what an equal number of McClellan's troops must have done "if that command was away;" but it is by no means the same thing to a commander in the field to have 10,000 men holding an important post in his rear, but wholly independent of his authority, and having them subject implicitly to his orders. Gen. McClellan was therefore manifestly right in not regarding Gen. Wool's 10,000 as equivalent to a rëenforcement of his army by that number; and the order which detached this division from his command has not been justified. True, he had more men than he needed, had he possessed the ability and the nerve to use them." But a General, in such a position as his then was, should either be fully trusted or superseded. Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat" by Shields at Kernstown, had retreated up the Valley, pursued by Gen. Banks, to the vicinity of Harrisonburg. Jackson, after holding some } 52 When he had fairly set down before Yorktown, he telegraphed to Washington as follows: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "April 10. "Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War: "The reconnoissance to-day proves that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions, under command of Franklin, and I will at once undertake it. If circumstances of which I am not aware make it impossible for you to send me two divisions to carry out this final plan of campaign, I will run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the result, if you will give me Franklin's division. If you still confide in my judgment, I entreat that you will grant this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. Although willing, under the pressure of necessity, to carry this through with Franklin alone, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I think two divisions necessary. Franklin and his division are indispensable to me. Gen. Barnard concurs in this view. I have determined on the point of attack, and am at this moment engaged in fixing the position of the batteries. "G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-General." The prompt response was as follows: 54 days a strong position near Mount Jackson, crossed the South Fork of the Shenandoah and took position in Elk Run Valley; but he was soon startled by tidings that Gen. Milroy, with the advance of Gen. Schenck's division of Fremont's West Virginia force, was threatening Staunton from the direction of Monterey. As a junction of Fremont's and Banks's commands would have involved the fall of Staunton, and the complete possession of the Valley by our troops, Jackson resolved to prevent it by striking a swift and hard blow at Fremont's advance. Leaving Ewell, whose division had recently joined him from Gordonsville, to observe and check Banks, Jackson moved rapidly to Staunton, being rëenforced by the division of Gen. Edward Johnson, which he dispatched 55 in advance of his own, against Milroy; who, being decidedly overmatched, retreated westwardly across Shenandoah Mountain, concentrating his command at McDowELL, and sending "WAR DEPARTMENT, April 11, 1862. Maj.-Gen. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Commanding Army of Potomac, Fortress Monroe, Virginia: "By direction of the President, Franklin's division has been ordered to march back to Alexandria and immediately embark for Fort Monroe. "L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.” Which McClellan thus acknowledged: “HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "Near Yorktown, April 12-12 M. "Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War: "Your dispatch received. I thank you most sincerely for the rëenforcements sent to me. Franklin will attack on the other side. The moment I hear from him, I will state point of rendezvous. I am confident as to results now. “G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-General.” All this promise ended in no performance. Gloucester was not attacked. Franklin's division was not even debarked, but lay idle more than a fortnight in the transports which brought it to the Peninsula, until Magruder saw fit to evacuate Yorktown. 53 March 23. THE FIGHT AT MCDOWELL. 133 to Schenck for assistance. Schenck | 3 missing. Our total loss in this well was at Franklin, 34 miles north, contested action was 256, including which distance he traversed, with his 145 slightly wounded. Gen. Jackbrigade, in 23 hours, joining Milroy son's report admits a loss on his part at 10 A. M. of the 8th; but he of 461-71 killed, including 3 Cobrought only three regiments, reduced lonels and 2 Majors, and 390 woundby details to less than 2,000 men; ed, among whom was Gen. Johnson. while Milroy's force was but very Our troops retreated to Franklin little stronger. Jackson's column during the night, carrying off their was considerably the larger, though wounded, but burning a part of their it is stated that but six regiments were stores. actually engaged in the fight. 58 Jackson pursued next day toward Franklin, but did not see fit to attack. Returning to McDowell," he recrossed the Shenandoah Mountain to Lebanon White Sulphur Springs; where he gave his troops a brief rest, and then resumed" his march to Harrisonburg, having ascertained that Banks had fallen back to Strasburg. Being joined near Newmarket by Ewell's division, he moved via Luray upon Front Royal, keeping his advance carefully masked by Ashby's cavalry, so that he swooped down almost unannounced on our small force holding that position, under Col. John R. Kenly, who nevertheless made a spirited resistance, but was soon driven out with loss by the enemy's overwhelming numbers. Kenly, after abandoning the town, attempted to make a stand on a ridge scarcely a mile in its rear; but, his force being hardly a tenth of that assailing him, he was soon compelled to retreat across the river, after destroying his camp and stores. He tried to burn the bridge over the North Fork of the Shenandoah, but the Rebels were upon him and extinguished the flames. A few miles farther on, he was overtaken by the Rebel cavalry under Ashby and and a fight ensued, in 58 May 23. The Rebels advanced to and posted themselves on the top of a ridge in the Bull Pasture Mountain, where it is traversed by the Staunton turn pike, a mile or two west of McDowell. Schenck saw that Milroy's position was untenable, being commanded by hights in several directions; but he could not safely abandon it in broad daylight, and so decided to remain. Some desultory skirmishing and cannonading followed; until, at 3 P. M., upon information that the Rebels were trying to plant a battery on the mountain, where it would command our whole encampment, Schenck directed Milroy, with the 3d Virginia, 25th, 32d, and 82d Ohio, numbering a little over 2,000 men, to advance and feel of the enemy. Led by Col. N. C. McLean, of the 75th Ohio, they charged up the mountain with great gallantry, defying the fire of a superior force, whose heads only were visible, and were engaged at close range for an hour and a half, during which an attempt was made to turn the Rebel right, but repulsed. The fight did not wholly cease till 8 P. M., when our men were withdrawn by order, bringing in their dead and wounded, taking 4 prisoners and reporting but Flournoy, 56 May 14. 57 May 17. which Col. K. was severely wounded, | town-a report soon confirmed by a his train captured, and his command disorderly rush of fugitives and nearly destroyed. Fully 700 prisoners, a section of rifled 10-pounders, and a large amount of stores, were , among the trophies of this Rebel triumph. Our men fought nobly; but they were 900 against 8,000. Gen. Banks remained quiet and unsuspecting at Strasburg, with no enemy in his front, and no sign of danger, until the evening of the 23d, when he was astounded by tidings of Kenly's disaster, and assurances that the Rebels, 15,000 to 20,000 strong, were pressing forward to Winchester, directly in his rear. Shields's division having been sent, by order from Washington, to the Rappahannock, he had hardly 5,000 men at hand, with perhaps 2,000 or 3,000 more scattered through the Valley in his rear. Jackson's force must have exceeded, 20,000 men." Banks had, on the first tidings of trouble at Front Royal, dispatched a small force to the aid of Kenly; but this was now recalled, and our trains sent forward on the road to Winchester, escorted by Gen. Hatch, with our cavalry, and 6 pieces of artillery. At 9 A. M. our column was in motion, and had hardly proceeded three miles when it was apprised that the train had been attacked, and that the Rebels held the road at Middle 60 69 59 Lt.-Gen. Jackson, in his official report, says: "My command at this time embraced Ashby's cavalry; the 1st brigade, under Gen. Winder; the 2d brigade, Col. Campbell commanding; 3d brigade, Col. Fulkerson commanding; the troops recently under command of Brig.-Gen. Edward Johnson; and the division of Gen. Ewell, comprising the brigades of Gens. Elzey, Taylor, Trimble, and the Maryland Line, consisting of the 1st Maryland regiment and Brockenbrough's battery, under Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Stewart, and the 2d and 6th Virginia cavalry, under Col. Flournoy." wagons to the rear. The column was thereupon rëorganized, with the train in the rear; and, on reaching Middletown, Col. D. Donnelly, commanding the vanguard, encountered a small force of Rebels, who were easily repulsed and driven back on the road to Front Royal. Col. Brodhead, 1st Michigan cavalry, now took the advance, and soon reported the road clear to Winchester. Before all our army had passed, the Rebels advanced on the Front Royal road in such force as to occupy Middletown, compelling our rear-guard to fall back to Strasburg, making a circuit thence to the north, whereby the 1st Vermont, Col. Tompkins, was enabled to rejoin Banks at Winchester in season for the fight of next morning; while the 5th New York, Col. De Forrest, made its way through the mountains to the Potomac, bringing in a train of 32 wagons and many stragglers. There was some fighting with our rear-guard at Strasburg, and again at Newtown, eight miles from Winchester; but our men retreated with moderate loss, and our infantry and artillery were again concentrated at Winchester by midnight. Here they were allowed a rest of two or three hours, broken at brief intervals by the rattle of mus On our side, Brig.-Gen. Gordon, in his official report, says: "From the testimony of our signal officers, and from a fair estimate of the number in Rebel lines drawn up on the hights, from fugitives and deserters, the number of regiments in the Rebel army opposite Winchester was 28, being Ewell's division, Jackson's and Johnson's forces; the whole being commanded by Gen. Jackson. These regiments were full, and could not have numbered less than 22,000 men, with a corresponding proportion of artillery." 6o May 24. BANKS DRIVEN OUT OF THE VALLEY. 135 ketry, as the Rebels closed around | columns, each protected by an effithem, their artillery opening at day- cient rear-guard, and reached Marlight.1 tinsburg, 22 miles distant, in the course of the afternoon. Here a halt of two and a half hours was taken, to rest and refresh; our rear-guard leaving that town at 7 P. M., and reaching the Potomac, opposite Williamsport, 12 miles farther, in the course of the evening. Banks had now less than 7,000 men," opposed to more than 20,000, flushed with victory, and confident that the day would witness the capture or destruction of our little army. Col. Geo. H. Gordon commanded our right; Col. Dudley Donnelly our left. Gen. Hatch, who had been cut off at Middletown, had just rejoined with his cavalry. Facing the enemy boldly, our men held their ground for five hours, inflicting and suffering considerable loss; until, Jackson's entire army having by this time been brought up, it was manifest that further resistance was madness, and could only result in our destruction. Our trains being by this time well on the road, the order to retreat was given, and our line of battle, under a withering fire of musketry from left, right, and center, broke into column of march and moved rapidly through Winchester, amid the deafening yells of their exulting pursuers, which were echoed with delirious frenzy by the Winchester Rebels." The 2d Massachusetts, Lt.-Col. Andrews, which, with the 3d Wisconsin, Col. Ruger, formed our rear-guard, halted, undismayed by the hideous din, in a street of the town, to re-form its line, and then resumed its rapid but steady march, sharply followed, but not seriously annoyed, by the eager foe. Our troops moved in three parallel 61 May 25. 62 Gen. Banks's official report says: "My own command consisted of 2 brigades of less than 4,000 men, all told, with 900 cavalry, 10 Parrott guns, and one battery of 6-pounders, smooth-bore cannon. To this should be added the 10th Maine regiment of infantry, and 5 companies of Maryland cavalry, stationed at Winchester, which were engaged in the action." Gen. Banks admits a loss, in his hurried retreat for 53 miles, of 38 killed, 155 wounded, and 711 missing; total, 904; with 55 out of 500 wagons, and no guns. This of course does not include the losses by Col. Kenly's rout at Front Royal, nor the sick and wounded left in hospitals at Strasburg and Winchester. We lost also a large amount of quartermaster and commissary stores, most of which were destroyed. Jackson admits a total loss, including that at Front Royal, of 68 killed and 329 wounded; and claims to have captured 2 guns, 9,354 small arms, and about 3,050 prisoners, including 750 sick and wounded, whom he paroled and left in the hospitals when he retreated, 63 Gen. Gordon, in his official report, says: sending some 2,300 up the Valley. | army at Franklin, Pendleton county, He attributes his failure to crush 24 miles north of Monterey, was Banks entirely to the misconduct of Ashby's cavalry, who stopped to pillage our abandoned wagons between Middletown and Newtown, and could not thereafter be brought to the front till too late. Jackson, after menacing Harper's Ferry," which was held by Gen. Rufus Saxton, called in his detachments and commenced a rapid retreat." It was high time. Gen. Shields, whose division had been detached from Banks, and marched over a hundred miles to join McDowell at Fredericksburg, to replace the division of Gen. Franklin-already sent to McClellan-and enable McDowell to move directly on Richmond, was now ordered from Washington to postpone this movement, and push 20,000 men rapidly to the Shenandoah, along the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Gen. Fremont, who had concentrated his little 65 68 Speaking of our retreat from Winchester, he says: 66 67 The Federal forces, upon falling back into the town, preserved their organization remarkably well. In passing through its streets, however, they were thrown into confusion; and, shortly after debouching into the plain and turnpike to Martinsburg, and after being fired upon by our artillery, they presented the aspect of a mass of disordered fugitives. Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory." May 29 May 30. 68 Gen. McDowell, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, states that Shields's division, 11,000 strong, raising his entire force—not including Franklin's division, already sent to McClellan—to 41,000 men, joined him at or near Fredericksburg either on the 22d or 23d of May, but in want of artillery ammunition: that which they had having just been condemned at Catlett's Station, and the new supply ordered from the Washington arsenal having got aground on the flats of the Potomac and thus been delayed. On Saturday, the 24th, the President and Secretary of War came down to confer likewise ordered" by telegraph from Washington to hasten across the main range of the Alleghanies to Harrisonburg, hardly 50 miles distant, and thus intercept the retreat of Jackson up the valley, and cöoperate with McDowell and Shields to crush him. There is a direct road from Franklin to Harrisonburg, not absolutely impassable by an army, though it crosses four distinct ranges of steep mountains; but Gen. Fremont's trains were at Moorefield, 40 miles north by east, and to attempt crossing without them was to doom his army to starvation, there being little for man or beast to eat in those wild mountains. He therefore decided to go by Moorefield, which compelled him to go 20 miles farther northeast, to Wardensville, in order to find a practicable route across the mountains. Stripping his army as with him, and found him not yet ready for the contemplated advance on Richmond, but that he would be that afternoon, and that Shields's division could go on Sunday. He [McDowell] added, that he had once before moved on Sunday alluding to the battle of Bull Run-and had been very much condemned for it all over the country, but that he was ready to do so again. The President therefore suggested that he might get a "good ready,” and start on Monday, which was agreed on. Messrs. Lincoln and Stanton returned to Washington that night, and "had hardly left before a telegram came announcing this raid of Jackson up [down] the Shenandoah Valley." This was soon followed by an order adds: "I did so, although I replied that it was to send a division up after Jackson. McDowell a crushing blow to us all." The President ordered another brigade to move up there, and ment. Two divisions were thus sent before then another brigade, and then another regiMcDowell, whose heart was set on the Richmond movement, followed himself. 69 May 24. |