Confining the Master of a Vessel.-Counterfeiting Coin.-Forgery.

3. It is necessary in the indictment to state | the restraint is but momentary, is a confinement that the intent was to prejudice the underwriters. prohibited by law; and such conduct is not exIbid. cused or justified by a previous battery on the 4. The prosecutor on an indictment for de-seamen, to enforce a command which the seastroying a vessel, must show that the insurance men ought to have performed. Ibid. is a valid insurance; and if made by an incorporated insurance company, the act of incorporation must be shown, and the contract of insurance must be shown to have been executed. Ibid.

5. The legal meaning of the term "destroy," by the act of congress, is to unfit the vessel for service, beyond the hope of ordinary means. This, as to the extent of the injury, is synonymous with "cast away." Both mean such an act as causes the vessel to perish and to be lost, or to be irrecoverable by ordinary means. Ibid.

2. Confining the Master of a Vessel.

6. To constitute the offence of confining the captain, the act of confining must be feloniously done. The United States v. Henry, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 428.

7. To take hold of the master, on the deck; and afterwards presenting a pistol at his breast in the cabin, and thereby preventing his going on deck, is a confinement of the master. The United States v. Stevens, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 548.

8. Any confinement of the master, whether by depriving him of the use of his limbs, or by shutting him in the cabin, or by intimidation preventing him from the free use of every part of the vessel, amounts to a confinement of the master within the twelfth section of the act of congress of April 2, 1799, ch. 38. United States v. Sharp et al, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 118.

9. Such offence, if committed within the mouth of a foreign river, which is a mile and a half wide, is within the act of congress. United States v. Smith et al., 3 Wash. C. C. R. 78.

10. A confinement of the master, within the statute of 1790, ch. 9, sec. 12, is not limited merely to a seizure of the master, and preventing the moving of his body, or to locking him up in a particular place, as a cabin or state-room, but extends to all restraints of personal liberty in freely going about the ship, by present force, or threats of bodily injury. United States v. Hemmer, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 105.

11. A master of a vessel may so conduct himself as to justify the officers and crew in placing restraints upon him, to prevent his committing acts which might endanger the lives of all the persons on board; but an excuse of this kind must be listened to with great caution, and such measures should cease whenever the occasion for them ceases. Ibid.

12. If the master of a vessel is restrained from performing his duties by such mutinous conduct in his crew as would reasonably intimidate a firm man; this is a confinement within the meaning of the act of congress. United States v. Bladen, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 213.

15. To constitute a confinement of the master within the purview of the same act, it is sufficient that there is a personal seizure or restraint of the master, although it may be for the purpose of inflicting personal chastisement upon the master. United States v. Savage, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 464.

3. Counterfeiting Coin.

16. The head pistareen, is no part of the Spanish milled dollar. Such pistareen or piece of coin is not a silver coin of Spain, made current by law in the United States. United States v. Gardner, 10 Peters, 618.

4. Forgery.

17. Indictment in the circuit court of North Carolina for the forgery of, and an attempt to pass, &c., a certain paper writing in imitation of, and purporting to be a bill or note issued by the president, directors and company of the Bank of the United States, founded on the eighteenth section of the act of 1816, establishing the Bank of the United States. The note was signed with the name of John Huske, who had not been at any time president of the Bank of the United States, but who, at the time of the date of the counterfeit, was the president of the office of discount at Fayetteville; and was countersigned by the name of John W. Sandford, who at no time was cashier of the mother bank, but was at the said date cashier of the said office of discount and deposit. Held, that this was an offence within the provisions of the law. United States v. Turner, 7 Peters, 132.

18. The policy of the act extends to such a case. The object is to guard the public from false and counterfeit paper, purporting on its face to be issued by the bank. It could not be presumed that persons in general could be cognizant of the fact, who, at particular periods, were the president and cashier of the bank. They were officers liable to be removed at the pleasure of the directors, and the times of their appointment or removal, or even their names, could not ordinarily be within the knowledge of the body of the citizens. The public mischief would be equally great whether the names were those of the genuine officers, or of fictitious or unauthorized persons, and ordinary diligence would not protect them against imposition. Ibid.

19. Indictment on the eighteenth section of the act of congress, passed on the 15th day of April, 1816, entitled "an act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States." The indictment charged the defendant with uttering and forging "a counterfeit bill in imitation of a bill issued by the president," &c., of the bank. The forged paper was in these words and figures: "Cashier of the Bank of the United States, pay to C. W. Earnest, or order, five dollars. Office of discount and deposit in Pitts14. Seizing the person of the master, although | burgh, the 10th day of Dec., 1829. A. Bracken

13. The circumstance that the master went armed to every part of the ship, if it was necessary for his safety that he should protect himself, will not vary the case. Ibid.

Forgery. Larceny.

ridge, pres., J. Correy, cash." Indorsed, "pay | 31. The party accused of passing or uttering the bearer, C. W. Earnest." Held, that a counterfeit paper, must be present when the act genuine instrument of which the forged and is done, privy to it, or aiding, consenting, or procounterfeit instrument is an imitation, is not a curing it to be done. If done by consent, all are bill issued by order of the president, &c., of the equally guilty. Ibid. Bank of the United States, according to the true intent and meaning of the eighteenth section of the act incorporating the bank. United States v. Brewster, 7 Peters, 164.

20. Counterfeiting an indorsement of a post note of the Bank of the United States, is not an offence under the eighteenth section of the act incorporating the bank. United States v. Stewart, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 226.

21. In a prosecution for forging the notes of the Bank of the United States, it is not necessary to prove that it was committed with intent to defraud some corporation or person, and that the notes stated in the indictment and given in evidence as forged, and those alleged to be forged, are the same. United States v. Reuben Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 126.

22. Proof of passing or attempting to pass counterfeit money, by an agent employed by the defendant for that purpose, is the same as proving the acts to have been done by himself. United States v. Morrow, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 733.

32. Passing a counterfeit note in the name of a fictitious person, an assumed name, or on a bank which never existed, is within the law. It is not necessary that the note, if genuine, would be valid, if on its face it purports to be good; the want of validity must appear on its face. | Ibid. 33. The possession of other counterfeit paper by the defendant or a confederate, at the time of passing counterfeit notes, is evidence of the scienter. The United States v. Harman, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 294.

34. An order or check drawn by the president of a branch bank of the Bank of the United States, on the cashier of the bank at Philadel phia, for the payment of money, is an order or check within the eighteenth section of the act chartering the bank. United States v. Shelmire, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 371.

35. The bank is bound to pay such orders or checks; and the indictment may charge the passing such counterfeit order to be with the intent to defraud the bank, or the person to

23. In a prosecution for passing counterfeit money, the jury should be satisfied that the re-whom it is passed. Ibid. semblance of the forged to the genuine piece is such as might deceive a person using ordinary caution. Ibid.

24. Forgeries under the laws of the United States must be tried in the district where the crime is committed. United States v. Britton, 2 Mason's Rep. 462.

25. In an indictment for forgery, it is in general necessary to set forth the tenor of the instrument, and it must be proved as it is set forth. Ibid.

26. In an indictment for forgery, if there is a variance of a letter in any word between the paper alleged to be forged and the indictment, the paper will be received in evidence, if the variance does not make another word, or one differing in sense and grammar. If it is doubtful, the meaning will be left to the jury. United States v. Harman, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 292.

36. The law presumes the intention of passing counterfeit paper to be to defraud any person who may suffer a loss by receiving it as genuine. Ibid. 374.

37. Intoxication is no defence on a charge for passing counterfeit bank notes, if the defendant was possessed of his reason, and was capable of knowing whether the note he passed was good or bad. Ibid. 517.

5. Larceny.

38. The offence of larceny is not punishable under the act of 1790, ch. 9, 36, unless committed in a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States; and to bring the case within the statute, there must be an averment of such sole and exclusive jurisdiction in the indictment. "Personal goods," in that statute, do not include choses in action; the latter 27. An order on the cashier of the Bank of the not being the subject of larceny at the common United States, is evidence in support of an indict-law. United States v. Davis, 5 Mason's C. C. R. ment for forging an order on the cashier of the 356. corporation of the Bank of the United States. Ibid.

28. The scienter may be proved by the fact of similar forged orders found in the possession of the defendant, or of an accomplice, in passing | them. Ibid.

29. If there is a concert between two or more to pass counterfeit notes on any joint or concurrent action in passing them, the act of one is evidence against the other; and the possession of counterfeit notes by one, is the possession of the other. Ibid.

30. Passing a paper is putting it off in payment or exchange. Uttering it is a declaration that it is good, with an intention to pass, or an offer to pass it. United States v. Mitchell, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 367

VOL. I.-43

39. Where a larceny is committed in a place not under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, it may yet be punishable under the third section of the act of 1825, ch. 276. Ibid.

40. Offences are punishable under that section according to the laws of the state where they were committed, under circumstances or in places in which, before that act, no court of the United States had authority to punish them. Ibid.

41. The taking by the defendant of an article delivered to him as a servant, to remove from one room to another, and converting the same to his own use, is larceny, and not embezzlement. The United States v. Clew, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 700.

42. Larceny committed on board an American

30

Murder.

ship in an enclosed dock, in a foreign port, is not | ted States. United States v. Magill, 1 Wash. C. punishable under the statute of the 30th of April, C. R. 463. 1790, ch. 9, sec. 16. United States v. Hamilton, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 152.

43. The feloniously stealing goods which had been cast away from a vessel wrecked at Rockaway Beach, the goods, when so taken, having been above high water mark, in the county of Queens, in the state of New York, was an offence under the ninth section of the act entitled an "act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," passed 3d March, 1825. The United States v. Lawrence Coombs, 12 Peters.

6. Murder.

44. The third article of the constitution of the United States, which declares that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," vests in the United States. exclusive jurisdiction of all such cases: and a murder committed in the waters of a state where the tide ebbs and flows, is a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; 4 Cond. Rep. 275.

45. Congress have not, in the eighth section of the act of April 30th, 1790, ch. 36, for the punishment of certain offences against the United States, exercised the power, if any such is given by the constitution of the United States, of conferring jurisdiction on the courts of the United States, of a murder committed in the waters of a state where the tide ebbs and flows. Ibid.

46. Congress having provided, in the eighth section of the act of April 30th, 1790, for the punishment of murder, &c., committed "upon he high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or ay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," it is not the offence committed, but the bay, &c., in which it is committed, that must be out of the jurisdiction of the state. Ibid.

51. The legislature making use of a technical law term, its meaning must be ascertained by the common law; and therefore the definition of murder must be taken from that code. Ibid.

52. To constitute the offence of murder under

the law of the United States, cognizable in the
circuit court of the United States, not only the
❘ stroke, but the death, must happen on the high
seas.
Ibid.

53. Where a person is insane at the time he commits a murder, he is not punishable as a murderer, although such insanity be remotely occasioned by undue indulgence in spirituous liquors. But it is otherwise if he be at the time intoxicated, and his insanity be directly caused by the immediate influence of such liquors. United States v. Drew, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 328.

54. If a seaman is in a state of great debility and exhaustion, so that he cannot go aloft without danger of death or enormous bodily injury, and the facts are known to the master, who, notwithstanding, compels the seaman, by moral or physical force, to go aloft, persisting with brutal malignity in such course, and the seaman falls from the mast, and is drowned thereby, and his death was occasioned by such miscon duct in the master; under such circumstances, it is murder in the master. If there be no malice in the master, the crime is reduced to manslaughter. United States v. Freeman, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 505.

55. Convictions for murder may take place where, the murdered body is not found. United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 19.

56. To make a man a principal in a murder, it is not necessary that he should inflict the mor tal wound. It is sufficient if he be present, aiding and abetting the act. Nor is it necessary that there should be a particular malice against the deceased. It is sufficient if there be delibe rate malignity and depravity in the conduct of the party. United States v. Ross, 1 Gallis. C. C.

47. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a murder committed on the high seas, from a vessel belonging to the United States, by a foreigner, being on board of such | R. 524. vessel, upon another foreigner, being on board of a foreign vessel. United States v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 184; 4 Cond. Rep. 623.

57. If a number of persons conspire together to do an unlawful act, and death happen in the prosecution of the design, it is murder in all. 48. The courts of the United States have not If the unlawful act was a trespass, the murder, jurisdiction of a murder committed by one fo- to affect all, must be done in the prosecution of reigner on another foreigner, on board a foreign the design. If the unlawful act be a felony, it vessel on the high seas. But they have jurisdic-will be murder in all, although the death happen tion of a piracy thus committed. Ibid.

collaterally, or beside the principal design. Ibid. 58. If several persons conspire to seize, rith force and violence, a vessel, and run away with her, and, if necessary, to kill any person who shall oppose them in the execution of the design, and death ensue in the prosecution of the design; it is murder in all who are present, aiding and abetting in executing the design. Ibid.

49. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under the act of April 30th, 1790, ch. 37, of murder or robbery committed on the high seas; although not committed on board a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, as if she had no national character, but was held by pirates or persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign nation. United States v. Holmes et al., 5 Wheat. 412; 4 Cond. Rep. 708. 50. The law of the United States declares that murder committed on the high seas shall be tried in the district where the offender is ap-clares that congress shall have power to exercise prehended, or into which he is first brought; and therefore the circuit court has jurisdiction in a case arising under the authority of the Uni

59. Malice, in the sense of the law, means wilfulness. Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 115.

60. The constitution of the United States de

exclusive legislation in all cases whatever, over places purchased by the consent of the legisla tures of the states in which the same shall be,

Obstruction of Process.-Perjury.

for the erection of forts, &c. The right of exclusive legislation carries with it the right of exclusive jurisdiction; and when a murder is committed in a fort so purchased with such consent, the circuit court of the United States has juris-vide for liquidating and paying certain claims of diction over the offence, under the act of 1790; although, in the cession, the state reserved a right to execute civil and criminal process issuing under state authority in such places. The United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason's Č. C. R. 91. 61. The legal meaning of "malice aforethought," in cases of homicide, is not confined to homicide committed in cold blood, with settled design and premeditation, but extends to all 67. The secretary of the treasury, in order to cases of homicide, however sudden the occa- carry into effect the anthority given to him to sion, where the act is done with such cruel cir-liquidate and pay the claims referred to in the cumstances as are the ordinary indications of a wicked, depraved and malignant spirit; as where the punishment inflicted by a party, even upon provocation, is outrageous in its nature and continuance, and beyond all proportion to the offence; so that it is rather to be attributed to diabolical malignity and brutality than to human infirmity. And much, in these cases, depends on the instrument employed, whether dangerous to life or not. Ibid.

charged the false swearing to be an affidavit made before a justice of the peace of Kentucky, in support of a claim against the United States, under the act of congress of July 1832, to pro

the state of Virginia. By the supreme court:~ There is no statute of the United States which expressly authorizes any justice of the peace of a state, or any officer of the national govern ment, judicial or otherwise, to administer an oath in support of any claim against the United States, under the act of 1823. The United States v. Bailey, 9 Peters, 238.

7. Obstruction of Process.

62. The offence of obstructing process consists in refusing to give up possession, or in opposing or obstructing the execution of the writ, by threats of violence, which it is in the power of the person to enforce; and thus preventing the officer from executing his writ. The United States v. Lowry, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 169.

63. A mere threat of resistance to the writ, is not an offence under the act of congress; but if, where the officer proceeds with the writ to the land, and is about to execute his process, a threat is used, by a person forcibly retaining the possession, accompanied by the exercise of force, or having the capacity to employ it, and the officer does not execute his writ; the offence is complete. Ibid.

64. The officer is not obliged to expose his person, or to proceed to a personal conflict with the offender. lbid.

act of 1832, had established a regulation author izing affidavits made before any justice of the peace of a state to be received and considered in proof of claims under the act. By implication he possessed the power to make such a regulation, and to allow such affidavits in proof of claims under the act of 1832. It was incident to his duty and authority in settling claims under the act. When the oath is taken before a state or national magistrate, authorized to administer oaths, in pursuance of any regulations prescribed by the treasury department, or in conformity with the practice and usage of the treasury department, so that the affidavit would be admissible evidence at the department in support of any claim against the United States, and the party swears falsely, the case is within the provision of the act of 1823, ch. 165. Ibid.

68. If a state magistrate shall administer an oath, under an act of congress expressly giving him the power to do so, it would be a lawful oath, by one having authority; and as much so as if he had been specially appointed a commissioner under a law of the United States for that purpose: and such an oath, administered under such circumstances, would be within the purview of the act of 1823. Ibid.

69. The act of 1823 does not create or punish the crime of perjury, technically considered. But it creates a new and substantial offence of false swearing, and punishes it in the same manner as perjury. The oath, therefore, need not be administered in a judicial proceeding, or in a case of which the state magistrate under the state laws had jurisdiction, so as to make the false swearing perjury. It would be sufficient that it might be lawfully administered by the magistrate, and was not in violation of his official

65. The 22d section of the act of April 30th, 1790, ch. 36, prohibits the obstruction of process of every species, legal and judicial, whether issued by the court in session, or by a judge or magistrate acting in that capacity out of court, in execution of the laws of the United States. On an indictment under this section for resisting duty. Ibid. an officer, it is not necessary it should appear 70. The language of the act of 1823 should that the accused used, or even threatened vio-be construed with reference to the usages of the lence. United States v. Lukens, 3 Wash. C. C. R.

335.

8. Perjury.

treasury department. The false swearing and false affirmation referred to in the act, ought to be construed to include all cases of swearing and affirmation required by the practice of the de66. Indictment for false swearing, under the partment, in regard to the expenditure of public third section of the act of congress of March 1, money, or in support of any claims against the 1822, which declares that "any person who shall United States. The language of the act is suffiswear or affirm falsely, touching the expenditure cienty broad to include all such cases; and there of public money, or in support of any claim is no reason for excepting them from the words, against the United States, shall suffer as for wil-as they are within the policy of the act, and the ful and corrupt perjury." The indictment mischief to be remedied. Ibid.

Piracy.

75. Perjury consists in swearing falsely and corruptly, contrary to the belief of the witness; not in swearing rashly or inconsiderately, accord-5, ing to his belief. Ibid. 378.