ments from his new base at once, and that such incidental modifications as the foregoing may render proper, be also made. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

On the same day, Gen. McClellan had telegraphed from Fort ress Monroe: "I expect to move from here to-morrow morning on Yorktown, where a force of some 15,000 of the Rebels are in intrenched position, and I think it quite possible they will attempt to resist us." On the 4th, he said: "Our advance is at Cockestown, within five miles of Yorktown. ... I expect to fight to-morrow, as I shall endeavor to cut the communication between Yorktown and Richmond." At the same time Gen. Wool, telegraphing the departure of these forces for Yorktown, expressed a decided opinion that no serious resistance would be encountered there. It is probable, from the information since obtained, that when the movement commenced, the Rebel force under Magruder was less than 10,000. It is certain that the intrenchments were by no means so formidable as to justify the loss of time requisite for a siege, not only wasting precious days, but wearing out as many lives in the trenches as would have been sacrificed in carrying the works by assault. Such, at least, appears to have been the opinion of the President, who did not imagine for a moment, when his order above quoted was given, that a purpose to sit down before Yorktown, until the enemy had time to concentrate a strong force there, was entertained by the Cormanding General.

The

Carrying out the policy of his order of April 3d, the President, as indicated by an order issued from the War Department on the following day, created two new military departments, including the spheres of operation and the troops left behind by McClellan on his withdrawal to the Peninsula. Department of the Shenandoah embraced that portion of Virginia and Maryland lying between the Mountain Department and the Blue Ridge, and was put under the command of Maj.Gen. Banks. The Department of the Rappahannock com. prised that portion of Virginia east of the Blue Ridge to the Potomac and the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. together with the District of Columbia and the country between the Potomac and the Patuxent. Gen. McDowell was desig

nated to command this department.

The movements of the

enemy in the valley, and the exposed condition in which McClellan had been on the point of leaving the National Capital, in disregard of instructions and of the express conditions on which the movement to the Peninsula was permitted, showed the expediency of having a responsible commander in both these localities. The remoteness of Gen. McClellan, and his occupation with other engrossing duties, seemed further to require this change.

If the President had not expected any serious loss of time at Yorktown, it is equally evident, from official dispatches, that such a thought had found no place in the mind of McClellan until about the same date as his official notification of the action of the Administration, just referred to. His dispatch, urging a reconsideration of this action, was prefaced by representations of the numbers and preparations of the enemy, not very closely agreeing with those previously given, yet at least such as to afford cogent reasons for an unhesitating advance. This significant paper is subjoined:

[Received 8.30 A. M., April 6.]

NEAR YORKTOWN, 7 P. M., April 5. A. LINCOLN, President: The enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnoissance just made by Gen. Barnard shows that their line of works extend across the entire Peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick river. Many of them are very formidable. Deserters say they are being reënforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under these circumstances, I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the First Corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy, and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the Rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers, but whatever your decision may be I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. If you can not leave me the whole of the First Corps, I urgently ask that I may not lose Franklin and his division.

G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.

To this dispatch the following reply was promptly sent:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY,

April 6, 1862.

}

Maj. Gen. GEO. B. MCCLELLAN: The President directs me to say that your dispatch to him has been received. Sumner's corps is on the road to you, and will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's division is now on the advance toward Manassas. There are no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the Government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

Magruder, who commanded the Rebel force near Yorktown, fully appreciated the element of time in this campaign, and undoubtedly maneuvered with some skill to put his adversary on a cautious policy. In general orders to be read to his troops, on the 4th of April, he said: "The enemy is before us—our works are strong—our cause is good-we fight for our homes, and must be careful. Every hour we hold out, brings us reënforcements." Instead of availing himself of his overwhelming superiority of numbers, by a resolute attack, McClellan paused to discuss still further the conduct of the Administration as to matters far away from the immediate sphere of his labors, and to beg for reënforcements. On the 6th, he sent the following dispatch, (received in Washington at 3 o'clock P. M.):

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

A. LINCOLN, President: The order forming new Departments, if rigidly enforced, deprives me of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely necessary to enable me to advance to Richmond. I have by no means the transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles. I respectfully request that I may not be placed in this position, but that my orders for wagon trains, ammunition, and other material that I have prepared and necessarily left behind, as well as Woodbury's brigade, may at once be complied with. The enemy is strong in my front, and I have a most serious task before me, in the fulfillment of which I need all the aid the

Government can give me. I again repeat the urgent request that Gen. Franklin and his division may be restored to my command.

G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.

To this the President replied:

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862. Maj. Gen. MCCLELLAN, Fortress Monroe: Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. The Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of Gen. Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. They will probably use time as advantageously as you can. A. LINCOLN.

In disregarding this pointed advice-from one who was entitled to command a grave, though still not irretrievable, error of the campaign, was committed at the outset. Gen. Burnside had done at Newbern, on the 14th of the previous month, what was incomparably more difficult, in carrying the works of the enemy, when manned by numbers fully equal to his own. His forces, too, were largely made up of raw recruits. The Army of the Potomac, after eight months spent in its formation and discipline, was deemed by its commander inadequate to force its way through the line of fortifications at Yorktown, though so many times more numerous than the enemy. Magruder gained the opportunity which he craved. Davis ordered Johnston and Beauregard to advance from Corinth, on the 3d of April, to crush the army of Grant at Pittsburg Landinglittle dreaming then, as may well be supposed, that nearly three months would elapse before their presence would be indispensable at Richmond. The slow processes of a regular siege began in front of the little army of Magruder. Thousands sickened and died in the trenches. The nation grew weary of the same disheartening news, day by day, and week after week. Finally, the siege batteries were prepared to begin; and the enemy, though now strengthened by all the aid that thirty days could bring, was found to have deserted his

works the moment an earnest attack was believed to be imminent.

To the President's dispatch of April 6, Gen. McClellan had little else to reply than by extravagant representations of the enemy's strength, with a corresponding disparagement of his own, followed by complaining entreaties for reënforcements that could not be furnished. In this response, he also said: "Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decido the existing contest."

So persistent was McClellan in these complaints and demands, that Mr. Lincoln felt constrained to address to him the following frank and kindly letter, plainly rehearsing the facts and reasons of the case, and again pointedly indicating the grand necessity of the hour:

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862. MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it certainly not without reluctance.

After you left, I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. General Banks' corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburgh, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction: but when that arrangement was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of