ried forward to the battle. It was an attempt was made to bring them 10 Gen. McClellan, in his report, states that the still rising Chickahominy floated the log-way approaches to Gen. Sumner's brigade, after that officer had crossed his corps, so as to render them impassable; hence he [McClellan] was obliged to send his horse around by Bottom's Bridge, six miles below, in returning to his headquarters. He adds: "The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries established upon commanding hights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured. "The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks, for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechanicsville, and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy, down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three (23) miles. In the condition of the roads at that time, this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days; by which time the enemy would have been secure within his intrenchments around Richmond.' It is hard for non-military readers to appreciate admiringly the Generalship which confessedly exposes one wing of an army for two days to the entire force of its adversary, without assistance in any form from the other. If there be any military reason why Gen. McClellan should have thrown two corps across the Chickahominy on his left, within a few miles of Richmond, without simultaneously, or for five days thereafter, pushing over his right also, and seizing the commanding hights which were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries, no indications of them appear in his report; which, with reference to following up our advantage of the 1st, naively says: In the morning," McClellan awaited an attack, which he says was made at 6 A. M., on the left of Sumner's corps, by Gen. Pickett, supported by Gen. Roger A. Pryor's brigade of Huger's division; to which French's brigade, on our side, stood opposed. The fight between them was noisy, but not very bloody: due caution and "An advance involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy would have exposed each to defeat in detail.” That Gen. McClellan greatly over-estimated the strength of the Rebel batteries and their supports opposite Fitz-John Porter and Franklin, and the difficulty of crossing there, is made plain by his dispatch, four days later, to the War Department, as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "NEW BRIDGE, June 5, 1862. “Rained most of the night; has now ceased, but is not clear. The river still very high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our bridges near here this morning; our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing still kept up. The rain forces us to remain in statu quo. With great difficulty, a division of infantry has been crossed this morning to support the troops on the other side, should the enemy renew attack. I felt obliged to do this, although it leaves us G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding. "Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War." rather weak here. Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, in his report of the campaign, says: "The repulse of the Rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was not repeat themselves. We now know the state one of those occasions which, if not seized, do of disorganization and dismay in which the Rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance though we did not then know all that we now to overcome to bring over our right wing. Aldo, it was obvious at that time that, when the Rebels struck the blow at our left wing, they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force; and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of We should have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other twofifths." ours. 11 June 1. distance being maintained on either side. Mahone's brigade was brought up to the aid of Pryor, and Howard's to that of French; and finally Meagher's Irish regiments went to the front, and a desultory conflict was maintained for some two or three hours, during which Gen. Howard lost his arm and had two of his staff wounded. The Rebels at length desisted, and retreated unpursued. Their reports assert that they made no attack, but only repelled one. The Rebels remained through the day in quiet possession of Couch's and Casey's camps, sending off muskets, tents, and camp equipage to Richmond; following themselves after nightfall. Johnston says that Smith did not renew his attack on our right, because of his discovery of strong intrenchments in that quarter, which he had not seen the night before. It is certain that he was not disturbed by any demonstration on our part, and retired wholly unmolested. Ten days later, we had not recovered the ground held by Casey's advance on the morning of May 31. Johnston reports the loss in Smith's division at 1,233, and in Longstreet's at "about" 3,000; total, 4,233; saying nothing of any loss sustained by Huger. Among his killed were Gen. Robert Hatton, of Tenn.; Cols. Lomax, 3d Ala., Jones, 12th Ala., Giles, 5th S. C., and Lightfoot, 22d N. C.; while, beside himself, Gens. Rhodes and Garland, with Cols. Goodwin, 9th Va., and Wade Hampton, S. C., were wounded. He also lost Gen. Petti 12 12 Gen. McClellan says that Hill estimates his loss at 2,500, and adds this number to the above total, making in all 6,733: but it is evident that Johnston includes Hill's loss in that of Longstreet, who was in command of both divisions. grew and Col. C. Davis, of S. C., and Col. Long, taken prisoners. He claims to have taken 10 guns, 6,000 muskets, and "several hundred" prisoners-an expression which the number of our wounded who fell into his hands must have fully justified. He probably took few others, and no officer of distinction. 13 Gen. McClellan reports our total loss at 5,739, whereof 890 were killed, 3,627 wounded, and 1,222 missing some of these probably dead, and others left on the field wounded, to fall into the hands of the enemy. Among our killed were Col. G. D. Bailey, Maj. Van Valkenburg, and Adjt. Ramsey, of the 1st N. Y. artillery; Cols. J. L. Riker, 62d, and James M. Brown, 100th N. Y., Rippey, 61st, and Miller, 81st Pa. Among our wounded were Gens. Naglee, Pa., Devens, Mass., O. O. Howard, Maine, and Wessells; Col. E. E. Cross, 5th N. H., and many other valuable officers. Considering that the bulk of the loss on either side fell on regiments which together brought less than 15,000 men into the field, the admitted loss is quite heavy. Keyes's corps numbered about 12,000 men present; of whom 4,000 were dead or wounded before 5 P. M. of the 31st. Perhaps as many had fled to the rear; yet Gen. McClellan's dispatch to the War Department, written so late as noon of the second day, in saying that "Casey's division gave way unaccountably and discreditably," is indiscriminate and unjust. A green division of less than 7,000 But in a confidential dispatch of June 4th, to the War Department, he says: (6 The losses in the battles of the 31st and 1st will amount to 7,000." Though this may have been an estimate merely, it was very near the truth. 13 શ MORE DELAYS AND EXCUSES. 149 Call's division of McDowell's corps should follow as speedily as might be. Gen. McClellan responded:' 15 "I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reenforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have addriving off the Rebel pickets, and securing vanced my pickets about a mile to-day; a very advantageous position." men could not fairly be expected to He soon afterward" telegraphed: "I am completely checked by the weath The roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery-almost so for infanstate. We have another rain-storm on our try. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful hands. I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal. In view of these cirwith-gether tion the propriety of detaching largely from cumstances, I present for your consideraHalleck's army, to strengthen this; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large Gen. Hooker, next morning," by Heintzelman's order, made a reconnoissance in force, advancing to within four miles of Richmond, unresisted save by pickets. Gen. McClellan, on learning this movement, ordered Hooker to be recalled to and take position at Fair Oaks. The General commanding wrote this day to the Secretary of War: "The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning; but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete; and all credit is due to the gallantry of our offi cers and men. "1 have. If this cannot be done, or even in organized force in front of him, while we connection with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better conform to military princialthough the rëenforcements might not arples to strengthen this army. And, even upon Richmond, the moral effect would be rive in season to take part in the attack great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements. I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather permits, I will attack with whatforce would enable me to gain much more ever force I may have, although a larger decided results. I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry." Secretary Stanton promptly responded: 17 vice, he contemplated sending a column to operate with Mitchel against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a critical condition, demanding immediate at tention. Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's forces is with him at Okolo na. McCall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible. "Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was badly handled. It is clear that a pretty strong force is operating with Jackson, for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies. "Be assured, General, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and, whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms." 18 Gen. McCall's division arrived by water during the two following days; on the last of which, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry and 4 guns, attacked and dispersed two squadrons of the 5th U. S. cavalry, Capt. Royall, near Hanover Old Church; thence proceeding to make a rapid circuit of our grand army, via Tunstall's Station, seizing and burning two schooners laden with forage, and 14 wagons; capturing and taking off 165 prisoners, 260 mules and horses; halting three hours to rest at Talleysville, in the rear of our army; resuming his march at midnight; crossing the Chickahominy near Long Bridge, by hastily improvised bridges, next forenoon; and reaching Richmond unassailed next morning. This was the first of the notable cavalry raids of the war, tempting to many imitations, some of them brilliant in design and execution; some of them damaging to the adverse party; others disastrous to their executors; but, on the whole, involving a squandering of horseflesh and an amount of useless devastation which rendered them decidedly unprofitable, and hardly reconcilable with the legitimate ends of warfare. Gen. McClellan, at midnight on the 14th, telegraphed to the War Department as follows: “HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "CAMP LINCOLN, June 14, 1862. "All quiet in every direction. The stamther now very favorable. I hope two days pede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two days shall advance as soon as the bridges are more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time, I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage. "It ought to be distinctly understood pletely under my control. I received a that McDowell and his troops are comtelegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. "That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the general in terests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. "If I cannot fully control all his troops, I fight the battle with what I have, and let want none of them, but would prefer to others be responsible for the results. "The department lines should not be aland all other troops sent to me, should be lowed to interfere with me; but Gen. McD., placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is to be entertained; you know that I have too great to allow personal considerations none. "The indications are, from our balloon reconnoissances and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily in 18 June 12-13. STONEWALL JACKSON JOINS LEE. 151 creasing in numbers, and determined to thousand men have left Richmond to rëenfight desperately." force Jackson, it illustrates their strength On the 20th, he telegraphed to the and confidence. After to-morrow, we shall President: Stonewall Jackson, having done us all the mischief he could in the Valley, arrested McDowell's overland march to join McClellan, and sent 40,000 or 50,000 of our men on all manner of wild-goose chases, was now on his way in full force to Richmond; hence,.misleading reports of his movements were artfully circulated among our commanders. Gen. McClellan telegraphed" to the War Department that he had information from deserters that troops had left Richmond to rëenforce Jackson, and that they were probably not less than 10,000 men. To this the President responded, that he had similar information from Gen. King at Fredericksburg; and added: "If this is true, it is as good as a rëenforcement to you." McClellan on that day telegraphed to the President: "A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen 19 June 18. fight the Rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorcompletion of some necessary preliminaable condition of the earth and sky, and the ries." To-morrow and to-morrow passed, and still our army did not advance; until, on the 24th, a young man of suspicious character was brought in by Gen. McClellan's scouts from the direction of Hanover Court House, fessed himself a deserter from Jackwho, after some prevarication, conson's command, which he had left near Gordonsville on the 21st, moving along the Virginia Central Railroad to Frederickshall, with intent to turn our right and attack our rear on the 28th. To McClellan's dispatch announcing this capture, and asking information of Jackson's position and movements, Secretary Stanton replied " as follows: 20 the numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement, that Jackson's force was, nine 10,000 Rebels under Jackson at Gordonsdays ago, 40,000 men. Some reports place ville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont Virginia was threatened; and Gen. Kelly, yesterday reported rumors that Western that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his dépôts. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance information of his whereabouts. at Luray. The people decline to give any Within the last two days, the evidence is strong that, for some purpose, the enemy is circu "We have no definite information as to lating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge on the subject. "A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on the 14th inst., stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington 20 June 25. |