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night of the 22d, a small cavalry force made an attack on our army trains at Catlett's Station, doing no great damage. The right of Pope being still heavily threatened, whilo a strong force was massed in his front at Rappabannock Station, he formed the bold plan of concentrating his force, recrossing the Rappahannock, and assailing the flank and rear of the opposing army. On the morning of the 23d, his forces were collected for this purpose near Rappahannock Station. The river had meanwhile suddenly risen, and finding that a crossing could not be effected in less than thirty-six hours, the plan was changed. Sigel's corps, supported by those of Banks and Reno, were ordered to Sulphur Springs, to attack any force fallen in with, and to advance to Waterloo Bridge. McDowell, to whose command the reënforcements under Reynolds were attached, was moved directly upon Warrenton, to unite with Sigel, if occasion should require, on the road from thence to Sulphur Springs or Waterloo Bridge.

It was ascertained that, on the afternoon of the 24th, tho whole force of the enemy was extended along the river, from Rappahannock Station to Waterloo Bridge, his center being near Sulphur Springs. During the day, a large Rebel force mored rapidly northward toward Rectortown, west of Bull Run Mountains, (which are crossed by the Manassas railroad at Thoroughfare Gap.) This movement clearly evinced a purpose to turn the right of Pope's army by way of White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap. Gen. Pope, feeling bound, as he says, by his instructions to maintain his communication with Fredericksburg, and having assurances that 30,000 men were to be sent forward that day, or the next morning, did not immediately change his position to meet that emergency. The main force of the enemy steadily tending in the same direction as the advance, he determined, on the night of the 25th, to abandon the lower fords of the Rappa hannock, and directed McDowell, with his own corps and that of Sigel, to hold Warrenton, while Reno was pushed forward three miles on the Warrenton turnpike, and Fitz John Porter, who had now reported to him from near Bealton Station, was ordered to join Reno. Heintzelman's corps was left at Warrenton Junction,

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with the intention of being sent, at the proper time, to Greenwich, intermodiate between Warrenton and Gainesville. It was requested of Gen. Halleck that Franklin's corps should be hastened to Gainesville, and that a strong division of the Peninsular troops should be posted at Manassas Junction. All the cavalry at that place was ordered to be sent forward to Thoroughfare Gap, for observation. Gen. Kearney was directed to post strong guards all along the railroad in his rear, from Warrenton Junction southward, while Gen. Sturgis was charged with the performance of a like duty from Manassas Junction to Catlett's Station. It was confidently expected by Gen. Pope that these several dispositions would have been completed by the afternoon of the 26th.

Jackson advanced through Thoroughfare Gap, as anticipated, and at 8 o'clock P. M., on the 26th, he had cut the railroad six miles east of Warrenton Junction, near Kettle Run. A sharp action ensued on the 27th between Hooker and Ewell, near Bristow, in which the latter was beaten. No report had been made by the cavalry sent to watch the enemy's movement, and it now became manifest to the commanding General that the re-enforcements so confidently expected on the assurances given, had failed to come to his support. His plans, otherwise likely to have been successful in stopping Jackson's advance, were thus foiled. He determined to throw the forces he had upon the enemy, moving toward Manassas and Gainesville, and getting between Lee's army and Bull Run. His entire force, much of which was greatly exhausted by continual marching or fighting, during the last nine days, now numbered about 54,000. On the morning of the 27th he proceeded to execute the purpose just indicated.

McDowell reached Gainesville during the night of the 27th, as directed, and Kearney and Reno took position at Greenwich, according to orders, communicating with McDowell. This force was thus successfully interposed between the main army of Lec, still west of the Bull Run Mountains, near White Plains, and the forces of Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, now south of the Warrenton turnpike, in the immediate vicinity of Manassas Junction. It was now that Gen. Pope, feeling that Jackson

was completely in his power, ordered Fitz John Porter, with his command of fresh troops, to move at 1 o'clock the next morning to Bristow Station, with a view to complete the work of inclosing and crushing Jackson. This order was defiantly disregarded, as charged by Gen. Pope, and as subsequently proved to the full satisfaction of a court-martial, by whose verdict Porter, for this and other acts during the two or three days ensuing, was iguominiously dismissed from the service. Kearney, having been moved to Bristow Station, was sent thence, followed by Hooker, (whose command, notwithstanding the orders of Gen. Halleck, and the lavish promises of McClellan in reply, was almost entirely destitute of ammunition), in pursuit of Ewell toward Manassas. Porter's corps did not arrive at Bristow until half past 10 o'clock in the morning of the 28th. Meanwhile, Jackson had evacuated Manassas Junction, very early that morning. Sigel's corps, in the advance at Gainesville, had also failed to move on Manassas as expeditiously as was intended, otherwise the retreat of Jackson would have been intercepted before he reached Bull Run. The commanding General reached Manassas Junction, with Reno's corps and Kearney's division, within an hour after Jackson in person had left for Centreville. Hooker, Kearney and Reno were immediately sent forward toward the latter place, and Porter was ordered to bring up his corps. McDowell was also apprised of the state of affairs, and ordered to recall his troops advancing on Manassas, (as directed before Jackson's retreat was begun,) and to move out the road from Gainesville toward Centreville. Near night, Gen. Kearney drove Jackson's rear-guard out of the latter place, occupying it about dark, with his advance a httle beyond. • McDowell, who had with him Sigel's corps and Reynolds' division, in addition to his own corps, (from which the division of Ricketts had been detached in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap), encountered the advance of Jackson about 6 o'clock in the evening, and a conflict ensued, lasting until dark, when each force held its ground. Contrary to expectation, however, King's division, which had sustained the principal part in this action, withdrew during the night, and Ricketts had been driven back from the Gap, retiring upon Bristow

Station. The party assailing Ricketts was the advance of Longstrect, sent to re-enforce Jackson.

Gen. Sigel, supported by Reynolds, was directed to attack Jackson on the 29th, and Gen. Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, was ordered forward from Centreville to attack the enemy in the rear. Orders were sent to McDow. ell and Porter to move forward, with their two corps, to Gainesville, with all haste, to participate in the battle. Sigel began the attack at daylight, (on the 29th), a mile or two east of Groveton, where he was soon joined by Hooker and Kearney. Jackson at first attempted to avoid an engagement by falling back, but was compelled to take a stand, having his right a little south of the Warrenton turnpikc, and his left near Sudley Springs. His line was covered by an old railroad grade, extending from Gainesville toward Leesburg. The engagement was a severe and protracted one. Porter having entirely failed to bring his men into action as ordered, Jackson, though his forces were badly cut up, was able to hold out until Longstreet, with the advance of Lee's main army, vear night came up to his support.

The losses were very heavy on both sides, Gen. Pope estimating his killed and wounded at six or eight thousand. That of the enemy was very much greater.

The battle of the 30th, the enemy being thus re-enforced, was fought under great disadvantages, near the old battleground of Bull Run. The Government troops fought with great bravery, maintaining their position with remarkable firmness amidst heavy losses, though the left was gradually forced back. Pope had boldly attacked, in the morning, to anticipate the arrival of further re-enforcements to the enemy by Thoroughfare Gap. It was not until dark that this sanguinary engagement ceased, when our left had receded nearly threefourths of a mile, though with unbroken ranks and in good order, the turnpike in the rear, which the enemy had endeavored to occupy, being still well covered. The losses on both sides were very heavy.

Gen. Pope's army was not only exhausted with hard work before the commencement of this day's fight, but was also

becoming destitute of supplies. To an urgent request on the 28th for rations and forage, to be promptly forwarded, he received the following reply on the morning of the 30th :

TO TIE COMMANDING OFFICER AT CENTREVILLE: I have been instructed by Gen. McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all the cars also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train. Respectfully,

W. B. FRANKLIN, Major-General commanding Sixth Corps.

“Such a letter," says Gen. Pope, “when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment.” Neither Sumner's corps nor Franklin's had as yet been advanced to render any aid in a military crisis, which urgently demanded the presence of every available man at the scene of action. Another corps, commanded by McClellan's chief favorite, Fitz John Porter, though close at hand, had been found equally wanting at Groveton, through the deliberate disobedience of its commander, though it took part in the battle of the 30th. Gen. McClellan was, meanwhile, quietly waiting at Alexandria, having been ordered by Gen. Halleck, on the 27th, to “take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria ;" and having also been told on the same day, that “ Franklin's corps should march " to Manassas“ as possible.” On the previous day, the 26th, Sumner's corps commenced disembarking at Acquia Creck. While thus leisurely waiting, charged with the duty of promptly sending indispensable re-enforcements to Pope, yet neglecting to send even the needed supplies to the troops he already had, McClellan was sending such suggestions to Washington as the following:

as soon

I am clear tnat one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope ; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe.

To this the President replicd :

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