At a local election, held on the 23d of May, a secessionist was elected by one hundred and ninety majority, though the Union vote was more than three times the vote cast in 1861 against separation. Treasonable language was so extensively and openly used, as to call for an order that all persons who should be arrested therefor must take the oath of allegiance, and give bonds, or be sent beyond the National lines. The influence of the churches was antagonistic, in many instances, to the Government. In June, six prominent clergymen of the city having been summoned to take the oath of allegiance, and refusing, five were sent to the penitentiary-one, on account of feeble health, being paroled. These measures seem severe; doubtless they were so; but it must be remembered that Nashville was in close proximity to the rebel army; that it was surrounded by prowling bands of guerrillas; that it was filled with men and women venomously traitorous, and who regarded neither the laws of war, the obligations of honor, the requirements of religion, nor the sanctity of an oath, in their unscrupulous opposition to the National Government. The most energetic measures were requisite to secure protection for the patriot, and peace for the city.

While Governor Johnson was thus devoting his energies to the mairtenance of order, and the administration of a quasi civil government, the military authorities found their attention fully demanded by new combinations and positions of the rebel armies, and by unexpected changes in the military situation.

Just before the occupation of Nashville by General Buell's column, on the 25th of February, General Johnston, at the head of a considerable rebel force, which, previous to the attack upon Fort Donelson, had held Bowling Green, passed through the former city, retreating south. He had continued his march as far as Murfreesboro'. Here it was thought he would give battle, but upon the advance of the National troops, the rebels continued their flight about one hundred miles farther south, and commenced concentrating along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. It was their object to resist the attempt which the Union forces were now making to get in the rear of Memphis, and of the rebel forts Randolph and Pillow, which were then frowning upon the Mississippi.

General Buell was, therefore, directed to march no farther south, but to turn his army in a westerly direction, and form a junction with General Grant, who had already advanced up the Tennessee River as far as Pittsburg Landing, almost simultaneously with General Buell's advance on Nashville. As early as the 3d of March, by a gunboat reconnoissance, the rebels were discovered fortifying themselves at this point, and after a short but sharp skirmish were driven from their works. Meanwhile a great expedition was fitted out to proceed, under General Grant, up the Tennessee. It consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Sherman, Hurlbut, McClernand, Lew. Wallace, and Colonel Lauman. More than fifty-seven transports were employed, besides gunboats, in this expedition.

The nature and object of these various movements, and their connection with contemporaneou events, may perhaps be more readily compre

hended by a reference to the annexed map; and a remembrance of those various operations which were taking place almost simultaneously, and which constituted parts of a single campaign, culminating in the surrender of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the recovery of the entire line of the Mississippi River by the National arms. As the historian must record these acts separately, they are liable to become dissociated in the mind of the reader.

It is the middle of March, 1862. General Curtis has pursued the routed battalions of the rebel Price, driven him into the mountains of Arkansas, awaited quietly his attack, and on the 6th and 7th of March defeated in the battle of Pea Ridge the combined forces of Van Dorn, McCulloch, and Price. General Grant and Commodore Foote have captured Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, on the 6th of February, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, the 16th of the same month. Nashville had been occupied on the 25th by a column advancing from Louisville and Bowling Green. The rebel General Johnston has retreated to Murfreesboro', and thence south towards the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, to form a junction with Beauregard, which he soon effected.

Columbus was evacuated by the rebels on the 1st of March. New Madrid surrendered a fortnight later to General Pope. Commodore Foote is still thundering away at the iron gates of Island No. 10, which does not surrender until the 7th of April, the very day on which, in the terrible battle of Shiloh, the rebel victory of the preceding day is wrested from them, and turned into a disastrous defeat. Thus, in the short space of two months, occur the battle of Pea Ridge, the assault at New Madrid, the successful siege of Island No. 10, the bombardment of Fort Henry, the sanguinary three days' battle at Fort Donelson, the evacuation of Columbus, the National advance through Bowling Green, the occupation of Nashville, General Grant's expedition up the Tennessee River, and the fierce battle of Shiloh-all forming parts of one campaign, directed by one mind, constituting one plan, tending to one object-the recovery of the Mississippi. These brilliant achievements, aided by General Curtis's march through the wilderness, the naval engagements on the great river which constitutes the pride and the power of the nation, and the siege of Corinth, resulted, after four months of severe campaigning, in the capture of Memphis, and the National occupation of the river down to that point.

On the 11th of March, General Grant's advance reached Savannah, a little hamlet scarce deserving the name of a village. It was situated on the Tennessee River, but a few miles north of the Mississippi State line. The object of his advance was apparent. If he could obtain and hold possession of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, Memphis would fall an easy prey into the National hands; the fortifications on the Mississippi River would be no longer tenable; the upper half of the river would pass, at once, under National control; and the rebels would be cut off from their most direct communication between the East and the West.

The rebel leaders, through the multitude of traitors who thronged Washington, were early informed of the National plans. To thwart the movement, General Beauregard was assigned the command of the Depart

ment of the Mississippi, which he assumed on the 5th of March, calling upon the Governors of Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama for additional troops. Rebel forces were recalled from Pensacola and Mobile to strengthen his army. The nucleus was composed of two divisions under General Polk, from Columbus. General A. S. Johnston was directed to move from Murfreesboro', to form a junction with this body. Cannon were needed The people were called upon to furnish bells from their churches and plantations, to melt up for artillery. By the 1st of April, the whole rebel force was concentrated along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. General Buell was at this time moving from Nashville to Savannah, to form a junction with General Grant. The nation would thus have an army which, though inferior in numbers to that of the rebels, would probably be superior in armament.

The advantages, however, which the rebels possessed for a speedy concentration of their force may be seen by a glance at the map. General Buell's army could not safely be withdrawn from the front of Nashville until he was assured that General Johnston's force had been permanently withdrawn from Murfreesboro'. He had then a wearisome march across

the country of one hundred and fifty miles, from Nashville to Savannah, before he could reach General Grant. The rebels, on the contrary, had an uninterrupted line of communication by rail between Murfreesboro' and Corinth. Thus, while General Buell was moving across the country with the delay unavoidably incident to such a march, the rebel General Johnston had already reached Corinth. The united rebel army had been organized into three grand divisions, under Generals Polk, Bragg, and Hardee.

It was decided by the rebels not to await the National advance, but to attack General Grant before the arrival of General Buell. With a very spirited address, General Johnston endeavored to rouse his troops to the most determined valor. In order to convey to the reader a clear idea of the conflict which ensued, a brief description of the locality is needful.

Pittsburg Landing is simply a steamboat landing for the surrounding country. Two log huts constituted the town. Twenty miles back from the river, in a southwesterly direction, is Corinth, at the junction of the Memphis and Charleston, and the Mobile and Ohio Railroads. A few miles from the river, on the Corinth road, stood, prior to the battle, a log church, called Shiloh Church. This building, at the close of the first day's battle, was used by General Beauregard as his head-quarters, and gave the name to the battle-field. The surrounding country is rolling, partially cultivated, but, for the most part, covered with thick woods, with some underbrush, the whole cut up by numerous ravines. The soil is clayey. A maze of roads, and lanes, and by-paths bewilders any one not thoroughly acquainted with the region.

On either side of Pittsburg Landing, but at some little distance from it, there is a creek flowing down to the river. One branch is called Lick Creek, the other Snake Creek. About six miles below Pittsburg Landing is Crump's Landing; and still farther down, on the eastern banks of the river, is the hamlet of Savannah, to which we have alluded. Here, some ten miles from the main body of his army, General Grant had established his head-quarters.

At Pittsburg Landing the western bank of the river is high, and the road runs down to the water through a narrow ravine. Stretching back from this landing, over a space of from two to four miles, General Grant's army was encamped. It would seem that the Union commanders had not conceived that they might be attacked by the rebels before General Buell should arrive. At least no preparations had been made for such a contingency. A superior hostile army lay in their immediate front. A deep, unbridged, unfordable river was in their rear. Yet their divisions werė, apparently, not arranged with any view to easy and speedy concentration. General Sherman's Division, which occupied the extreme front, was composed entirely of new troops, fresh from camps of instruction, none of whom had ever been under fire. No attempt was made to throw up breastworks. No efficient system of pickets had been established, and no sufficient system of scouting had been maintained.

The fact is as indisputable as it is extraordinary, that this army, separated by scarcely a score of miles from its outnumbering foe, was wholly

unprepared for the tremendous assault which was speedily, on the 6th of April, made upon it. They were apparently taken as much by surprise as if the attack had come from the stars. Who is responsible for this inexplicable fact it is difficult to tell. The country excused, though not without hesitation, the blunder, since, by a series of good providences, the army was saved from destruction, and a National victory was at last gained, though at a fearful sacrifice. A court of inquiry was talked of, but none was ordered. The wail over the thousands needlessly slaughtered was drowned in the shouts of the final victory, and the hurried verdict of the military inquest was, as usual, "No blame is attached to any one." Though the impartial historian cannot indorse this tacit exoneration, neither can he be expected to do what the military authorities, with all the facts before them, failed to do, determine on whom the responsibility of the first day's disaster at Pittsburg Landing rests.

On the 2d of April, General Beauregard learned that General Buell was rapidly advancing across the country, and that the union of the two National forces would soon be effected. His own preparations for the attack were not yet quite completed. But he determined to strike without further delay. On the morning of the 3d, orders were issued for a forward movement. It was the plan to attack General Grant's forces early on the morning of the 5th. The roads, however, were narrow; the rebel troops, unused to marching, and a severe rain-storm, on the night of the 4th, delayed them, so that they did not reach the immediate front of the National troops until the afternoon of Saturday, the 5th. The hour of attack was, accordingly, deferred until the following morning. This delay saved the National forces from what must otherwise have proved an overwhelming defeat.

Here, during Saturday night, lay the entire rebel army, in close proximity to the Union lines. Yet their presence seems never to have been so much as suspected by the Union commanders. But thirty-five thousand National troops had crossed the river. Seventy thousand rebels were prepared to rush upon them. During the entire day of Saturday, portions of the rebel cavalry were frequently seen along the front. There were frequent skirmishes. It is said that General Sherman had privately stated that he thought that there was great danger of a rebel attack, and that General Grant had intimated a like opinion. No adequate measures, however, were taken to ascertain the whereabouts of the rebels. The Union army slept quietly in its tents on Saturday night, quite unconscious of the storm which was to burst upon them on the morrow. "I did not believe," says General Sherman, "that the enemy designed any thing but a strong demonstration."

At half-past five o'clock on the morning of the Sabbath the rebel columns were put in motion, advancing to the attack in three lines, under the three generals, Hardee, Bragg, and Polk. The reserves were commanded by General Breckenridge. Generals Johnston and Beauregard commanded the entire movement. The former was commander-in-chief. Their design was to pierce the patriot line, and then drive the two separ ated wings back into the river.