belligerents were in transit. To guard the security of the canal and maintain these neutral features was the duty of the Khedive first, of the Porte secondarily, but finally of the signatory powers in concert. No fortifications were permitted, no special commercial privileges were allowed. It is to be noticed that this neutralization was arranged for, although Great Britain had intervened single handed to put down the Arabi outbreak in 1882, and although by her purchase of the Khedive's shares, she was a large stockholder in the concern. There was nevertheless a reservation in the British adherence to this treaty, made three days before its signature, which I think is not generally known. Professor Holland gives it (p. 293) in his Studies in International Law, published in 1898. The delegates of Great Britain in offering this treaty text as the definitive rule to secure the free use of the Suez Canal, believe that it is their duty to announce a general reservation as to the applicability of its provisions in so far as they are incompatible with the transitory and exceptional state in which Egypt is actually found and so far as they might interfere with the liberty of action of the Government during the occupation of Egypt by Her Majesty's forces. This amounts to protection so long as England occupies Egypt, neutralization afterwards. Professor Holland adds: It is owing to this reservation that, as was explained by Mr. Curzon in the House of Commons, July 12, 1898, "the terms of this convention have not been brought into practical operation.” Another English writer, in the Spectator of December 10, 1898, makes a similar assertion. In reality the neutrality convention was never brought into force, and is now a dead letter, as the Spaniards found when they tried to coal their fleet at Port Said. They claimed to regard the Suez Canal as an international piece of water, but Lord Cromer insisted, and maintained his point, that it was part of the waters of a neutral power. The Suez Canal is not internationalized, but is under control of the power that controls Egypt. Whether the other powers who signed and ratified this convention will always accept this curious British view, that a treaty can be declared inoperative by one signatory at will, it is unnecessary to ask. For my present purpose it is enough to call attention to the claim and to the argument. As Egypt becomes, by force of continued occupation, British territory, even so, pari passu, the Suez Canal becomes British waters. And likewise the converse must be true, to bring the canal under British control Great Britain must hold Egypt. By the middle of the last century neutralization had become the policy of the United States in view of any Central American interoceanic canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty not only provided for joint protection and guaranty of neutrality; it also bound its parties to invite other powers to unite with them, thus creating a specific contract and erecting it into a general principle. In 1867 the same policy still governed, for in its treaty with Nicaragua of that date the United States both guaranteed the neutrality of the contemplated canal and promised to influence other nations to do the same. Then in the early eighties came a change. The French attempt at Panama awakened American jealousies, and the Monroe doctrine was drawn out with a flourish, like a sword from its sheath. Single-handed neutralization, that is, protection, was advocated by Mr. Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was attacked because it stood in their way. There ensued the French failure at Panama, and the status quo remained. During the twenty years since then this change of policy has been adhered to. The growth of the United States in wealth and influence has been one reason. Its new-born naval strength, needing rapid mobilization for the defense of either coast, was another reason. The growing conviction that an interoceanic canal is a national undertaking, with important political bearings, and not a private venture, is a third. Mr. Hay still had a kindly feeling for the neutralization theory and drafted the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to correspond." But the Senate would have none of that, and now the treaty of 1850, that old bugbear, has been wiped out, with British consent. The next step is such permanent control of the territory to be canalized, whether in Colombia or Nicaragua, whether by cession or lease, as to confer actual sovereignty over it upon the United States. For the moment this hangs fire, but we seem to regard it as essential, and doubtless there a In the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty. are ways of bringing pressure to bear. As in the case of Suez, neutralization has given place to protection, and protection means ownership, that is, the substantial possession of sovereignty. The British tenure in Egypt is an anomalous thing. Repeatedly the British Government has disclaimed the idea of permanent occupation. But, on the other hand, it will not set a limit to its stay, and shows no sign of evacuation. Protection is a burden, but the compensation is worth it. That seems to be the theory of our own Government also. It will incur large expense in construction; it will assume the constant burden of protection. This may easily involve the maintenance of an established government in the United States of Colombia, to fortify our hold upon the canalized The equivalent will lie in exclusive military control of the canal. Is it worth what it will cost? That remains to be zone. seen. There is a single thought more. Financial ownership and political control, as applied to an interoceanic canal, are entirely distinct. They are not in the same plane, and neither can be converted into a commercial advantage by any form of discrimination. The freedom of the world's waterways is too well established a principle for that. |