desperate courage sweep away infantry and batteries, cost what it might.

The battle lasted from 4 o'clock in the afternoon until 9 o'clock in the evening; the valor shown was heroic and the losses terrible. General D. H. Hill draws this picture of one episode:

I never saw anything more grandly heroic than the advance, after sunset, of the nine brigades under Magruder's orders. Unfortunately they did not move together and were beaten in detail. As each brigade emerged from the woods, from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, tearing great gaps in its ranks, but the heroes reeled on, and were shot down by the reserves at the guns, which a few squads reached. Most of them had an open field, half a mile wide, to cross, under the fire of field artillery in front and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gunboats in their rear. It was not war; it was murder.-["War Book," Vol. II, p. 394.

Lec's belief that a success now would not only relieve Richmond, but save the Confederacy, accounts for the desperate effort he made, against the advice of his generals. Of the fighting on both sides General McClellan says: "I doubt whether in the annals of war there was ever a more persistent and gallant attack, or a more cool and effective resistance." Within two hours of the close of the battle, orders were given to fall back to Harrison's Landing, on the James river, and the next day the army arrived there in safety with all its trains. Their march of six or seven miles was made through a heavy rain, and proved somewhat demoralizing to men exhausted by seven days' fighting. The troops were safe under the guns of the fleet, the retreat had been skillfully conducted, and the campaign

was over.

Now that the war is over, and we obtain accounts of it from those engaged in it on both sides, it is instructive to get their judgment of movements and results, and especially their estimate of their opponents. Thus General Hill, who had led so gallantly the desperate charge, and lost so

heavily says: "The battle, with all its melancholy results, proved, however, that the Confederate infantry, and Federal artillery, side by side on the same field, need fear no foc on earth. Both commanders had shown great ability; McClellan, if not always great in advance, was masterly in retreat, and was unquestionably the greatest of Americans as an organizer of an army. Lee's plans were perfect, and had not his dispositions for a decisive battle at Frazier's farm miscarried, through no fault of his own, he would have won a most complete victory. It was not the least part of his greatness that he did not complain of his disappointment, and that he at no time sought a scapegoat upon which to lay a failure. As reunited Americans, we have reason to be proud of both commanders."

As to the character and conduct of our own troops in this severe campaign, General Franklin, one of our generals, says of them:_

I cannot finish without a word as to the conduct of the men. My experience during the period generally known as "the Seven Days" was with the Sixth and Seventh corps. During the whole time between June 26 and July 2 there was not a night in which the men did not march almost continually, nor a day on which there was not a fight. I never saw a skulker during the whole time, nor heard one insubordinate word. Some men fell by the wayside exhausted, and were captured, but their misfortune was due to physical inability to go on. They had no food but that which was carried in their haversacks, and the hot weather soon rendered that uneatable. Sleep was out of the question, and the only rest obtained was while lying down awaiting an attack, or sheltering themselves from shot and shell. No murmur was heard, everything was accepted as the work for which they had enlisted. They had been soldiers less than a year, yet their conduct could not have been more soldierly had they seen ten years of service. No such material for soldiers was ever in the field before, and their behavior in this movement foreshadowed their success as veterans at Appomattox.-["War Book," Vol. II, p. 182.

So ended this campaign, for the army was soon withdrawn from the Peninsula, and General McClellan was relieved of his command as commander-in-chief of all the

Union armies, and put in charge of the defenses of Washington, when he was called upon to resist Lee's invasion of Maryland, and successfully fought the battle of Antietam. The results of the campaign were sad and disappointing in the highest degree. The losses on both sides were simply enormous. General McClellan estimates them, during those last seven days of fighting, as 15,849 killed, wounded and missing; and the losses of the Confederate army during the same period he puts at 19,749, both of which are substantially correct according to the latest revision of the reports on both sides. On our side it was almost the destruction of the largest and best equipped army of the war. When it set out from Fortress Monroe, after that long cry of "On to Richmond!" though we had no suitable army for such an enterprise, we followed this one with its accomplished and popular commander, almost sure of success. But when three weary months had worn away and our troops were only approaching the city, and we heard from them as fighting daily battles, and every boat and train from the front came loaded with their wounded and sick, and finally the news came that they were in full retreat through those swamps of the Chickahominy, and fighting such battles as "Beaver Dam," "Gaines' Mill," Savage's Station," Glendale," and "Malvern Hill," and as we learned more of the particulars of this wrecked expedition, who that did not experience it can appreciate the disappointment, the personal anguish, and public sorrow that spread over all the Northern States? And if anything could have discouraged us, in such a war for the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the Republic, it would have been this. For it looked as if the failure of this grand expedition might lead to the acknowledgment of the Confederacy by foreign powers, while the "peace party" at home were disposed to adjust matters upon any terms, even new compromises with slavery, which would have left us worse off than ever, and

robbed the world of the only successful experiment in selfgovernment and equal rights. But instead of discouragement, and giving over the attempt to maintain the Republic, such reverses only showed that we were not appreciating our danger, and had not begun to do enough to escape it. And the Northern States were wise enough and patriotic enough to understand it, and push forward their enlistments and multiply their contributions to the war until the object of the war was secured. The repeated and vast levies for troops made by the government and the enthusiasm for enlistment which followed, and this before either the battle of Gettysburg had been won or Vicksburg had fallen, showed what was meant by the "Uprising of a Great People," and as distinctly forecast the final result as though some prophet had foretold it.

CHAPTER XIV.

FURTHER CALLS FOR VOLUNTEERS.

Two Requisitions for 300,000 Men Each in the Summer of 1802-Governor Buckingham's Proclamation-The Patriotic Response of the Men of Connecticut-Mr. Lincoln's Views as to Emancipation-Value of the Slaves-The Emancipation Proclamation Foreshadowed.

In one of Mr. Lincoln's dispatches to General McClellan, when he was in his greatest perplexity and distress, he said:

“Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fortress Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country and will bring it out. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of 300,000 men, which I accept.”—[“Century,” October, 1888, p. 145.

Governor Buckingham was of course one of this number, and with his patriotic State behind him, sure to follow where he led the way, he might well counsel, as he always had done, the raising of more troops. His letter to the President, a few months after he issued his call for 75,000 men, counseling him to raise 400,000 or 500,000 if he would cope successfully with the Confederate forces already in the field, has previously been referred to. (It can be found in full on pp. 166-168.) Again and again he had filled his quota, and had regiments on hand which he begged in vain to have taken into the service. The State had also at his suggestion offered to put its troops into the field at its own expense and await the convenience of the government for repayment.