FLIGHT OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

603

with the greatest exultation by Jefferson Davis, who had left Richmond that morning, arrived at Manassas Junction at four o'clock, and hastened on horseback to the head-quarters of Johnston. From the Junction, that night," he telegraphed to his "Congress," which had convened in Richmond the day before-" Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious. The enemy was routed,

. July 21, 1861.

and fled precipitately, abandoning a large amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks, and baggage. The ground was strewed for miles with those killed, and the farm-houses and the ground around were filled with wounded. ... Our force was fifteen thousand; that of the enemy estimated at thirtyfive thousand."

Why did not Patterson hold Johnston at Winchester, or re-enforce McDowell at Bull's Run? was a question asked by the people with the severest earnestness, when it was known that to the presence of the former and his troops must be, in a great degree, attributed the disasters that had befallen the National arms. With better information than the public then possessed, the question may now be answered, with the sanction of official and semi-official records, in these few words :-Because his force was greatly inferior in numbers and appointment to that of Johnston; because he was posi

1 This is from a drawing by Mr. Forbes, already mentioned, made after the evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates, in the spring of 1862. It was taken from near the center of the battle-field, and shows the ruins of Mrs. Henry's house, and to the right of them, through an opening in the distance, looking southeast, is seen Manas-as Junction. In the foreground is seen a portion of a small marble monument erected to the memory of General Bee, whose body was buried on that spot. Other graves are seen near; and turkey buzzards, which uncovered many bodies that were put in shallow graves, are seen feasting on the carcass of a horse.

Mrs. Henry, it is said, was confined to her bed, and remained in her house during the battle. Shot and shell went through it, and she was wounded two or three times. She died soon afterward. Robinson was yet occupying his house, with his family, at the close of 1865.

3 This was not only an exaggeration but a misrepresentation. From the most reliable authorities on both sides, it appears that, in the final struggle, the Nationals had about thirteen thousand men and the Confederates about twenty-seven thousand. The latter had been receiving re-enforcements all day, while not a man crossed Bull's Run after twelve o'clock to re-enforce the Nationals.

604

WHY MCDOWELL WAS NOT RE-ENFORCED.

tively instructed not to fight without a moral certainty of success;' because his army had commenced dissolving, by the expiration of the terms of enlistment of the three-months regiments, and when Johnston started for

a July 18,

July.

Manassas Patterson could not have brought ten thousand effective men into action; and because, by some strange mischance,

1861. he was for five days, at the most critical time, namely, from the 17th to the 22d of July, when McDowell was moving upon Manassas and fighting the Confederates, without the slightest communication from the General-in-chief, whilst he (Patterson) was anxiously asking for information and advice. He had been informed by General Scott on the 12th,' that Manassas would be attacked on Tuesday, the 16th. On the 13th, he was directed by his Chief to make demonstrations to keep Johnston at Winchester, if he (Patterson) did not feel strong enough to attack him. Patterson made the demonstration, accordingly, on the day when Manassas was to be attacked, and drove Johnston's pickets within their intrenchments. On the following day he moved his army to Charlestown, where he could more easily re-enforce McDowell, if called to do so; and at the same time he received a dispatch from Scott, saying "McDowell's first day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court House. Tomorrow, probably, the Junction will be carried."

⚫ July 17.

d July 18.

d

Johnston was still at Winchester, with full thirty thousand troops, and Patterson, supposing that the work at Manassas would be completed on the morrow, felt a satisfaction in having accomplished what he was ordered to do. He was too weak to attack Johnston, but he had held him, he believed, until Beauregard was smitten. On the following morning, at the hour when Johnston received orders to hasten to Manassas, Patterson telegraphed to Scott the relative forces of the opposing armies in the Valley, showing his to be greatly inferior, but asking, "Shall I strike ?" To this he received no reply; and when, on the 20th, he telegraphed to the Chief that Johnston, with a greater part of his army, had moved off southwestward, and he received no orders in reply, he supposed that McDowell had been victorious at Manassas, and that the Confederates, in numbers too overwhelming to make it prudent for him to follow, were flying from the Valley for safety. The first knowledge that he received of the battle, fought three days later than was intended, was conveyed to him in a newspaper from Philadelphia. Patterson seems to have done all that was possible for a prudent and obedient soldier to do, under the circumstances. If he did not. prevent the disaster at Bull's Run, he undoubtedly prevented a greater, by keeping Johnston and his heavy force from a meditated invasion of Maryland, and the capture of Washington City by assault in. the rear.

The flight of the National army back to the defenses of Washington, and the attending circumstances, afforded one of the most impressive, picturesque, and even ludicrous episodes in history. The determination, the strength, and the resources of the Confederates had been greatly underrated, and there was perfect confidence in the public mind that the impending

1 See page 520.

For a full elucidation of this matter, see volume ii. of the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War; and Narrative of the Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley: by Major-General Robert Patterson.

SPECTATORS OF THE BATTLE.

605

battle near Manassas would result in absolute and crushing victory for the National arms. It was expected to be the finishing blow to the rebellion. The skirmish of the 18th had cast only a passing cloud over the otherwise serene sky of expectation; and it was dispelled in the course of twenty-four hours.

It became known at Washington on Saturday that McDowell was to attack Beauregard on the line of Bull's Run on Sunday, and scores of men, and even women-Congressmen, officials of every grade, and plain citizens -went out to see the grand spectacle, as the Romans went to the Coliseum to see the gladiators fight. They had tickets of admission to the amphitheater of hills near Bull's Run, in the form of passes from the military authorities; and early on Sunday morning Centreville was gay with civilians. The headquarters of Colonel Miles was crowded with guests, where wine and cigars were used prodigally. The Hights during the day were covered with spectators and the soldiery

some, more courageous or more curious than others, pushed on toward the Stone Bridge, some distance beyond Cub Run, where they could hear the scream of shells, and see the white puffs of smoke when they exploded in the air. The excitement was delicious whilst danger was distant; but before sunset, cheeks that glowed with exhilaration at noon, were pale with terror. Then the actors and the audience were commingled in wild disorder, in a flight from the scenes of the bloody drama as precipitate as that from a theater on fire.

When the right of the National army gave way, Johnston, hoping to cut off their retreat, ordered Ewell to cross Bull's Run in heavy force, and attack the left at Centrevile. Ewell instantly made the attempt, but his columns were so severely smitten by a storm of grape and canister, from the heavy guns of the gallant Colonel Davies, that they recoiled, and fled back in confusion. The enterprise was abandoned, and thereafter the left was unmolested. Davies was the senior of Richardson in rank, and commanded the detachment which all day long had been watching the lower fords, and annoying passing columns of the Confederates beyond Bull's Run with shot and shell from the batteries of Green, Hunt, Benjamin, and Tidball, the latter belonging to Colonel Blenker's brigade.

Whilst the left was standing firmly, the vanquished right was moving. from the field of strife, in haste and much disorder, towards the passages of

606

PANIC AT CUB RUN AND CENTREVILLE.

Bull's Run, from the Stone Bridge to Sudley's Ford, pursued by Confederates of all arms, who made many prisoners. Still greater would have been the number of captives, had not many of the troops been free from panic, and in condition to cover the retreat and give encouragement to the disordered mass. When McDowell perceived that the day was lost, and retreat inevitable, his first care was to protect his army in its flight. For this purpose he detailed Colonel Porter and his regulars, with the cavalry. He also sent word to Miles to order a brigade to the Warrenton Road, at Cub Run, for the same purpose, and Blenker was sent. McDowell himself hastened to the left, where he found much confusion that might prove dangerous, caused by orders and counter-orders of Miles and his brigade commanders. He was informed that Miles had been intoxicated nearly all day, and playing the buffoon, to the disgust of his officers and men. So he took command of the division himself, for Miles could not be trusted.

Porter performed his duties admirably. He kept the Confederates in check; and after the retreat had fairly begun, according to orders, there was not much panic or confusion visible, until those who crossed at and near the Stone Bridge, and others at the fords above, met in converging streams (one along the Warrenton Turnpike, and the other down the forest road traversed by Hunter and Heintzelman in the morning) near the bridge over Cub Run, which was barricaded by a caisson' that had been overturned on it by a solid shot from the pursuers. Schenck's Brigade had already crossed, and gone on to Centreville, but many civilians in his rear were caught here by the hurrying mass of soldiers. The excitement was intense. The number of the pursuers was magnified by fear from five hundred to five thousand, and they were not far behind. Shots from their Flying Artillery were coming too near to be harmless. Frightened teamsters cut their horses loose, mounted them, and scampered away, leaving their wagons to block the road. The drivers of artillery horses did the same, and left their cannon behind to be seized by the Confederates. Full one-third of the artillery lost that day was left between Cub Run and the Stone Bridge.'

The caisson on the bridge was soon removed, and onward the excited mass pressed. Blenker's protecting brigade, lying across the road, opened and let them pass; and at twilight the fugitives were all behind the lines at Centreville, where the Fifth Division, intact, formed a strong protecting force. Ignorant of the number and exact position of McDowell's reserves, only five hundred cavalry of the pursuing force crossed Bull's Run that even

1 A caisson is an ammunition-chest on wheels, for the service of artillery in battle.

2 The Nationals lost twenty-seven cannon, ten of which were captured on the field, and the remainder were abandoned during the flight to Centreville. They had forty-nine pieces in all, of which twenty-eight were rifled. All but two were fully horsed and equipped. Only twenty-eight of the forty-nine pieces crossed Bull's Kun before the battle, and only one was brought safely back to Centreville. Besides these cannon, the Nationals lost a large amount of small arms, ammunition, stores, provisions, and clothing. A large number of the knapsacks and blankets that were lost had been laid aside by the soldiers before going into battle, on account of the beat of the day.

Beauregard reported his spoils of victory to be twenty-eight field-pieces captured, with over one hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun: also thirty-seven caissons; six forges; four battery-wagons; sixty-four artillery horses completely equipped; five hundred thousand rounds of small arms ammunition; four thou sand five hundred sets of accouterments, and over five thousand muskets. His engineer-in-chief, Captain E P. Alexander, reported in addition as captured, a large number of intrenching, carpenters', and blacksmiths tools; camp and cooking utensils; clothing and blankets; twenty-two tents, and a large quantity of medicines and hospital supplies.

1

RETREAT TO THE LINE OF THE POTOMAC.

607

ing; and when, at dusk, these encountered some of Blenker's pickets in the gloom, they wheeled and hastened back to the Stone Bridge, when some of his brigade went boldly forward, and brought away two of the cannon abandoned near Cub Run.' In the mean time a part of Beauregard's reserves, which had been ordered up, had arrived.

At Centreville, McDowell held a brief and informal coun

cil with his officers, when it is 9

was determined to continue the retreat to the defenses of Washington, for the shattered and

demoralized army was in no

STONE CHURCH, CENTREVILLE.

condition to resist even one-half of the Confederates known to be at Manassas. They had been on duty almost twenty-four hours, without sleep, without

much rest, and many of them without food; and during seven or eight hours of the time, a greater portion of those who came over Bull's Run had been fighting under a bla-. zing sun. They needed rest; but so dangerous did it seem to remain, that the soldiers cheerfully obeyed the order to move forward. Indeed, large numbers of them had already done so. Leaving the sick, and wounded, and dying, who could not be removed, under proper caretakers in a stone church at Centreville (which was used a long time as a hospital), the army moved forward at a little past ten o'clock, with Colonel Richardson's brigade as a rear-guard. Most of them reached the camps near Washington, which they had left. in high spirits on the 16th, before daylight. Richardson left Centreville at two o'clock in the morning, when all the other troops and batteries had retired, and twelve hours afterward he was with his brigade on Arlington Hights. The survivors of the conflict had left behind them not less, probably, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, than three thousand five hundred of their comrades,

.

a July,

1861.

1 Beauregard, in his official report, gives as the reason for relinquishing the pursnit, a report that McDowell's reserves, "known to be fresh and of considerable strength," he said, "were threatening the position of Union Mills Ford," near which lay the forces under Ewell.