Duties on Imported Merchandise and Tonnage. court, and afterwards, by the final sentence of | transferred by parol, while at sea, to an Amerithe court, the goods are ordered to be restored can citizen, and resold to her original owners, to the neutral owner, the duties on the goods on her return into port, before her entry, does must be paid. United States v. The Brig Con- not, by that operation, lose her privileges as an cord, 9 Cranch, 387; 3 Cond. Rep. 438. American bottom, or become subject to foreign duties. United States v. Willing et al., 4 Cranch, 48; 2 Cond. Rep. 20. 19. Under the prize act of June 26, 1812, and the act of 2d August, 1813, allowing a deduction of thirty-three and a third per cent. on all goods captured from the enemy, and made good prize of war, &c., and brought into the United States; goods brought in for adjudication are not included, sold by order of court, and ultimately restored to a neutral claimant as his property; but such goods are chargeable with the same rate of duties as goods imported in foreign bottoms. The Nereid; Pinto, Claimant, 1 Wheat. 171; 3 Cond. Rep. 528. 20. By the conquest and military occupation of a portion of the territory of the United States by a public enemy, that portion is to be deemed a foreign country, so far as respects our revenue laws. United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246; 4 Cond. Rep. 444. 21. Goods imported into it are not imported into the United States; and are subject to such duties, only, as the conqueror may impose. Ibid. 22. The subsequent evacuation of the conquered territory by the enemy, and resumption of authority by the United States, cannot change the character of past transactions. The jus postliminii does not apply to the case; and goods previously imported do not become liable to pay duties to the United States, by the resumption of their sovereignty over the conquered territory. Ibid. 23. The term "tea" is used in the duty acts, as known in a commercial sense; and the "bohea tea" of commerce is not usually a sample substance, but is made up in China, of various kinds of the lowest price black teas. Two Hundred Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 430; 5 Cond. Rep. 643. 24. By the duty acts, it is liable to the same specific duty, without regard to the quality or price. Ibid. 25. The twenty-ninth section of the collection act of 1799, ch. 128, does not extend to the case of a vessel arriving from a foreign port, and passing through the conterminous waters of a river, which forms the boundary between the United States and the territory of a foreign state; for the purpose of proceeding to such territory. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362; 5 Cond. Rep. 612. 26. The third section of the act of congress of the 9th of January, 1808, which prohibited | the transshipment of goods from one vessel to another, did not include the case of a vessel lading in port by means of river craft, &c. The Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. The United States, 7 Cranch, 52; 2 Cond. Rep. 411. 27. The second section of the act of congress of the 25th of April, 1808, did not require a permit to lade any vessel, nor authorize the forfeiture and condemnation of the vessel or cargo, for lading without the inspection of a revenue officer; the only penalty for such lading being the denial of a clearance. Ibid. 28. An American registered vessel, in part 29. An appraisement regularly made under the act of April 18th, 1818, ch. 361, for the purpose of ascertaining the value of goods subject to an ad valorem duty, is conclusive as to the value in which the duty is to be estimated; and no evidence is admissible to prove that the actual cost or value is different. Tappan et al. v. The United States, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 393. 30. That act is strictly constitutional. But it has not changed the basis of the valuation, on which duties are ordinarily to be estimated. Ibid. 31. The right to duties accrues by the impor tation with an intent to unlade; and immediately upon the importation, the duties become a personal charge and debt on the importer. United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 482. 32. By the revenue act of 20th April, 1818, ch. 74, sect. 4, in calculating duties on ad valorem goods, the actual cost is to be taken, including all charges except commissions, outside packages, and insurance. United States v. May, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 98. 33. If the importer actually pays commissions, the charge is excepted. Ibid. 34. Nor is it any objection that an agent of the importer makes him debtor for the goods in the invoice, as bought of the agent; if in fact he has acted only as agent for the importer in the purchase. Ibid. 35. Where, by mistake, fraud, or accident, the tonnage and light duties payable by law, are not paid by the owner of a vessel, an action of debt lies against him to recover them. But not against a mere consignee of the vessel, for he has no interest or special property in the vessel. United States v. Hathway, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 324. 36. Neither by the British treaty, of 3d July, 1815, nor by any act of congress, nor by the president's proclamation of the 24th August, 1822, are British ships, coming from British colonies, entitled to enter American ports, on payment of the same tonnage and light duties as American vessels, but they are to pay the full duties on foreign vessels. The treaty of 1815, applies only to vessels coming from European ports. Ibid. 37. Hats made of palmetto leaf, are not hats made of straw, chip, or grass, within the act of 22d of May, 1824, ch. 136; and therefore pay only a duty of fifteen per cent. ad valorem. United States v. Goodwin, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 128. 38. A vessel engaged in the coasting trade, and having goods on board, which have not paid duties, is not within the purview of the fiftieth section of the revenue law of 1799, ch. 128, as to landing foreign goods without a permit. Jackson in Error v. The United States, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 186. Duties on Imported Merchandise and Tonnage. that day were liable to pay the duties; although they had actually arrived before within the jurisdictional limits of the United States. Arnold v. United States, 9 Cranch, 104; 3 Cond. Rep. 296. 39. The second proviso of the sixty-second | 47. The act of 1812, ch. 112, laying double section of the collection act of 1799, ch. 128, duties, took effect on that day; and all vessels makes the consignee of goods liable, as owner, arriving at their port of entry and discharge on for the duties thereon; but it does not prevent the consignee from passing, by sale or otherwise, a good title to the same goods, subject only to the payment of the duties thereon. If the consignee owes other bonds for duties, which are due and unpaid, he is entitled to no credit for duties at the custom-house: but the goods them selves may pass by sale, and are liable only for the duties payable thereon, and not for other duties due and unpaid. Howland v. Harris, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 497. 40. Where goods are imported in a ship, after such sale, and before they are unladen, an inspector is put on board. His custody thereof, to secure the lien of the United States for duties, is not a divestment of the title and possession of the vendee as against a wrongdoer. Ibid. 41. The act of congress, passed the 24th of July, 1813, which imposed "a duty on all sugar refined within the United States," after the 1st day of January, 1814, did not subject to duty, sugar refined before that day, and put into moulds. United States v. Penington, Peters' C. C. R. 113. 42. The cargo of an American vessel ich arrived in Philadelphia, on the 16th June, 1812, from British possessions in India, where the owner of a cargo had been obliged to give a bond to land the cargo in the United States, is not liable to double duties under the act of congress of July 1, 1812. Perot et al. v. The United States, Peters' C. C. R. 256. 43. R. D. imported a quantity of merchandise in his own vessel, consigned to E. D., who received the goods, and gave bonds for the duties to the United States, with the plaintiffs as his sureties. The invoice and bill of lading showed the goods to be the property of R. D., but the bond was executed by E. D., without calling himself the agent of R. D. Held, that the sureties of E. D. are not entitled to recover the amount of the bonds paid by them from R. D., under the provisions of the act of congress, giving a preference to sureties who pay bonds for duties. Childs v. Shoemaker, Assignee, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 494. 44. The law of the United States clearly marks the distinction between owner, importer, con. signee or agent; and the entry is to express the character in which it is made, at the time the duties are secured. If, as agent, this must be so stated in the bond. Ibid. 45. The fiftieth section of the collection act of 1799, ch. 128, applies to all cases of unlading goods without a permit in any port or place within any collection district; whether originally intended for the port of discharge or not. The Industry, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 114. 46. A vessel is forfeited, by the unlading without a permit, of goods exceeding four hundred dollars in value, which were not brought in such vessel from a foreign port, but transshipped into her on the homeward voyage. The Harmony, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 123. 48. Duties accrue upon the arrival in a port with intent to unlade the cargo there; and not upon the entry of the goods at the custom-house. The importation is complete, on such arrival. United States v. Lindsey, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 365. 49. Under the tariff act of 22d May, 1824, ch. 136, bombazines, being goods of which wool is a component material, are liable to pay a duty of thirty per cent. United States v. Clark, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 30. 50. By the act of congress of 1799, ch. 128, consignees are authorized to enter goods and give bonds for the duties. In such case the United States have no remedy over against the owner of the goods, for whom the consignee acts as agent or trustee, if the duties are not paid. Knox v. Devens, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 380. 51. The revenue or tariff act of 1816, lays a duty on "loaf sugar" of twelve cents per pound. Held, that the words "loaf sugar" must be considered according to trade and commerce, and buying and selling; and if upon this evidence it meant sugar in loaves, then crushed loaf sugar, was not loaf sugar within the act. United States v. Breed, 1 Sumner's C. C. R. 159. 52. Revenue and duty acts are not, in the sense of the law, penal acts, and are not therefore to be construed strictly; nor are they, on the other hand, acts in favour of private rights and liberty and therefore to be construed with extraordinary liberality. They are to be construed according to the true import and meaning of their terms; and when the legislative intention is ascertained, that, and that only, is to be our guide in interpreting them. We are not to strain them to reach cases not within their terms, even if we might conjecture that public policy might have reached those cases; nor, on the other hand, are we to restrain their terms, so as to exclude cases clearly within them, simply because public policy might dictate such an exclusion. İbid. 160. 53. When a foreign name is well known here, and no different appellation exists in domestic use, it is to be presumed that, in commercial law, the legislature used the word in the foreign sense. Ibid. 163. 54. A mere change in the form of an article will not authorize a party to evade the duty law; but this is a principle that requires quali fication and examination. The question would be one of intent and fact. Ibid. 55. To constitute an evasion of a revenue law, which shall be deemed in point of law a fraudu lent evasion, it is not sufficient that a party introduces an article perfectly lawful, which defeats the policy contemplated by the act, or which supersedes or diminishes the use of the article taxed by the act. There must be, sub Duties on Imported Merchandise and Tonnage. stantially, the introduction of the very thing taxed, under a false denomination or cover, with an intent to evade or defeat the act. Ibid. 166. 56. Where whales are caught, and oil is manufactured by the crew of an American vessel, the oil is not the product of "foreign fishing," within the purview of the revenue laws of the United States, though it has since been owned and brought into port by persons in foreign service. United States v. Burdett, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 336. 57. Appurtenances, or equipments of a ship, as a chain cable, or other articles purchased bona fide for the use of the ship, are not "goods, wares, and merchandise," within the meaning of the revenue act of 1799, ch. 128, sec. 50, which require a permit before they are landed. United States v. A Chain Cable, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 362. 58. The act of congress considers a consignee, for all the purposes of law, an owner, and unless he states himself not to be so, he is the principal in the bond; and it is only in favour of his sureties, and upon him and his effects, that the law gives the preference. Childs v. Shoemaker, Assignee, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 497. 59. The bond in this case was properly given by the consignee of the goods, and therefore there was no mistake; it is not to be rectified at law; and in equity, the plaintiff would be told that equality is equity, and that a court of equity will not rectify a mistake, in order to violate one of its favourite maxims. Ibid. 60. Where goods, subject to ad valorem duty, are purchased in a foreign place, and exported to the United States, a true valuation in the invoice is the actual cost at which they were purchased. United States v. Twelve Casks, Gilpin's D. C. R. 510. 61. Where goods, subject to ad valorem duty, are manufactured in a foreign country, and exported to the United States, a true valuation in the invoice, is the market price or value at the place of exportation. Ibid. 62. A false valuation in an invoice of goods subject to ad valorem duty, is a price charged in the invoice, less than the fair buying and selling prices, at the time and place where the invoice was made up. United States v. Fourteen Packages, Gilpin's D. C. R. 244. is not exclusively confined to the lien on the goods, and the security of the bond given for the duties. The duties due upon all goods imported constitute a personal debt due to the United States from the importer, independently of any lien on the goods, and of any bond given for the duties. The consignee of goods imported is, for this purpose, treated as the owner and importer. Meredith et al. v. The United States, 13 Peters, 486. 66. The right of the government to the duties accrues, in the fiscal sense of the term, when the goods have arrived at the port of entry. The debt for the duties is then due, although it may be payable afterwards, according to the regulations of acts of congress. Ibid. 67. The debt due to the United States for duties on imported merchandise, is not extinguished by the giving of bonds, with surety, for the same. The revenue collection act of 1799, ch. 128, requires that the collector should take bonds for the duties from all the persons who are the importers, whether they be partners or part owners. Ibid. 68. The government of the United States have a right to retain money in their hands belonging to a surety in a bond, given for duties which are unpaid, until a suit shall be terminated for the recovery of the amount of the duties on the goods due by the importers. The government is not obliged to appropriate the money of the surety to the satisfaction of the bond, but may hold it as a security until the suit is determined. Ibid. 69. By the act of congress of 1833, ch. 54, sec. 4, French silk gloves are free of duty upon importation. Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sumner's C. C. R. 384. 70. Laws imposing duties are not construed beyond the natural import of the language, and duties are never imposed upon the citizens upon doubtful interpretations. Ibid. 71. It has long been a settled rule of construction of revenue laws, imposing duties on articles of a specified denomination, to construe the article according to the designation of such article, as understood and known in commerce, and not in reference to the materials of which it may be made, or the use to which it might be applied. Nor ought such laws to be construed as embrac63. To make up a false invoice at the place ing all articles which might be subsequently of exportation, with intent to defraud the re-applied to the same use and purpose as the spevenue, is not an offence against the law, until followed up by an actual attempt to use it for the purpose of an entry. United States v. Twentyeight Packages, Gilpin's D. C. R. 320. 64. Stockings and half-stockings, made entirely of silk, imported from Liverpool, in October, 1838, were exempted from the payment of duty, by the act of congress passed March 2, 1833, entitled, "An act to modify the act of the 14th July, 1832, and all other acts imposing duties on imports." Hardy v. Hoyt, 13 Peters, 292. 65. The importers of goods, in virtue of the importation thereof, become personally indebted to the United States for the duties thereon; and the remedy of the United States for the duties cified article. Curtis v. Martin, 3 Howard, 109. 72. Gunny-bags, so called in commerce, afterwards used as cotton bagging, were not known or used as cotton bagging before the year 1832, when a duty was laid on cotton bagging, and were not subject to the duty on cotton bagging, imposed by that act. The duty on cotton bagging must be considered as imposed on those articles only, which were known and understood as such in commerce in 1832. Ibid. 73. When an importer of goods intends to contest the legality of duties on his goods, claimed to be imposed on them, a notice of such purpose need not be given in writing. Swartwout v. Gihon, 3 Howard, 110. 74. Under the provisions of the act of 1799, a Collection of Duties. seizure of goods, liable to seizure by that act, may be made by any officer of the customs of any district, although made within any other district. Taylor et al. v. The United States, 3 Howard, 205. 75. At the common law, any person may, at his peril, seize for a forfeiture to the government; and if the government adopts his seizure, and institutes proceedings to enforce the forfeiture, and the property is condemned, he is completely justified. Ibid. 76. It is not true that the mere liability to an action in the event of a suit, will constitute an absolute and universal objection to his competency. Officers of the customs, and the persons who made the seizure of goods proceeded against as forfeited under the revenue laws, are competent witnesses on the trial of informations against the goods. Ibid. by allowing a mere stranger to make the entry, or take the oath prescribed on the entry. Ibid. 304. 83. The United States having a lien on goods imported, for the payment of the duties accruing on them, and which have not been secured by bond; and being entitled to the custody of them, from the time of their arrival in port, until the duties are paid or secured, any attachment by a state officer, is an interference with such lien and right to custody, and, being repugnant to the laws of the United States, is void. Ibid. 305. 84. The acknowledgment by the custom-house storekeeper, that he holds goods upon which the duties have not been secured or paid, subject tc an attachment issued out of a state court, at a suit of a creditor of the importer, was a plain departure from his duty, and is not authorized 77. Revenue laws are not to be deemed penal by the law of the United States, and cannot be laws, in the sense in which that phrase is some-admitted to vary the rights of the parties. Ibid. times used. In one sense, every law imposing 85. There is no impossibility or impracticaa penalty or forfeiture may be deemed a penal bility in courts making such rules in relation to law; in another sense, such laws are often the filing of the pleadings, and the joining of deemed, and truly deserve to be called remedial issues, in actions for duties on merchandise, as laws, enacted for the prevention of fraud, for will enable the causes to be heard and tried the suppression of a public wrong, or to effect a upon the merits, and a verdict found at the republic good, and are not in the strict sense penal turn term of the court. Ex parte Davenport, 6 acts, although they may inflict a penalty for vio- Peters, 661. lating them. Revenue laws are to be considered in this light. Ibid. 78. The onus probandi of proving the legal importation of goods seized, after probable cause, in the opinion of the judge, was shown, is on the claimant of the goods. Ibid. 79. The sixty-eighth section of the act of 1799, was intended to reach cases where, by a false or fraudulent under-valuation, less than the amount of duties required by law has been paid, as well as to cases where no duties have been paid at all. Ibid. 80. See the cases of States, 4 Howard, 242. States, 3 Howard, 251. 4 Howard, 333. Clifton v. The United 2. Collection of Duties. 81. The United States have no general lien on merchandise, the property of the importer, for duties due by him upon other importations. The only effect of the first provision in the sixtysecond section of the act of 1799, ch. 128, is, that the delinquent debtor is denied at the custom-house any further credit for duties until his unsatisfied bonds are paid. He is compellable to pay the duties in cash; and upon such payment, he is entitled to the delivery of the goods imported. The manifest intention of the remaining clause in the section is, to compel the original consignee to enter the goods imported by him. Harris v. Dennie, 3 Peters, 302. 82. No person but the owner or original consignee, or in his absence or sickness, his agent or factor, is entitled to enter the goods at the custom-house, or give bond for the duties, or to pay the duties. Upon the entry, the original invoices are to be produced and sworn to; and the whole objects of the act would be defeated 86. Duties on imported goods do not accrue until the arrival of the vessel at the port of entry. United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch, 368; 2 Cond. Rep. 280. 87. A fraudulent transfer of goods, made to evade the law imposing a duty on merchandise imported, and which prohibits a person owing duties to the United States to make an entry of the other goods imported, will not operate to oblige the collector to accept the bond of the transferee on such goods. Olney v. Arnold, 3 Dall. 308; 1 Cond. Rep. 136. 88. The word insolvency, mentioned in the duty act of 1790, ch. 35, sec. 45, and repeated in the act of 1797, ch. 94, sec. 3, and 1799, ch. 128, sec. 65, means a legal insolvency; which, whenever it occurs, the right of preference arises to the United States, as well as in other specified cases, to which the acts of 1797 and 1799, have extended the acts of insolvency. Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396; 4 Cond. Rep. 183. 89. Where the res gestæ, in a revenue cause, are incapable of explanation, consistently with the innocence of the party, condemnation follows, although there be no positive testimony of the offence having been committed. Circumstances are sometimes more convincing than the most positive evidence. The Robert Edwards, 6 Wheat. 187; 5 Cond. Rep. 59. 90. Although a mere intention to evade the payment of duties be not, per se, a cause of forfeiture, yet, when a question arises, whether an act has been committed which draws after it that consequence, such intention will justify the court in not putting on the conduct of the party, in respect to the act in question, an interpretation as favourable as under other circumstances it would be disposed to do. Ibid. 91. In a libel or information, under the sixty. Collection of Duties. 99. The words "true value," in the eleventh section of the duty act of the 20th of April, 1818, ch. 361, mean the actual cost of the goods to the importer at the place from which they were imported, and not the current market value of the goods at such place. United States v. Tappan, 11 Wheat. 419; 6 Cond. Rep. 372. 100. If the collector, in fact, suspects that the goods are invoiced below the current market value thereof, at the place from which they were imported, but does not suspect that they were invoiced below the true and actual cost thereof to the importer, the collector has no right to direct an appraisement. Ibid. seventh section of the collection act of 1799, ch. | which they have a lien for duties, or to recover 128, against goods, on account of their differing damages for the illegal taking or detaining the in description from the contents of the entry, it same. Ibid. is not necessary that it should allege an intention to defraud the revenue. Two Hundred Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 430; 5 Cond. Rep. 643. 92. The term "concealed," as used in the sixty-eight section of the duty act of the 2d of March, 1799, ch. 128, applies only to articles intended to be secreted and withdrawn from public view, on account of the duties not having been paid, or secured to be paid, or from some other fraudulent motive. The forfeiture inflicted by that section, does not extend to a case where the duties not having been paid, or secured in any other manner than by giving the general bond, and storing the goods according to the sixty-second section of the act, the goods were fraudulently removed from the storehouse agreed upon by the collector and the importer, by some persons other than the claimants, who were bona fide purchasers of the goods, and without their knowledge and consent, to another port, where the goods were found stowed on board the vessel in which they were transported, in the usual manner of stowing such goods when shipped for transportation. United States v. Three Hundred and Fifty Chests of Tea, 12 Wheat. 486; 6 Cond. Rep. 593. 93. Under the sixty-second section of the act, in the case of teas, the duties "are secured to be paid," in the sense of the law, by the single bond of the importer, accompanied by a deposit of the teas imported, to be kept under the lock and key of the inspector, and subject to the control of the collector and naval officer, until the duties are actually paid, or otherwise secured; and no forfeiture is incurred, under the sixtyeighth section, by the removal and concealment of the goods on which the duties have been thus "secured to be paid." Ibid. 94. To authorize the seizure and bringing to adjudication of teas, under the forty-third section of the act, it is necessary, not only that the chests should be unaccompanied by the proper certificates, but also by the marks required to be placed upon them by the thirty-ninth section. Ibid. 95. The lien of the government for duties, attaches upon the articles from the moment of their importation, and is not discharged by the unauthorized and illegal removal of the goods from the custody of the custom-house officers. Ibid. 96. Query, Whether such lien can be enforced against a bona fide purchaser, without notice, | that the duties were not paid or secured? Ibid. 97. The lien for duties cannot, in any case, be enforced by a libel or information in the admiralty; the revenue jurisdiction of the district courts, proceeding in rem, only extending to cases of seizures for forfeitures under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States. Ibid. 98. But a suit at common law may be instituted in the district or circuit courts, in the name of the United States, founded upon their legal right to recover the possession of goods upon 50 * 101. But, whenever, in the opinion of the collector, there is just ground to suspect that the invoice does not truly state the actual cost of the goods, he may direct the appraisement, and is not bound to disclose the grounds upon which he forms that opinion, whether it is formed from his knowledge or information of the current market price of the goods, or other circumstances affording grounds to suspect the invoice to be fraudulent. Ibid. 102. The obligor, in a bond given for duties, pursuant to the collection act, has an election to perform either part of the alternative mentioned in the condition; and although the specific sum be less than the amount of duties, he is discharged upon payment of it. United States v. Thompson, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 388. 103. No duties are payable on goods imported into the United States, unless expressly provided for by statute. Liverpool Hero, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 184. 104. The act of 2d August, 1813, ch. 48, releasing one-third of the duties on goods captured by private armed vessels, did not apply to vessels brought in before the passing of the act, but not condemned until after it had passed. Prince v. The United States, 2 Gallis. C. Ĉ. R. 204. 105. Duties accrue as soon as the goods are voluntarily imported; and this extends as well to prize goods as any other, for the condemnation relates back to the time of importation. Ibid. 106. The receipt of a collector, acknowledging payment, is prima facie evidence, but not conclusive of the fact of payment. Ibid. 107. Debt lies in favour of the United States against the importer, for the duties due on goods imported. United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason, C. C. R. 482. 108. An executor, as such, has a right to enter goods belonging to his testator, at the customhouse, and, as executor, to give bonds for the duties. Such bonds bind the estate of the testator. If the executor becomes insolvent, the United States may, in equity, claim payment of the debt due for duties, from the sureties upon the probate bond of the executor, where the executor has wasted the assets, and are not obliged to resort for payment to the surety on the custom-house bond in the first instance. United States v. Aborn, 3 Mason, C. C. R. 126. 3 z |