flour, beef, pork, and bacon, whereof | sisted in seeking a more immediate junction with Longstreet's advance. Pope reached Manassas, with Kearny's division and Reno's corps, about noon; Jackson having left with his rear-guard an hour earlier. Pope immediately pushed forward all his forces in hand upon Centerville, ordered Porter to come up at once to Manassas, and McDowell to advance toward Centerville. Meanwhile, McDowell, unordered, had detached Ricketts's division and sent it toward Thoroughfare Gap; so that it was no longer available for the directed movement on Centerville.

the Rebel army stood in greater need than did ours. McDowell, Kearny, and Reno reached, during the night, the positions assigned them by Pope. Longstreet had only started the day before from the south side of the Rappahannock, opposite Warrenton Springs, and had not yet entered Thoroughfare Gap. Could McDowell but block it effectually with a few regiments and batteries, while the rest of our army was hurled upon Jackson, our triumph must be certain and decisive. Hence Pope, about dark, sent back explicit orders to Porter, at Warrenton Junction, to move forward at 1 A. M.,23 and report to headquarters at Bristow, 10 miles distant, during the night or early next morning. This order Porter failed to obey; not moving till after daylight, and not reaching Bristow till 104 A. M. McDowell was likewise ordered, at 9 P. M.," to press forward, at the very earliest dawn, toward Manassas Junction, resting his right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, while Reno advanced simultaneously from Greenwich upon Manassas, and Kearny upon Bristow. Kearny reached Bristow at 8 A. M.,25 with Reno on his left, and was immediately pushed forward, followed by Hooker, on the track of Ewell. McDowell gave orders for the required movement at 2 A. M.; but Sigel, who held his advance, had not fairly cleared Gainesville at 7 A. M.

Meantime, Jackson, who was not easily caught napping, had commenced his evacuation of Manassas at 3 A. M., moving viâ Centerville; and thus escaping the destruction which probably awaited him had he per 23 August 28. August 27.

24

Late in the afternoon, Kearny occupied Centerville; Jackson's rearguard retreating by Sudley Springs; while part of his force took the Warrenton turnpike toward Gainesville, impeding our advance on both roads by destroying the bridges over Bull Run and Cub Run. At 6 P. M., Jackson's advance, now moving toward Thoroughfare Gap, encountered King's division of McDowell's corps, and a sanguinary combat ensued, which was terminated by darkness, the advantage being on the side of the Rebels. The loss on both sides was heavy; and among the Rebel wounded were Maj.-Gen. Ewell and Brig.-Gen. Taliaferro; the former severely.

Pope, still at Centerville, was apprised of this collision at 10 P. M., and then felt that he had Jackson sure. Sending orders to McDowell and King to hold their ground at all hazards, and directing Kearny to push forward at 1 a. M." from Centerville, along the Warrenton turnpike, and to hug Jackson close, so as to prevent his retreating northward

26

August 29.

LONGSTREET ON HAND-BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE.

toward Leesburg; and to
whom he supposed to be
Manassas Junction, to move upon
Centerville at dawn, he confidently
expected to have Jackson inclosed
and early in the morning assailed by
25,000 on either side, who were to
crush him before Longstreet could
possibly arrive.

183

Porter, | ing, of King's abandonment of the now at Gainesville road, had sent orders to Sigel, at Groveton, to advance and attack vigorously at daylight, supported by Reynolds; while Heintzelman, with Hooker's and Kearny's divisions, was to push forward from Centerville toward Gainesville; Reno following, with orders to attack promptly and vigorously. Fitz-John Porter, with his own corps and King's division, was to move from Manassas upon the Gainesville road with all speed, with intent to turn Jackson's flank at the intersection of the Warrenton turnpike.

But he was reckoning without his host-or rather, without the other one. Gen. Longstreet's advance had reached Thoroughfare Gap at 3 P. M.," and passed through it; but encountered on this side a superior force, strongly posted, by which it was easily repulsed. As there was no time to be lost, Gen. D. R. Jones, with two brigades, was sent in at once; while Hood, with two others, following a mountain foot-path, attempted to turn our right; and Wilcox, with two more, making a circuit through Hopewell Gap, three miles north, was to come in on our rear.

Ricketts's single division was of course unable to stand against Longstreet's heavy corps, and was driven off with loss, commencing its retreat just at dark. Longstreet's whole force was pushed rapidly through the pass, and, early next day," its van was in Gainesville, pressing on to the rescue of Jackson, its steps quickened by the roar of cannon, and meeting no resistance to the desired concentration; McDowell and King having got out of the way during the night, retreating on Manassas Junction. When Longstreet, before noon, came rapidly into action on the right of Jackson, already hotly engaged, the Rebel army was once more reunited, and felt itself invincible.

Sigel, who was nearest the enemy, with the division of Schurz forming his right, that of Schenck his left, and the brigade of Milroy between them, advanced, by order, at 5 A. M., and was fully engaged before 7; gaining ground by hard fighting till half past 10, when Milroy and Schurz had advanced a mile, and Schenck two miles, though obstinately resisted by the enemy. But the Rebel strength in their front was constantly increasing, and now assumed the offensive, hurling heavy masses of infantry against our right; which held its ground firmly by the aid of its batteries, but not without heavy loss.

Schenck, being now ordered by Sigel to strike the Rebel assailants in flank and rear, was soon briskly engaged; the enemy attempting to flank him in turn. At this moment, Gen. Kearny's division of Ileintzelman's corps arrived on the field, by the Sudley Springs road, and went in on Sigel's right; while Reno, coming up by the Gainesville turnpike,

Pope, apprised, just before morn- supported our center; and Reynolds,

Explanations.

BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE, OR SECOND BULL RUN. 185

with the Pennsylvania Reserves, | the left, advanced by order, charged came into position, at noon, on our the enemy's left and swept back his extreme left. About 2 P. M., Gen. first line, rolling it up on his center Hooker, with Heintzelman's remain- and right. King's division was sent ing division, came down the Sudley into the fight about sunset, and adSprings road on our extreme right; vanced considerably beyond our genand his troops immediately went in eral line of battle; but, soon finding to the aid of the wasted and hungry itself confronted by a heavier force commands of Schurz and Milroy, of the enemy, was brought to a stand. who were thus enabled to refill their Meantime, Hood charged in turn, cartridge boxes and obtain some with a fresh division of Longstreet's much needed food and rest. corps, which had marched through the Gap that day and been sent by Lee to the relief of Jackson, now clearly outnumbered. Hood's famous Texas brigade and that of Law rushed forward with great intrepidity, re-. pulsing Kearny's most advanced regiments, taking 1 gun, 4 flags, and 100 prisoners. Darkness arrested the conflict, either army resting on the field of battle; but Pope, with some reason, claiming the advantage, in that he held some ground which had been wrested from the enemy during the day. The losses on either side were probably not far from 7,000 men.

The fighting thence till 4 P. M. was desultory—a succession of heavy skirmishes from point to point along the front; either General being intent on his approaching rëenforcements, and trusting to time as his friend. At 41, McDowell being announced as at hand, Pope sent a peremptory order to Porter to go into action on the enemy's right, turning it if possible; and, an hour later, presuming this order obeyed, directed Heintzelman and Reno to attack the enemy in front; which order was gallantly obeyed.

29

And now, though Fitz-John Porter was still missing, and King's division did not reach the field till near sunset, our army was for once superior in numbers; Kearny's and Hooker's fresh regiments pressing forward and crowding back the enemy's left, which had been skillfully disposed for a good part of the day behind the embankment of an abandoned railroad, which served most effectively as a breast-work. At 5 P. M., Kearny, bringing up nearly his entire division, and changing his front to

29 Pope, in his official report, says:

"In this attack, Grover's brigade of Hooker's division was particularly distinguished by a determined bayonet-charge, breaking two of the enemy's lines, and penetrating to the third before it could be checked."

own; and now his opportunity had vanished. Longstreet's corps had been arriving throughout the day, and was now all present-much of it perfectly fresh, so far as fighting was concerned, and ready for most effective service on the morrow.

Pope, so often disappointed and baffled, found his fighting force reduced by casualties and by straggling, on the morning of that eventful morrow, to about 40,000 men. These had had a surfeit of marching and fighting, with very little eating, for the two preceding days; while his artillery and cavalry horses had been ten days in harness, and two days without food. To his appeal of the 28th to Gen. Halleck for rations, for forage, and fresh horses, he had that morning at daylight" received an answer from Gen. Franklin, written by direction of Gen. McClellan, and dated 8 P. M. of the 29th, informarms, within sight and sound of the battle during the whole day. So far as I know, he made no effort whatever to comply with my orders or to take any part in the action. I do not hesitate to say that, if he had discharged his duty as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jack son's force before he could have been by any possibility sufficiently rüenforced to have made an effective resistance. I did not myself feel for a moment that it was necessary for me, having given Gen. Porter an order to march toward the enemy, in a particular direction, to send him in addition specific orders to attack; it being his clear duty, and in accordance with every military precept, to have brought his forces into action wherever he encountered the enemy, when a furious battle with that enemy was raging during the whole day in his immediate presence. I believe-in fact, I am positive-that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, Gen. Porter had in his font no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear; that, if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet; and that the army of Gen. Lee would have been so crippled

ing him that rations would be loaded in the available wagons and cars at Alexandria so soon as he would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. If cavalry had been ever so necessary to the guarding of railroad trains, he had probably not then a regiment that could have gone to Alexandria and back within 48 hours. He had received no rëenforcements or supplies since the 26th, and had no assurance that any were on the way. To retreat was difficult; to stand still and famish unadvisable; so he ordered Porter, supported by King, to advance down the Warrenton turnpike and attack; while Heintzelman and Reno, supported by Ricketts's division, were to assail and turn the enemy's left.

Porter's attack was feeble; and not unreasonably so, since he encountered the enemy in greatly superior numbers, and was speedily thrown and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character."

31 In his official report, he says:

"At that time, my effective force, greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded. missing, and broken down men. during the severe operations of the two or three days and nights previous; the sharp actions of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 29th, were estimated by me and others as follows: McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, 12,000 men; Sigel's corps, 7,000; Reno's corps, 7,000; Heintzelman's corps, 7,002; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about 12,000 men, including the brigade of Piatt, which formed a part of Sturgis's division, and the only portion that ever joined me. But of this force the brigades of Piatt and Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about 5,000 men, had been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th for Centerville, and were not available for operations on that day. This reduced Porter's effective force in the field to about 7,000 men; which gave me a total force of 40,000 men. Banks's corps, about 5,000 strong, was at Bristow Station, in charge of the railroad trains, and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army, still at that place."

32

Aug. 30.