own 40,000 men, was rëenforced, the | of the two corps of Reynolds (16,000) night before, by two divisions (Kear- and W. F. Smith (21,000), with cavny's and Hooker's own) from Hook- alry under Bayard, raising it nearly er, raising his command nearly to or quite to 40,000. At 9 A. M., Rey55,000. At least half our entire force nolds advanced on the left; Meade's across the river was thus with Frank- division, in front, being immediately lin on the left, where the main attack assailed by Rebel batteries (J. E. B. manifestly should have been made, Stuart's) on his left flank, which comand where Burnside appears to have pelled him to halt and silence them. purposed that it should have been At 11 A. M., he pushed on, fighting; made. But it was after 7 A. M. of the while one of Hooker's divisions in fatal day when Franklin received his reserve was brought across, and Birorders; which, if they were intended ney's and Gibbon's divisions were to direct a determined attack in full moved up to his support. Reynolds's force, were certainly very blindly and corps being thus all in line of battle, vaguely worded," whereas, a military Meade again gallantly advanced into order should be as precise and clear as the woods in his front; grappling, at language will allow, and as positive as 1, in fierce encounter, with A. P. the circumstances will warrant. It is Hill's corps, crushing back the brigvery certain that a Massena or a Blu- ades of Archer and Lane, and, forcing cher could have found warrant in that his way in between them, took some order for attacking at once with his 200 prisoners. Here, in attempting entire corps, leaving Hooker's men to rally Orr's rifles, which had been. to defend the bridges and act as a disorganized, fell Brig.-Gen. Maxcy reserve; but, if hot work is wanted Gregg," mortally wounded. of a Franklin, it should be required and prescribed in terms more peremptory and less equivocal. He asserts that he expected and awaited further orders, which he never in terms received; at least, not till it was too late to obey them with any hope of success. Franklin's grand division consisted 12"Gen. Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain with you during the day. The General commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column, of a division or more, to be moved from Gen. Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these | But the enemy rallied all their forces; Early's division, composed of Lawton's, Trimble's, and his own brigades, which, with D. H. Hill's corps, had arrived that morning from Port Royal, after a severe nightmarch, and been posted behind A. P. Hill, rushed to the front; and Meade's division, lacking prompt support, moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of Gen. Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions to Gens. Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an Orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.' "I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "JOHN G. PARKE, Chief of Staff. Major-Gen. FRANKLIN, Commanding Grand Division Army of Potomac." 13 Governor elect of South Carolina. OUR LOSSES AT FREDERICKSBURG. was overwhelmed and driven back, with heavy loss, to the railroad, which they had crossed in their advance, where they made a brief stand, but were again hurled back by an impetuous, determined Rebel charge, losing many prisoners. Meade had already called for aid: and Gen. Gibbon had advanced on his right, and one of Birney's brigades on his left, whereby the enemy were checked and repulsed; Col. Atkinson, commanding Lawton's brigade, being here wounded and taken prisoner. Meade's division fell back, having lost 1,760 men this day out some 6,000 engaged; having, of its three Brigadiers, Gen. C. F. Jackson killed, and Col. Wm. T. Sinclair severely wounded. Maj.-Gen. Gibbon, on his right, was also wounded and taken off the field; whereupon, his division fell back also. 347 The advance of Reynolds's left was for some time retarded by Stuart's cavalry, holding the extreme Rebel right, whose battery opened a most annoying cross-fire on our infantry as it advanced from the Rappahannock. The 9th New York was first sent to take this battery, but failedtaking to their heels instead; when a brigade was brought up by Gen. Tyler, and charged with no better success. A third charge was stopped by the deadly fire of the Rebel battery; when more troops were brought up on our side, and the enemy at length flanked and gradually crowded back to the Massaponax; but they still maintained a bold front, and kept up the contest till nightfall; having succeeded in diverting from Reynolds's main attack in front a force which he could ill afford to spare. Our losses on this bloody day were not less than 15,000 men; though the number returned as actually killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, foots up but 13,771-as follows: Killed, Woun`d. Miss'g. Total. Sickles's division of Hooker's men, which had followed Birney's to the front, took the place of Gibbon's; but Smith's corps-21,000 strong-was not sent in, and remained nearer to Fredericksburg, not determinedly engaged throughout the day. Yet, even Reynolds's and Stoneman's corps Engineers.... (the latter composed of Birney's and Sickles's divisions) showed so strong a front that Stonewall Jackson did not venture to assume the offensive till nightfall; when a very brief experience convinced him that he might better let well alone.1 14 Jackson, with exemplary candor, says in his official report: Total. 7 $55 5,494 100 50 3,234 13,771 Not one of these died more lamented than Maj.-Gen. George D. Bayard, commanding our cavalry on the left, who was struck by a shell and mortally wounded; dying that night. But 28 years old, and on the to make preparations for the attempt. In order to guard against disaster, the infantry was to be preceded by artillery, and the movement postponed until late in the evening; so that, if com "Repulsed on the right, left, and center, the enemy, soon after, reformed his lines, and gave some indications of a purpose to renew the at-pelled to retire, it would be under the cover of tack. I waited some time to receive it; but, he making no forward movement, I determined, if prudent, to do so myself. The artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous; yet it was so promising of good results, if successfully executed, as to induce me night. Owing to unexpected delay, the movement could not be got ready till late in the evening. The first gun had hardly moved forward from the wood a hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery reopened, and so completely swept our front as to satisfy me that the proposed movement should be abandoned." eve of marriage, his death fell like a | life, a nobler spirit, a grander, more pall on many loving hearts. benignant destiny! Lee at first reported his losses at "about 1,800 killed and wounded" -one of those preposterous misrepresentations to which commanders on either side were too prone. His actual loss, as embodied in the detailed reports of Longstreet and Jackson, was over 5,000," and may probably be fairly estimated at 6,000, including 500 unwounded prisoners. He claims to have taken 900 prisoners and 9,000 small arms, but no guns. Thus closed what the exulting correspondent at Lee's headquarters of The Times (London) calls " a memorable day to the historian of the Decline and Fall of the American Republic." Not so, O owl-eyed scribe! but rather one of those days of bloody baptism from whose regenerating flood that Republic was divinely appointed to rise to a purer "That night, I went all over the field on our right; in fact, I was with the officers and men until nearly daylight. I found the feeling to be rather against an attack the next morning; in fact, it was decidedly against it. 16 It would be incredible on any testimony less conclusive than his own " that Gen. Burnside, on the very heel of this prodigal, horrible carnage, resolved to attack again next day, and on the very point where the enemy's lines had been proved impregnable at a cost of 10,000 men. Another butchery as fruitless and still more demoralizing would doubtless have been incurred, but for the timely and forcible remonstrance of stern old Sumner who never kept out of a fight when there was a shadow of excuse for going in-and who protested, backed by nearly every General in the army, against such suicidal madness. Burnside finally gave way, and thus probably saved the 9th corps (of old, his own) from useless, inexcusable sacrifice. the enemy into their next line, and, by going in with them, they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left Gen. Sumner with order. The order was given, and the column of that understanding, and directed him to give the attack was formed. "The next morning, just before the column was to have started, Gen. Sumner came to me and said: 'General, I hope you will desist from this attack; I do not know of any general officer who approves of it; and I think it will prove disastrous to the army.' Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of an advance whenever it was possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, and sent over for the division and corps commanders, and consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the other officers of the command on the other side, and found that the same impression prevailed among them. I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated. And besides, inasmuch as the President of the United States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack; that he would give me all the support that he couid, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed, I felt that I could not take the respon "I returned to my headquarters, and, after conversation with Gen. Sumner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th army corps-which was the corps I originally commanded-to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments. It consisted of some 18 old regiments, and some new ones; and I desired the column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments, by coming quick-sibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding ly up after each other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried." LEE AND BURNSIDE ON FREDERICKSBURG. 17 349 The two armies stood facing each | body of his army. But how could other throughout the 14th and 15th: he know at once how severely we Lee strengthening his defenses and had suffered? And, even if he did awaiting a renewal of the attack; know, would it have been wise to Burnside at length deciding to with- rush his men upon our batteries, as draw all but Hooker's corps across ours had been rushed upon his? the river, and continue to hold Fred- Jackson had decided against this, ericksburg; but this he finally gave when in the flush of his success; and up, on Hooker's representation that he decided wisely. To push forward he should be unable to hold the town; their men till under the fire of our and decided to rëcross his entire army heavy guns, commandingly posted on during the night of the 15th; which our side of the Rappahannock, would was quietly effected without serious have been to imitate Burnside's blunloss. A few of our desperately wound- der; and they had not 15,000 men ed, a few pickets, and considerable to spare. ammunition, were left by us in Fredericksburg; but Franklin did not lose a man; and not one gun was abandoned as a trophy of this ill-starred advance on Richmond. Our pontoons were all taken up and brought chief command with unfeigned reoff; the Rebels next day reoccupy-luctance and self-distrust, and keenly ing Fredericksburg and their side of the river; and thenceforth pickets and sharp-shooters fired across the stream, whenever any temptation to a shot was afforded, with as businesslike an air as though the Rappahannock had always been the boundary of two hostile empires, over which no armed force had ever ventured. Lee has been blamed for not following up his advantage; and it is just possible that he might have made something by a tremendous bombardment of the town while still crowded with our decimated, disheartened troops-possibly by a sudden, determined assault upon it, or upon Franklin's wing, with the great 17 Lee's 'General Order No. 38,' dated Dec. 21, congratulating his army on their success in this encounter, says: “The immense army of the enemy completed its preparations for the attack without interruption, and gave battle in its own time, and on ground of its own selection. "It was encountered by less than twenty thou General Burnside's errors in this movement were errors of judgment only; and these were nobly redeemed by his subsequent conduct and bearing. Though he had accepted the felt that he had not been fairly treated in the matter of the pontoons, and that Franklin had not done his best in the hour of trial, he excused others and took all the blame on himself. In his report to Gen. Halleck," he says: "But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy 24 hours to concentrate his forces in his strong position, we should almost certainly have succeeded; in which case, the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it sand of this brave army; and its columns, This is so unfair as to be essentially false, and quite unworthy of a great soldier. 18 Dec. 19. "To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enemy, I owe every thing. For the failure in the attack, I am responsible; as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and would have carried the points had it been possible. "To the families and friends of the dead, I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies; but for the wounded, I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and final recovery. "The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me the more respon sible." But General Burnside's usefulness as commander of the Army of the Potomac was at an end. Officers and soldiers alike felt that he had sadly misjudged in ordering an assault on the bristling heights south of Fredericksburg-still more,in seeking to repeat that assault after the bloody, calamitous experience of the 13th-and the popularity of McClellan was immensely strengthened and widened by that disastrous repulse. Whatever his faults, 'Little Mac' had ever been careful of the lives of his men; and this fact was now remembered to his credit. Had the army been polled for the choice of a commander at any time during the month following our withdrawal from Fredericksburg, it is probable that McClellan would have had a decisive majority, and morally certain that Burnside's supporters would have proved a still more indubitable minority. The latter, however, had no idea of sitting down under his defeat. 19 Dec. 26. 19 While the Rebel chiefs were congratulating each other that the Army of the Potomac had been paralyzed, at least for the Winter, he was planning a fresh and determined advance on Richmond. Within a fortnight after his bloody repulse, he ordered " rations cooked, wagons packed, and every thing made ready for a general movement; intending to make a feint above Fredericksburg, but to cross at the Sedden House, six or seven miles below; while 2,500 cavalry, with 4 guns, crossing at Kelly's ford, were to raid across the Virginia Central, the Lynchburg and the Weldon Railroads, blowing up the locks on the James River Canal; crossing the Nottoway, and reporting to Gen. Peck, in command at Suffolk; while several other flying expeditions were to distract the enemy's attention and deceive him as to the significance of the general movement. He had just given 20 the initial impulse to this combined movement, when a telegram from the President arrested it; and, repairing at once to Washington, Gen. B. learned that representations had been made at headquarters by certain of his subordinates, prompted and sustained by others, that, if he were permitted to proceed, in the existing temper of the army, he would inevitably incur disasters so grave as to signally belittle, if not wholly efface, those of the recent failure. In deference to these representations, the President had telegraphed as he did; and the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief, though now for the first time apprised of the clandestine communications of army officers to Mr. Lincoln, failed even to attempt a removal of the impression 20 Dec. 30. |