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XI.

SLAVERY IN THE WAR-EMANCIPATION,

the prohibition. Hence, when the State Conventions were assembled to ratify or reject it, with such eminent Revolutionary patriots as Patrick Henry, John Hancock, Samuel Adams, George Clinton, and Luther Martin, leading in the opposition, the clauses affecting Slavery were vigilantly, and not unsuccessfully, scrutinized for grounds of attack the provision concerning the African Slave-Trade being assailed in some States from the side of Slavery, in others from that of anti-Slavery, with vigor and effect. In the North, these assaults were parried by pointing to the power conferred on Con

THE Federal Constitution was framed in General Convention, and carried in the several State Conventions, by the aid of adroit and politic evasions and reserves on the part of its framers and champions. The existing necessity for a stronger central authority, which had been developed during the painful experiences of our preceding years of independence, were most keenly felt by the mercantile and mechanical or manufacturing classes, who were consequently zealous advocates of a "more perfect Union." The rural districts, on the other hand, were far less seriously affected by commercial embarrassment and currency dilapida-gress to abolish the traffic after twention, and were naturally jealous of a distant and unfamiliar power. Hence the reticence, if not ambiguity, of the text with regard to what has recently been termed “cöercion," or the right of the Federal Government to subdue by arms the forcible resistance of a State, or of several States, to its legitimate authority-a reticence which was imitated by the most prominent advocates of ratification, whether in The Federalist or in the several State Conventions. So with regard to Slavery as well. It is plain that the General Convention would have utterly and instantly prohibited the Foreign Slave-Trade, but for the proclaimed fact that this would insure the rejection of their handiwork by the still slave-hungry States of South Carolina and Georgia, if not of North Carolina also; though Virginia was among the most earnest advocates of

ty years, as so much clear gain: to reject the Constitution would not arrest the traffic now, but would destroy the power to prohibit it hereafter. On the other hand, the Federalists in the Southern Conventions met their adversaries by pointing to the privilege secured to the slaveholders of hunting their fugitive chattels in other States than their own-a privilege hitherto non-existent-and asked them what was to be gained by rejecting that. In fact, the Constitution was essentially a matter of compromise and mutual concession--a proceeding wherein Thrift is apt to gain at the cost of Principle. Perhaps the majority in no State obtained exactly what they wanted, but were satisfied that, on the whole, they were better with the Constitution than without it.

Patrick Henry alone, in opposing

as a

VIEWS OF PATRICK HENRY AND J. Q. ADAMS.

ratification, assailed the Constitution measure of thorough, undisguised, all-absorbing consolidation, and, though himself a professed contemner of Slavery, sought to arouse the fears of the Virginia slaveholders

as follows:

"Among ten thousand implied powers which they may assume, they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one of your slaves, if they please; and this must and will be done by men, a majority of whom have not a common interest with you. They will, therefore, have no feeling of your interests. It has been repeatedly said here, that the great object of a National Government was national defense. That power, which is said to be intended for security and safety, may be rendered detestable and oppressive. If they give power to the General Government to provide for the general defense, the means must be commensurate to the end. All the means in the possession of the people must be given to the Government which is intrusted with the public defense. In this State, there are 236,000 Blacks; and there are many in several other States: but there are few or none in the Northern States; and yet, if the Northern States shall be of opinion that our slaves are numberless, they may call forth every national resource. May Congress not say that every Black man must fight? Did we not see a little of this last war? We

were not so hard pushed as to make emancipation general; but acts of Assembly passed, that every slave who would go to the army should be free. Another thing will contribute to bring this event about: Slavery is detested; we feel its fatal effects; we deplore it with all the pity of humanity. Let all these considerations, at some future period, press with full force on the minds of Congres let that urbanity, which I trust will distinguish America, and the necessity

of national defense-let all these things operate on their minds: they will search that paper, and see if they have the power of manumission. And have they not, Sir? Have they not power to provide for the general defense and welfare? May they

not think that these call for the abolition of

Slavery? May they not pronounce all slaves free? and will they not be warranted

'In closing the argument in favor of ratifying the Federal Constitution, Mr. Zachariah Johnson said:

They tell us that they see a progressive danger of bringing about emancipation. The principle has begun since the Revolution. Let

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by that power? There is no ambiguous implication or logical deduction. The paper speaks to the point. They have the power, in clear, unequivocal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it. As much as I deplore Slavery, I see that prudence forbids its abolition. I deny that the General Government ought to set them free, because a decided majority of the States have not the ties of sympathy and fellow-feeling for those whose interest would be affected by their emancipation. The majority of Congress is to the North, and the slaves are to the South.”

Gov. Edmund Randolph-who became Washington's Attorney-General-answered Mr. Henry: denying most strenuously that there is any power of abolition given to Congress by the Constitution; but not alluding to what Henry had urged with regard to the War power and the right of Congress to summon every slave to the military defense of the country. Nor does this view of the subject appear to have attracted much attention elsewhere—at least, it does not appear to have been anywhere controverted.'

In 1836, Mr. John Quincy Adams, having been required to vote Yea or Nay, in the House, on a proposition reported by Mr. H. L. Pinckney, of South Carolina, in these words—

"Resolved, That Congress possesses no constitutional power to interfere in any way with the institution of Slavery in any of the States of this confederacy".

voted Nay, in company with but cight others; and, obtaining the floor in Committee soon afterward, on a proposition that rations be distributed from the public stores to citizens of Georgia and Alabama who have been driven from their homes by Indian

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depredations, proceeded to show that | such distribution (which he advocated) was justifiable only under the constitutional power of Congress "to promote the general welfare," which Southern statesmen habitually repudiated, or under the still more sweep ing War power. In the course of his argument, he said:

to interfere with the institution of Slavery
in the States. The existing law prohibiting
the importation of slaves into the United
States from foreign countries is itself an in-
terference with the institution of Slavery in
the States. It was so considered by the
founders of the Constitution of the United
States, in which it was stipulated that Con-
the institution, prior to the year 1808.
gress should not interfere, in that way, with

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During the war with Great Britain, the military and naval commanders of that nation issued proclamations inviting the slaves to repair to their standard, with promises of freedom and of settlement in some of the British colonial establishments. This, surely, was an interference with the institution of Slavery in the States. By the treaty of peace, Great Britain stipulated to evacuate all the forts and places in the United States, without carrying away any slaves. If the Government of the United States had no power to interfere, in any way, with the institution of Slavery in the States, they would not have had the authority to require this stipulation. It is well known that this engagement was not fulfilled by the British naval and military commanders; that, on the contrary, they did carry away all the slaves whom they had induced to join them; and that the British Government inflexibly refused to restore any of them to their masters; that a claim of indemnity was conse

of the slaves, and was successfully maintained. All that series of transactions was an interference by Congress with the institution of Slavery in the States in one way

"Sir, in the authority given to Congress by the Constitution of the United States to declare war, all the powers incidental to war are, by necessary implication, conferred upon the Government of the United States. Now, the powers incidental to war are derived, not from their internal municipal source, but from the laws and usages of nations. * * * There are, then, Mr. Chairman, in the authority of Congress and of the Executive, two classes of powers, altogether different in their nature, and often incompatible with each other-the War power and the Peace power. The Peace power is limited by regulations, and restricted by provisions, prescribed within the Constitution itself. The War power is limited only by the laws and usages of nations. This power is tremendous; it is strictly constitutional; but it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected for the protection of lib-quently instituted in behalf of the owners erty, of property, and of life. This, Sir, is the power which authorizes you to pass the resolution now before you; and, in my opinion, there is no other. * * * There are, indeed, powers of Peace conferred upon Congress which also come within the scope and jurisdiction of the laws of nations; such as the negotiation of treaties of amity and commerce; the interchange of public ministers and consuls; and all the personal and social intercourse between the individual inhabitants of the United States and foreign nations, and the Indian tribes, which require the interposition of any law. But the powers of War are all regulated by the laws of nations, and are subject to no other limitation. * * * It was upon this principle that I voted against the resolution reported by the Slavery Committee, 'that Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere, in any way, with the institution of Slavery in any of the States of this confederacy;' to which resolution most of those with whom I usually concur, and even my own colleagues in this House, gave their assent. I do not admit that there is, even among the Peace powers of Congress, no such authority; but in war, there are many ways by which Congress not only have the authority, but are bound,

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in the way of protection and support. It was by the institution of Slavery alone that the restitution of slaves, enticed by proclamations into the British service, could be claimed as property. But for the institution of Slavery, the British commanders could neither have allured them to their standard, nor restored them, otherwise than as liberated prisoners of war. But for the institution of Slavery, there could have been no stipulation that they should not be carried away as property, nor any claim of indemnity for the violation of that engagement.

"But the War power of Congress over the institution of Slavery in the States is yet far more extensive. Suppose the case of a servile war, complicated, to some extent-as it is even now-with an Indian war; suppose Congress were called to raise armies, to supply money from the whole Union to suppress a servile insurrection: would they have no authority to interfere with the institution of Slavery? The issue of a servile war may be disastrous; it may become necessary for the master of the slave to recognize his emancipation by a

MR. ADAMS ON SLAVERY IN WAR.

treaty of peace: can it, for an instant, be pretended that Congress, in such a contingency, would have no authority to interfere with the institution of Slavery, in any way, in the States? Why, it would be equivalent to saying that Congress has no constitutional authority to make peace.”

Mr. Adams proceeded to show that Texas was then [prior to her annexation] the arena of a war concerning Slavery a war based on an effort to rëestablish Slavery where it had been abolished by Mexico; and that our country was powerfully incited to take part directly therein, on the side of Slavery; and might yet be impelled to do so. In view of this probability, he asked—

"Do you imagine that while, in the very nature of things, your own Southern and South-western States must be the battle-field upon which the last great conflict must be fought between Slavery and Emancipation -do you imagine that your Congress will have no constitutional authority to interfere with the institution of Slavery in any way, in the States of this confederacy? Sir, they must and will interfere with it-perhaps to sustain it by war; perhaps to abolish it by treaties of peace: and they will not only possess the constitutional power so to interfere, but they will be bound in duty to do it, by the express provisions of the Constitution itself. From the instant that your slaveholding States become the theater of war-civil, servile, or foreign-from that instant, the War powers of Congress extend to interference with the institution of Slavery in every way by which it can be interfered with, from a claim of indemnity for slaves taken or destroyed, to the cession of the State burdened with Slavery to a foriegn power."

In 1842, when the prospective annexation of Texas, and a consequent war with Mexico, first loomed above the horizon, Mr. Adams returned to the subject; and, with reference to certain anti-Slavery resolves recently offered by Mr. Giddings, of Ohio, and the action of the House thereupon, said:

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so.

aware that it is touching upon a sore place; and I would gladly get over it if I could. It has been my effort, so far as was in my power, to avoid any allusion whatever to that question which the gentleman from Virginia tells us that the most lamb-like disposition in the South never can approach without anger and indignation. Sir, that is my sorrow. I admit that the fact We can not touch that subject without raising, throughout the whole South, a mass of violence and passion, with which one might as well reason as with a hurricane. That, I know, is the fact in the South; and that is why members coming from a Free State are silenced as soon as they rise on this floor; why they are pronounced out of order; made to sit down; and, if they proceed, are censured and expelled. But in behalf of the South and of Southern institutions, a man may get up in this House and expatiate for weeks together. On this point, I do complain; and I must say I have been rather disappointed that I have not been put down already, as speaking out of order. What I say is involuntary, because the subject has been brought into the House from another quarter, as the gentleman himself admits. I would leave that institution to the exclusive consideration and management of the States more peculiarly interested in it, just so long as they can keep it within their own bounds. So far, I admit that Congress has no power to meddle with it. So long as they do not step out of their own bounds, and do not put the question to the people of the United States, whose peace, welfare, and happiness, are all at stake, so long I will agree to leave them to themselves. But when a member from a Free State brings forward certain resolutions, for which, instead of reasoning to disprove his positions, you vote a censure upon him-and that without hearing-it is quite another affair. At the time this was done, I said that, so far as I could understand the resolutions proposed by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Giddings], there were some of them for which I was ready to vote, and some which I must vote against; and I will now tell this House, my constituents, and

the fact in this House. And it is the reason

the world of mankind, that the resolution against which I would have voted was that in which he declares that what are called the Slave States have the exclusive right of consultation on the subject of Slavery. For that resolution, I never would vote; because I believe that it is not just, and does not contain constitutional doctrine. I believe that, so long as the Slave States are able to sustain their institutions, without going abroad or calling upon other parts of * April 15.

"What I am now to say, I say with great reluctance and with great pain. I am well

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the Union to aid them or act on the subject, so long I will consent never to interfere. I have said this; and I repeat it: but, if they come to the Free States and say to them, 'You must help us to keep down our slaves; you must aid us in an insurrection and a civil war;' then I say that, with that call, comes a full and plenary power to this House and to the Senate over the whole subject. It is a War power. I say it is a War power; and when your country is actually in war, whether it be a war of invasion or a war of insurrection, Congress has power to carry on the war, and must carry it on according to the laws of war; and, by the laws of war, an invaded country has all its laws and municipal institutions swept by the board, and martial law takes the place of them.

"This power in Congress has, perhaps, never been called into exercise under the present Constitution of the United States. But, when the laws of war are in force, what, I ask, is one of those laws? It is this: that when a country is invaded, and two hostile armies are set in martial array, the commanders of both armies have power to emancipate all the slaves in the invaded territory. Nor is this a mere theoretic statement. The history of South America shows that the doctrine has been carried into practical execution within the last thirty years. Slavery was abolished in Colombia, first by the Spanish General Murillo; and, secondly, by the American General Bolivar. It was abolished by virtue of a military command, given at the head of the army; and its abolition continues to be law to this day. It was abolished by the laws of war, and not by municipal enactments. The power was exercised by military commanders, under instructions, of course, from their respective Governments.

"And here I recur again to the example of Gen. Jackson. What are you now about in Congress? You are about passing a grant to refund to Gen. Jackson the amount of a certain fine imposed upon him by a judge under the laws of the State of Louisiana. You are going to refund him the money, with interest; and this you are going to do, because the imposition of the fine was unjust. And why was it unjust? Because Gen. Jackson was acting under the laws of war; and because, the moment you place a military commander in a district which is the theater of war, the laws of war apply to that district. * * I might furnish a thousand proofs to show that the pretensions of gentlemen to the sanctity of their municipal institutions, under a state of actual invasion and of actual war, whether servile, civil, or foreign, is wholly unfounded; and that the laws of war do, in all such cases, take precedence. I lay this down as the

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law of nations. I say that the military authority takes, for the time, the place of all municipal institutions, and of Slavery among the rest; and that, under that state of things, so far from its being true that the States where Slavery exists have the exclusive management of the subject, not only the President of the United States, but the commander of the army, has power to order the universal emancipation of the slaves. I have given here more in detail a principle which I have asserted on this floor before now, and of which I have no more doubt than that you, Sir, occupy that chair. I give it in its development, in order that any gentleman from any part of the Union may, if he think proper, deny the truth of the position, and may maintain his denial-not by indignation, not by passion and fury, but by sound and sober reasoning from the laws of nations and the laws of war. And, if my position can be answered, and refuted, I shall receive the refutation with pleasure; I shall be glad to listen to reason, aside, as I say, from indignation and passion. And if, by the force of reasoning, my understanding can be convinced, I here pledge myself to recant what I have asserted.

"Let my position be answered; let me be told, let my constituents be told, let the people of my State be told-a State whose soil tolerates not the foot of a slave-that they are bound by the Constitution to a long and toilsome march under burning Summer suns and a deadly Southern clime, for the suppression of a servile war; that they are bound to leave their bodies to rot upon the sands of Carolina-to leave their wives widows and their children orphansthat those who can not march are bound to pour out their treasure, while their sons or brothers are pouring out their blood, to suppress a servile, combined with a civil or a foreign war; and yet that there exists no power, beyond the limits of the Slave State where such war is raging, to emancipate the slaves! I say, let this be proved-I am open to conviction; but, till that conviction comes, I put it forth not as a dictate of feeling, but as a settled maxim of the laws of nations, that in such a case the military supersedes the civil power; and on this account I should have been obliged to vote, as I have said, against one of the resolutions of my excellent friend from Ohio [Mr. Giddings], or should at least have required that it be amended in conformity with the Constitution of the United States."

Hon. Joshua R. Giddings, while a member of the House of Representatives, thirteen years prior to the appearance of Mr. Lincoln's Procia

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