to determine the character of matters of jurisdiction, in regard, namely, to their spiritual quality." 20 While in the above quotation the word spiritual is stressed and the word moral is not used, mixed matters are referred to. Dr. Macksey has already said that 21 the spiritual jurisdiction of the Roman Church is "to safeguard the internal moral order of right and wrong..." It is clear that in Dr. Macksey's teaching the State is bound to recognize the supremacy of the jurisdiction of the Roman Church in the great moral questions of life. Public worship and education would come instantly within such a claim of jurisdiction. The State, therefore, is bound to recognize the juridical rights of the Roman Church in these matters and, in the last analysis, they are exclusive and absolute. Question: Do the juridical rights of the Roman Church as a matter of objective right and of theory, i. e., under ideal Roman Catholic conditions, demand that the State shall further and protect the Roman Church and religion as the only true Church and religion? Dr. Macksey says: "The State, furthermore, is bound to render due worship to God, as follows from the same argument from the natural law which proves man's obligation to external worship, namely, that man must acknowledge his dependence upon God and his subjection to Him in every capacity in which he is so dependent, and therefore not only in his private capacity as an individual 20 Ibid, p. 252 c. 21 Vide supra p. 47. but also in that public, corporate capacity whereby he and his fellow citizens constitute the State. Due worship, in the present economy, is that of the religion of Christ, entrusted to the care of the of the (Roman) Church." 22 Question: Do the juridical rights of the Roman Church as a matter of objective right and of theory, i. e., under ideal Roman Catholic conditions, demand that the State shall further and protect the Roman Catholic Church in any claim it may make over the moral instruction of children? Dr. Macksey says: "The State must also protect the (Roman) Church in the exercise of her functions, for the reason that the State is bound to protect all the rights of its citizens, and among these their religious rights, which as a matter of fact would be insecure and fruitless were not the (Roman) Church protected. The State is even under obligation to promote the spiritual interests of the (Roman) Church; for the State is bound to promote whatever by reaction naturally works for the moral development of its citizens and consequently for the internal peace of the community, and in the present condition of human nature that development is necessarily dependent upon the spiritual influence of the (Roman) Church." 28 Dr. Macksey obviously claims that teaching, in matters belonging to morals, is the sovereign right of the Roman Church. The United States by its Constitution 22 C. E., vol. xiv, p. 252 c. 23 C. E., vol. xiv, p. 252 c. repudiates such sovereignty in the Roman Church, and all sovereignty in every church, by forbidding Congress to make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Dr. Macksey, therefore, asserts a right that is in direct conflict with the constitutional law of the State. He also asserts a dependence of the community in its moral life on the Roman Church which excludes any other religious and moral society from moral and, therefore, in the nature of things, from legal rights. Nothing can be more intolerable in the modern State than the promulgation of the theory that, as a matter of objective right, it is the duty of the State to promote the interests of the Roman Church to the exclusion of other churches. Question: Does the Roman Church, then, consider that the union of Church and State is desirable, and that as far as possible or expedient it ought to be secured in preference to the existing separation? Dr. Macksey says: "Between the (Roman) Church and a non-Christian or a Christian, but non-(Roman) Catholic, State a condition of separation, as meaning a condition of indifference of the State towards the (Roman) Church, is to be expected, as the foundation of the specific obligations involved in union are wanting. Such a separation for a (Roman) Catholic State would be criminal, as ignoring the sacred obligations of the State.” 24 Dr. Macksey is strictly logical: When you cannot have separation, it is to be expected that you will not have it. When you can have union, it is criminal if 24 C. E., vol. xiv, p. 253 c. you do not have it. The existence of a majority vote in its favor can, of course, reëstablish the ancient union of the Roman Church and the State. Question: Where, in the modern State, the Roman Catholics are largely in the majority, must not the moral rights and, ultimately, the legal rights of the minority be, as a matter of objective truth, subject to determination in accordance with the will of the Pope operating through the majority? An apposite answer to this question does not appear in Dr. Macksey's treatise, but happily it is a question that it would seem average common sense can answer. Differences of belief and opinion are, happily, sufficiently prevalent to prevent a unanimously Roman Catholic State in the New World, but not to prevent the development, through Roman Catholic propaganda, of a State that shall be as nearly Roman Catholic as it can be made. Agreeable as the situation might prove if all had been converted, the process of conversion has objections that are historically justified. The conversion of a majority in the modern State would secure control of the electorate. A minority would be compelled, in Roman Catholic doctrine, to rely on considerations of favor and expediency, and not on the sure foundation of objective truth, to secure and perpetuate the full enjoyment of their moral and legal rights, the freedom of thinking and acting on matters relating to religion and morals, the conduct of their public worship, and the preaching and teaching of their religious and moral tenets, as now guaranteed, e. g., in the Constitution of the United States.25 25 The journal L'Europe Nouvelle (Paris, July 16, 1927, p. 941, A society, forming only a part of the community, cannot rightfully or justly ask from the rest of the community their unprotesting endurance of a doctrine which denies their inherent rights the basis of objective truth, and offers them in lieu of it a dubious toleration by grace and favor. Argument is not met by quoting glittering generalities uttered by members of the Roman Hierarchy on patriotism and civil duties; e. g., (a) That religious liberty is safeguarded by the American Constitution; 26 to this we reply that the safeguard is found not in the Constitution but in the numerical majority that maintains it. (b) That it was a great leap forward when the United States declared that Congress should make no law respecting an establishment of religion; 27 to this we reply that a religion is substantially established when obedience to a church sovereignty is an integral part of its creed. (c) That union of the Roman Church and the State is relegated to the limbo of defunct controversies; 28 to this we reply that it is not so relegated for it is advocated here and now. (d) That no combination of circumstances is likely to arise which would make a union desirable to note 13), commenting on the references of Governor Smith in his magazine article, (Atlantic Monthly, May, 1927, p. 724 d) to "the completely Catholic State," says: “But it would be necessary in such a case to reserve to one, who in this completely Catholic State should have lost the Catholic faith, the possibility of living according to the law of his conscience." "Encore faudrait-il ici réserver à celui qui, dans cet Etat complètement catholique, viendrait à perdre la foi catholique, la possibilité de vivre selon la loi de sa conscience." 26 Cardinal O'Connell, see Atlantic Monthly, May, 1927, p. 725. 27 Archbishop Ireland, ibid. 28 Archbishop Dowling, ibid. |