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tance to Richmond from the same stream at Mechanicsville. The entire line now extended from the latter point to Seven Pines, about half way from the river to Richmond, the Chickahominy flowing between the left and the right and center. This stream, here about forty feet in width, is subject to sudden variations in volume, heavy rains causing it to overflow the bottom-lands on each side, and rendering it impassable except by bridges-all of which, in this vicinity, had been destroyed by the enemy. The Meadow Bridge was north of Richmond, near the Virginia Central railroad, and a short distance above the bridge at Mechanicsville. The third, following down the stream six or seven miles, was called New Bridge, and was a less distance above the York river railroad bridge. Between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville, McClellan determined to construct as many as eleven new bridges.

The Rebel line of defenses, within which the enemy had retired, commenced nearly opposite Drewry's Bluff, on the James river, and bending in a northeasterly direction, across the York river railroad, to the Chickahominy, very nearly followed up the right bank of that stream. The diameter of this semi-circular line was about seven miles, from the center at Richmond. The main body of the enemy, it appears, was encamped on the New Bridge road. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was still in command.

By instructions from the War Department, issued on the 17th of May, Gen. McDowell, to be reënforced by Shields' division, had been directed to establish a communication, as soon as possible, between his left and McClellan's right. Corresponding directions were sent to Gen. McClellan. A gunboat expedition up the James river had meanwhile been repulsed at Fort Darling, and the attempt to approach Richmond by that means had been effectually abandoned. On the 21st, McClellan telegraphed the following, with many other matters, to the Presilent:

I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant, addressed to myself and Gen. McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my depart

ment. This fact, my superior rank, and the express language of the sixty-second article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by your Excellency; and I consider that he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy can not advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas.

The President replied as follows, under date of May 22:

Your long dispatch of yesterday is just received. You will have just such control of Gen. McDowell and his forces as you therein indicate. McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats, if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will certainly not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he can reach you in five days after starting; whereas by water he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it.

A. LINCOLN.

How the purpose above indicated came necessarily to be changed, will best appear from the two following dispatches:

MAY 24, 1862.

I left Gen. McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but it is so worn that he can not move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting Gen. Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces, under Gen. Anderson, now opposing Gen. McDowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the ene my's supplies from Ricnmord, preserve the railroad bridge

across the two forks of the Pamunkey and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st. A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN.

McClellan, in his report, erroneously gives a later dispatch (dated May 24) as the President's response on this occasion.

Intelligence received at a later hour on the same day, caused the President to suspend the order in regard to Gen. McDowell's movement, as the subjoined dispatch indicated to McClellan :

MAY 24, 1862.

In consequence of Gen. Banks' critical position, I have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell's movements to join you, The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw Gen. Fremont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in their rear. A. LINCOLN.

To this, Gen. McClellan replied: "I will make my calculations accordingly."

The next dispatch clearly sets forth the situation of affairs at the time:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862. Your dispatch received. Gen. Banks was at Strasburg with about six thousand men, Shields having been taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. On the 23d, a Rebel force of seven to ten thousand fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entirely; crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks on the road to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race with them, beating them into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is

broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with ten thousand troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, that another force of ten thousand is near Orleans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about twenty thousand of his forces moving back to the vicinity of Port Royal; and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg; both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort, calling in militia from the adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation.

If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you.

Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have. A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. MCCLellan.

Later, on the same day, the President sent the following:

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. MCCLELLAN: The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Banks before him-in precisely what force we can not tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap railroad, from both north and south, in precisely what force we can not tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. LINCOLN.

On the same day, McClellan replied: "Telegram received Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to pre

I have two corps

vent reënforcements being sent to me. across the Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond; the others on this side at other crossings within the same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed."

Gen. Stoneman was sent out with a small cavalry force to cut the Virginia Central railroad between the Chickahominy and Hanover Court House. This is the eastern one of two lines of railroad from Richmond, both of which meet at Hanover Junction, several miles beyond the Court House. The other extends nearly due north from Richmond to Fredericksburg and Acquia Creek. Both roads cross the South Anna river a few miles south of their junction, and at no great distance apart. To have destroyed both the South Anna bridges of these roads would have cut the enemy's direct communications with the forces in the Valley, and with those resisting McDowell's advance southward. In cutting only one of these roads, several miles south of the South Anna, very little was effected. The President anxiously telegraphed, on the 26th: "Can you not cut the Acquia Creek railroad also? What impression have you as to the intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?" McClellan replied (on the same day) that he had "cut the Virginia Central railroad in three places, between Hanover Court House and the Chickahominy," and would "try to cut the other." To the other questions of the President, he replied: "I do not think Richmond intrenchments formidable; but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day." Later, he telegraphed as follows:

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Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster, and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow

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