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MEADE FAILS TO HOLD THE WELDON ROAD.

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bore, of course, no comparison to | don railroad reached; but hardly had

ours.

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It had now been established, at a cost of fully 10,000 men,"1 that Petersburg could not be carried by direct assault, no matter in what force: and our troops were directed to intrench strongly in its front, while the 2d and 6th corps were moved" to the left, with intent to find and turn the enemy's right; cutting or holding the Weldon railroad.

The 2d moved around to the Jerusalem plank road, where it was met by the enemy in force, and driven back a short distance; the 6th not being at hand. Next morning, the advance was resumed by both corps, but too tardily and disconnectedly the country being, for the most part, thickly wooded and difficult. A. P. Hill was watching the movement, and, at the proper moment, threw a division of his corps in between our two, striking rapidly in flank successively Barlow's, Mott's, and Gibbon's divisions, rolling them up and forcing them back, with a loss of 4 guns and many prisoners. At the same time, another of Hill's divisions struck the flank of the 6th corps likewise, inflicting on it also considerable loss. But Meade now arrived on the field -the Rebel advance having been checked-and, getting both corps well in hand, he ordered, at nightfall, an advance, which was made, and most of the lost ground recoveredHill not being in force to resist him in the open field.

Our advance southward was resumed next morning, and the Wel

61 Between June 10 and 20, Meade's losses were killed, 1,198; wounded, 6,853; missing, 1,614: total, 9,665. And this does not probably

operations upon it begun, when Hill again struck the flank of our three regiments in advance, and routed them, taking many prisoners, and driving the fugitives back on the main body; when he again desisted, carrying off his captives. Our losses in this baffled effort were scarcely less than 4,000 men, mainly prisoners; with no resulting advantage, save a moderate extension of our left toward the Weldon railroad.

The mishap of this first attempt to clutch the Weldon railroad involved or drew after it another. Gen. Wilson, with his own and Kautz's divisions of cavalry, together 8,000 strong, had on that day been impelled still farther to our left, on a raid against the enemy's railroads. Moving southward for some distance, he turned abruptly to his right, and struck the Weldon road at Reams's station, where he burned the dépôt and tore up a long stretch of track. Passing thence rapidly westward, he struck the Lynchburg road at a point 15 miles from Petersburg, and followed it westward to Nottoway station, destroying the track for 22 miles; here encountering and defeating a Rebel cavalry force under W. F. Lee. Hence, he dispatched Kautz to Burkesville, the junction of this with the Danville road, where both roads were torn up, as was the Danville so far S. W. as Meherrin station; where Kautz was rejoined by Wilson, and the work prosecuted so far as Roanoke bridge (over the Staunton); where they were con

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include the losses of Sheridan's cavalry, who were fighting north of the James. 62 June 21. 63 June 23. 64 June 24.

fronted by a stronger force than they could dislodge, and commenced their return to our camps.

But, by this time, the enemy were all around them, and intent on their destruction. Striking the Weldon road at Stony creek," they were again confronted by more Rebels than they could drive; and, after a hard fight, were obliged to give up the attempt, and make for Reams's station, which Wilson undoubtedly supposed to be now held by Hancock or Warren. He was badly mistaken, however; for here was a far stronger Rebel force (including Mahone's and Finnegan's infantry brigades, beside Hampton's cavalry) than that which had baffled him at Stony creek; and his attempt to force a passage resulted in his signal defeat, involving the loss of his guns, his train, with many prisoners and their horses. About 1,000 negroes, who had fallen into the wake of our cavalry-many of them mounted on horses borrowed for the occasion-here fell into the hands of the Rebels, and were returned to a servitude which their effort to escape was not calculated to lighten. Wilson and Kautz fled separately across the Nottoway, and, by a long circuit southward, made their way back to our lines before Petersburg-men and horses coming in pretty nearly used up. Grant, in his report, says, indeed, with his habitual optimism, that

"the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several weeks;" but such was not the general opinion; and Grant sent no more cavalry to the Rebel rear for months. Lee claims to have taken from Wilson

65 June 28.

and Kautz on this raid 1,000 prisoners (beside the wounded), 13 guns, and 30 wagons.

. On our right, Gen. Butler had been directed to throw a pontoon-bridge over the James to Deep Bottom, north of his stronghold at Bermuda Hundreds; which he did skillfully and without loss; Brig.-Gen. Foster, with a brigade of the 10th corps, taking post at Deep Bottom, only 10 miles from Richmond, and very near its southward defenses at Howlett's.

Gen. Sheridan, who, with his cavalry, had rested some days at White House, after their return from their harassing raid toward Gordonsville, now moved across the Peninsula to the James, being resolutely attacked" by the way; but he beat off his assailants, with a loss of some 500 on either side, and made his way safely to our right, bringing in his guns and train.

The residue of the 18th corps was now returned to Butler; and thus, in spite of reverses, our lines were extended on both flanks, so as to threaten Richmond above the James, while we attempted to flank and carry Petersburg on the south. Why it was not then, or thereafter, found advisable to mass suddenly against the center of the enemy's long, thin line, and burst through it, wherever, between Richmond and Petersburg, it should seem weakest, Gen. Grant in his report does not inform us. Possibly, the sore experience of Cold Harbor had made him chary of infantry assaults on lines fortified and held by marksmen of such nerve as now composed the bulk of Lee's decimated but still formidable army. There were several collisions along

66 June 25.

HANCOCK NORTH OF THE JAMES.

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ible. Having given his soldiers some much needed rest-the Summer being intensely hot and dry, and the earth parched and baked so that any movement raised a cloud of dust which nearly suffocated men and horses, and revealed its existence, its strength, and its destination, to the ever-watchful foe-another effort on our right was resolved on. A railroad along the rear of our position was, during the Summer, completed, facilitating not only the distribution of munitions and provisions from our

where the Lieutenant-General had his headquarters, but serving to accelerate also the movement of troops.

our lines in front of Petersburg, generally provoked by the now elated enemy, who assailed Gen. Stannard's division of the 10th corps; first opening with artillery and then charging with infantry; only to be repulsed with a loss of 150 prisoners. A demonstration was made next day against Burnside's front; but it was not resolute, and was easily repulsed. Thence ensued some days of comparative quiet our men having marched and fought almost incessantly for eight weeks, having lost meantime fully 70,000 of their num-chief landing and dépôt at City Point, ber by desperate fighting-mainly against great advantages of position or shelter, which screened the enemy from losses at all proportionate to ours-and they were by no means in such heart for daily conflict as when they last crossed the Rapidan. True, their numbers had been nearly or quite kept up by rëenforcements from various quarters; but many of these were such men as high bounties attract to military service, and who were not 'bounty-jumpers' only because they had, as yet, found no chance to jump." In fact, the Army of the Potomac in 1864, though still including many thousands of excellent and now veteran soldiers, was in good part formed of material very different from and inferior to that which McClellan led to the Peninsula in 1862. And this army, when concentrated south of the James, was by no means equal in morale and efficiency to that same army at the opening of the campaign.

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Foster's fortified post at Deep Bottom, threatening an attack on Richmond, while easily strengthened from Bermuda Hundreds, disquieted Lee; and one or two attempts had been made upon it, but easily repulsed. Grant resolved to reciprocate the enemy's attentions; so, having quietly transferred the 2d corps from his extreme left to his extreme right, across the James, at Deep Bottom," he directed Hancock to turn the enemy's advance position, while Foster should amuse him by a feint in front; and this order was so admirably obeyed that the Rebel outpost was successfully flanked and carried by Miles's brigade" of Barlow's division, capturing 4 guns. The enemy fell back behind Bailey's creek; still holding firmly his strong defensive work at Chapin's bluff, opposite Fort Darling.

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Sheridan, with his cavalry, attempted to flank this work, and gained some high ground from which he only 168,000 ever made their appearance at the front. July 26-7.

* Consisting of the 183d Pa., 28th Mass., and 26th Mich., under Col. J. C. Lynch.

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hoped to get into its rear; but night | failure. And now, at 4 A. M.-the

came on before he was ready; and, so imminent seemed the danger on this flank, that Lee drew" five of his eight remaining divisions across the James to avert it, affording the opportunity which Grant was awaiting.

fuse having been rëlighted-the explosion took place; hoisting the fort into the air, annihilating its garrison of 300 men, and leaving in its stead a gigantic hollow or crater of loose earth, 150 feet long by some 60 wide and 25 to 30 deep. Instantly, our guns opened all along the front; and the astounded enemy may well have supposed them the thunders of doom.

But it was indispensable to success that a column of assault should rush forward instantly and resolutely, so as to clear the chasm and gain the crest before the foe should recover from his surprise; and, on this vital point, failure had already been secured. The 9th corps, as then con

Burnside's corps held a position directly in front of Petersburg, including a point where our lines, owing to the nature of the ground, had been pushed up to within 150 yards of the enemy's, where a fort projected beyond their average front. Under this fort, a mine had been run from a convenient ravine or hollow within our lines, which was entirely screened from the enemy's observation; and this mine would seem to have been completed not only without counter-stituted, was not that from which mining by the Rebels, but without being even suspected by them; though a report of its existence (probably founded on the story of some deserter or prisoner) was printed in one of the Richmond journals.

All being ready, the morning of July 30th was fixed for springing the mine; which was to be instantly followed, of course, by the opening of our guns all along the front, and by an assault at the chasm opened in the enemy's defenses by the explosion. It was calculated that, if a crest barely 400 yards behind the doomed fort could be gained and held, Petersburg must fall, with heavy loss to its defenders.

any commanding general would have selected a storming party; yet, because it was Burnside's mine, his corps was, without discussion, allowed to furnish the column of assault. His inspecting officer had reported that, of its four divisions, that composed of Blacks was fittest for this perilous service; but Grant, discrediting this, had directed that one of the three White divisions should be chosen. Thereupon, the leaders of these divisions were allowed to cast lots to see which of them should go in-or rather, which two of them should stay out-and the lot fell on the 1st, Brig.-Gen. Ledlie—and no man in the army believed this other than the worst choice of the three.

The mine was to be fired at 3 A. M.; when the match was duly ap-It need hardly be added that no preplied, but no explosion followed. After a considerable pause, Lt. Jacob Douty and Sergt. Henry Rees, of the 48th Pa., ventured into the gallery, detecting and removing the cause of

paration had been made during the night preceding the explosion, by quietly removing (or opening paths through) the abatis, &c., which protected our front from sudden dashes 71 July 27-29.

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BURNSIDE'S MINE EXPLOSION-BARLOW'S ASSAULT. 591

of the enemy, for the instant advance in force of our column of assault.

of unresisted slaughter. The Black charge, feeble as it was, had given us a few prisoners; but now our men could no more retreat than advance; the enemy's guns sweeping the ground between the chasm and our front. A first Rebel assault on our unfortunates was repulsed in sheer desperation; and thousands, of course, took the risk of darting out of the death-trap and racing at top speed to our lines; but our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,400; while that of the enemy, including 300 blown up in the fort, was barely 1,000.

Undismayed by the disastrous re

The explosion had occurred; the Rebel fort had been hoisted 200 feet, and had fallen in fragments; our guns had opened all along the front, cliciting a far feebler and ineffective response; but several minutes passed-precious, fatal minutes !—before Ledlie's division, clearing with difficulty the obstacles in its path-went forward into the chasm, and there stopped, though the enemy at that point were still paralyzed and the deciding crest completely at our mercy. Then parts of Burnside's two remaining White divisions (Potter's and Wilcox's) followed; but, once in the crater, Ledlie's men bar-sult of "this [needlessly] miserable red the way to a farther advance, affair," as he fitly characterizes it, and all huddled together, losing their Grant paused scarcely a fortnight formation and becoming mixed up; before he resumed the offensive; reGen. Potter finally extricating him- turning to successive operations on self, and charging toward the crest; both flanks. Once more, Hancock but with so slender a following that was impelled" against the front of he was soon obliged to fall back. the Rebel left, facing Deep Bottom; Two hours were thus shamefully his depleted corps being strengthened squandered, while the Rebels, recov- by the 10th, now led by Birney, and ering their self-possession, were plant- by Gregg's division of cavalry. Again ing batteries on either side, and pushing out to the right, Hancock mustering their infantry in an adja- attempted to flank the Rebel defenses cent ravine; and now-when more across Bailey's creek: Barlow, with men in the crater could only render two divisions, being sent around to the confusion more hopeless and mag- assault in flank and rear; while nify the disaster--Burnside threw in Mott's division menaced their eastern his Black division; which, passing front, and Birney's corps assailed beyond and rather to the right of the them next the river. Birney gained crater, charged toward the crest, but some advantage, taking 4 guns; but were met by a fire of artillery and Barlow's assault was delivered by a musketry which speedily hurled them single brigade, and came to nothing. back into the crater, where all order In fact, Hancock had been delayed was lost, all idea of aught beyond in landing his men, so that Lee, forepersonal safety abandoned, while the warned, had begun to rëenforce this enemy's shells and balls poured into flank; as he did more fully next day: it like hail, rendering it an arena so that, when our troops again ad

12 Aug. 12.

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