not affecting the claims of Slavery, to espouse this rule in its utmost strictness. Let him now indicate, if he can, any article, clause, phrase, or word, in the Constitution, which gives to Congress any power to establish a "uniform law throughout the United States" on the subject of fugitive slaves. Let him now show, if he can, from the records of the Federal Convention, one jot of evidence inclining to any such power. Whatever may be its interpretation in other respects, the clause on which this Bill purports to be founded gives no such power. Sir, nothing can come out of nothing, and the Fugitive Slave Bill is, therefore, without any source or origin in the Constitution. It is an open and unmitigated usurpation.

And, sir, when the veteran Senator of Virginia has answered this objection: when he has been able to find in the Constitution a power which is not to be found, and to make us see what is not to be seen, then let him answer another objection. The Constitution has secured the inestimable right of Trial by Jury in "suits at common law," where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars. Of course, Freedom is not susceptible of pecuniary valuation, therefore there can be no question that the claim for a fugitive slave is within this condition. In determining what is meant by "suits at common law," recourse must be had to the common law itself, precisely as we resort to that law in order to determine what is meant by "Trial by Jury." Let the Senator, if he be a lawyer, now undertake to show that a claim for a fugitive slave is not, according to the early precedents and writs — well known to the framers of the Constitution, especially to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and John Rutledge,

the Temple

of South Carolina, both of whom had studied law at a suit at common law, to which, under the solemn guaranty of the Constitution, is attached the Trial by Jury, as an inseparable incident. Senator undertake to show this, if he can.

Let the

And, sir, when the veteran Senator has found a power in the Constitution where none exists, and has set aside the right of Trial by Jury in a suit at common law, then let him answer yet another objection. By the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, a claim for a fugitive slave is declared to be a case under the Constitution, within the judicial power; and this judgment of the court is confirmed by common sense and common law. Let the Senator undertake to show, if he can, how such an exalted exercise of judicial power can be confided to a single petty magistrate, appointed, not by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but by the Court; holding his office, not during good behavior, but merely during the will of the Court; and receiving, not a regular salary, but fees according to each individual case. Let the Senator answer this objection, if, in any way, by any twist of learning, logic, or law, he can.

Thus, sir, do I present the issue directly on this outrageous enactment. Let the author of the Fugitive Slave Bill meet it. He will find me ready to follow him in argument, though I trust never to be led, even by his example, into any departure from those courtesies of debate which are essential to the harmony of every legislative body.

Such, Mr. President, is my response to all that has been said in this debate so far as I deem it in

any way worthy of attention. To the two associate chieftains in this personal assault, the veteran Senator from Virginia, and the Senator from South Carolina with the silver-white locks, I have replied completely. It is true that others have joined in the cry, which these associates first started; but I shall not be tempted further. Some there are who are best answered by silence; best answered by withholding the words which leap impulsively to the lips.

And now, turning my back upon these things, let mc, as I close, dwell on a single aspect of this discussion which will render it memorable. On former occasions like this, the right of petition has been vehemently assailed, or practically denied. Only two years ago, memorials for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Bill, presented by me, were laid on your table, Mr. President, without reference to any Committee. All is changed now. Senators have condemned the memorial, and sounded the cry of "treason," "treason," in our ears; but thus far, throughout this excited debate, no person has so completely outraged the spirit of our institutions, or forgotten himself, as to persevere in objecting to the reception of the memorial, and its proper reference.

It is true, the remonstrants and their representatives here have been treated with indignity; but the great right of petition the sword

though thus discredited,

Here, sir, is a triumph for

STRUGGLE FOR THE REPEAL OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE BILL

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 31ST July, 1854.

The efforts of the friends of Freedom in Congress have encountered opposition at every stage. The presentation of petitions by John Quincy Adams was thwarted in every way that vindictive rage could prompt. All propositions for the repeal of obnoxious laws sustaining Slavery have been stifled. To accomplish this result, parliamentary courtesy and parliamentary law have both been set at defiance. On a former occasion, (see ante, p. 74,) when Mr. Sumner brought forward his motion for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Bill, he was refused a hearing; and he obtained it only by taking advantage of the Civil and Diplomatic Appropriation Bill, and moving an amendment to it, which no parliamentary subtlety or audacity could declare to be out of order. On the presentation of petitions against the Fugitive Slave Bill, from time to time, he was met by similar checks. Meanwhile, anything for Slavery was always in order. An experience of a single day will show something of this.

On the 31st July, 1854, Mr. Seward, of New York, under instructions from the Committee on Pensions, reported a Bill, which had already passed the House of Representatives, for the relief of Betsey Nash, a poor and aged woman, whose husband had died of wounds received in the the war of 1812, and asked for its immediate consideration. This simple measure, demanded by obvious justice, was at once embarrassed by an incongruous proposition for the support of Slavery. Mr. Adams, of Mississippi, moved, as an amendment, another Bill, for the relief of Mrs. Batchelder, the widow of a person who had been killed in Boston, while aiding as a volunteer in the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Bill. In the face of various objections this amend

ment was adopted. Mr. Sumner at once followed by a proposition in the following words:

"Provided, that the Act of Congress, approved 18th Sept. 1850, for the surrender of fugitives from service or labor, be, and the same hereby is repealed."

--

But this was ruled out of order, as "not germane to the Bill under consideration ;" and the two Bills, hitched together— one for a military pension, and the other for contribution to the widow of a Slave-Hunter were put on their passage. Mr. Sumner then sprang for the floor, when a struggle ensued, which is minutely reported in the Congressional Globe. The careful reader will observe that, in order to cut off an effort to repeal the Fugitive Slave Bill, at least two unquestionable rules of parliamentary law were overturned.

Mr. SUMNER. In pursuance of notice, I now ask leave to introduce a Bill.

Mr. STUART. I object to it, and move to take up the River and Harbor Bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The other Bill is not disposed of. The third reading of a Bill for the relief of Betsey Nash.

The Bill was then read a third time and passed. Mr. SUMNER. In pursuance of notice, I ask leave to introduce a Bill, which I now send to the table. Mr. STUART. Is that in order?

Mr. SUMNER. Why not?

Mr. BENJAMIN. There is a pending motion of the Senator from Michigan to take up the River and Harbor Bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That motion was not entertained, because the Senator from Massachusetts had and has the floor.

Mr. STUART.

I make the motion now.