lows:

Sedgwick's (6th) Corps, 4,601 | Sickles's (3d) corps, 4,089

Sedgwick being now out of the way, Lee was at liberty to turn with all his force on Hooker, who still remained within his hasty earthworks between Chancellorsville and the Rappahannock. But the Rebels had been marched and fought till they were exhausted, and had been fearfully slaughtered in their reckless rushes on our batteries on Sunday. They may have been willing to repeat that madness; but Lee manifestly was not. The day passed with little skirmishing and no serious fighting; and, at evening, Hooker called a council of corps commanders, which decided nothing; but he determined to rëcross that night, and did so, utterly unmolested. He states that he brought back one gun more than he took over, and judges that he inflicted greater injury than he received. That is probably an overestimate: since he admits a total

"Yours received, saying you could hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both."

Slocum's (12th)

Couch's (24)

Reynolds's (1st)

66

2,883 Howard's (11th) " 2,508 2,025 | Meade's (5th)

292 Cavalry, &c.

699

150

He adds that a Rebel surgeon at Richmond stated the loss of their side in these struggles at 18,000;" and it is significant that no official statement of their losses was ever

made, and that Pollard is silent on the subject. It is quite probable that, while the prestige of success was wholly with the Rebels, their losses were actually more exhausting

than ours.

And the violent storm

and consequent flood which attended and covered Hooker's recrossing, setting some of his pontoons adrift and threatening to separate him from his resources, is cited on one side to explain his retreat, and on the other to excuse Lee's failure to molest it.

Hooker, his army having returned to their familiar camping-ground on the north of the Rappahannock, issued" a congratulatory order, wherein he says:

"The Major-General commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected,

ton's crossing, in rear of the enemy). The enemy having weakened his left, in order to force McLaws and gain the river road, Gen. Lee

42 Pollard gives the following account of this movement from the Rebel side; which must serve for want of a better:

"The enemy, however, was not yet defeated. One more struggle remained; and, to make that, the enemy during the night massed a heavy force against McLaws's left, in order to establish communication with Hooker along the river road. Anderson moved rapidly to the support of McLaws, and reached the church about 12 M., having marched 15 miles. Gen. Lee having arrived on the field, ordered Anderson to move round the church and establish his right on Early's left (Early having come up from Hamil

of the enemy, and, at a concerted signal, Anderson and Early rushed upon the enemy's left.

"The signal for the general attack was not given until just before sunset, when our men rushed upon the enemy like a hurricane. But little resistance was made: the beaten foe having fled in wild confusion in the direction of Banks's

ford. At dark, a short pause ensued; but, speedily driven to Banks's ford, and on that as soon as the moon rose, the enemy was night of the 4th of May ended this remarkable series of battles on the lines of the Rappahannock."

365

"It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the troops unite on Sunday next in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due His name.

"Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, the

'By our celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the rivers was undisputed, and, on our withdrawal, not a Rebel ventured to follow.

"The events of last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier

of this army. We have added new luster to its former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his intrenchments, and, wherever we have fought, have inflicted heavier blows than we have received. We have taken from the enemy 5,000 prisoners, 15 colors; captured and brought off 7 pieces of artil' lery; placed hors de combat 18,000 of his chosen troops; destroyed his dépôts filled

with vast amounts of stores; deranged his communications; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and consternation. We

have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions; and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle."

Lee issued a kindred order next day; in which, with at least equal justice and modesty, he says:

"With heartfelt gratification, the General commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by

their country; and, while we mourn their loss, let us resolve to emulate their noble example. The army and the country alike lament the absence for a time of one [Jackson] to whose bravery, energy, and skill they are so much indebted for success.

The operations of our cavalry, under Stoneman and Averill, had been ill-judged, feeble, and inefficient as well could be. Averill, who was on the right, went out to Culpepper Court House, and thence to the Rapidan; where he remained, attempting nothing and achieving it, till an order from Hooker reached" him, directing his return to the north side of the Rappahannock; which was obeyed with alacrity.

Stoneman himself pushed down by Louisa Court House and Yanceyville to Thompson's Cross-Roads, on the South Anna; having meantime sent Col. Wyndham with a detachment to Columbia, on the James, where a little damage was done and more attempted to the James and Kanawha Canal. Gen. Gregg, with the 1st Maine and 10th New York, was impelled eastward, to destroy the railroad bridge on the Fredericksburg

"Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly intrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Rappahannock. While this glorious victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are especially called upon May 2.

45

to the task, and contented himself with burning two or three turnpike bridges; falling back upon Stoneman. Col. Judson Kilpatrick was sent, with the Harris Light, to cut the railroads leading northward from Richmond still nearer that city, and struck" the Fredericksburg road at

48

the Virginia Central road, near Meadow Bridge, doing there a little mischief, and thence pushing north-eastward across the Pamunkey near Hanover, and the Mattapony at Aylett's, to King and Queen Court House, and thence south-eastwardly to our lines" at Gloucester Point, on York river. Lt.-Col. B. F. Davis, 12th Illinois, had meantime passed down the South Anna to Ashland, where he tore up some rails and captured a train of sick, whom he paroled, and crossed thence to Hanover Station on the Central, which was fractured, and considerable Confederate property destroyed. Davis then pushed down to within seven miles of Richmond, where he bivouacked that night, and set his face next morning toward Williamsburg on the Peninsula; but was stopped and turned aside by a Rebel force at Tunstall's Station, near White House; moving thence northward until he fell in with Kilpatrick near King and Queen Court House, and escaped with him to Gen. King's outpost at Gloucester Point. Stoneman, with Gregg and Buford, turned back" from Yanceyville, recrossing the Rapidan at Raccoon ford, and the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford.50

Attempts were made to represent Stoneman's movement as successful, when it was in fact one of the most conspicuous failures of the war, though it might and should have been far otherwise. His force, if held well together, was sufficient to have severed for at least a week all connection by rail or telegraph between Lee and Richmond, riding right over any array of cavalry that could have been May 7. May 3.

47

48

ericksburg road at or above its junction with the Central; as, below that point, cutting one of those roads, even permanently, was of little use; since communication between Richmond and Fredericksburg might be maintained by either. By keeping his entire force in hand, and thus going where and as he would, Stoneman might have destroyed the principal bridges on both roads, rendering them impassable for weeks; and brought away thousands of able-bodied negroes, mounted on as many serviceable horses. As it was, by dissipating his forces, he rendered them too weak at most points to effect any thing, and kept them running from the enemy instead of running after them; thus giving to his expedition the appearance rather of a furtive raid on smoke-houses and henroosts than that of an important movement in a great war. The few little gaps made in the railroads. by his detachments were easily and quickly closed; while the 300 horses and mules he brought away would not half replace the horses broken down by his men-mainly in keeping out of the enemy's way.

While Hooker was preparing for and executing his movement across the Rappahannock, Longstreet, with a large force, was aiming a similar blow at the extreme left of our position in Virginia; where Gen. John J. Peck held the little village of SUFFOLK, with a force ultimately increased to 14,000 men, aided by three gunboats on the Blackwater. Suffolk being an important railroad junction, covering the landward apMay 8.

49

May 5.

50

tain and the Antietam? Grant was beginning to be triumphant in Mississippi, and would soon be thundering at the gates of Vicksburg; Dick Taylor, chased almost out of Louisiana by Banks, could do little toward the rescue of threatened Port Hudson: why not spare Longstreet to needy, beseeching Jo. Johnston, enabling him to overwhelm Grant and then to crush out Banks, restoring the Confederate ascendency on the Mississippi, while simply holding on along the Rappahannock, trusting to the great advantages afforded to the defensive by the rugged topography of that region, and to the terrors inspired by the memories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville?

In fact, Lee's invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania at that juncture was justifiable on political grounds alone. The Confederate chiefs must have acted on the strength of trusted assurances that the Northern Peace Democracy, detesting the Emancipation policy now steadfastly ascendant at Washington, and weary of high taxes, dear fabrics, a disordered currency, and an enormous yet swelling National Debt, were ripe for revolt: so that a Rebel victory on Northern soil would enable the devotees of Slavery in the loyal States to seize upon the pending Conscription and wield it as an engine of revolution. Lee hints this obscurely where, in the opening of his report on this campaign, after trying to give military reasons for his movement, and failing to satisfy himself of their plausibility, he says:

"In addition to these results, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained

by military success."

* June 3.

A month had barely elapsed since Hooker rëcrossed the Rappahannock, when Lee put his columns in motion up the southern bank of that river. McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps led' the march from Fredericksburg, followed' by Ewell's corps; while Hood moved up from the Rapidan; all concentrating, with the cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart, on Culpepper Court House. These movements were of course carefully screened from observation on our side; A. P. Hill's corps being left to make as much display as possible in and around Fredericksburg: but Hooker was soon aware that something unusual was in progress, and threw over Gen. Howe's division of the 6th corps a little below the city, to ascertain if the enemy were still in force there. Hill soon convinced him that they were; creating an impression that there had been no material reduction of the Rebel strength in that quarter; but, as it was not his policy to fight, and Howe did not care to attack the entire Rebel army, there was no serious conflict. Howe, after some careful skirmishing, desisted, and ultimately withdrew without loss.

3

It being at length clear that the enemy were operating on our right, Hooker massed his cavalry near Catlett's Station, giving its command to Pleasanton, who speedily prepared to look across the Rappahannock and see what was going on there. He was backed by two small but choice brigades of infantry under Gen. Ames, of the 11th, and Gen. Russell, of the 6th corps, each taking a battery; and the whole moved quietly down to Kelly's and to Beverly