WASHINGTON CITY TO BE COVERED. averaged about 220,000 men," was at no time large enough, according to his computation, to justify a determined offensive, since he persisted in computing the Rebel army confronting him at no less than "150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched." 46 129 Ordered, That the army and navy cooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. "L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General." Gen. McClellan's chief of spies had by this time reduced the force of the Rebels in Northern Virginia" to 115,500 men, with 300 field and 26 Now, the movement first contem- to 30 siege-guns-quite a formidable plated, by way of the Rappahannock army, if its leader should conclude, and Urbana-still more, that ulti- after Gen. McClellan's embarking mately decided on by way of Fortress the bulk of his forces for Fortress Monroe and the Peninsula-involved Monroe, to make a rush upon Washa division of this army, and the reser-ington from behind the Rappahanvation of a considerable part of it for the protection of Washington, as also the securing of Maryland and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from desolating raids down the Shenandoah Valley. President Lincoln had reluctantly given his assent to this circumlittoral advance, on these expressed conditions: "EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, "PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER, No. 3: Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. "That no more than two army corps (about 50,000 troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March instant; and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day. 45 Dec. 1, 198, 213; Jan. 1, 219,707; Feb. 1, 222,196; March 1, 221,987. VOL. II.-9 nock. Five days later, Secretary Stanton wrote, as we have already seen, to Gen. McClellan, that the President made no objection to his plan of operations, provided he would "1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junc tion as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. "2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. "3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac-choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route." Just before starting for the Peninsula, Gen. McClellan received, "with surprise," the following note, involving a subtraction, he estimates, of 10,000 troops from the force which he expected to have transferred to the Peninsula: “EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, "March 31, 1862. "Major-General MCCLELLAN : “My Dear Sir: This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Fremont; and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even 46 Letter to the Secretary of War. beyond the mere acknowledgment that the Commander-in-Chief may order what he Yours, very truly, pleases. "A. LINCOLN." Stonewall Jackson's advance to and fight at Winchester, indicating further pugnacity in that quarter, were soon found to interfere with Gen. McClellan's order 48 to Gen. Banks to move his division down to Manassas, leaving only two regiments of cavalry to "occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley." Gen. McClellan, on embarking, calculated that he left behind, including Blenker's division, ordered to Fremont, and not including McDowell's corps, which he intended should follow him, no less than 75,000 men. But, as Blenker's division was known to be ordered to Fremont, in West Virginia, they are improperly included. Even excluding these, he computes the whole number available for the defense of Washington, including 35,467 under Banks in the Valley of the Shenandoah, at 67,428 men, with 85 pieces of light artillery. Yet he had barely departed when Gens. Hitchcock and L. Thomas, who had been instructed to investigate the matter, reported," "that the requirement of the President, that this city [Washington] shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." Gen. Wadsworth, Military Governor of Washington, and as brave a man as ever lived, submitted to the War Department a statement that the entire force left under his command for the defense of Washington amounted to 20,477, of whom 19,022 were present for duty; nearly all of them new and 49 April 2 48 March 16. imperfectly disciplined, several of the regiments in a very disorganized condition; 2 heavy artillery and 1 infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months for artillery service, had been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac ; while he was at this time under orders from McClellan to detail 3 regiments to join divisions on their way to the Peninsula, and another for service at Budd's Ferry; while a further order directed him to send 4,000 men to Manassas and Warrenton to relieve Gen. Sumner, so as to enable him to embark for Yorktown. Upon the report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, the President gave orders that either McDowell's or Sumner's corps should remain in front of Washington until otherwise directed. Two days later, he telegraphed to the War Department that: "It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands— probably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps, my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position." In a dispatch of even date to the President, he says: "Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply, I have the honor to state that my 50 April 3. 61 April 5. THE PRESIDENT URGES MCCLELLAN TO ACT. 131 entire force for duty amounts to only about | just obtained from the Secretary of War a (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. Gen. statement taken, as he said, from your own Wool's command, as you will observe from returns, making 108,000 then with you and the accompanying order, has been taken en route to you. You now say you will out of my control, although he has most have but 85,000 when all en route to you cheerfully cooperated with me. The only shall have reached you. How can the disuse that can be made of his command is to crepancy of 23,000 be accounted for? protect my communications in rear of this "As to Gen. Wool's command, I underpoint. At this time, only 53,000 men have stand it is doing for you precisely what a joined me; but they are coming up as rap-like number of your own would have to do idly as my means of transportation will if that command was away. permit. Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation." The President responded by this letter: "WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862. "Maj.-Gen. MCCLELLAN: "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you, is with you by this time; and, if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay, the enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reenforcements than you can by rëenforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the Bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note-is now notingthat the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act. "Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN." "MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here; and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it-certainly, not without reluctance. After you left, I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field-battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this, even, was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted, and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be The President's question as to the gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack grave discrepancy between the 85,000 Washington. My explicit order that Wash- men, admitted to be with or on their ington should, by the judgment of all the commanders of army corps, be left entirely way to him by Gen. M., and the secure, had been neglected. It was precise- 108,000 asserted by Secretary Stanly this that drove me to detain McDowell. ton, was never answered, and proba"I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manas-bly could not be; since an official resas Junction; but, when that arrangement turn of the number of his army April was broken up, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself; and allow me to ask: Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade. "There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had 30th, while it was still before Yorktown, makes its aggregate 130,378, whereof 112,392 were present and fit for duty; Franklin's division of 12,448 men having in the mean time been sent to him. But, on another point, military men are not likely to agree with the President. Gen. Wool's command may very probably have been doing just |