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that the time has come when that concession can be revoked with safety to Great Britain and advantage to the great material interests of that country. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

No. 210.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, March 17, 1862.

SIR: Your despatch of February 27, No. 123, has been received. I have communicated to the navy the information it gives concerning the Oreto. The occupation of so many of the southern ports having been effected by our forces, and all of the others being now effectually invested, I apprehend that the illicit traffic which has been so flagrantly carried on from British ports will come to an end.

It is difficult for us to understand here why the maritime powers in Europe do not at once rescind their decisions concerning belligerent rights to insurgents who cannot send forth or receive one single vessel either for purposes of war or of commerce.

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SIR: I am directed to inform you that the regulation of the department of the 19th of August, 1861, by which "no person was allowed to 'go abroad from a port of the United States without a passport either from this department or countersigned by the Secretary of State, nor any person allowed to land in the United States without a passport from a minister or consul of the United States, or, if a foreigner, from his own government, countersigned by such minister or consul;" also, the regulation requiring the "loyalty of all Americans applying for passports or visas to be tested under oath," are hereby rescinded; the causes which required the issue of the above regulations having, it is to be hoped, ceased to exist.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

(Same to all of the diplomatic and consular agents of the United States.)

No 132.]

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, March 20, 1862.

SIR: Late last evening I received despatches from the department numbered from 194 to 198, both inclusive. Several of them are highly important, and I shall seize the earliest opportunity to act upon the suggestions they

contain in my communications with her Majesty's government. Indeed, you will before this have received my despatch, No. 131, of the 13th instant, which covered a copy of a note of mine to Lord Russell on the case of the General Miramon, drawn up in the sense conveyed in your No. 184, of the 14th of February. As the efforts of disaffected parties here grow more and more desperate in proportion to the increase of the necessities on the other side of the water, I shall find occasion to renew the subject with additional means of illustration.

I take it for granted that even in the midst of your engrossing occupations you find sufficient time to glance at the report of the debates in Parliament on subjects of interest to the United States, and more especially on international questions of rights on the ocean and of blockade in time of war. The most marked indication to be observed is the general sense of uneasiness at the change operated in the position of Great Britain as a maritime power by the enlargement gradually making of the privileges of neutral nations. Whilst on the opposition side you perceive a distinct disapproval of the agreement made in 1856 at Paris, there is equally perceptible among the ministers a disposition to seize the first opportunity to annul the obligations which it has been thonght to impose. The remarks of Sir George Cornwall Lewis upon the effect of war upon the measure, regarded merely as a treaty and not as new rules incorporated into the international law, are full of significance. Lord Palmerston has been not inappropriately reminded of the difference between the tone of his speech at Liverpool in 1856 and that in the late debate, whilst even Lord Russell is quoted as having expressed the opinion that some modification of the declaration of Paris would seem to be almost indispensable.

Such are the immediate effects of that which, at first blush, appeared to these enlightened gentlemen a great triumph in the case of the Trent. Such are the consequences of refusing to accept the adhesion of the United States to the declaration of Paris from an over-zealous desire to escape the effect of a precipitate admission of belligerent rights. Both these events have brought vividly to their observation the consideration of the position of Great Britain in the contingency of a war on the ocean. Like the dog in the fable, in snatching at the shadow, they find they have lost the solid meat. A conflict with the United States would, as things are now, at once transfer the whole carrying trade of Great Britain into the hands of the neutral nations of the continent of Europe. It is now becoming plain that, without the additional provision first suggested by Mr. Maury, English interests on the sea are in great jeopardy in time of war, and yet that, with the admission of it, the control of the ocean is forever lost. Whichever way they look there is difficulty. Self-interest being the cardinal point of the policy they seek to pursue, it is plain that the adoption of the declaration of Paris is a sacrifice of which they are beginning to repent. Not the least remarkable among the admissions made in this debate is that which specifies the danger of a war with the United States in the event of a persistence in their former doctrine respecting the cargoes of neutral ships, at the time of the contest with Russia, as having been the main cause that prompted the concessions in that declaration. Thus it would seem that the idea of the growing power of the United States as one nation is everywhere present to their imaginations as the great obstacle in the way of their continued domination of the sea. Can it be wondered at if, under these circumstances, the notion of a permanent separation of this power into two parts, one of which can be played off against the other, were not altogether unwelcome to their hearts?

To considerations of a similar kind are we indebted for the security that has been afforded to us in our present contest against interference with the

blockade. That there has been and still is a very strong inclination in the country to get rid of it is unquestionable. That but for its unavoidable connexion with possibilities of consequences in other and not very remote complications, an attempt of the kind would have been made, I am strongly inclined to believe. The argument that has overborne all these tendencies is drawn from the fear that such a step would only lead in the same direction with the preceding ones taken at Paris. It would ultimately deprive Britannia of her power longer to rule the waves. The "entente cordiale" with France is not yet hearty enough to make such a result altogether acceptable even to the fancy. Neither are the relations with Russia 80 friendly as to render a voluntary release of the main instrument to keep her in check, a proposition to be entertained with favor. For these reasons no countenance will be given to any remonstrance against our blockade; neither will the general reasoning of Mr Cobden, in favor of limiting the right of blockade, find much response among people in authority. Even the admissions rendered necessary to establish a position in reclaiming the rebel emissaries on board the Trent will be limited, as far as may be, to shut the door against further concessions.

It will then continue to depend upon the degree of concert established among those nations of the world which have ever upheld neutral rights, whether any real advance be made in the recognized doctrines of international law or not, just as it has done in preceding times. Great Britain will concede only from a conviction that such a course is the safest for herself. The remedy for other countries is obvious. It is to unite in the labor of raising the obligations of specific contracts to the level of permanent international law, and to enforce the observation of a consistent system of policy upon any single power whenever it may venture to set up the promptings of its immediate interest as the only rule of action it thinks proper to abide by.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

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SIR: I have no despatches from you since the date of my last acknowledg ments. The events of the week have been striking and significant :-The capture of Newbern by Burnside, with the consequent evacuation of Beaufort and Fort Macon by the insurgents, and the destruction by themselves of their own piratical steamer Nashville; the rout of the insurgents, on their retreat from Winchester to Strasburg, by Shields; the victory of General Pope at New Madrid, and the bombardment of Island No. 10, the Mississippi, by Commodore Foote.

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A movement of the main army of the Potomac down the river to Fortress Monroe is quietly going on, and demonstrations will soon be made against Norfolk and Richmond.

We suppose our ocean expedition against New Orleans must, at this time, have reached the mouth of the Mississippi.

There are some indications of reviving loyalty in Virginia and Tennessee. The bonds of the insurgents are now understood to be everywhere at a discount of seventy-five per cent. While it seems impossible that their

organization can be longer maintained, there are abundant indications that they will find guerilla warfare even more hopeless than privateering has proved to be. How much longer can the European states resist the ideas concerning this war which we submitted to them a year ago, and which they then so inconsiderately rejected?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.

No. 135.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, March 27, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the reception from the department of despatches numbered from 199 to 208, inclusive.

It will have come to your knowledge, by the reception of my despatch. No. 131, of the 13th of March, that I had already acted in conformity with the suggestions contained in your No. 207, dated on the 11th, by addressing a note to Earl Russell in remonstrance against the notorious activity of the subjects of Great Britain in efforts to set at nought the blockade. To that communication I have not yet received a reply. The reception of a letter from Mr. Dudley, the consul at Liverpool, containing additional information to the same effect, supplied me with a new occasion to write to his lordship in the spirit of your despatch No. 196, of the 27th of February. A copy of this latest note, dated the 26th instant, is herewith transmitted. After a full conversation with Mr. Morse, we both arrived at the conclusion that the evidence in our possession would not sustain so broad a position as that contemplated in your letter; for, whatever may have been the purposes of the confederate emissaries and their friends pending the difficulties connected with the Trent case-and I am inclined to believe they went to the full extent indicated-I fancy they have shrunk within much smaller compass since that speck of war has disappeared. The activity is now mainly directed to the expediting of every species of supply through the means of, steam vessels, which may themselves be turned to some account in the way of illicit trade or of piratical warfare. Of these last the Oreto seems to be the only one likely to prove formidable. I thought it, therefore, a good opportu nity to place upon his lordship the responsibility of the consequences of permitting himself to be deluded by what I cannot help thinking the wilful blindness and credulous partiality of the British authorities at Liverpool. From the experience of the past, I have little or no confidence in the success of any application that may be made of the kind. It is not the less important, for all that, to perpetuate the testimony for future use. That Great Britain did, in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in struggling with a monstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly and at once assume our inability to master it, and then become the only foreign nation steadily contributing in every indirect way possible to verify its prejudgment, will probably be the verdict made up against her by posterity on a calm comparison of the evidence. I do not mean to say that such has been the course of the whole people. A considerable portion of them in all classes have been actuated by nobler views. There is, throughout England, a great deal of warm though passive sympathy with America. But there is likewise an extraordinary amount of fear as well as of jealousy. And it is these last passions which have pervaded the mass of the governing

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classes, until they have inscribed for the whole nation a moral and political record which no subsequent action will ever avail to obliterate.

I am bound to notice, in several of your late despatches, a strong disposition to press upon the British government an argument for a retraction of its original error in granting to the rebels the rights of a belligerent. There may come a moment when such a proceeding might seem to me likely to be of use. But I must frankly confess that I do not see it yet. The very last speech of Lord Russell in the House of Lords is, from beginning to end, inspired by an opposite idea. The final disruption of the United States and the ultimate recognition of the seceding States are as visible in every word of that address as they were in the letter of the same nobleman to Mr. Edwards on the 14th of May last. Lord Palmerston has entertained the same conviction. * * * The foreign policy of the government, upon which its friends almost exclusively depend for what is left it of popularity in the nation, rests upon this basis. * * * For these reasons I respectfully submit to your consideration my doubts about the expediency of moving in this direction now. Indeed, should it so happen that the existing indications of an early termination of the struggle continue to multiply, there will be little occasion for further remonstrance of any kind here; for the disposition to help a party once that it is felt to be certainly sinking is not very common among either political or commercial men; and there are no others in great Britain who would stop to shed a tear over the fallen fortunes of the quasi belligerent of their own creation.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[Enclosures.]

1. Copy of Mr. Adams's note of March 25, to Earl Russell, on the Oreto, &c. 2. Copy of Mr. Consul Dudley's note to Mr. Adams, of March 22, about the arming of the Oreto.

Mr. Adams to Earl Russell.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
London, March 25, 1862.

MY LORD: I have the honor to submit to your consideration the copy of a letter received from the consul of the United States at Liverpool, touching the case of the steam gunboat Oreto, which I have already made the subject of a communication some time ago. It is with great reluctance that I am driven to the conviction that the representations made to your lordship of the purposes and destination of that vessel were delusive, and that though at first it may have been intended for service in Sicily, yet that such an intention has been long since abandoned in fact, and the pretence has been held up only the better to conceal the true object of the parties engaged. That object is to make war on the United States. All the persons thus far known to be most connected with the undertaking are either directly employed by the insurgents in the United States of America, or residents of Great Britain notoriously in sympathy with and giving aid and comfort to them on this side of the water.

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