part in the first election of Mr. Lincoln, and in the encouragement of enlistments into the three-months' regiments first sent out. But it was not until the second year of the war that he felt called upon to enlist himself. He had been West and into Kentucky on business, and realizing the occasion, concluded that he must not only encourage others to go to the war, but go himself. He proposed it to his father-in-law, who was as patriotic as himself, and took a leading part in all the efforts of the city to raise funds and troops. He was told that he could not advise it. He could not be spared. He might send twenty substitutes, but he must not think of it. The answer was that he had the most profound respect for his judgment, and would in almost anything defer to his wishes, but this was a matter of conscience with him. He was satisfied that the crisis. required it of him and other business men, and he must go and set them an example. He stepped across the street from his banking house to the State House, where he told Governor Buckingham of his purpose, and added that if he could give him a lieutenancy or some such humble official position it would gratify him. The Governor jumped up and, seizing both his hands, said: "I'll make you a colonel, and you may take your choice of the four regiments now enlisting and gathering at the camp, and I will put you in charge of the camp as post commander, for you are the man of all others needed there." He went directly to the camp, and for a month never passed a night at his own house, until he had put things in order there. His regiment was soon in the field, and served honorably and efficiently in the Department of the Gulf, under General Banks, and nobly bore its part of hardship and loss in the capture of Port Hudson and the severe fight at Irish Bend.* This regiment was

Here is where the Twenty-fifth went into battle for the first time, and not only encountered a severe musketry fire, but became also the mark of a battery on one side and the guns of a rebel gunboat on the other. "Here they were kept under fire eleven hours and suffered fearfully. But the men stood up to their work nobly,

characterized by its fine discipline and its reverence for sacred things, which it carried with it from home and preserved amid the corruptions of war and in that rude region of the Southwest. It is told that a visitor in the camp, who was surprised at the character of the men in this respect, said: "Colonel, I don't hear any swearing in your camp." "Don't have any," was the reply. "Don't have any? You needn't tell me that, when there are no officers around." "I tell you we don't have any. I'll give you five dollars for any oath you pick up in my camp." And it is said that he never made any money by it.

66

So these heavy calls upon the State for troops were met, and no draft was made, though it would have come if enlistments had not proved sufficient. Every city and town was expected to look after its own quota, and by personal and united effort, the offer of bounties, and the application of the overplus number from one town to the deficit of another, the requisite number of soldiers was raised.

The aggregate of those who dishonestly sought exemption, was of course very small, when compared with the whole number liable to military duty. The people generally were ready to stand the draft, and some calmly awaited the result as the decision of Providence upon their duty to go or stay. Still there was a decided repugnance to a draft, however equitable, and all, with Connecticut ideas of freedom, wished to see the ranks filled by volunteers.-["Connecticut in the War," p. 243.

There was some hot haste required at last to do it. Many towns had not filled their quotas until the last day. At New Haven several thousand people were gathered at the north portico of the State House early that day, where a citizens' meeting was organized, addresses made, bids offered for substitutes, and additional bounties to enlistments, until 4 o'clock, when the draft was to begin to

Incited by the example of their gallant colonel, Bissell, who, regardless of his own safety, passed from end to end of the line, encouraging them to deeds of bravery," -["Connecticut in the War," p. 405.

supply the deficiency. The number was nearly full, and the draft was delayed for half an hour, when it was announced that the number was completed. More than a hundred had enlisted since 9 o'clock in the morning; some of the towns even then had not furnished their quota, but others had an excess of men, and these were enough to supply the deficiencies. So that these two heavy calls for troops were both met, and within three months the men were in the field. They were there to resist the invasion of Maryland, which took place in September; they did good service, and some of them suffered terribly. The battle of Antictam has been called "the bloodiest day of the war." General McClellan makes his entire loss in this battle over 12,000, and General Lee's was not less. As it was not decisive, and no particular advantage was taken of it, ɛo but that the free States were invaded again the next year, when the more decisive battle of Gettysburg was fought, it was felt to be a great expenditure of means for no more important results. It was this which removed General McClellan from the command of the army, and from the army itself.

CHAPTER XV.

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, 1862.

The President's Decision in Regard to Emancipation-His Plan of Buying Off the Northern Slave States and Paying them for Their few Slaves-The Failure-His Correspondence with Mr. Bancroft -His Decision to Issue such Proclamation as soon as the Government Should Have Gained Some Important Victory-It was Done after the Battle of Antietam.

From the beginning of the war, the government and the people of the North had been perplexed to know how to treat slavery. The reason and manner of its toleration in hope of a gradual and peaceful extinction of slavery have been described, as well as the violation of agreements by the South and the successive acts of aggression which culminated in secession and war, all the direct result of the Southern determination to perpetuate and extend slavery. In these circumstances, it might have been expected when the war came that the government would at once attack slavery, the most vulnerable point of the Confederacy. As it was, however, the President had a plan of his own to induce the border slave States, where there were the fewest slaves, to emancipate them and let the government pay for them, and so prevent these States from joining the Confederacy. Delaware had only 1,800 slaves, and Congress had already passed a joint resolution, "That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolition of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid." Maryland had more slaves, but her interests were all in the direction of free labor, and to get rid of her slave system as soon as possible, and be on an equal business footing

with the other Northern States. So had Kentucky and Missouri, with their greater territory and rich resources, a strong inducement to free themselves from their hampering slave system. For a time the President seemed confident that by fair treatment and compensation for their slaves, he could induce them to abolish slavery and keep out of the Confederacy. He pressed it personally upon their representatives in Congress. He recommended it in his messages, and presented in all its detail the feasibility and wisdom of such a plan, while carefully avoiding everything that could wound their keen sensibilities upon this subject. He took unwearied pains to relieve every difficulty and suggest every feasible method, and put the matter into their own hands, so as to have them feel that it was not forced upon them by the government. He appealed to these States in his most candid and kindest manner, and urged them by every consideration of wisdom and duty not to be blind to the signs of the times, and neglect a great providential opportunity, and have cause forever to lament that they threw away such a priceless boon once offered to the slave, and to the nation.

Nor was this all. Several months after the President and Congress had sanctioned this policy of compensated emancipation in the border slave States, he gathered their delegations about him at the White House, and read to them a second carefully prepared paper upon the subject. He urges his plan as the surest and quickest to end the war; as one which the government can carry out and make compensation for their slaves, which it may never be able to do after the country is impoverished by a destructive war; he also reminds them, that if the war continues long, as it must, if the object is not soon attained, the institution of their States will be extinguished by the mere friction and abrasion; the mere incidents and necessities. of war; he tells them they know what the power of the