THE CIVIL WAR. CHAPTER I. THE EVACUATION OF MANASSAS. (From January to April, 1862.) INACTION ON THE POTOMAC.-UNEASINESS OF THE COMMUNITY.-PLAN OF THE WAR-PEREMPTORY ORDER OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN. THE ARMY IN MOTION. REBEL DEFENCES AT MANASSAS.-FORCE SENT TO THE PENINSULA.-DREAD OF THE MERRIMAC. THE disastrous battle of Bull Run was fought on the 21st of July, 1861. After this, the summer, the autumn, and the winter passed slowly away, while the immense Army of the Potomac, numbering not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men, remained quietly within their intrenchments. General Scott, and after him, General McClellan, deemed these months of inaction necessary, that the mass of raw recruits might be organized and drilled. In the community there were two parties, the one approving, the other condemning this policy. The general voice of the public was, however, very loud and incessant against this long delay of any military action. It was said that we were thus affording the enemy time to strengthen his position; that though our troops were new. they had only undisciplined troops to encounter; that it was important to avail ourselves of the enthusiasm which the assault upon our National flag had created, and that a few prompt victories would so discourage the rebels, that the war would speedily be brought to a close. The result, however, showed that it was not the Divine will that the war should be speedily ended. It became manifest to every believer in an overruling Providence, that the war was the instrument which God had brought forward to sweep from our land the gigantic crime of American Slavery. Every hour during which the war was protracted, slowly undermined that massive fabric of sin and shame. The autumn and the winter, in the mild climate of Virginia, were delightful, even to the commencement of the New Year. The rebel troops, raw recruits, not nearly so well disciplined as our own, certainly not better armed, and quite inferior in numbers, were encamped at Manassas, distant from our outposts not more than twenty miles. The roads between the two armies were in good condition. They led over a gently undulating country, where our troops could meet with no obstructions until they reached the intrenchments of the foe. The general plan, at this time, for the conduct of the war was simple, and one which, under able leaders, could hardly fail of ultimate success. First, by a vigorous blockade, the rebels were to be isolated from the rest of the world, and cut off from all supplies. We have already narrated the wonderful vigor with which a navy was created, and have shown what an Herculean task it was to undertake the blockade of a coast over three thousand miles in extent. Then the Mississippi was to be seized, from Cairo to the Gulf, so that, with our gunboats, we could have the control of all the Western rivers. The energy and success with which this latter enterprise was commenced, in the storming of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the capture of New Orleans, we have also recorded. To the Army of the Potomac was intrusted the duty of driving the rebels out of Virginia, and wresting from them Richmond, their capital. These various yet united measures involved campaigns so distant from each other, and so distinct in their operations, that they could be carried on simultaneously.* The conquest of Richmond, in consequence of the discouragement with which it would oppress the rebels, and the moral influence it would exert upon those foreign nations by whom we were menaced with intervention, was deemed certainly not less important than either of the other measures. Hence it was, that the inaction of the Army of the Potomac, month after month, caused such intense disquietude. The Prince de Joinville, one of the sons of Louis Philippe, of France, joined the Union army. He was the personal friend of General McClellan, and was on his staff. In some very able articles published by him in the "Revue des Deux Mondes," in Paris, in October, 1862, and subsequently translated and published in a pamphlet in this country, this inexplicable inaction is attributed to the natural want of energy of the American people. And yet his pen seems to falter in bringing against our countrymen a charge so unprecedented. "And here I may point out," he says, "a characteristic trait of the American people-delay. This delay in resolving and acting, so opposed to the promptitude, the decision, the audacity, to which the American, considered as an individual, had accustomed us, is an inexplicable phenomenon, which always causes me the greatest astonishment." The Prince was deceived. This amazing delay was not caused by want of energy in the soldiers, or by lack of zeal in the nation, but by the strategic plans of the Commander-in-Chief. At length the impatient nation, uninformed respecting General McClellan's plans, uttered remonstrances so united and so loud, that President Lincoln, on the 27th of January, * The whole extent of the coast to be guarded by a blockading fleet, according to an official report made to Rear-Admiral Davis, was three thousand five hundred and forty-nine miles, without counting the indentations of the harbors and ports. There were one hundred and eightynine openings in this coast, either rivers, bays, harbors, inlets, sounds, or passes, through which vessels could run in and out. All the maritime enterprise of Great Britain seemed to be enlisted in endeavors to run the blockade. To the honor of France, it should be mentioned, that during the whole continuance of the war, scarcely a French vessel was known to make any effort to carry aid and comfort to the rebels. 1862, issued an order from the Executive Mansion in Washington, that on the 22d of February there should be a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgents. General McClellan, when he succeeded General Scott in the command of the whole army of the United States, found his qualifications for this high military position immediately put to the severest test. The work of organization of that vast volunteer army of five hundred thousand men was to be accomplished. To his immediate supervision and agency were committed the equipment and preparation of the Eastern Army. Two nundred regiments, of the best material for soldiers that was ever gathered, were to be organized, drilled, disciplined, furnished with competent generals, equipped with artillery and cavalry, and provided with the munitions of war. To create such an army, and to call into existence the vast quantity of arms and equipments of every kind needed by so immense a force, involved inconceivable difficulties. But to Major-General McClellan, aided by the equally indefatigable exertions of the Secretary of War, belongs the credit of this achievement. The splendid Army of the Potomac, with the bright array of military strength and thoroughly drilled soldiery gathered into his staff, and conspicuous in his generals, has usually been admitted to be incontestable evidence of the young commander's organizing genius. The organization of such an army, from the vast mass of brave, but undisciplined men,-leaving suddenly the peaceful pursuits of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, or homes of wealth and luxury,-and the equipment of great naval expeditions, when the means and munitions of war were as yet unprovided, required, unquestionably, time. The scene thus created, upon the silent banks of the Potomac, was one of the most gorgeous war has ever presented. Nearly two hundred thousand mer were dwelling in their neatly arranged and orderly cities of white tents, on the undulating shores of that beautiful stream. The glistening ranks upon the hill-sides, the ponderous parks of artillery, ever moving to and fro, the almost meteoric sweep of squadrons of cavalry over the plains, the waving of countless banners, the gorgeous display of military staffs surrounding their chief, the reviews of brigades, divisions, and corps d'armée, the peal of bugles and the bursts of exultant music from a thousand * The following note from the President shows his views, at the time, respecting the line of attack upon Richmond :EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3d, 1862. Major-General MCCLELLAN : MY DEAR SIR:-You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac. Ycurs appears to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across the land to the terminus of the railroad on York River. Mine is to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine? 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine? 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine? 4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communication, while mine would? In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? VOL. II-2 Yours truly, A. LINCOLN. |