DANGEROUS PRECEDENTS FOR ENGLAND.

273 South, all the people were ever considered by him as American citizens, for whose conduct in regard to other nations the government of the United States would be responsible. In his efforts to prevent foreign recognition of the Confederacy, Mr. Seward's position was that of unswerving devotion to the Union. He would not be entrapped into any admission of the possibility of its disruption. His great law was the law of self-preservation. "In assuming this position," said he, "and the policy resulting from it, we have done as I think Great Britain herself must, and therefore would do, if a domestic insurrection should attempt to detach Ireland, or Scotland, or England from the United Kingdom, while she would hear no argument nor enter into any debate on the subject." This language he addressed to the British Government on July 21, 1861, through Mr. Adams, our minister, in transmitting him a copy of the act of Congress which had just been passed, authorizing the President to proclaim certain ports of the United States to be closed to trade. It had been intimated by Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, that the British Government would question our right to close these ports. There was at this time domestic trouble in the Republic of New Grenada. The government of that country had notified the British Government that five named ports of that republic had been closed to commerce. On the 27th of June, 1861, Mr. H. Berkly, M. P., rose in the House of Commons and asked the Secretary of State for foreign affairs whether Her Majesty's Government recognized the notification given. Lord John Russell replied as follows: "The opinion of Her Majesty's Government, after taking legal advice, is, that it is perfectly competent for the government of a country, in a state of tranquillity, to say which ports shall be open to trade and which shall be closed; but in the event of insurrection or civil war in that country, it is not competent for its government to close the ports that are de facto in the hands of the insurgents, as that would be an invasion of international law with regard to blockade. Admiral Milne, acting on instructions from Her Majesty's Government, has ordered the commanders of Her Majesty's ships not to recognize the closing of their ports." Mr. Seward gave the British Government to understand that his government would not " for a moment acquiesce in such a doctrine." We had a navy of not unequal strength with that of Great Britain, and, to quote Mr. Seward's enunciation of American policy, "Our blockade, being effective, must be respected." We were troubled no further with the blockade question. Although not bound by the Paris Declaration, we adhered to our own time-honored policy from which its rules were framed; and voluntarily abandoned advantages of which we might have availed ourselves on the ground of not being bound by them.

Throughout our unhappy domestic strife, Mr. Seward directed our foreign affairs in a spirit of moderation and patriotism. He displayed an ability not surpassed in the diplomacy of any time. In the bitterness of the strife incident to the recombining of our national elements during the reconstruction period, the services, the high patriotism, the untiring labors of this peerless

statesman were forgotten or eclipsed by the events of that troublous era. Yet he was ever anxious to soften the asperities of the reconstruction period. He was generous to those who differed with him on political principles, while unyielding in his own tenets. To the author of this volume he was ever kind. He recalls with affectionate memory, in this connection, a speech delivered by Mr. Seward before an immense gathering of his neighbors in Corning Hall, Auburn, New-York, on the 31st of October, 1868. It was a deliberate speech, yet not devoid of clever humor. It had its effect not only in Auburn, but throughout the state. It gave to the author, who was then a candidate for Congressman-at-large for the State of New-York, a handsome percentage of votes beyond that given to others,-and notably large in Auburn. The question then was one of national reconciliation and magnanimity. Congress had been derelict in not receiving the states no longer belligerent. Mr. Seward had opposed force, and commended peaceful methods of persuasion and reason. He eulogized in that speech many of the Democratic leaders for their aid in carrying, and their loyalty in accepting, the amendment abolishing slavery. "I entertain,” he said, “no ill-will toward the Democratic party or its leaders, and certainly have no uncharitable feelings toward that great constituency. On the other hand, I cherish a grateful appreciation of the patriotism, the magnanimity, the heroism of many of my fellow-citizens, with whom I have cheerfully labored and co-operated while they still retained their adhesion to the Democratic party. How could I distrust the loyalty or the virtue of Andrew Johnson, of General Hancock, of General McClellan, of Senator Hendricks, of Indiana, or his associate, Mr. Niblack, or of Mr. Cox, formerly of Ohio, to whom personally, more than any other member, is due the passage of the constitutional amendment in Congress abolishing African slavery?" This was great, and, to some extent, needed encomium at that time. Mr. Seward was a grand tribune of the people. He could proudly say that no state, nor any citizen, had by any act or word of his ever suffered disfranchisement or confiscation; nor, except for the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, had any one, through him, endured penalties or punishment after hostilities had ceased. He vindicated the Monroe doctrine in Mexico. He was a friend of the exile and emigrant. Praise and justice from him was pure gold. It was more to the writer. It was justification before his countrymen in the state of his adoption in a crucial test of all the liberalities of his political life.

To William H. Seward, the grandest man of his day, no national tribute has yet been paid. After a tour of the world, and after being received by all nations as the peer of any living statesman, he reposes in the sepulchre at Auburn, whose associations are as peaceful as the ways which led to it were stormful. But while the diplomatic correspondence of our Civil War shall remain in the archives of the Nation, that monument of his worth and greatness must far surpass in grandeur any memorial of bronze or marble that genius can conceive or art execute.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE TRENT AFFAIR.

THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS

I

THEIR AUTHORITY AND INSTRUCTIONS THEIR ARRIVAL IN HAVANA - INTRODUCTION TO THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL -CAPTAIN WILKES DECIDES TO ARREST THEM-THE TRENT BROUGHT TO -RESISTANCE TALKED OF BRITISH INDIGNATION AND THREATS-CAPTAIN WILKES RELEASES THE TRENT- HIS MISTAKE THE PRISONERS AT FORT WARREN-THE QUESTION IN CONGRESS—MR. VALLANDIGHAM'S PREDICTION - MR. COX'S REPLY-EARL RUSSELL'S NOTE - MR. SEWARD'S REPLY-THE ARREST JUSTIFIED — BELLIGERENT RIGHTS, AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS — A DIPLOMATIC DUEL-EARL RUSSELL DISARMED - NO APOLOGY — A DINNER PARTY-THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS-AN AMERICAN VICTORY.

N October, 1861, John Slidell and James M. Mason were appointed commissioners or diplomatic agents of the Confederate States to England and France.

They were especially instructed by the Confederate Secretary of State, Mr. Hunter, to work for the recognition of the Confederacy as an independent power. As inducements to these governments, they were to represent- first, that a vast area of the South would be devoted to the production of cheap cotton; and second, that the development of the agricultural resources of the South under free trade would create a demand for the manufactures of England and France, larger and more profitable to all parties than would be possible under the commercial regulations of the United States.

The commissioners were to inform the governments to whom they were accredited that although the Confederacy, as then formed, included but eleven states, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri would undoubtedly attach themselves to its fortunes, after the close of the existing war. There would then be embraced in the Confederacy a great, populous, and growing empire. Its internal regulations would harmonize with the most liberal policies of commerce. The commissioners were to say that one of the conditions which would be insisted upon in any treaty of peace with the United States, would

be a stipulation to leave the border slave states free to vote on the question of withdrawing from the Federal Union and joining the Southern Confederacy; both governments to retire their military forces from these states until the question was decided. When the time should come for this proceeding, it was inferred that there would be no doubt that the vote would be in favor of the South.

Charged with these instructions, and clothed with all diplomatic authority in the premises, including the power to enter into conventions for treaties, the commissioners embarked at Charleston on board the steamer Theodora. The steamer eluded our blockading squadron, and landed them on the Island of Cuba.

Capt. Charles Wilkes was commanding the United States steam sloop of war San Jacinto, which carried thirteen guns. He was at this time on the south coast of the island, off Cienfuegos. Learning of the arrival of the Theodora with the commissioners, he took in a supply of coal and sailed October 26, with all dispatch, intending to capture the blockade-runner. The San Jacinto arrived at Havana on the thirty-first; but it arrived too late to intercept her. Before leaving Cienfuegos Captain Wilkes had ascertained that the commissioners were at Havana, and that they intended to depart from that port on board the English mail steamer Trent, about the 7th of November, en route for Southampton, England.

Captain Wilkes was a dashing, enterprising officer. He was one who would not hesitate to act on his own responsibility. Even in a doubtful case, when the interests and honor of his country were concerned, he resolved his doubts in favor of his flag. The question at once arose in his mind whether he had, under the law of nations, a right to arrest this embassy, while it was at sea under the protection of a neutral flag. At Cienfuegos he had access to some volumes of Kent, Wheaton, Vattel, and the decisions of Sir William Scott and other judges of the Admiralty Court of Great Britain, which bore on the rights and responsibilities of neutrals. As a first step in the inquiry, he rightly assumed that the case was within the sphere of international law. The governments of Great Britain, France, and Spain had already recognized the Confederate States as a belligerent power. The ports of these countries, and of their colonies and dependencies, were open to vessels bearing the Confederate flag. Confederate cruisers were then admitted to all the protection and courtesy extended to vessels of the United States. Clearly, therefore, the merchant vessels of the nations that had recognized this belligerent power were bound to observe the duties imposed upon them by international law in regard to contraband persons and property. In view of this obligation to avoid contraband trade, Captain Wilkes did not hesitate to board and search the Trent. As a matter of law his conclusion was impregnable. A neutral ship bearing dispatches of the enemy, if her commander had knowledge of the fact, was unquestionably subject to seizure

DETERMINATION TO SEIZE THE TRENT.

277

and condemnation. But the seizure of the persons of the commissioners was a different matter. Were they to be regarded as diplomatic agents? If they were, then, would they, under the law of nations, be subject to arrest? In respect to the latter question, Captain Wilkes had read in the authorities on international law, that "foreign ministers of a belligerent on board neutral ships are required to possess papers from the other belligerent to permit them to pass free."

Messrs. Mason and Slidell had assumed, and held themselves out at Havana, to be diplomatic agents of the Confederate States, bound on a mission to the governments of England and France. Captain Wilkes had ample proof of this fact. They had openly stated that they were clothed with full authority to form treaties and alliances. Their mission looked to the recognition of the Confederate States as an independent power. They had been presented to the Captain-General of Cuba by Her Britannic Majesty's Consul-General; yet it was stated that this was merely an act of courtesy. Captain Wilkes had been informed by the Captain-General that he had not received them in any official or diplomatic capacity, but only as distinguished gentlemen and strangers. Nevertheless, during their stay at Havana, both report and assumption gave these gentlemen the title of ministers of the Confederate States on a mission to England and France. It was in this character that they were introduced on board the English mail steamer Trent, by the British Consul-General and his son. The latter acted as agent of the steamer when the commissioners embarked on her en route for Southampton. This steamer was a merchant vessel. It was plying between Vera Cruz, Havana, and St. Thomas. It carried Her Britannic Majesty's mails by contract.

Under these circumstances Captain Wilkes determined to seize the Trent and take the commissioners into his custody on the high seas at the first opportunity. He had no doubt as to the right of search, or of his power to seize the enemy's dispatches on a neutral ship, when they were reduced to writing; but he had, perhaps, some doubt as to his right to seize the persons of the commissioners. "These gentlemen were not," he afterwards said in his official report to the Secretary of the Navy, "dispatches in the literal sense, and did not seem to come under that designation, and nowhere could I find a case in point." But, accepting them at their own representations, as accredited diplomatic agents of the enemy, he solved the doubt by regarding them as "the embodiment of dispatches."

In the absence of a case in point, this conclusion of Captain Wilkes would have been admitted in the high Court of Admiralty itself as correct, but he weakened it by giving further and untenable reasons in its support. In one point of view he regarded the Confederate commissioners as being the embodiment of dispatches, -as clothed with diplomatic authority; and, therefore, as contraband, unless protected by a Federal passport; while from