Hudgins et al. v. Kemp. the fraud, and hence was a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration. We shall not, therefore, deem it material to refer to any portion of the mass of evidence in the case, except so far as it bears upon the connection of the grantee with this question of fraud. The answer of the defendant to the bill is not very satisfactory. The bill charges that the deed, though it bears date 21st February, 1842, was really executed on or about the 2d of July following, the time it was put on record; and that it was antedated in pursuance of the fraudulent purpose charged against the parties. The answer does not notice or deny this allegation. Again, the bill charges that the deed was not delivered at the time it bears date; ror, in fact, delivered at all to the grantee in any other way than the putting of it on record by the grantor himself. This charge is not noticed or denied; neither is the allegation denied, that the grantee remained in the possession and enjoyment of the property after the conveyance, the same as before. And this averment, besides being thus virtually admitted, is fully established by the proofs in the case. The consideration or purchase-money agreed to be given for the three tracts of land conveyed was less than one-half the value, as proved by uncontradicted testimony. The deed contained a clause, that the lands should be subject to any judgments that were then a lien upon them; and it was urged, on the argument, that these judgments should be taken into the account, on fixing the amount of the purchase-money. But the answer is, that it does not appear, from any evidence in the case, that judgments existed against John L. Hudgins at the date of the deed. We have examined the proofs attentively, and find none; nor have any been referred to in the briefs of the counsel. It also appears that Robert, the grantee, some four months after the date of his deed, and when the title to the lands in question was in him, if the conveyance had been really made at its date, was present, and participated in a negotiation for a loan of money to John L. Hudgins, and which was to be secured by a deed from him of these very lands, in trust, to the persons advancing the money. The conduct of the defendant, Robert, in this instance, furnishes the foundation for a strong inference, either that the deed had not then been executed and delivered, or, if it had been, that the grantee held it for the use and benefit of John L. Hudgins, the grantor. In either view, the fact affords a well-founded suspicion of the bona fides of the transaction between the parties. In respect to the payment of the purchase-money, of which Hudgins et al. v. Kemp. very formal proofs have been given of the principal part of it, the effect in support of the conveyance is very much impaired by the fact that John L. Hudgins, in the schedule of his estate annexed to this petition in bankruptcy, 23d February, 1843, takes no notice of this indebtedness to him, by Robert, the grantee, and the truth of the schedule is verified under oath. This was a year and two days after the date of the deed, and when the purchase-money was unpaid, if the facts are true, as insisted by both the parties subsequently, upon the question of payment. They now admit this did not take place till August, 1844. No attempt has been made to account for or reconcile this inconsistency, if not worse, on the part of John L. Hudgins. Without pursuing the examination of the proofs in the case further, we will simply say, that after the fullest consideration of the facts in the case, we are satisfied with the conclusion arrived at by the court below upon this question. But it is insisted that, admitting the conveyance to be void as it respects the creditors of John L. Hudgins, the court below erred in ordering a sale of the property, without having first ascertained the debts of the bankrupt, and permitting the grantee in the deed to redeem on paying them, or directing only so much of the land to be sold as would be sufficient to pay the debts. The answer to this is, that the defendant, Robert Hudgins, made no offer to pay the debts on ascertaining the amount, and, for aught that appears, the whole of the property will be no more than sufficient to pay the liabilities of the bankrupt. If there should, by chance, be any surplus, it belongs to the court in bankruptcy to dispose of it. Whether it should go to the bankrupt or to his grantee, will be for that court to determine. It is also insisted, that the court below erred in decreeing the rents and profits of the lands in controversy against the defendant, Robert Hudgins, for the reasons that it is not shown that he was in the possession and enjoyment of the same; and, also, that the court erred in decreeing these rents and profits from the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, instead of from the decree declaring John L. Hudgins a bankrupt. The short answer to each of these objections is, that no such exceptions were taken to the report of the master, and are therefore not properly before us. That was the time and place to have presented these questions, and the omission precludes any question here on the matter. The decree of the court below affirmed. Hudgins et al. v. Kemp. ELLIOTT W. HUDGINS AND JOHN L. HUDGINS, APPELLANTS, v. WYNDHAM KEMP, ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF JOHN L. HUDGINS. In this case, as in the preceding, no exceptions having been taken in the court below to a master's report respecting rents and profits, the questions cannot be decided by this court. THIS was a branch of the preceding case, was argued by the same counsel, and included within the same principles. Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia. The bill was filed by the assignee of the bankrupt, J. L. Hudgins, as in the preceding case, against E. W. Hudgins, a son, to set aside two deeds of conveyance of lands, as executed and delivered by the bankrupt to hinder and delay creditorscne dated 6th September, 1839, conveying three hundred acres lying in the county of York; the other dated 1st March, 1842, conveying, by estimation, seven hundred acres, in the same county-the latter for the consideration of $3,000. This deed was made a few days after the one set aside in the case of the assignee against Robert Hudgins. The case depends upon substantially the same evidence. Portions of it, tending to connect this defendant with the conduct of the grantor, in conveying away his property in fraud of his creditors, as respects the deed of the 1st March, 1842, are, if possible, somewhat stronger than that in the preceding case. The court, on the 18th May, 1843, decreed that the deed was fraudulent and void, and that the assignee in bankruptcy take possession of the property as a receiver; and, further, that the deed of the 6th September, 1839, was not made in fraud of creditors, but was valid as against the complainant. The court also directed an account of the rents and profits, from the time of the petition in bankruptcy to the time of the receiver taking possession. The master subsequently reported rents and profits to the amount of $659.72; and on the 27th June, 1855, a final decree was entered. The court decreed that the defendant, Elliott W. Hudgins, pay to the complainant $659.72, with interest from 2d June, 1848; and that, if the proceeds of the property directed to be sold in the case of the plaintiff against Robert Hudgins and others, should not be sufficient to satisfy the debts proved against the bankrupt, then the plaintiff is authorized to sell the lands in question, as particularly specified and directed in the said decree. Brown v. Shannon et al. The only question arising on the master's report in this case, and the decree in pursuance thereof, is, that the rents and profits should not have been charged prior to the decree in bankruptcy. The answer to this objection is, that no such exception was taken to the report, and cannot, therefore, be noticed here. The case, in all its essential parts, falls within the views presented in the preceding one of this plaintiff against Robert Hudgins and others, and must abide the like result. The decree of the court below is affirmed. ISAAC BROWN, APPELLANT, v. JOSEPH P. SHANNON et al. Where a bill is filed to enforce the specific execution of a contract in relation to the use of a patent right, this court has no appellate jurisdiction, unless the matter in controversy exceeds two thousand dollars. The jurisdiction, where the bill is founded upon a contract, differs materially from the jurisdiction on a bill to prevent the infringement of the monopoly of the patentee, or of those claiming under him by legal assignments, and to protect them in their rights to the exclusive use. The penalty of the bond taken, when an injn amount or value in dispute. is awarded, is no evidence of the THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. It was argued by Mr. Schley for the appellant, and submitted on a printed argument by Mr. Latrobe and Mr. Gwinn for the defendants. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland. The bill was filed by Joseph P. Shannon & Company, Gelston & Matthews, Lapouraille & Maughlin, and Griffiss & Cate, who composed four different partnership firms in the city of Baltimore, separately engaged in the business of planing, who all joined in the bill of complaint against Brown, the appellant, praying that he might be enjoined from the use of certain planing machines, mentioned in the bill, in the city of Baltimore. Upon the hearing, a perpetual injunction was granted accordingly, and from that decree this appeal was taken. From the manner in which the bill is framed, there is some 20h 55 L-ed 826 16wa345 125 52 127 378 881 749 140 355 Brown v. Shannon et al. difficulty in determining whether the complainants are seeking the aid of this court to prohibit the infringement of a patent right assigned to them, or to enforce the specific execution of two contracts with the appellant, exhibited with the bill; for the right claimed under the patent, and the right claimed under the contracts, are so mingled together in the statements and allegations of the complainants as to leave some doubt upon that point. And the first question, therefore, for this court to determine, is, upon which of these two grounds does the bill seek for relief? The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in the one case is materially different from its jurisdiction in the other; and, while this court can exercise no appellate power in a case arising under contracts like those exhibited, unless the amount or value of the matter in contro versy exceeds two thousand dollars, it may yet lawfully exercise its appellate jurisdiction when a far less amount is in dispute, if the party is proceeding either at law or in equity for the infringement of a patent right to which he claims to be entitled. Upon looking, however, carefully into the bill, we think it must be regarded and treated as a proceeding to enforce the specific execution of the contracts referred to, and not as one to protect the complainants in the exclusive enjoyment of a patent right. It states that three of the partnership firms named as complainants-that is to say, Joseph P. Shannon & Company, Gelston & Matthews, and Lapouraille & Maughlin-were, by regular assignments, entitled to the exclusive use of Woodworth's planing machine in the State of Maryland, east of the Blue Ridge. That the appellant had used these machines in the city of Baltimore, without any right derived from the patentee, and that, in consequence of this infringement of their rights, various suits and controversies had taken place between them and Brown, who claimed the right to use the machines in question, as the assignee of a patent of Emmons. The bill then proceeds to state that, in order to put an end to these controversies and suits, these appellees, and the appellant, entered into the contract of the 19th of January, 1853, which is exhibited with the bill. By this contract, the portion of the appellees of which we are now speaking, and the appellant, agreed that each of the said three partnership firms and the appellant should have the right to use the Woodworth patent at one establishment, anywhere within the territorial limits above mentioned, not exceeding five machines at such establishment; and that each of the said parties should also have the right to use Emmons's patent. |