to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer." To which the President, at 4:10 P. M., responded as follows: "Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative-to wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope'-is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels. "A. LINCOLN.” But McClellan had already not only arrested Franklin's march at Anandale, but sent Sumner's corps northward toward Arlington and Chain Bridge, instead of toward the enemy. At 7:50 P. M., Halleck telegraphed him thus: "You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas." wagon trains to move to Pope with the least possible delay.' Gen. Halleck, at 9:40 A. M. on the fatal 30th, telegraphed McClellan : Franklin's march of yesterday, considering "I am by no means satisfied with Gen. the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department would have given him plenty of transportation if he had applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly." At 11 A. M., McClellan responded: "Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives ?” To which Halleck, at 12:20 P. M., responded as follows: "I think Couch should land at Alexandria and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. | Let me know when Couch arrives." Franklin's and Sumner's corps. were now actually pushed forward, and found Pope without difficulty, McClellan, at 8 P. M., telegraphed defeated and driven back on Centerto Halleck : "It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, ville. Had they been there two days earlier, and had Porter now and then condescended to obey an order, that until we knew what was at Vienna. Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 P. M., defeat might have been transformed endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his into a victory. It seems clear that command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either neither McClellan, nor any of his was in disobedience to your orders. Please devoted lieutenants, was anxious that give distinct orders in reference to Frank-victory, under such auspices, should lin's movements of to-morrow. At 10 P. M., Gen. McClellan telegraphed again: be achieved. Pope's appointment to the command, and his address to his army on opening the campaign," had been understood by them as reflecting on the strategy of the Peninsular campaign; and this was their mode of resenting the indignity. "See page 173. "Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin to place himself in communication with Gen. Pope by advancing, as soon as possible, and, at the same time, cover the transit of Pope's supplies. Orders have been given for railway and LEE'S ADVANCE INTO MARYLAND. 193 IX. 'MY MARYLAND'-LEE'S INVASION. GEN. MCCLELLAN had already' been verbally charged with the command of the defenses of Washington; and was, upon fuller advices of Pope's disasters, invested' by the President and Gen. Halleck with the entire control, not only of those fortifications, but of "all the troops for the defense of the capital," in obedience to the imperious demand of a large majority of the surviving officers and soldiers. Pope's original army had in great part been demolished; while that brought from the Peninsula by McClellan had been taught to attribute the general ill-fortune not to the tardiness and heartlessness wherewith Pope had been rëenforced and supported by their leaders, but to his own incapacity, presumption, and folly. McClellan at once ordered a concentration of his forces within the defenses of Washington; where they were soon prepared to resist the enemy, but whither Lee had no idea of following them. Having been joined by D. H. Hill's fresh division, from Richmond, he sent that division at once in the van of his army to Leesburg; thence crossing the Potomac and moving on Frederick. Jackson followed with a heavy corps, consisting of A. P. Hill's, Ewell's, and his own divisions, embracing 14 brigades, crossing at White's Ford and moving on Frederick, which was occupied on the 6th, without resistance. Gen. Lee, with the rest of his army, rapidly followed, concentrating at Frederick; whence he issued the following seductive address: 3 "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF Northern "To the People of Maryland": "It is right that you should know the my command within the limits of your "The people of the Confederate States of a conquered province. "Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most arrested and imprisoned, upon no charge, valuable provisions, your citizens have been: and contrary to all the forms of law. 5 "A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in better days no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt. "The government of your chief city has possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such State. "In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been so unjustly despoiled. 66 This, citizens of Maryland, is our mis- 4 5 among you, and will protect all of you in | tomac to replenish their wasted and every opinion. inadequate resources. "It is for you to decide your destiny freely and without constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and, while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will. 'R. E. LEE, General Commanding.” The fond expectations which had prompted this address were never realized. The Marylanders had no gluttonous appetite for fighting on the side of the Union; still less for risking their lives in support of the Confederacy. All who were inclined to fighting on that side had found their way into the Rebel lines long before; there being little difficulty in stealing across the Potomac, and none at all in crossing by night to Virginia from the intensely disloyal, slaveholding counties of south-western Maryland. In vain was Gen. Bradley T. Johnson-who had left Frederick at the outset of the war to serve in the Rebel army-made Provost-Marshal of that town, recruiting offices opened, and all manner of solicitations to enlistment set forth. The number of recruits won to the Rebel standard while it floated over Maryland probably just about equaled its loss by deserters-say from 200 to 300. The conduct of the Rebel soldiery was in the main exemplary. Hungry, ragged, and shoeless, as they often were, they rarely entered a house except by order, and never abused women; but cattle, horses, and everything that might contribute to the subsistence or efficiency of an army, were seized by wholesale, not only for present use, but thousands of animals were driven across the Po*Sept. 3. 6 Gen. McClellan was early apprised of the disappearance of the Rebels from his front, and soon advised that they were crossing into Maryland. His several corps were accordingly brought across the Potomac and posted on the north of Washington; which city he left' in command of Gen. Banks, making his headquarters that night with the 6th corps, at Rockville. He moved slowly, because uncertain, as were his superiors, that the Rebel movement across the Potomac was not a feint. But his advance, after a brisk skirmish, on the 12th entered Frederick, which the Rebels had evacuated, moving westward, during the two preceding days, and through which his main body passed next day. Here he was so lucky as to obtain a copy of Lee's general order, only four days old, developing his prospective movements, as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN "VIRGINIA, September 9, 1862. "The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson's command will form the advance; and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday night, take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. "Gen. Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army. "Gen. McLaws, with his own division and that of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen. Longstreet; on reaching Middletown, he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. "Gen. Walker, with his division, after 7 Sept. 7. MCCLELLAN'S BLUNDER AT FREDERICK. accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning; Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with Gen. McLaws and Gen. Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. "Gen. D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance and supply trains, &c., will precede Gen. Hill. "Gen. Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Gens. Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind. The commands of Gens. Jackson, MeLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. "Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, &c. By command of Gen. R. E. LEE. "R. H. CHILTON, "Assistant Adjutant-General. “Maj.-Gen. D. H. HILL, Com'ding Div." McClellan had thus, by a rare stroke of good fortune, become possessed of his adversary's designs, when it was too late to change them, and when it could not be known to that adversary, at least until developed by counteracting movements, that he had this knowledge, and was acting upon it. Lee had ventured the hazardous maneuver of dividing his army in a hostile country, and placing a considerable and treacherous, though fordable, river between its parts, while an enemy superior in numbers to the whole of it hung closely upon its rear. Such strategy must have been dictated by an ineffable contempt either for the capacity of his antagonist or for the most obvious rules of war. 195 clear not only that Harper's Ferry was Lee's object, and that Jackson's corps and Walker's division were ere this across the Potomac in eager quest of it, but that only McLaws's corps-20,000 men at the utmostwas now between our whole army and the coveted prize. Our corps happened then to be mainly concentrated around Frederick; but Franklin's division-nearly 17,000 strong was some miles southward, and thus nearer to Harper's Ferry, and in front of McLaws. Had McClellan instantly put his whole army in motion, marching by the left flank on parallel roads leading directly toward the Potomac and the Ferry, and sending orders to Franklin to advance and either force his way to the Ferry or engage whomsoever might attempt to resist him, assured that corps after corps would follow swiftly his advance and second his attacks, McLaws must have been utterly crushed before sunset of the 14th, and Harper's Ferry relieved by midnight at farthest. That, instead of this, McClellan should have advanced his main body on the road tending rather north of west, through Turner's Gap to Boonsborough and Hagerstown, rather than on roads. leading to Crampton's Gap and to the Potomac, is unexplained and inexplicable. The South Mountain' range of hills, which stretch north-eastwardly from the Potomac across Maryland, are a modified continuation of Virginia's 'Blue Ridge,' as the less considerable Catoctin range, near Frederick, are an extension of the 'Bull Run' range. Between them is the valley of Catoctin creek, some ten The order above given rendered it miles wide at the Potomac, but nar rowing to a point at its head. Seve- | six of his brigades, under Anderson, ral roads cross both ranges; the best being the National Road from Baltimore through Frederick and Middletown (the chief village of the Catoctin Valley), to Hagerstown and Cumberland. Lee, having divided his army in order to swoop down on Harper's Ferry, was compelled by McClellan's quickened and assured pursuit, based on the captured order aforesaid, to fight all our army with half of his own-reversing the strategy usual in this quarter; for, if McClellan's advance were not impeded, Harper's Ferry would be relieved. So, Gen. Pleasanton, leading our cavalry advance on the road to Hagerstown, encountered some resistance at the crossing of Catoctin creek in Middletown; but, skirmishing occasionally with Stuart's cavalry, pressed on, backed by Cox's division of Burnside's corps, to find the enemy in force before TURNER'S GAP of South Mountain, a few miles beyond. 8 This gap is about 400 feet high; the crests on either side rising some 600 feet higher; the old Hagerstown and Sharpsburg roads, half a mile to a mile distant, on either side, rising higher than the National Road, and materially increasing the difficulty of holding the pass against a largely superior force. Lee, in his eagerness to grasp the prize whereon he was intent, and in his confident assurance that McClellan would continue the cautious and hesitating movement of six or seven miles a day by which he had hitherto advanced from Washington, had pushed Longstreet forward on Jack son's track to Hagerstown,' whence 8 Sept. 13. had been sent to cooperate with McLaws against Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. This left only D. H. Hill's division of five brigades to hold Turner's Gap and the adjacent passes, with such help as might be afforded by Stuart's cavalry; Stuart having reported to Hill, on the 13th, that only two brigades were pursuing them. He was undeceived, however, when, at 7 A. M. next morning, Cox's division of Burnside's corps advanced up the turnpike from Middletown, preceded by Pleasanton's cavalry and a battery, and opened on that defending the Gap; while by far the larger portion of the Army of the Potomac could be seen, by the aid of a good field-glass, from a favorable position on the mountain, either advancing across the valley or winding down the opposite heights into it. Hill reports his division as but 5,000 strong; and even this small force had been somewhat dispersed in pursuance of the orders of Lee and the erroneous information of Stuart. The brigade of Gen. Garland, which was first pushed forward to meet our advance, was instantly and badly cut up, its commander being killed; when it retired in disorder, and was replaced by that of Anderson, supported by those of Rhodes and Ripley, who held the pass firmly for hours against the most gallant efforts of Cox's Ohio regiments. But, meanwhile, our superior numbers, backed by desperate fighting, enabled us steadily to gain ground on either side, until the crest of the heights on the left of the pass was fairly ours, though one of our batteries had Sept. 11. 9 |