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the fourth struck a port stopper in the centre, breaking it in two and driving the iron fragments through the port. The first and third shots decided the battle, the former, as Captain Rodgers observed, having taken away the desire to fight, and the latter the ability to get away. The captured prisoners amounted to 145, officers and men, and the hull of the Atlanta was so little injured that in a short time she was enabled to take her place among vessels of her class in the United States navy.

The combat was characterized by the Secretary of the Navy as "the most marked and extraordinary in the service during the year, and in some respects one of the most significant and instructive naval battles of the war." Whatever opinions may have been entertained of the efficacy of iron-clads against forts of masonry or sand, few could doubt after this that when iron-clads were pitted against ironclads their execution could be of the most decisive character. The Monitor class of vessels, which had fallen into temporary disfavor after the attack on Fort Sumter, became again popular, and were recognized as likely to be of the highest value in harbor or coast defence. The brevity of the conflict and the complete disabling of the Atlanta also reconciled many to the heavy ordnance carried by these vessels, the efficacy of which had been a subject of some dispute among professional men.

Notwithstanding the failure of the attack of April 7th, the Government was unwilling to relinquish further efforts against Charleston, and as the tone of Admiral Dupont's letters indicated that he was opposed to a renewed attack upon the forts, it was determined to relieve him by the appointment of Rear-Admiral Foote. That officer dying in New York before his departure, Rear-Admiral Dahlgren was appointed to the command of the squadron, and entered upon his duties on July 6th. Previous to this date the demonstrations against Charleston had been exclusively naval, but with the arrival of Gen. Gillmore as commander-in-chief of the military department of the South, arrangements were made for combined operations by the land forces and the iron-clads.

The chief maritime disaster on this station was the loss of the Weehawken, which sank at her moorings on the morning of Dec. 6th, during the prevalence of a northwesterly gale, carrying with her to the bottom four of her engineers and twenty-six of her crew. The remainder of the ship's company escaped in the boats, or by jumping overboard at the moment of going down. The most of those who per ished were probably drowned in the turret and immediately below it, while seeking to force their way through the narrow openings which afford the only means of escape. The disaster

was at the time attributed to her hatches being unclosed.

The proper station of the Western Gulf squadron was along the Gulf coast from Pensacola to the Rio Grande, but owing to military movements in Mississippi and Louisiana, RearAdmiral Farragut (having been promoted to the new grade) was obliged to employ many of his vessels in the Mississippi and Red Rivers, in active cooperation with the land forces. For the same reason he gave his chief attention to this portion of his squadron, leaving the blockade of the coast to his subordinates.

The operations of the Mississippi fleet, like those of the preceding, were almost exclusively undertaken in conjunction with the land forces. Important services were rendered by the gunboats in patrolling the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, and dispersing the guerrillas who fired upon supply steamers and transports. To the gunboats on the Ohio, which in July cooperated with the land forces in the pursuit of Morgan, was in a considerable degree due the capture of that leader and his force.

The flotilla on the Mississippi numbered upward of a hundred vessels, carrying 462 guns, with crews amounting in the aggregate to 5,500 men. Thirteen of these were efficient iron-clads, 33" tin-clads," so called from being less heavily plated than the others, and the remainder consisted of despatch and auxiliary vessels, rams, &c. There were also a number of iron and tin-clads in the course of construction.

The number of vessels captured by the several squadrons from the commencement of the war to Nov. 1st, 1863, was 1,045, classified as follows: steamers, 179; ships, 15; barques, 26; brigs, 30; schooners, 547; sloops, 131; yachts and small boats, 117. The value of all the prizes sent to admiralty courts for adjudication is estimated by Secretary Welles at upward of $13,000,000; and the value of those condemned, the costs and amounts distributed, are shown in the following table:

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CHAPTER XXXV.

Situation of Gen. Rosecrans-Attack on Fort Donelson-Expeditions of Colburn, Sheridan, Hall, and Col. Streight-Advance of Gen. Rosecrans-Retreat of Gen. Bragg-Movement of Gen. Burnside-Other Movements-Occupation of Chattanooga-Further advance of Gen. Rosecrans-Battle of Chickamauga-Firmness of Gen. Thomas-Army concentrates at Chattanooga.

BEFORE proceeding to state the important movements of the army under Gen. Rosecrans which took place at this time, it may be proper to notice its situation subsequent to the battle of Stone River in the beginning of the year. The operations of the Army of the Cumberland, under Maj.-Gen. Rosecrans, during 1862, closed with the battle of Stone River, near Murfreesboro. This battle took place on the last days of 1862 and the first of 1863. On the 5th of January the headquarters of the army were established at Murfreesboro. The army occupied a position in front of the town, and a series of extensive earthworks, completely encircling it, were constructed for the purpose of making it a depot of supplies and the base of future operations. The railroad track and the bridges in the rear toward Nashville were also repaired. On the 9th of January the army was divided into three corps, designated the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first, and commanded respectively by Gens. Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden. Active operations were, however, suspended, owing to the rains of the season. Large supplies were collected in consequence of the rise of the Cumberland River at Nashville and Murfreesboro. But the enemy was not idle. His cavalry overran the country, and men and wagons belonging to Gen. Rosecrans were often captured by him. The object was to cut off the communications of the Army of the Cumberland and its supplies. Thus also many of the steamers on the Cumberland River were captured and burned.

On the 31st, Brig. Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, with a division of infantry and two brigades of cavalry, under Col. Minty, moved from camp on an expedition in the direction of Rover and Franklin. The force was absent thirteen days, and during that time some portion of it visited Middletown, Unionville, Versailles, Peytonville, Franklin, Hillsboro, Kinderhook, and Triune. The cavalry captured one hundred and fortyone prisoners, including two colonels, one ma jor, four captains, and several lieutenants, with two men severely injured.

On the 3d of February an attack was made on Fort Donelson, in another part of this department. On the 2d, the Confederate Col. Forrest, with nine hundred men, had taken a position at Palmyra, for the purpose of interrupting the navigation of the Cumberland. On the next day he advanced upon the fort both from above and below. The garrison consisted of nine companies of the 83d Illinois, a battalion of the 5th Iowa cavalry, Flood's battery,

and some wounded men, under command of Col. A. C. Harding. The battery consisted of four rifled guns, and in addition there was a pivot of thirty-two pounder rifled, mounted on the northwest corner of the fort. At half-past one in the afternoon a flag of truce was sent in by Col. Forrest, demanding a surrender of the fort and garrison. This was promptly refused, and preparations for defence were made. The attack was immediately commenced, and kept up with numerous charges, which were gallantly repulsed, until eight o'clock in the evening, when another demand for a surrender was made. It was again promptly refused, and the enemy retired in confusion. The Federal loss was thirteen killed, fifty-one wounded, and twenty taken prisoners, without including a captain and twenty-six men who were captured on the same day while on a scout; also one gun, twenty-five mules, and forty-two horses. The Confederate loss was estimated at two hundred and fifty killed, six hundred wounded, and one hundred and five prisoners.

A period of inactivity now ensued, which was suddenly broken by the defeat and capture of a Federal brigade at Spring Hill on the 5th of March. On the preceding day an expedition, under the command of Col. John Colburn, consisting of part of the 33d and 85th Indiana, 22d Wisconsin, and 19th Michigan, numbering fifteen hundred and eighty-nine men, together with the 124th Ohio; and six hundred cavalry and one battery of six small guns, was ordered to proceed from Franklin to Spring Hill, ten miles south, on the Columbia turnpike. Soon after commencing the march, the enemy were encountered, and after a sharp skirmish, repulsed. Moving forward about two miles, they were again encountered, but, owing to the late hour, the command encamped. Starting again on the next morning, the 124th Ohio being in the rear of the wagon train, the enemy was again met, after an advance of two miles, and sharp skir mishing was kept up for some distance. The enemy was then found in full force under Gen. Van Dorn and Col. Forrest. A severe struggle ensued, which was protracted until Col. Forrest had taken a position in the rear, when Col. Colborn, finding his ammunition failing, and his retreat cut off, surrendered. Thirteen hundred and six men were made prisoners. The cav alry were not engaged, and, with the artillery, escaped. The Confederate force consisted of cavalry and mounted infantry, composing six brigades, under the command of Maj.-Gen. Van Dorn. The whole force of Gen. Van Dorn had

been at Spring Hill for three days, preparing to make an attack on Franklin.

Meanwhile a successful expedition was made by Gen. Sheridan, with his division, and Col. Minty, with a force of eight hundred cavalry. Several sharp skirmishes took place, and a portion of the force which captured Col. Colburn was overtaken at Thompson Station and driven from the field, and the force of Gen. Van Dorn was followed to Duck river, when the expedition returned to Franklin.

On the 18th of March, an expedition, consisting of the 105th Ohio, 80th and 123d Illinois, and an Indiana battery, and one company of 1st Middle Tennessee cavalry, numbering about fourteen hundred men, under the command of Col. A. S. Hall, left Murfreesboro and moved in the direction of Liberty. That night Gainesville was occupied, and on the next morning an advance was made, when a slight skirmish ensued. The enemy slowly retired on the turnpike down Smith's Fork, followed by Col. Hall, until they were found drawn up in line across the road. Finding, upon a reconnoissance, that he was greatly outnumbered, Col. Hall fell back toward Murfreesboro, with the object of drawing the enemy after him. That night he encamped at Auburn, seven miles from Liberty, and on the next morning, the 20th, took up a position at Milton, twelve miles northeast of Marfreesboro. Here he was attacked by the Confederate force under Gen. John Morgan, who, after a fight of three and a half hours, withdrew from the field. Four captains, two lieutenants, and fifty-seven men were left on the field as dead or mortally wounded. Their total loss was estimated at nearly four hundred. Ten prisoners, eight horses, and fifty-three stands of arms were captured. The loss of Col. Hall was six killed, forty-two wounded, and seven missing. The force of the enemy was about two thousand.

A large number of expeditions, similar to those above stated, were sent out at different times; often with much success. About the 10th of April another attack was made on Maj.-Gen. Gordon Granger, at Franklin, by the Confederate force, under Maj.-Gen. Van Dorn. The force of Gen. Granger consisted of the divisions of Brig.-Gens. Baird and Gilbert, sixteen hundred men and sixteen guns, and Brig.-Gen. Smith's cavalry brigade of eleven hundred and twenty-eight men; also a cavalry force of sixteen hundred men and two guns, under Col. Stanley. The only artificial defence was an uncompleted fort, which mounted two siege guns and two three-inch rifled guns. Its elevation was about forty feet above the surrounding country, and it commanded most of the approaches to Franklin, north of the Harpeth, and all from the south except a small portion of the surface covered by a few blocks of houses. Gen. Granger's camp was on the north side of the river, about two thirds of a mile distant from the town. Gen. Baird was ordered to hold in check any force attempting to cross the fords below

the town, and Gen. Gilbert was placed in a position to meet any attack in front, or to reenforce either flank. Gen. Stanley was stationed out four miles on the road to Murfreesboro, and Gen. Smith's cavalry were held in reserve to reënforce Gen. Stanley. This force, however, was sent under a misapprehension to Brentwood. An attack was made by Gen. Van Dorn upon Gen. Granger's front, which was repelled and afterward turned upon Gen. Stanley, who was driven back by overpowering numbers before reënforcements could reach him. After this the enemy withdrew. The force of the enemy was estimated at nine thousand cavalry and two regiments of infantry, and his loss at about three hundred. The loss of Gen. Granger was thirty-seven killed, wounded, and missing.

On the 20th of April, a force, consisting of Maj. Gen. Reynolds's division, Col. Wilder's mounted brigade, and seventeen hundred cavalry, under Col. Minty, left Murfreesboro to capture or disperse any Confederate force at McMinnsville. At night the cavalry encamped between Readyville and Woodbury. Early the next morning the force moved on, and, approaching the town, the pickets of the enemy were discovered. Forming a line, they opened fire, and were charged upon and driven through the town. The entire force thus dispersed consisted of seven hundred men. The wagon train had left the town for Chattanooga about an hour before the arrival of the Federal force, but, by hard pressing, three wagons were captured, and eight or nine men. Other movements were made by this force, which resulted in the capture of one hundred and thirty prisoners, the destruction of a trestle work below Morrison's, the burning of the railroad buildings, one locomotive, and two cars, at that place, the burning of the railroad bridge across Hickory creek, and the capture there of a large amount of bacon and other commissary stores. A large amount of property and stores, including a cotton factory and other Government buildings, was destroyed at McMinnsville, and a large number of horses and mules brought in. No casualties occurred to the Federal force.

On the 29th of April, a force of five hundred men, under Col. Watkins, captured a camp of the enemy, taking one hundred and thirtyeight prisoners.

About the same time an expedition was fitted out for Northern Georgia, consisting of the 51st Indiana, 80th Illinois, and portions of two Ohio regiments, under command of Col. A. D. Streight. The force numbered about eighteen hundred men, and the instructions given to Col. Streight were as follows:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPOT OF THE CUMBERLAND, MURFREESBORO, April 8th, 1863. Colonel A. D. Streight, 51st Indiana Volunteers:

By special field order, No. 94, paragraph 8, you have been assigned to the command of an Independent Provisional Brigade, for temporary purposes. After fitting out your command with equipments and supplies, as you have already been directed in the ver

bal instructions of the General commanding this department, you will then proceed by a route of which you will be advised by telegraph, to some good steamboat landing on the Tennessee river, not far above Fort Henry, where you will embark your command, and proceed up the river. At Hamburg you will communicate with Brig.-Gen. Dodge, who will probably have a messenger there, awaiting your arrival. If it should then appear unsafe to move farther up the river, you will debark at Hamburg, and, without delay, join the force of Gen. Dodge, which will then be en route for Iuka, Mississippi. If, however, it should be deemed safe, you will land at Eastport, and form a junction with Gen. Dodge. From that point you will then march in conjunction with him to menace Tuscumbia; but you will not wait to join in the attack, unless it should be necessary for the safety of Gen. Dodge's command or your own, or unless some considerable advantage can be gained over the enemy without interfering with the general object of your expedition. After having marched long enough with Gen. Dodge to create a general impression that you are a part of his expedition, you will push to the southward and reach Russellville or Moulton. From there your route will be governed by circumstances; but you will with all reasonable despatch push on to Western Georgia, and cut the railroads which supply the rebel army by way of Chattanooga. To accomplish this is the chief object of your expedition; and you must not allow collateral or incidental schemes, even though promising great results, to delay you so as to endanger your return. Your quartermaster has been furnished with funds sufficient for the necessary expenses of your command; you will draw your supplies and keep your command well mounted from the country through which you pass. For all property taken for the legitimate use of your command, you will make cash payments in full to men of undoubted loyalty, give the usual conditional receipts to men whose loyalty is doubt ful; but to rebels, nothing. You are particularly commanded to restrain your command from pillage and marauding; you will destroy all depots of supplies for the rebel army, all manufactories of guns, ammunition, equipments, and clothing for their use, which you can without delaying you so as to endanger your return. That you may not be trammelled with minute instructions, nothing further will be ordered than this general outline of policy and operation. In intrusting this highly important and somewhat perilous expedítion to your charge, the General commanding places great reliance on your prudence, energy, and valor, and the well-attested bravery and endurance of the officers and men in your command. Whenever it is possible and reasonably safe, send us word of your progress. You may return by way of Northern Alabama or Northern Georgia. Should you be surrounded by rebel forces, and your retreat cut off, defend yourself as long as possible, and make the surrender of your command cost the enemy as many times your number as possible. A copy of the general order from the War Department, in regard to paroling prisoners, together with the necessary blanks, are herewith furnished you; you are authorized to enlist all able-bodied men who desire to join the "Army of the Union." You must return as soon as the main objects of your expedition are accomplished.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff. The following additional instructions were sent by telegraph to Col. Streight:

April 9th, 1863. The written instructions you have received, are de. signed to cover the cases you allude to. It is not necessary that a manufactory be directly in the em

ploy of the rebels, to come under the rule there laid down. If it produces any considerable quantity of supplies, which are likely to reach the rebel army, it is to be destroyed. Of course, small mills, that can only supply the necessaries of life to the inhabitants,

should not be injured. Any considerable amount of supplies likely to reach the rebel army, are to be des troyed. If you dress your soldiers in the costume of the enemy, they will be liable to be treated as spies: you should not do this without the consent of the men, after they have been fully advised of the consequences. J. A. GARFIELD, Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

Under these instructions, Col. Streight embarked on steamers at Nashville, with his command, and landed near Fort Donelson on the Cumberland river. He then proceeded across the country to the Tennessee river, while the steamers descended to the Ohio and came up the Tennessee to meet him. Thence he proceeded to Eastport, and formed a junction with Gen. Dodge's force then marching upon Tuscumbia, and defeated the Confederate troops stationed there, with considerable loss to them. Thence he moved to Northern Georgia, aiming to reach the important points of Rome and Atlanta. Meanwhile Gen. Dodge, with his force, turned southward, to make a sweeping raid in Northern Alabama, and return to his headquarters at Corinth.

No sooner had Col. Streight commenced his march than information of his movements was received by Gen. Forrest and Col. Roddy, who, with a cavalry force, happened to be within striking distance. By a rapid movement they came upon the rear of Col. Streight, and commenced a running fight, which continued for four days, during which there were two severe battles and several spirited skirmishes. The Federal troops thus marched over a hundred miles toward the heart of the State, destroying bridges, and large supplies of corn collected for the Confederate army, a large foundery for the manufacture of cannon and shot, and seizing all the animals needed. Strict discipline was also maintained, and the inhabitants were not needlessly harassed. The Confederate force finally increased to overwhelming numbers, and Col. Streight, having expended his ammunition, and his men becoming exhausted, was compelled to surrender at a point fifteen miles from Rome, in Georgia. His men, numbering thirteen hundred, were paroled and sent to Virginia, and exchanged about two months afterward. But his officers were retained and imprisoned, on the demand of the Governor of Georgia, by whom they were claimed as having incurred the penalty fixed by a statute of the State for inciting slaves to rebellion. It was charged, at the time of the surrender, that negroes were found in Col. Streight's command, who were uniformed and bearing arms. This was denied by the privates, who asserted that only five or six negroes were with the command, and they had started with it from Nashville. This imprisonment of Col. Streight caused the Federal Government to suspend the exchange of Confederate officers, and subsequently to imprison Gen. John Morgan and his officers in the penitentiary of Ohio. Col. Streight was then released from imprisonment as a felon, and, subsequently, Gen. Morgan escaped.

At this time, the authorities at Washington were led to believe that large detachments were going from Gen. Bragg's army to reenforce Gen. Johnston in Mississippi. Gen. Rosecrans was therefore urged to take advantage of this opportunity to drive Gen. Bragg back into Georgia, and thus secure East Tennessee from the possession of the enemy. Gen. Burnside was also ordered to cooperate with him. The following correspondence occurred between Gens. Halleck and Rosecrans:

MURFREESBORO, TENN., June 11th, 1863. Your despatch of to-day is received. You remember that I gave you, as a necessary condition of success, an adequate cavalry force. Since that time I have not lost a moment in mounting our dismounted cavalry as fast as we could get horses. Not more than three hundred remain to be mounted. The 5th Iowa, ordered up from Donelson, arrived to-day. The 1st Wisconsin will be here by Saturday. My preliminary infantry movements have nearly all been completed, and I am preparing to strike a blow that will tell. But to show you how differently things are viewed here, I called on my corps and division commanders and generals of cavalry, for answers in writing to the questions:

First-From your best information, do you think the enemy materially weakened in our front? Second -Do you think this army can advance at this time with reasonable prospect of fighting a great and successful battle? Third-Do you think an advance advisable at this time? To the first, eleven answered no; six, yes, to the extent of ten thousand. To the second, four, yes, with doubts; thirteen, no. To the third, not one yes; seventeen, no.

Not one thinks an advance advisable until Vicksburg's fate is determined. Admitting these officers to have a reasonable share of military sagacity, courage, and patriotism, you perceive that there are graver and stronger reasons than probably appear at Washington, for the attitude of this army. I therefore counsel caution and patience at headquarters. Better wait a little to get all we can ready to insure the best result. If, by so doing, we, perforce of Providence, observe a great military maxim-not to risk two great and decisive battles at the same time-we might have cause to be thankful for it. At all events you see that, to expect success, I must have such thorough grounds that when I say "Forward," my word will inspire convic tion and confidence where both are now wanting. I

should like to have your suggestion.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General. To Maj.-Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

WASHINGTON, June 12th, 1863.

GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday is just received. I do not understand your application of the military maxim not to fight two great battles at the same time. It will apply to a single army, but not to two armies acting independently of each other. Johnston and Bragg are acting on interior lines between you and Grant, and it is for their interest, not ours, that they should fight at different times, so as to use the same force against both of you. It is for our interest to fight them, if possible, while divided. If you are not strong enough to fight Bragg with a part of his force absent, you will not be able to fight him after the affair at Vicksburg is over, and his troops return to your front. There is another military maxim, that "councils of war never fight." If you say that you are not prepared to fight Bragg, I shall not order you to do so, for the responsibility of fighting or refusing to fight at a particular time or place, must rest upon the general in immediate command. It cannot be shared by a council of war, nor will the authorities here make fight against your will. You ask me to counsel them to caution and patience. I have done so very often,

you

but after five or six months of inactivity, with your force all the time diminishing and no hope of any impatience is pretty well exhausted. If you do not deem mediate increase, you must not be surprised that their it prudent to risk a general battle with Bragg, why can you not harass him, or make such demonstrations as to prevent his sending more reënforcements to Johnston? I do not write this in a spirit of fault tivity of so large an army in the field is causing much finding, but to assure you that the prolonged inaccomplaint and dissatisfaction, not only in Washington, but throughout the country." Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Maj.-Gen. ROSECRANS, Murfreesboro, Tenn. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, MURFREESBORO, June 21st, 1863. GENERAL: In your favor of the 12th inst., you say you do not see how the maxim of not fighting two great battles at the same time, applies to the case of this army and to Grant's. Looking at the matter practically, we and our opposing forces are so widely separated, that for Bragg to materially aid Johnston, he must abandon our front substantially, and then we can move to our ultimate work with more rapidity, and less waste of material on natural obstacles. If Grant is defeated, both forces will come here, and then we ought to be near our base. The same maxim that forbids, as you take it, a single army fighting two great battles at the same time-by the way, a very awkward thing to do -would forbid this nation's engaging all its forces in the great West at the same time, so as to leave it without a single reserve to stem the current of possible disaster. This is, I think, sustained by high military and political considerations. We ought to fight here, if we have a strong prospect of winning a decisive battle over the opposing force, and upon this ground I shall act. I shall be careful not to risk our last reserve without strong grounds to expect success.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General. Maj.-Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

On the 24th of June, Gen. Rosecrans commenced a series of movements for the purpose of bringing on a conflict between his forces and those under the command of Gen. Bragg, or to cause the latter to retire. His plan was to create the impression of a main advance from Murfreesboro upon Gen. Bragg's centre and left, by feint movements and demonstrations with the smaller portion of the army in the direction of Shelbyville, while the decisive blow should be struck by marching rapidly with the main body upon Gen. Bragg's right, and, after turning or defeating it, to move upon Tullahoma, by way of Manchester. Thus he would seize the enemy's base and lines of communication from that point.

The twentieth corps, under Gen. McCook, was selected to make the advance on the right. the division of Gen. Sheridan advanced on the About 7 o'clock on the morning of the 24th, Shelbyville road, preceded by five companies of the 30th Indiana mounted infantry, under Lieut.-Col. Jones. As it came in sight of the enemy's outposts, it halted and bivouacked on

each side of the road in the wood. The divis-ions of Gens. Johnson and Davis advanced six miles on the same road, and then turned to the left on the road to Liberty Gap.

The morning was stormy, but, before day-break, the mounted infantry, under Col. Wilder, marched along the road leading to Manchester,

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