POPE DEFEATED AT GAINESVILLE. 187 charge, followed by the divisions of back in confusion; the Confederates | Hood's two brigades again led the But the fates were against us. The enemy was aware of his advantage, and resolved to press it to the utmost. Our attack on his left, under Jackson, for a time promised success; until our advancing troops were mowed down by the cross-fire of 4 batteries from Longstreet's left, which decimated and drove them back in confusion. Jackson, seeing them recoil, immediately ordered an advance; which Longstreet supported by pushing forward his whole command against our center and left. 33 Lee, in his official report, says: "The obscurity of night and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning; when the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position of Centerville, about four miles beyond Bull Run. The prevalence of a heavy rain, which began during the night, threatened to render Bull Run impassable, and impeded our movements. Longstreet remained on the battle-field to engage the attention of the enemy, and cover the burial of the dead and the removal of the wounded; while Jackson proceeded by Sudley's lord to the Little River turnpike, to turn the Franklin's corps, from McClellan's army, reported 8,000 strong, was, unknown to Pope, throughout this mournful day, a little cast of Centerville." Pope reached that point between 9 and 10 P. M., and at once made his dispositions for resisting a Rebel attack. But none was attempted. Sumner, as well as Franklin, from McClellan's army, joined him here, raising his total force to fully 60,000 men; which was probably more than the enemy could now bring against him. Pope evidently expected to be atenemy's right and intercept his retreat to Washington. Jackson's progress was retarded by the inclemency of the weather and the fatigue of his troops; who, in addition to their arduous marches, had fought three severe engagements in as many days. He reached Little River turnpike in the evening, and the next day, September 1st, advanced by that road toward Fairfax Court House." 34 Pope, in his official report, says. "About 6 P. M., I heard accidentally that Franklin's corps had arrived at a point about four miles east of Centerville, and 12 miles in our rear, and that it was only about 8,000 strong." tacked next morning in this strong position; but Lee, not unmindful of the still recent and sore experience of Malvern Heights, was too good a General to repeat his own blunders. Aware that a demoralized army under an inapt commander may be most safely and surely assailed on its flank and rear-by blows that threaten to cut off its line of supply and retreat he started Jackson northward, with his own and Ewell's divisions, at an early hour next morning," with instructions to turn and assail our right. Crossing Bull Run at Sudley Ford, Jackson took a country road thence to Little River turnpike, on which, turning sharply to the right, he moved down toward Fairfax C. H.; and, toward evening of the next day, when nearing the little village of Germantown, a mile or two from Fairfax C. II., he found his advance resisted. Pope, not even threatened with a front attack, had ere this suspected the Rebels of a fresh attempt to flank his right, and had directed Gen. Sumner to push forward two brigades toward the turnpike, while Gen. Hooker was that afternoon dispatched to Fairfax C. H. to support the movement. 36 sion, at once ordered a charge, and was shot dead while leading it, by a bullet through his head. His command thereupon fell back in disorder, uncovering the flank of Reno's other division, which thereupon fell back also. Gen. Phil. Kearny, with his division of Heintzelman's corps, now advanced and renewed the action, in the midst of a thunder-storm so furious that ammunition could with great difficulty be kept serviceable; while the roar of cannon was utterly unheard at Centerville, barely three miles distant. Riding forward too recklessly, Kearny, about sunset, was shot dead, when almost within the Rebel lines, and the command of his division devolved on Gen. Birney, who promptly ordered a bayonetcharge by his own brigade, consisting of the 1st, 38th, and 40th New York. The order was executed by Col. Egan with great gallantry, and the enemy's advance driven back considerably; Gen. Birney holding the field of conflict through the night, burying our dead and removing our wounded. Our total loss here cannot have exceeded 500 men; but among them were Gens. Kearny and Stevens, and Maj. Tilden, 38th New York, who fell in the closing bayonetcharge. Jackson's flanking movement and attack, though wisely conceived and vigorously made, had failed to His achieve any material results. report claims no prisoners nor arms captured." Pope's retreat from Centerville were in position on our right and front, covering his line of retreat from Centerville to Fairfax Court House. Our line of battle was for ned-Gen. Hill's division on the right; Ewell's division, Gen. Lawton commanding, in THE LOSSES OF POPE'S CAMPAIGN. had in effect commenced on the 1st, when he found himself flanked by Jackson; and was continued through out that and the following day, without further annoyance from the enemy, until his whole army was drawn back within the intrenchments which, along the south bank of the Potomac, cover the approaches to Washington; when he resigned his command, and was succeeded by Gen. McClellan. Gen. Lee officially claims to have captured, during his campaign against Pope, more than 7,000 prisoners, beside 2,000 of our wounded left in his hands, with 30 pieces of artillery, and 20,000 small arms; while our losses of railroad cars, munitions, tents, and camp equipage, must have been immense. Lee's Medical Director makes the Rebel losses in the two days' fighting on Manassas Plains, 1,090 killed, 6,154 wounded: total, 7,244. Longstreet reports his losses from the 23d to the 30th of August, inclusive, at 4,725. A. P. Hill reports the losses in his division, from the 24th to the 31st, at 1,548. Probably the entire Rebel loss from Cedar Mountain to Chantilly did not fall short of 15,000 men; while Pope's, if we include that by stragglers who never rejoined their regiments, must have been fully double that number. Among our the center, and Jackson's division, Gen. Starke commanding, on the left-all on the right of the turnpike road. Artillery was posted on an eminence to the left of the road. The brigades of Branch and Field, Col. Brockenbrough commanding the latter, were sent forward to feel and engage the enemy. A cold and drenching thunder-shower swept over the field at this time, striking directly into the faces of our troops. These two brigades gallantly engaged the enemy; but so severe was the fire in front and flank of Branch's brigade as to produce in it some disorder and falling back. The brigades 189 killed, beside those already named, were Cols. Fletcher Webs er, son of the great Daniel, Roberts, 1st Mich., O'Connor, 2d Wisc., Koltes, 73d Pa., commanding a brigade, Cantwell, 82d Ohio, and Brown, 20th Ind. Among our wounded on the 30th, were Maj.-Gen. Robert C. Schenck and Col. Hardin, of the Pa. Reserves. Among the Rebels wounded in these fights, were Brig.Gens. Field and Trimble, and Cols. Forno and Baylor, commanding brigades. How far Pope's disasters are justly attributable to his own incapacity, and how far to the failure or withholding of support on which he had a right to calculate, it is time now to consider. In his report, he says: "It seems proper for me, since so much misrepresentation has been put into circulation as to the support I received from the Army of the Potomac, to state precisely what forces of that army came under my command, and were at any time engaged in the active operations of the campaign. Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, about 2,500, joined me on the 23d of August, at Rappaliannock Station. The corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about 18,000 strong, joined me on the 26th and and 27th of August, at Warrenton Junction. The Pennsylvania Reserves, under Reynolds, and Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions of Hooker and Kearny, rendered most gallant and efficient service in all the operations which occurred after they had reported to me. Porter's corps. from unnecessary and unusual delays, and frequent and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever except in of Gregg, Thomas, and Pender were then thrown into the fight. Soon, a portion of Ewell's division became engaged. The conflict now raged with great fury; the enemy obstinately and desperately contesting the ground until their Gens. Kearny and Stevens fell in front of Thomas's brigade; after which, they retired from the field. By the following morning, the Federal army had entirely disappeared from our view; and it soon appeared, by a report from Gen. Stuart, that it had passed Fairfax Court House and had moved in the direction of Washington city." the action of the 30th of August. This small fraction of 20,500 men was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing which ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in that campaign. By the time the corps of Franklin and Sumner, 19,000 strong, joined me at Centerville, the original Army of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman, and the division of Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which they had been engaged, and were so much broken down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed, that they were in little condition for any effective service whatever, and required, and should have had, some days of rest to put them into anything like condition to perform their duties in the field." Gen. McClellan, we have seen, was ordered on the 3d of August to withdraw his army from the Peninsula. He hesitated, and remonstrated; but the orders were rëiterated more peremptorily; and he left Harrison's Bar with his rear-guard on the 16th of August. Having embarked and dispatched his corps successively at and near Fortress Monroe, he left that post on the 23d, arriving at Acquia creek on the 24th, removing to Alexandria on the 27th; on which day Halleck telegraphed him: "Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied, as far as possible, by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centerville." To this, he replied, at 10:20 A. M.: I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of transportation." At 1:15 P. M., he again telegraphed Gen. Halleck as follows: * "Franklin's artillery has no horses except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defense? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connexion with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the | Valley?" Half an hour later, he telegraphed : "I think our policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible; but not to advance them until they can have their artillery and cavalry." An hour later, he telegraphed again: "I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac. "I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform wish to act in the dark." me at once what my position is. I do not At 6 P. M., he telegraphed again : "I have just received the copy of a dispatch from General Pope to you, dated 10 A. M., this morning, in which he says: All my right at Gainesville.' forces now sent forward should be sent to "I now have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, about 2,800 of Gen. Tyler's brigade, and Col. Tyler's 1st Connecticut Artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for the defense of Washington. "If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate. "In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order Gen. Casey to hold his men for [from] Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them off till further orders." At 4:40 P. M. next day, Aug. 28th, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck: 'Gen. Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move; may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be held at any MCCLELLAN MARKING' TIME. 191 cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare | tion to accomplish much, if he meets with them, I will send a good corps of troops serious resistance. I should not have moved there. It is the key to Washington, which him but for your pressing order of last connot be seriously menaced so long as it is night. What have you from Vienna and held." Dranesville?" At 4:45 P. M., again: he telegraphed "Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aids to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler; but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field; and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out." To these dispatches, Gen. Halleck, at 8:40 P. M., responded as follows: "There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas. They must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all; for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief." At noon, he telegraphed again: "Your telegram received. Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation. Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, where they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown? "Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance ?" Gen. McClellan had already directed Franklin to halt his command near Anandale; and, at 1 P. M. this day, he telegraphed Gen. Halleck as follows: "I shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to advanced_guards. hold the line through Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who, I really think, ought not, under present circumstances, to advance beyond` Anandale ?” Halleck, at 3 P. M., replied: "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going farther. Otherwise, he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses." Fifteen minutes before, McClellan had telegraphed the President as follows: "Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 6 A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving Gen. Cox to Upton's Hill, to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the Engineer brigade, to hold Fort Lyon, however. Detailed last night two regiments to the vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's brigade still at Acquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived; have but three squadrons. Franklin has but forty rounds "No middle ground will now answer. of ammunition, and no wagons to move Tell me what you wish me to do, and I wil inore. I do not think Franklin is in condi- | do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish "I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: 1st. To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; 2d. To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe. : |