the others, many of which had no horses near at hand, and the desultory fire of the incomplete line did not cause the Confederate line to waver, much less repulse it. One brigade of Gen. Johnson's was broken and fled to the rear, leaving the artillery they should have supported, and the men were shot down at the guns. The rest of the division fell back, and with them a few of the guns. The line of Gen. Davis's division, which was attacked at the same time, was also imperfectly formed. In vain it attempted to hold its position. Like that of Gen. Johnson, it was crushed and broken, and three entire batteries lost. The division of Gen. Sheridan, when first assailed, withstood the shock, and forced back the Confederate line; but when the division of Gen. Davis was driven back it stoutly resisted, and endeavored to hold the position until the others could be rallied in the rear, and advanced to its support. The effort, however, was unsuccessful, and like the others, his division retreated. The divisions of Gens. Johnson and Davis had in the mean time formed in the rear, and endeavored to stay the Confederate progress. They were unsuccessful, but maintained their line and fell back in good order, and again formed at the first good position. In like manner Gen. Sheridan proceeded. No guns were captured after the first assault, and the mass of prisoners was taken during this retreat. The object of Gen. Bragg was to turn the right flank, but this failed. Gen. Rosecrans, on the other hand, prepared to stop the progress of the Confederates on his right, without exposing his centre and left to immediate danger. His left wing could not be advanced to Murfreesborough, because his right was gone. He, therefore, massed his artillery upon his centre, at the probable point of assault. These movements were concealed by forests, and were unperceived by the enemy. Gen. Negley now ordered forward the advance of the centre, consisting of two small brigades to protect the retreating forces of Gen. McCook. These were supported by the division of Gen. Rousseau, and served to check the Confederate force in its pursuit of the right wing. As the enemy approached these brigades, they retired slowly. The former, unsuspecting it to be a decoy, rushed forward, and were received with such a cross-fire of double shotted canister from two batteries and a volley from a brigade, as caused their line to waver for a moment. It dashed forward again. In the mean time Gen. Rousseau had come up on the right of Gen. Negley, and his regular troops on his left advanced at the moment when the right of the Confederate left wing dashed forward. The combined fire of Gen. Negley's force and of the regular troops drove the Confederate main force back with terrible loss, and a large number of Confederate prisoners were taken. The struggle was maintained a few moments, when the Federal force under orders fell back, and the Confederate line, flushed with success, and

consisting of their centre and right of left wing, rushed in overwhelming mass upon the batter. ies which had been so placed as to rake them in almost every direction. A horrible slaughter ensued. The Confederate line wavered, fell back, and attempted to rally. On another discharge, they fled from the fire which they could not face. Meanwhile Gen. McCook had got into line on the right of Gen. Rousseau, and received reënforcements of artillery, and was ready for another attack. The Confederate force had now fallen back, and a suspension of fire took place along the entire line. It was midday. The Federal line had been driven back between two and three miles, thirty pieces of artillery had been lost, and the dead and wounded with many prisoners were in Confederate hands. The spirit of the troops was still resolute.

These movements had somewhat changed the position of the Federal line. The left and centre recovered their position at right angles to the Murfreesborough road and across it. They extended from the river to the distance of a mile west of it. The right wing had fallen back until it was nearly parallel to this road, and extending from Stewart's Creek to the right of Gen. Rousseau. The Confederate left was opposite the Federal right and a few hundred yards from it. In this position both of Gen. Rosecrans's flanks were protected by streams with good bridges and fords in his rear.

About three o'clock, the battle opened again by a Confederate attack upon the Federal centre and left. Although this was made by large masses, yet such was the favorable position occupied by the Federal line on a crest or ridge of ground, and such was the strength of its batteries that no advantage was gained by the Confederates. The slaughter on both sides was great and the contest very determined. It continued until five o'clock when the exhausted armies suspended operations for the night. This was so clear and beautiful that some batteries continued their fire. The result of the day was that the Federal right had been driven in almost upon the left, and a change of front had been made under fire, leaving in possession of the Confederate troops that part of the field. They also held the ground occupied in the morning by the Federal pickets on the left, which wing had receded to draw the Confederate troops on. During this time the communication to Nashville had often been cut off, and a strong force of Confederate cavalry had made a dash in the Federal rear within & mile of the front, and captured a considerable amount of hospital stores. The ammunition train of the right wing was twice captured and twice retaken. The Federal loss on that day was estimated at three thousand killed and wounded, twenty-five pieces of artillery, and s large number of prisoners. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was not less.

On Thursday the 1st of January, 1863, the line of Gen. Rosecrans was restored to its

original position by the success of Gen. McCook's efforts to recover and hold it, on the third attempt. The division on the extreme left was also moved across Stone River. The position on the right wing was intrenched and the communications in the rear completed. On the morning of the 2d, sharp demonstrations were made along the whole Federal line by the Confederate army, but nothing serious was attempted until three o'clock in the afternoon. At that time the Confederate force burst in mass upon the division across Stone River, as if having discovered the intention of Gen. Rosecrans to advance it in their rear. This attacking force consisted of their entire right wing. The three brigades of the Federal division under Col. Beatty were prepared for the attack and stood their ground manfully, but the overwhelming force finally drove them back across the creek. Gen. Negley's division, which had been formed in reserve as if for this occasion, now advanced, supported by the division of Gen. Davis and the pioneer battalion of Morton. The most bitter conflict of the battle now ensued. Both sides massed their batteries and used them with desperate vindictiveness. The Confederate line wavered and fell back. Gen. Davis was ordered to cross the stream, and Col. Sirwell of the 78th Pennsyl

vania, placing his hat on the point of his sword, led the way with a shout. Col. Beatty's division followed. An overwhelming and irresistible charge was made on the Confederate line, and it broke and fled. A battery was captured, and a stand of colors. The entire division of Gen. Negley followed up rapidly, and Gen. Rosecrans's whole line immediately advanced. The enemy's right wing was now broken, and the Federal force was gaining the Confederate flank, when resistance on its part became vain and the entire force receded with the loss of many prisoners. The next morning found the Federal line intrenched in its advanced position, but a storm was raging. Quiet prevailed through the day, excepting one or two sharp conflicts resulting in the capture of a small breastwork. On the next morning the Confederate army had retired from Murfreesborough, which was subsequently occupied by Gen. Rosecrans. Two divisions were soon sent forward in pursuit of the forces of Gen. Bragg, who fell back to Tullahoma. The Federal loss was 8,485 killed and wounded, and 3,600 missing. The enemy's loss is not known.

The original plan of Gen. Rosecrans to turn the right of the Confederate army and cut off its retreat, was entirely defeated by the failure of the right wing to maintain itself.

side's Forces-Losses.

THE conclusion of the campaign in Virginia remains to be described. Immediately after the battle of Antietam, the Confederate army retired across the Potomac and occupied strong positions on its right bank. All hopes that the State of Maryland would unite her destinies with the Southern Confederacy were now banished. The invasion had been made by crossing the Potomac within a limit of twelve miles, which is about a mile above the Point of Rocks and five iniles below the Monocacy aqueduct on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. The army then marched through fields, woods, and roads for Frederick. The line of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal for twelve miles presented a scene of desolation. It was tapped at five places. Several floodgates were cut to pieces, and from heights above large boulders of rock were dislodged and thrown into the canal. An unsuccessful attempt was made to blow up the aqueduct at Monocacy. The telegraph lines and the track of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad were much injured.

The bridge at Monocacy and portions of the abutments were destroyed. Private property did not escape. Fences were torn down and fields laid desolate.

The army of Gen. McClellan remained on the north bank of the Potomac in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Harper's Ferry. On the 1st of October it was visited by President Lincoln, who was cordially received and tarried until the 4th. On the 7th Gen. McClellan issued the following order relative to the proclamation threatening emancipation of the Southern slaves:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October 7, 1862.

General Order, 163.-The attention of the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac is called to General Orders, No. 139, War Department, September 24, 1862, publishing to the army the President's proclamation of September 22.

A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation, eral commanding an opportunity of defining specificofficially communicated to the army, affords to the Genally to the officers and soldiers under his command the relation borne by all persons in the military service

of the United States toward the civil authorities of the Government.

The Constitution confides to the civil authorities legislative, judicial, and executive-the power and duty of making, expounding, and executing the Federal laws. Armed forces are raised and supported simply to sustain the civil authorities, and are to be held in strict subordination thereto in all respects. The fundamental law of our political system is essential to the security of our republican institutions, and should be thoroughly understood and observed by every soldier. The principle upon which and the objects for which armies shall be employed in suppressing rebellion must be determined and declared by the authorities, and the Chief Executive, who is charged with the administration of the national affairs, is the proper and only source through which the views and orders of the Government can be made known to the armies of the nation.

Discussion by officers and soldiers concerning public measures determined upon and declared by the Government, when carried beyond the ordinary, temperate, and respectful expression of opinion, tend greatly to impair and destroy the discipline and efficiency of the troops, by substituting the spirit of political faction for the firm, steady, and earnest support of the authority of the Government, which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls.

In thus calling the attention of this army to the true relation between the soldiers and the Government, the General commanding merely adverts to an evil against which it has been thought advisable during our whole history to guard the armies of the Republic, and in so doing he will not be considered, by any right-minded person, as casting any reflection upon that loyalty and good conduct which have been so fully illustrated upon so many battle-fields.

In carrying out all measures of public policy this army will, of course, be guided by the same rules of mercy and Christianity that have ever controlled its conduct toward the defenceless.

By command of Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN.

JAS. A. HARDIE, Lieut. -Col., Aide-de-Camp and Act'g Ass't Adj.-General. On Monday night, Oct. 10, a body of Confederate cavalry of about twenty-five hundred, under Gen. Stuart, suddenly appeared at Chambersburg, Penn., and occupied the place. The Government storehouses and machine shops were burned by them; also the Cumberland Valley railroad depot. On the next day Gen. Stuart marched to Emmettsburg, thence to Woodsborough, New Market, and Monrovia, which place he reached early on Sunday morning. Thus far his force had gathered about one thousand horses. He next pushed for the Potomac, at Noland's Ford, at the mouth of the Monobut finding a Federal force there, he divided cacy; his troops and crossed at different places, chiefly at Conrad's Ferry, and six miles below the Monocacy. The entire distance of his march north of the Potomac, was a little over one hundred miles. A large number of Federal troops were put in motion to effect his capture, but without success. Reconnoissances made on the 16th and 17th discovered the Confederate army occupying a position extending from Bunker Hill to the Shenandoah river.

It had been expected that Gen. McClellan would take the forces of Gen. Pope's shattered army and march into Maryland and conquer the victorious Confederate force and

pursue them even to Richmond. The inactivity of his army after the battle of Antietam became a subject of complaint. It was overlooked that the low water in the Potomac required time to line its north shore with troops to prevent another invasion of Maryland. It was overlooked that most of his troops had been in active service in the field during the previous six months, and might require most important supplies. On the 6th of October the following despatch was sent by the general-inchief, Gen. Halleck, to Gen. McClellan:

Maj.-Gen. McClellan:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 6, 1862.

Maj. Gen. McClellano telegraph to you as follows:

The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operation, you can be reenforced with 80,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river. Also, to what point the reënforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your opera. tions be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief.

According to the report of Gen. Halleck, Gen. McClellan disapproved of the plan of crossing the Potomac south of the Blue Ridge, and said that he would cross at Harper's Ferry and advance on Winchester. The advance, however, did not take place until the 26th of October. It became the subject of speculation on the part of the public as to the real nature of the causes of delay. Subsequently, upon the removal of Gen. McClellan from the command of the army, on the 7th of November, the following letter was published:

}

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, Oct. 28, 1862. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: SIR: In reply to the general interrogatories contained in your letter of yesterday, I have to report:

ist. That requisitions for supplies to the army under Gen. McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of bureaus here; that is, for quartermasters' master-General; for commissary supplies, by his chief supplies, by his chief quartermaster on the Quartercommissary on the Commissary-General, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the General-in

Chief.

2d. On several occasions Gen. McClellan has telegraphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies. All these telegrams were immediately refer red to the heads of bureaus, with orders to report. It had been immediately filled, except one, where the was ascertained that, in every instance, the requisitions Quartermaster-General had been obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, tents, &c., not having a full supply here. There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay, in any deby Gen. McClellan, or by the officers of his staff. De partment or bureau, in issuing all supplies asked for lays have occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies

by rail, on account of the crowded condition of the depots, or of a want of cars; but whenever notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under the excellent superintendence of Gen. Haup, I think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. An army of the size of that under Gen. McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of neglect in making timely requisitions and un, avoidable delays in forwarding them and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of opinion that the requisitions from that army have been filled more promptly, and that the men, as a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the West. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours.

3d. Soon after the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements, in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washington, reënforcements could be sent from this place. On the first of October, finding that he proposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of October he was peremptorily ordered to "cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given. 4th. In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under Gen. McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side.

5th. On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to his intended movements, Gen. McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the first, fifth, and sixth corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filled, and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies.

On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies sent by rail had been delayed. As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint, and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the same date (the 11th) he spoke of many of his horses being broken down by fatigue. On the 12th he complained that the rate of supply was only "one hundred and fifty horses per week for the entire army there and in front of Washington."

I immediately directed the Quartermaster-General to inquire into this matter and report why a larger supply was not furnished. Gen. Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to Gen. McClellan's army in the field and in front of Washington for the previous six weeks had been 1,459 per week, or 8,754 in all. In addition, that large numbers of mules had been supplied, and that the number of animals with Gen. McClellan's army on the upper Potomac was over thirty-one thousand. He also reported that he was then sending to that army all the horses he could procure. On the 14th Gen. McClellan stated, in regard to Gen. Meigs's report that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing: "Gen. Meigs may have ordered these articles to be forwarded, but they have not reached our depot, and, unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which Gen. Meigs is the head, they might as well remain in New York or Philadelphia, so far as this army is concerned." I immediately called Gen. Meigs's attention to this apparent neglect of his department. On the 25th he reported, as the result of his investigation, that 48,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the quar

termaster of Gen. McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown; that 20,000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st; that 10,000 more were on their way, and 15,000 more ordered. Col. Ingals, aide-de-camp and chief quartermaster to Gen. McClellan, telegraphed, on the 25th: "The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated, I think, and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regi mental and brigade commanders." On the 24th he telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General that the clothing was not detained in cars at the depots: "Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted. I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions, so far as clothing is concerned. Our department is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles."

In regard to Gen. McClellan's means of promptly' communicating the wants of his army to me or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I report that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been in hourly communication with Washington by telegraph.

It is due to Gen. Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from Gen. McClellan.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief.
UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEgraph.

Received, Oct. 22, 1862-9 40 P M

From McClellan's Headquarters.

TO BRIG. GEN. MEIGS: Your despatch of this date is received. I have never intended, in any letter or despatch, to make any accusation against yourself or your department for not furnishing or forwarding clothing as rapidly as it was possible for you to do. I believe that everything has been done that could be done in this respect. The idea that I have tried to convey was, that certain portions of the command were without clothing, and the army could not move until it was supplied.

G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen.

Gen. McClellan alluding to or explaining the Nothing has been made public on the part of causes of the delay of the movements of the army. Strict justice requires that, in estimating the importance of the preceding letters, the testimony of Gen. Burnside on subsequent page should be considered. It was generally understood that Gen. McClellan's movement was delayed by the want of clothing and other supplies, and especially on account of his deficiency in cavalry and artillery horses. The purchase and forwarding of these was going on even up to the day of his crossing the Potomac. One army corps did not receive its clothing until it had commenced its march in Virginia. It was stated by several commanders that they made every effort to get the clothing for their troops, repeatedly sent teams to the railroad depots for it, and until a short time previous to the marching of the army they were invariably told that the clothing had not arrived.

Early on the 26th of October a cavalry force, under Col. Pleasanton, crossed the Potomac on the new pontoon bridge at Berlin, and moved on in the direction of Purcellville. Soon after the corps of Gen. Burnside began to cross in light marching order, followed by an immense train of wagons, and took a position near Lovettsville. On the next day a heavy reënforcement joined him. About the same

time the Confederate force prepared to abandon the line of the Potomac and to fall back. The crossing of the Federal troops was now constant, until the entire army was south of the river. On the 30th of October Gen. Sedgwick advanced from Boliver Heights, and crossed the Shenandoah in the direction of Shannondale, and Gen. Hancock pushed forward, pressing on the Confederate lines in front of Charlestown. Gen. Burnside moved along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge, followed by the corps of Gen. Porter.

The situation of the respective forces at this time was as follows: The Federal army reënforced by the divisions of Gens. Sigel and Sickles, who had advanced from Washington, occupied all the region east of the Blue Ridge, with the right resting on Harper's Ferry, and the left extending nearly to Paris, on the road from Aldie to Winchester. The centre was at Snickersville; with Snicker's Gap in its possession. The Confederate line was on the south side of the Blue Ridge, with the Shenandoah river immediately in its front, extending from Front Royal down to Charlestown, with the great body of their troops massed between Berryville and Winchester. On the 4th Ashby's Gap was occupied without opposition by the Federal troops. The cavalry, corps, under Col. Pleasanton, pushed on from Piedmont, and occupied Marguette, holding the approaches to Manassas and Chester Gap, on the left side of the Blue Ridge. The condition and spirit of the army at this time were unequalled by that of any force before organized. On the 6th Gen. McClellan's headquarters were at Rectortown near Front Royal. The army was steadily advancing and the Confederate force falling back, with some skirmishing. Warrenton was occupied by the Federal troops on the same day. On the 7th a severe snow storm commenced, and continued throughout the day. On the 8th the bridge at Rappahannock Station was taken and held by Gen. Bayard. On the night of the 7th, near midnight, Gen. Buckingham arrived, from Washington, at Gen. McClellan's tent, and delivered to him an order from President Lincoln, to surrender the command of the army to Gen. Burnside, and to report himself immediately at Trenton, the capital of the State of New Jersey. This order was entirely unexpected by Gen. McClellan, and probably by every officer of the army. The only reasons for it which have of ficially appeared, will be found in the above letter of Gen. Halleck, dated October 28, which was given to the public a few days after this removal.

Gen. McClellan immediately wrote the following address to his troops preparatory to his departure:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, CAMP NEAR RECTORTOWN, VA., November 7. } Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac: An order of the President devolves upon Maj.-Gen. Burnside the command of this army. In parting from you I cannot express the love and gratitude I bear to you. As an army you have grown up in my care. In

you I have never found doubt or coldness. The battles you have fought under my command will probably live in our Nation's history. The glory you have achieved over mutual perils and fatigues; the graves of our comrades fallen in battle and by disease; the broken forms of those whom wounds and sickness have disabled; the strongest associations which can exist among men unite in supporting the Constitution of our country and the us by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be comrades Nationality of its people.

(Signed) GEO. B. MCCLELLAN. Major-General U. S. A.

The next day was devoted by Gen. McClellan to the transfer of his command to Gen. Burnside. The most cordial feelings existed between the two officers, the latter of whom accepted a promotion which he had before twice declined, only upon the peremptory order of the War Department. On Sunday evening his officers assembled at his tent, for a final parting of commander and officers. It was such a scene of deep feeling as could occur only where officers reposed the highest confidence in their commander, who had led them successfully through some of the most fearful battles of modern wars. Monday was occupied in passing among the various camps, reviewing the troops, and taking a final leave of both officers and men. A spectator of these scenes has summed them up in these words:

"As Gen. McClellan, mounted upon a fine horse, attended by a retinue of fine-looking military men, riding rapidly through the ranks, gracefully recognized and bid a farewell to the army, the cries and demonstrations of the men were beyond bounds-wild, impassioned, and unrestrained. Disregarding all military forms they rushed from their ranks and thronged around him with the bitterest complaints against those who had removed from command their beloved leader."

On the next day, the 10th, he withdrew, taking the railroad cars at Warrenton. On reach ing Warrenton Junction a salute was fired. The troops, which had been drawn up in line, afterward broke ranks, when the soldiers crowded around him and many eagerly called for a few parting words. He said in response, while on the platform of the railroad depot, "I wish you to stand by Gen. Burnside as you have stood by me, and all will be well. Good-bye." To this there was a spontaneous and enthusiastic response.

The troops were also drawn up in line at Bristow's Station and Manassas Junction, where salutes were fired and he was complimented with enthusiastic cheers. On reaching Washington he proceeded immediately to the depot, and passed on to Philadelphia and Trenton, where he arrived early on the 12th.

What was now the military aspect? The movement of Gen. McClellan's army, after crossing the Potomac, was toward Gordonsville. This made a movement on the part of the ConVent the Federal army from getting between federate general Lee necessary in order to prehim and Richmond. For this purpose he at tempted to move from Winchester through the