the extreme to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statement. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to act in any direction, and, with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as secure. We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have reached fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles of Rich mond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water, during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond. At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. From here to Fortress Monroe is a march of about seventy miles, for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material, except by land. The result of the movement would thus be to march one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aids of the gunboats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army, which would ensue; the terrible depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign Powers to recognize our adversaries; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army, it may be promptly reenforced to enable it to resume the offensive. It may be said that there are no reenforcements available. I point to Gen. Burnside's force, to that of Gen. Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defence in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defence there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of this nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere, here is the true defence of Washington; it is here, on the bank of the James river, that the fate of the Union should be decided. Clear in my conviction of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the Commencement of this war; I do now what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded. If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your order to the utmost of my power, devoting to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess, whatever the result may be, and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings. I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to arrest disaster from my country. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General. GEN. HALLECK TO GEN. MCCLELLAN. WASHINGTON, Aug 6, 1862. Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, Commanding, &c., Berkeley, Va.: GENERAL-Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal interview; and even after that interview I tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. I assure you, General, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious thought than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all the pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. There was to my mind no other alternative. Allow me to allude to a few of the facts of the case. You and your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's forces in and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they have received and are receiving large reenforcements from the south. General Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only 40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety. With the enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other, as he may elect, neither can reënforce the other in case of such an attack. If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to reenforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you occupy should the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the peninsula is, under present circumstances, a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the peninsula to some point by water-say Fredericksburg-where the two armies can be united. Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged. You say that to withdraw from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, which is now in excellent condition and discipline. I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves assist in the demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your present position was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it. A new base on the Rappahannock, at Fredericksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Rich mond, and secures a reenforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. The change, with such advantages, will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than demor alize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the peninsula would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further from Richmond than Fredericksburg is. Besides the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and covers Washington from any attack by the enemy. The political effect of the withdrawal may at first look unfavorable, but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity; and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate fragments. But you will reply, Why not reenforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said at our interview that you required 50,000 additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have "some chance of success with 20,000; but you afterward telegraphed to me that you would require 35,000, as the enemy was being largely reenforced. If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reenforced would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River; and even after you got the reënforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time Gen, Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest hope of assistance from you. In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me-are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the peninsula now advise its abandonment. I have not inquired, and do not desire to know, by whose advice or for what reason the Army of the Po tomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy before them. I must take things as I find them. I find our forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better one, I certainly should have adopted it; but all of your plans require reënforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for reenforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having carefully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at different conclusions from your own. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. (Official Copy.) J. C. KELTON, Assistant Adj.-Gen. Thus the campaign was closed. The once proud Army of the Potomac was withdrawn from the peninsula to Aquia Creek and Alexandria, and its corps were immediately ordered into the field to reenforce the army of Gen. Pope southeast of Washington, and to act under his command. CHAPTER XX. General Pope takes command of the Army of Virginia-Call of the President for more Men-Advance of Gen. Lee-Battle of Cedar Mountain-Capture of Louisa Court House-Gen. Pope falls back-Dash on Catlett's Station-Further advance of the Enemy-Attack at Manassas-Attack at Bristow's Station-Battle near Manassas-Battle at GainesvilleBattle near Bull Run-Excitement in the Northern States-Retreat of Gen. Banks-Battle at Chantilly-Retreat of Gen. Pope to the fortifications at Washington. By an order of the President on the 27th of June, Maj.-Gen. Pope, who had been in command of a force in the West, entered upon the chief command of the army of Virginia. The following is the order of the President creating the Army of Virginia, and putting Gen. Pope in command, dated June 27, 1862: I. The forces under Maj-Gens. Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, including the troops now under Brig. Gen. Sturgis, at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one army, to be called the Army of Virginia. II. The command of the Army of Virginia is specially assigned to Maj.-Gen. John Pope as commanding general. The troops of the Mountain Department, heretofore under command of Gen. Fremont, shall constitute the First Army Corps, under the command of Gen. Fremont. The troops of the Shenandoah Department, now under Gen. Banks, shall constitute the Second Army Corps, and be commanded by him. The troops under the command of Gen. McDowell, except those within the fortifications and the city of Washington, shall form the Third Army Corps, and be under his command. The creation of the several separate and independent commands which constituted the forces west and southwest of Washington had always been looked upon with distrust. Hence the consolidation of these forces under one com mander was regarded with much satisfaction by the public, as a wise and prudent measure. The appointment of Gen. Pope to the chief command was not favorably received by Maj. Gen. Fremont. Consequently an order was issued from the War Department, relieving him from command. On the next day Gen. Fremont issued an order declaring his resignation of the command of his forces and assigning it to Brig.-Gen. Schenck. The ground upon which the resignation of Gen. Fremont was made, was understood to be that Gen. Pope, who had been appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia, was his inferior in rank, and he could not consistently command a corps under him. Gen. Schenck, on assuming command, issued his orders. At night of the same day he learned that Gen. Rufus King had been ordered to the command of that corps, and sent in his request to be relieved of command in that portion of the army. But on the subsequent day, still further learning that Gen. King had been detached and Gen. Sigel ordered to the same command, he withdrew his resignation. Meantime Maj.-Gen. Pope was making his arrangements to take the field. On the 14th of July he issued the following address to his army: To the Officers and Soldiers of the Army of Virginia: sumed command of this army. I have spent two weeks By special assignment of the President I have asin learning your whereabouts, your condition, and your wants, in preparing you for active operations, and in placing you in a position from which you can act promptly and to the purpose. These labors are nearly Another order was issued on the same day, completed, and I am about to join you in the field. declaring that the inhabitants along the lines Let us understand each other. I have come to you of railroads and telegraphs and the routes of from the West where we have always seen the backs of our enemies-from an army whose business it has travel, would be held responsible for any inbeen to seek an adversary and beat him when found; jury done to track, line, or road, or for any whose policy has been attack and not defence. In but attacks on trains or stragglers by bands of one instance has the enemy been able to place our Western armies in a defensive attitude. I presume I guerillas in their neighborhood. In cases of have been called here to pursue the same system, and damage to roads the citizens, within five miles, to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to would be turned out in mass to repair the damdo so and that speedily. I am sure you long for an age. If a soldier or legitimate follower of the opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achieving; that opportunity I shall endeavor to give army was fired upon from any house, the same you. In the mean time I desire you to dismiss certain should be razed to the ground. By another phrases I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst order all disloyal citizens within the lines of you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and the army, or within the reach of its respective holding them-of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. officers, were to be arrested at once. Those Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he taking the oath of allegiance, and giving suffiean most easily advance against the enemy. Let us cient security for its observance, were to be study the probable line of retreat of our opponents, allowed to remain; all others were to be conand leave our own to take care of itself. Let us look ducted to the South, beyond the extreme before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance-disaster and shame lurk in the rear. pickets, and if again found anywhere within Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to prethe lines, were to be treated as spies and subdict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a jected to the extreme rigor of military law. glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to These orders of Gen. Pope were followed by your countrymen forever. the pillaging of private property and by insults to females to a degree unknown heretofore during the war. The Confederate Government, by way of retaliation, issued an order declaring that Gen. Pope and the commissioned officers serving under him, were "not entitled to be considered as soldiers, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of cartel for the parole of future prisoners of war. Ordered, further, that in the event of the capture of Maj.-Gen. Pope, or any commissioned officer serving under him, the captive so taken shall be held in close confinement so long as the orders aforesaid shall continue in force, and unrepealed by the competent military authority of the United States, and that in the event of the murder of an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this Confederacy by virtue or under pretence of the order hereinbefore recited, it shall be the duty of the commanding general of the forces of this Confederacy to cause immediately to be hung, out of the commissioned officers prisoners as aforesaid, a number equal to that of our own citizens thus murdered by the enemy." (Signed) JOHN POPE, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. Subsequent orders issued by Gen. Pope at this time indicate the manner in which he proposed to conduct the campaign, as follows: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, General Orders, No. 5: Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible. By command of Maj.-Gen. POPE. GEO. D. RUGGLES, Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA, July 18, 1862. General Orders, No. 6: Hereafter in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used unless so stated especially in the order for the movement. Two days' cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men, and all villages and neighborhoods, through which they pass, will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by General Orders, No. 5, current series, from these head quarters, for the subsistence of men and horses. Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused hereafter on any pretext. Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of the army emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty will be specifically designated, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed without the gravest and most conclusive rea Bons. The main divisions of Gen. Pope's army were now stationed at Culpepper Court House and Fredericksburg. Culpepper Court House is about seventy miles from Washington and equally distant from Richmond. The route crosses the Long Bridge at Washington, thence through Alexandria, Fairfax, Manassas, Warrenton, &c. Fredericksburg is connected with Washington by steamboat navigation on the Potomac to Aquia Creek, thence by railroad, fifteen miles, to Fredericksburg, which is sixty miles by railroad from Richmond. Pope, although not personally in the field until the 27th of July, had been engaged in concentrating his forces. His delay in taking the field was occasioned by the absence of Maj.-Gen. Halleck, who arrived at Washington on the 23d of July, and entered upon the duties of general-in-chief. Gen. A show of force had been kept up in the Shenandoah Valley, and east of the Blue Ridge, by the Confederate Government throughout the month of July, chiefly for the purpose of preventing reënforcements to Gen. McClellan. The knowledge which it had of the position and strength of the Federal forces made it manifest that no reënforcement to the Army of the Potomac would come from any other quarter. The departure of the division of Gen. Burnside from Newport News, where it had been for some weeks ready to cooperate with Gen. McClellan in any forward movements to Aquia Creek on the 1st of August, was immediately known in Richmond. It showed not only that no reënforcements were coming to the Army of the Potomac, but also that this army would soon evacuate the peninsula. The star of their fortune now appeared to be in the ascendant. The day, so long and anxiously looked for, had come, in which they should be able to take their great and powerful adversary at a disadvantage, and demonstrate to civilized nations their own military strength and ability to win that independence which they had proclaimed. Consultations were immediately held at Richmond, and their purposes were soon formed. It was resolved to abandon the defensive policy and to repeat the exploit which Gen. Jackson had performed by driving Gen. Banks out of the Shenandoah Valley, on a scale of national magnitude. Rumors were set afloat that Tennessee, Kentucky, and the whole of Virginia were to be recovered at once; Maryland liberated from her oppression, and not only Washington and Baltimore captured, but also Harrisburg and Philadelphia in the east, and Cincinnati in the west. It was a magnificent enterprise for a people situated like those in the Confederate States at that time. Measures were immediately adopted for the execution of these plans. Gen. McClellan was to be left to retire from the peninsula without any further attacks than were necessary to cover their real designs, and their forces were to be prepared for an immediate movement northward. The Confederate forces at this time were greater than ever before. Not less than one hundred and fifty thousand men were at Richmond and in communication with it. All this force, excepting a strong corps of observation, was to be precipitated at once upon Maryland. The preparations to advance into Maryland which were making at Richmond, were immediately known at Washington and awakened great anxiety. An order was issued to Gen. Cox in western Virginia to send his main forces, with all possible despatch, by railroad to join Gen. Pope. To facilitate the withdrawal of the army from Harrison's Landing, as stated by Gen. Halleck, and to gain time also by a demonstration against the enemy, Gen. Pope was ordered to push his forces across the Rappahannock, and occupy Culpepper and threaten Gordonsville. At the same time President Lin coln issued the following order, calling out an additional three hundred thousand men to serve for nine months: WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 4, 1862. Ordered First-That a draft of three hundred thou sand militia be immediately called into the service of the United States, to service for nine months, unless the quotas to the States, and establish regulations for sooner discharged. The Secretary of War will assign the draft. Second-That if any State shall not by the 15th of August furnish its quota of the additional three hundred thousand volunteers authorized by law, the deficiency of volunteers in that State will also be made up by a special draft from the militia. The Secretary of War will establish regulations for this purpose. Third-Regulations will be prepared by the War Department, and presented to the President, with the object of securing the promotion of officers of the army and volunteers for meritorious and distinguished services, and of preventing the nomination and appointment in the military service of incompetent or unworthy officers. The regulations will also provide for ridding the service of such incompetent persons as now hold commissions. By order of the PRESIDENT. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. The Confederate army began to move immediately after the 1st of August, and the divisions of Gens. Jackson, Ewell, and Hill were hurried to the Rapidan river, which is the south fork of the Rappahannock. On Friday, the 8th of August, Gen. Pope reached Culpepper Court House, from his last encampment near Washington, the county seat of Rappahannock. At the same time the corps of Gen. Banks was in motion in the direction of Culpepper. The corps of Gen. Sigel was encamped at Sperryville, twenty miles from Culpepper, and on the road from Washington, Rappahannock county. At Culpepper Court House was Brig.-Gen. Crawford, with his brigade belonging to Gen. Banks's corps, and Gen. Ricketts's division, belonging to Gen. McDowell's corps. They had arrived two days previous from Warrenton with Gen. McDowell, who took command of all the forces then at Culpepper. Gen. Bayard with his cavalry had been guarding the fords of the Rapidan from Racoon Ford to a point fourteen miles below, and south of the railroad at Burnett's Ford, where he connected with the caval ry of Gen. Buford. At noon on Friday he sent information to Culpepper Court House that the enemy had early that morning crossed the river and driven in his pickets with such force that he was obliged to retire before them. He was retiring to the north and east side of Robertson's river, about eight miles from Culpepper, there to await a supporting force. The numbers of the enemy he estimated at two regiments of infantry, two pieces of light artillery, and three small regiments of cavalry. Gen. Buford at the same time reported the enemy to be advancing in heavy force upon Madison Court House, thus leaving it in doubt whether the movement was directed toward Culpepper or Madison. Wishing to maintain the communica tion with Fredericksburg at all hazards, Gen. Pope resolved to concentrate at Culpepper, in order to keep his forces interposed between |