawk. P. C., ch. 72, § 2.)

Archbold defines conspiracy to be "an agreement between two or more persons:

1. Falsely to charge another with a crime punishablo by law.

2. Wrongfully to injure or prejudice a third person, or any body of men in any manner.

3. To commit any offense punishable by law.

4. To do any act with intent to prevent the course of justice.

5. To effect a legal purpose with a corrupt intent, or by improper means.

6. Combination by journeymen to raise their wages. (Arch. Cr. Pl., 390, 1.)

In the State v. Buchanan (5 Har. & J., 317, 351), it is said that, by a course of decisions running through a space of more than four hundred years, from the reign of Edw. III to the 59 Geo. III, without a single conflicting adjudication, these points are clearly settled.

That a conspiracy to do any act that is criminal per se is an indictable offense at common law.

That an indictment will lie at common law: 1. For a conspiracy to do an act not illegal, nor punishable if done by an individual, but immoral only. 2. For a conspiracy to do an act neither illegal, nor immoral in an individual, but to effect a purpose which has a tendency to prejudice the public; e. g., a combination by workmen to raise their wages. 3. For a conspiracy to extort money from another or to injure his reputation by means not indictable, if practised by an individual, as by verbal defamation, and that whether it be to charge him with an indictable offense or not. 4. For a conspiracy to cheat and defraud a third person, accomplished by means of an act which would not in law amount to an indictable cheat, if effected by an individual. 5. For a malicious conspiracy

to impoverish, or ruin a third person in his trade, or profession. 6. For a conspiracy to defraud a third person by means of an act not per se unlawful, and though no person be thereby injured. 7. For a bare conspiracy to cheat or defraud a third person, though the means of effecting it could not be determined on at the time.

The Revisers, in their note to the section of the Revised Statutes, which is embodied in the section in the text, assign the following reason for restricting the definition of conspiracy within narrower limits than those of the common law. "The great difficulty in enlarging the definition of this offense consists in the inevitable result of depriving the courts of equity of the most effectual means of detecting fraud by compelling a discovery on oath. It is a sacred principle of our institutions that no man shall be compelled to accuse himself of any crime, which ought not to be violated in any case. Yet such must be the result, or the ordinary jurisdiction of courts of equity must be destroyed by declaring any private fraud when committed by two, or any concert to commit it, criminal. Frauds and combinations to defraud constitute the mass of equity business, and seldom is a case presented when there are not at least two parties to a fraud."

This was said in 1828, before the passage of the statuto authorizing the unrestricted examination of a defendant to a bill in chancery charging fraud. That statute was passed in 1833. It provided in substance that a defendant might be compelled to answer any bill in chancery, charging the defendant with being a party to any conveyance made with intent to defraud; or when the defendant shall be charged with any fraud whatever; but no such answer should be read in evidence against any party thereto on any complaint or on the trial of any indictment for the fraud charged in such bill. (Laws of 1833, ch. 14.) To some extent the adoption of this principle obviates the objection urged by the revisers to a full recognition of the common law definition of conspiracy. But as the provisions of the Revised Statutes have stood without objection for a long period, and are believed to be satisfactory, in practical operation, the Commissioners have not thought it best to enlarge them; except that they suggest the addition of the section next following, which is new. Their reason for refraining from reporting new exceptions to the general rule that a witness shall not be compelled to criminate himself, are stated in their note to section 200 of this Code.

Other conspiracies. The Revised Statutes also contain a section (2 Rev. Stat., 692, § 9,) declaring that no conspiracies other than such as are enumerated in the statute are punishable criminally. This provision is here omitted, as unnecessary, in view of the general one to like effect, embodied in section 2.

Conspira

cies against the peace

of the state.

Overt act, when neces

sary.

$ 225. If two or more persons, being out of this state, conspire to commit any act against the peace of this state, the commission or attempted commission of which, within this state, would be treason against the state, they are punishable by imprisonment in a state prison not exceeding ten years.

$226. No agreement except to commit a felony upon the person of another, or to commit arson or burglary, amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act beside such agreement be done to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement.

2 Rev. Stat., 692, § 10.

This rule is also a restriction of the rule of the common law. By that rule the gist of conspiracy is the unlawful confederating; and the act is complete when the confederacy is made. Any act done in pursuance of it is no constituent part of the offense, but merely an aggravation of it. See Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass., 329; State v. Rikey, 4 Halst., 293; State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J., 317, 352.

So, also, it is said that where an indictment charges an ordinary conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove a common design between the defendants before proving the acts of each defendant; for the acts of each defendant are only evidence against himself, and may be the only means of establishing the conspiracy. In high treason, the overt act of one is the overt act of all; and therefore a common design must, in such cases, precede the proof of individual acts. Reg. v. Brittain, 11 L. T., 48; 3 Cox Cr. Cas., 77.

As to whether the misdemeanor of conspiracy to commit a felony is to be deemed merged in the felony when subsequently committed, see Commonwealth v. Fisher, 5 Mass., 106; Lambert v. People, 9 Cow., 620; Rey v. Button, 3 Cox Cr. Cas., 229; and 18 L. J. M. C., 19

TITLE IX.

OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON.

CHAPTER I. Suicide.

II. Homicide.

III. Maiming.

IV. Kidnapping.

V. Attempts to kill.

VI. Robbery.

VII. Assaults with intent to commit felony other than assaults

with intent to kill.

VIII. Duels and challenges.

IX. Assault and battery.

X. Libel.

CHAPTER I.

SUICIDE.

SECTION 227. Suicide defined.

228. No forfeiture imposed for suicide.

229. Attempting suicide.

230. Aiding suicide.

231. Furnishing weapon or drug to commit suicide.

232. Aiding attempt at suicide.

233. Mental incapacity of person aided, no defense.

234. Punishment of aiding suicide.

235. Punishment of attempting suicide or aiding an attempt.

S227. Suicide is the intentional taking of one's Suicido own life.

defined.

No for

feiture

S 228. Although suicide is deemed a grave public wrong, yet from the impossibility of reaching the imposed successful perpetrator, no forfeiture is imposed.

Sec 2 Rev. Stat., 701, § 22.

for suicide.

ing suicide.

S229. But every person who, with intent to take Attempt his own life, commits upon himself any act dangerous to human life, or which if committed upon or towards another person and followed by death as a conse