COTTON, AND THE BLOCKADE.

263 ized warfare, quite as much as from the action of foreign powers. After these rights had been admitted, the only diplomatic questions of great importance with which the United States had to deal, were those affecting the blockade and international maritime rights. In view of the position which Mr. Seward took on assuming office in respect to intervention, no other international questions than those could have arisen, without involving a foreign war. Yet the possibility of such a war was never overlooked by that statesman.

66

It may be of interest to note here, that Mr. Seward did not lose sight of the hope of relations with the Spanish American republics, which would soon assume a spirit more elevated than one of merely commercial and conventional amity,- a spirit disinterested and unambitious, earnestly American in the continental sense of the word, and fraternal in no affected or mere diplomatic meaning of the term." "These states," said he, in the letter to Mr. Corwin before referred to, "hold a common attitude and relation towards all other nations. It is the interest of them all to be friends, as they are neighbors, and to mutually maintain and support each other, so far as may be consistent with the individual sovereignty which each of them rightly enjoys, equally against all disintegrating agencies within, and all foreign influences or power without their borders." This was the only movement for foreign aid or sympathy made by Mr. Seward during the war. He courted no European alliance. He was a continental American. He subsequently gave proof of the sincerity of his sympathy with our sister republic when an emperor was forced upon Mexico.

It was supposed by many that a dearth of American cotton might induce England to seek a supply of that staple by breaking the blockade of our Southern sea-ports. Up to the period of the Civil War the textile manufactories of Europe, and especially of England, were large consumers of American cotton. The blockade had cut off this supply. Mr. Seward was aware that great efforts were made by manufacturers to induce the English government to disregard the blockade. He was therefore most persistent in the assertion that the force of the Confederacy would soon be broken. Each disaster to our arms intensified this assertion. But, at the same time, each month of the war saw great accessions to our naval force. It was on the ocean only that foreign intervention could affect anything; and there, with our commerce fast disappearing, and the nearest foreign base of operation three thousand miles away, we had, by reason of the augmentation of our navy, comparatively little to fear. It was probably owing to these considerations, as much as from respect for international ethics, that England, and perhaps also France, did not attempt to raise the blockade of the Southern ports.

After all, cotton was not so much the monarch it had been reputed. It was soon discovered that it might be produced in sufficient quantity, if not

of as good quality, elsewhere than in the Southern States. On Dec. 6, 1861, cotton in Liverpool was not quoted at half the price it commanded in our own market. The stock in England on that date was 606,818 bales, although there was a deficiency of 200,000 American bales. This deficit was more than made up by the increasing production of India. On the corresponding date of the previous year, the stock of cotton in England was only 579,620 bales. The imports of India cotton had increased to 85 per cent. for eleven months of 1861, and in the last four of these months the increase arose to 160 per cent. At this rate of increase, India alone could supply England the following year with 1,350,000 bales of cotton, not to speak of the increasing production of Egypt and Brazil, which ordinarily exported about 200,000 bales. There was, therefore, not such a dearth of cotton as would justify British statesmen in risking a war with the then first naval power of the world, in order to obtain it from the Southern States.

Aside from the question of Confederate recognition, the complications. requiring diplomatic skill were such as usually occur in war.

By long established policy, the United States Government was committed. to the doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas. This doctrine asserted that the commerce of the world should be free from interruption by belligerent powers.. Was there any exception? Only in so far as an actual and effective blockade of the ports of either power might prevent an entrance to shipping. Up to the time of the Civil War, our government had contented itself with the assertion of this doctrine in its own behalf. Some efforts had, from time to time, been made by our statesmen to induce England and other maritime powers to accept it as a rule of international law. But this was without

success.

In

American policy has always moved on the line of humane progress. the management of our foreign relations, it has generally been the object of American statesmen to encourage the development of international commerce. We strove to relieve its argosies from the operation of maritime laws which pertained more to the piratical, barbaric past than to modern civilization. Long before the era of Independence, the American colonies had made a wonderful advance in commercial enterprise. Their commerce grew in spite of the most adverse circumstances. They encountered not only the harshest opposition of the "mother country," but, also, the enforcement of the worst restrictions of international codes which recognized maritime war as the most important and honorable of oceanic enterprises. The rules of these codes were developed in mediæval times by the Gothic rovers of the seas on misapplied principles of Roman military law. These rules recognized no maritime rights that were not accompanied by the power to enforce them. There was no jus gentium without the required force. The quarter-deck was the prize court, the captor was the judge. In short, almost to the present century, the code maritime of the great naval powers of Europe was little better

THE BRITISH CODE MARITIME.

265 than a system of legalized piracy. When England arrogated to herself the title of "Mistress of the Seas," the less formidable maritime nations began under her aggressions, and the advancing civilization, to recognize the propriety of relaxing the harsher rules of the medieval codes. Amendments were gradually adopted by them. England, however, long maintained the piratical practice of impressing the citizens of other nations into her naval service. She did not even allow them the alternative of walking the plank. She not seldom forced them to fight against their own flag. As for the cargoes of foreign ships navigating distant seas, they were confiscated without a moment's hesitation or inquiry, without regard to the relations of the governments concerned. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the "Spanish Main" was a favorite source of ill-gotten wealth for the buccaneering fleets of Great Britain. At a later period, the general seizure practice of these fleets began to be limited to ships of the enemy and "contraband" goods. Writers on the law of nations had, from the time of Grotius, asserted that its rules did not countenance the piratical practices of the times. This protest of law made little difference, however, on the Spanish Main. But in course of time a practice obtained, under which, in merchant traffic, goods "contraband of war" would alone be regarded as subject to seizure in neutral ships. As there was some difference of opinion among commentators in respect to what goods were contraband by the law of nations, and as each belligerent power was in the habit of deciding the questions as they arose according to its own strength and inclinations, treaties were entered into by which the contracting parties came to an understanding in the matter. By the decisions of the courts maritime, in course of time the rules of international rights and duties became fixed. Under these decisions, it appears there are two classes of contraband of war, namely, goods which neutrals are prohibited from carrying during war to the belligerent parties, and persons to whom they are forbidden to give passage.

From the first day of its independence, the United States Government adopted the policy of specifically enumerating in treaties not only the goods but the persons to whom the law of contraband should apply. Our policy in regard to men and goods was most liberal. The Continental Powers of Europe were more willing than England to meet us with a like policy. The latter power did agree to a schedule of contraband goods in the treaty negotiated with her in the year 1794. But we failed, until the settlement of the "Trent affair," to bring England to terms in regard to the exemption from capture of all persons except military enemies. We always admitted that the latter, when found by a belligerent on a neutral vessel, are subject to capture, even where the vessel is engaged in lawful commerce.

After the settlement of the Trent affair, Mr. Sumner discussed with great ability in the Senate, the maritime policy of the United States. He said that the true and time-honored American policy is that which was de

clared by Madison and Monroe in the year 1805, namely, that in exercising the right of search, the United States cannot accede to the claim of any nation to take from their vessels, on the high seas, any description of persons except soldiers in the actual service of the enemy, and that no goods can be contraband except those specially mentioned in treaties. All other effects may, "without any exception and in perfect liberty, be transported to places belonging to the enemy, excepting only places which shall be besieged, blockaded, or invested." The language last quoted is taken from our treaty with the Netherlands. This treaty was negotiated as far back as 1782. We enumerated the articles that were to be contraband, in our treaty with France in 1787. Our constant effort was in this direction. This policy is exhibited in every convention made with the Spanish-American States, beginning with Columbia in 1824.

A few years before the secession troubles, when we had no apprehension of war with any power, the United States Government, in the spirit of our favorite foreign policy, as dictated by William L. Marcy, submitted to the maritime nations of Europe certain propositions. These were to be by them agreed upon as permanent principles of international law. This was in the year 1854. These propositions were:

First. Free ships make free goods; that is to say, that the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a power or state at war, are free from capture or confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles contraband of war.

Second. The property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel is not subject to confiscation, unless the same be contraband of war.

Third. Blockades, to be respected, must be effective.

Some of the governments expressed a willingness to accept these principles. Others, who were at war, preferred to await the termination of hostilities before entering upon negotiations respecting them.

On the 16th of April, 1856, a congress, consisting of several maritime powers, was in session at Paris to effect some liberal modifications of the law of nations in regard to maritime war. On the same day the plenipotentiaries of the great powers were assembled. These were from Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey. They came to an agreement. It was in the form of a declaration, on these principles: First. Privateering is and remains abolished.

Second. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.

Third. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag.

Fourth. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by forces sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

THE PARIS DECLARATION.

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These four principles of maritime law constitute what is called, in diplomatic language, the Declaration of Paris.

The parties to this agreement pledged themselves to invite powers which had not been represented in that congress to accede to the declaration. It was agreed that the declaration should be binding on the parties to it, and on those who might accede to its principles, as one whole and indivisible compact. It was further agreed, that neither the original nor subsequently acceding parties should enter into any arrangement on the application of maritime law in time of war, without stipulating for a strict observance of the four principles of the declaration.

Up to the year 1861, forty-one powers had acceded to the Declaration of Paris. The list includes almost every European and South American state. The declaration was submitted, in 1855, by the governments at the congress, to the government of the United States. The following year, about July 14, 1856, Mr. Marcy, our Secretary of State, informed them that the President, Mr. Pierce, would not accede to it. In making this announcement, Mr. Marcy, in behalf of his government, called the attention of the states represented at Paris to the following points:

"First. That the second and third propositions contained in the Paris Declaration are substantially the same with the two propositions which had before been submitted to the maritime states by the President.

،، Second. That the Paris Declaration, with the conditions annexed, was inadmissible by the United States in three respects, namely: 1st, That the government of the United States could not give its assent to the first proposition, although it was willing to accept it with an amendment which should exempt the private property of individuals, though belonging to belligerent states, from seizure or conscription by national vessels in maritime war. 2d, That for this reason the stipulation annexed to the declaration, viz.: that the propositions must be taken altogether or rejected altogether, without modification, could not be allowed. 3d, That the fourth condition annexed to the declaration, which provided that the parties acceding to it should enter into no negotiation for any modifications of the law of maritime war with other nations which should not contain the four points contained in the Paris Declaration, seemed inconsistent with a proper regard to the national sovereignty of the United States."

On the 29th of July, 1856, Mr. Mason, then Minister of the United States to France, was instructed to propose to the imperial government of that country, to enter into an arrangement with the United States for its adherence to the Declaration of Paris, provided that the first principle should be amended as specified in the President's decision of the 14th of that month. Instructions were sent on the 31st of January following, to Mr. Dallas, our Minister at London, to make the like proposition to the British Government. No favorable results came from this effort. Probably there could not have been