XIII. SUEZ AND PANAMA-A PARALLEL.

By THEODORE S. WOOLSEY,
Professor of International Law, Yale University.

H. Doc. 461, pt 1—20

305

SUEZ AND PANAMA A PARALLEL.

By THEODORE S. WOOLSEY.

There is a certain parallelism in the history of the Suez Canal and of the Panama Canal, to which I ask your attention. Both are waterways of such transcendent importance as to completely alter the world's trade routes.

Both are under the nominal sovereignty of States which are themselves too poor to construct such works and too weak to protect them when constructed.

In both cases, therefore, there is a mixture of interests to be considered and guarded. There is first the canal as a commercial enterprise, involving physical maintenance, regulation of tolls, policing, return on the investment. There is the country through which it runs, and which grants a concession for it, possessing full or qualified sovereignty over it, profiting by it, but somewhat apprehensive of the results which may flow from it. And there is the State chartering the company of construction, or doing itself the work of construction, and thus owing the enterprise its protection.

A fourth point of resemblance lies in the political and military importance which each canal may be made to assume. One unites England with India, the other joins our own eastern and western coasts. In the Suez Canal Great Britain has a peculiar interest in wishing for control to assist in the mobilization of her fleets and prevent her enemies from using the short road to India and China. In the case of Panama the Pacific and Atlantic squadrons of our own Navy could concentrate upon a threatened point on either coast.

There is a further point of resemblance. To satisfy these various interests and provide a satisfactory international status to both canals until recently the theory of neutralization has been applied. Upon this let me enlarge a little.

There are two possible ways of securing the political stability of an international waterway after construction-by protection or neutralization. The latter is sometimes called internationalization. Under a system of protection one State, or a State and its allies, undertakes to safeguard the canal's stability. In return for this onerous duty special privileges will be claimed. But in neutralization the onus of preserving status is shared by all States joining in the process, and no one can claim special privilege where all are on the same level.

Looking merely at the security of a canal, at its constant commercial usefulness, and granting that the parties to a treaty which guarantees neutralization keep faith, this second method is superior to the first, because it implies a selfdenying obligation on the part of the signatories. Each maintains the neutral status by engaging that it will do nothing to violate that status; while under the system of protection there is no such engagement. Security depends upon the power of the protector solely, although if he is at war very likely the canal may be the most vulnerable point of attack upon him.

Other things being equal, then, the joint guaranty of neutral status by the world's maritime powers is to be preferred. But if the privileges gained by the protector state are so great as to be full compensation for his burden other things may not be equal. Such a privilege might be the exclusive use of the canal for military purposes in case of war.

This brings us to the final point of resemblance. In spite of the fact that both Great Britain and the United States have held in the main until recently to the theory of neutralization as the correct policy in both cases, both countries are now inclined to adopt and insist upon the right to protect, strengthening their hold upon the country inclosing the canal to make their protection more effective.

The culmination of the neutralization policy in Suez is seen in the convention of Constantinople of 1887 between all the leading European powers except Russia. Its terms provided for an open canal at all times for war ships and merchantmen. No act of war was to be permitted upon it or near it, and the twenty-four hours' rule was to be enforced where ships of two