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Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.

v. Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch, 384; 2 Cond. | troversy exceeds one thousand dollars. Held, Rep. 150.

557. The circuit court of the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to issue a mandamus to the postmaster-general of the United States, commanding him to enter certain credits to the account of mail contractors, which had been found due to them by the solicitor of the treasury of the United States, acting under an act of congress specially authorizing him to investigate the claims of the mail contractors, under their contracts with the postmaster-general, the predecessor in office to the postmaster-general to whom the mandamus was directed by the circuit court. Kendall, Postmaster-General of the United States v. The United States, on the relation of Stockton and Stokes, 12 Peters.

that the court cannot judicially take notice, that by computation it may possibly be made out as a matter of inference from the plaintiff's declaration, that the claim may be less than one thousand dollars; much less can it take such notice in a case where the plaintiff might be allowed interest by a jury, so as to swell the claim beyond one thousand dollars. Scott v. Lunt's Adm'r, 6 Peters, 349.

563. It was held that a writ of error would lie under the act regulating the circuit court of the District of Columbia, which is similar in its provisions to the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, sect. 22, to reverse a judgment of the circuit court, awarding a peremptory mandamus to admit the defendants in error to the offices of directors of 558. The supreme court of the United States the Columbian Insurance Company; and the has jurisdiction of appeals from the orphans' court directed Mr. Jones to produce affidavits as court, through the circuit court for the county to the value of the matters in controversy. But of Washington, by virtue of the act of congress it not appearing that it amounted to one thouof February 13, 1801; and by the act of congress sand dollars, the sum required to give the su subsequently passed, the matter in dispute, ex-preme court appellate jurisdiction, the court clusive of costs, must exceed the value of one thousand dollars in order to entitle the party to an appeal. Nicholls et al. v. Hodges' Ex., 1 Peters, 562.

afterwards ordered the writ of error to be quashed. The court was of opinion that there was nothing in controversy but the value of the office, and that its value must be ascertained by its 559. It was assumed on the argument, by the salary. Although, therefore, a writ of error counsel on both sides, that the circuit court of might issue to a judgment awarding a perempthe county of Washington, in the District of tory mandamus to restore to office where the Columbia, is vested with the same power in re-matter in controversy was sufficient to give jurislation to intestate's estates in that county, that is possessed by a county court in Maryland, over lands lying within the county. Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Peters, 162.

560. A petition was presented by Tobias Watkins for a habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the legality of his confinement in the jail of the county of Washington, by virtue of a judgment of the circuit court of the United States of the District of Columbia, rendered in a criminal prosecution instituted against him in that court. The petitioner alleged that the indictments under which he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, charge no offence for which the prisoner was punishable in that court, or of which that court could take cognizance; and consequently, that the proceedings were coram non judice: Held, that the supreme court has no jurisdiction in criminal cases which could reverse or affirm a judgment rendered in the circuit court in such a case, where the record is brought up directly by writ of error. Ex parte Tobias Watkins, 7 Peters, 201.

561. The circuit court for the District of Columbia has authority to adjourn to a distant day; and the adjourned session is considered as the same term. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Withers, 6 Wheat. 106; 5 Cond. Rep. 21.

diction to the court, it could not regularly issue in this case. The Columbian Ins. Co. v. Wheelwright et al., 7 Wheat. 534; 5 Cond. Rep. 334.

564. The case of Wheelwright et al. v. The Columbian Ins. Co. (7 Wheat. 534; 5 Cond. Rep. 334) furnishes a very strong, if not conclusive inference, that the supreme court did not consider the circuit court of the District of Columbia as standing on the same footing with the circuit courts of the states; and impliedly admitting that it had the power to issue a mandamus to an officer of the government of the United States, commanding him to perform a ministerial act. The Postmaster-General v. Stockton and Stokes, 12 Peters.

565. Under the constitution of the United States and the cession made by the states of Virginia and Maryland, the exercise of exclusive legislation in all cases whatever in the District of Columbia, is given to congress; and it is a sound principle that in every well organized government the judicial power should be coextensive with the legislative; so far, at least, as private rights are to be enforced by judicial proceedings. There is in the District of Columbia no division of powers between the general and state governments. Congress has the entire control over the district for the purpose of go562. The plaintiff claimed in his declaration vernment; and it is reasonable to suppose, that the sum of one thousand two hundred and forty-in organizing a judicial department here, all one dollars, and laid his damages at one thou-judicial power necessary for the purposes of go sand dollars; a general verdict having been vernment, would be vested in the courts of jusgiven against him, the matter in dispute is the sum he claims, ad quod damnum. The act of congress authorizes an appeal or writ of error to the supreme court, from the circuit court of the District of Columbia, where the matter in con

tice. The circuit court in the District of Columbia is the highest court of original jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. Ibid.

566. There can be no doubt but that in the state of Maryland a writ of mandamus might be

Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.

572. The circuit court for the District of Columbia is a court of record, having general jurisdiction over criminal cases. An offence cognisable in any court is cognisable in that court. Ex parte Tobias Watkins, 7 Peters, 203.

issued to an executive officer, commanding him | power, in cases arising under the constitution to perform a ministerial act required of him by and laws. Ibid. law; and if it would lie in that state, there can be no good reason why it should not lie in the District of Columbia, in analogous cases. Ibid. 567. It is, in a special and modified manner, in which the writ of mandamus is to be used in the supreme court, and in the circuit courts of 573. If the offence be punishable by law, that the United States; and does not stand on the court is competent to inflict the punishment. same footing as in the District of Columbia, un- The judgment of such a tribunal has all the der the adoption of the laws of Maryland, which obligation which the judgment of any tribunal included the common law, as altered or modified can have. To determine whether the offence in the state on the 27th of February, 1801. Ibid. charged in the indictment be legally punishable 568. By the fifth section of the act of con- or not, is among the most unquestionable of its gress, of the 27th February, 1801, the circuit powers and duties. The decision of this quescourt of the District of Columbia, has cognizance tion is the exercise of its jurisdiction, whether of all actions or suits of a civil nature, at com- its judgment be for or against the prisoner. mon law or in equity, in which the United States The judgment is equally binding in one case shall be plaintiff or complainant; and also of all and in the other; and must remain in full force, cases in law and equity between parties, both or unless reversed regularly by a superior court either of which shall be resident or found within capable of reversing it. If this judgment is oblithe district. The latter limitation can only af-gatory, no court can ever look behind it. Ibid. fect the exercise of the jurisdiction, and cannot limit the subject matter thereof. No court can, in the ordinary administration of justice, in common law proceedings, exercise jurisdiction over a party, unless he shall voluntarily appear, or is found within the jurisdiction of the court so as to be served with process. Ibid.

569. By the act of congress of 27th February, 1801, there is a delegation to the circuit court of the District of Columbia, of the whole judicial power in the District of Columbia; and in the very language of the constitution, which declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under the laws of the United States; and supplies what was said by the supreme court to be wanting, in the cases of M'Intire v. Wood, and M'Cluny v. Silliman. Ibid.

570. The jurisdiction and authority of the circuit court of the District of Columbia is given by a reference to the act of the 13th February, 1801; and the repeal of this act, fifteen months afterwards, and after the court in this district had been organized, and had gone into operation under the act of the 27th February, 1801, could not in any manner affect that law any further than was provided by the repealing act. To what law was the circuit court of the District of Columbia to look for the powers vested in the circuit courts of the United States, by which the court was to be governed, during the time the act of the 13th February was in force? Certainly to none other than that act. And whether the time was shorter or longer before that law was repealed, could make no difference. Ibid. 571. The third section of the act of congress of the 27th February, 1801, is to be construed as if the eleventh section of the act of the 13th February, 1801, had been incorporated in it at full length. And by this section it is declared that the circuit courts shall have cognisance of all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority: which are the very words of the constitution. This delegates the whole judicial

574. Had any offence against the laws of the United States been in fact committed, the circuit court for the District of Columbia could take cognisance of it. The question, whether any offence was committed, or was not committed; that is, whether the indictment did or did not show that an offence had been committed, was a question which that court was competent to decide. If its judgment was erroneous, a point which the court does not determine, still it is a judgment; and until reversed, cannot be disregarded. Ibid.

575. With what propriety can the supreme court look into an indictment found in the circuit court, and which has passed into judgment before that court? It has no power to examine the proceedings on a writ of error; and it would be strange, if, under colour of a writ to liberate an individual from an unlawful imprisonment, the court could substantially reverse a judgment which the law has placed beyond its control. An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous. Ibid.

576. It is universally understood that the judgments of the courts of the United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown on the pleadings, are yet binding on all the world; and that this apparent want of jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ of error. The judgment of the circuit court in a criminal case is of itself evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support no inspection of the indictment on which it is founded. The law trusts that court with the whole subject, and has not confided to this court the power of revising its decisions. This court cannot usurp that power by the instru mentality of a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment informs us that the commitment is legal, and with that information it is our duty to be satisfied. Ibid.

577. The circuit court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to issue a mandamus to the postmaster-general of the United States,

Courts Martial.-Courts of the several States of the United States.

commanding him to credit the amount found men, or for the trial of privates not in actual ser. due to certain contractors for carrying the mail vice, under the laws of Virginia. Ibid. of the United States; the amount due to the 587. The sentence of a court-martial rendered contractors having been ascertained by the soli-against an individual, without notice, is void. citor of the treasury of the United States, acting | Ibid. under an act of congress referring the accounts to him. Kendall, Postmaster-General, v. The United States, 12 Peters, 524.

COURTS MARTIAL.

578. A militia-man who refused to obey the orders of the president of the United States, calling him into the public service, although not in the sense of the act of 1795, "employed in the service of the United States," so as to be liable to the rules and articles of war; was liable to be tried by a court-martial, called under the authority of the United States, for the offence, under the fifth section of the same act. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; 4 Cond. Rep. 589.

579. A court-martial has no jurisdiction over a person not liable to be enrolled in the militia; its sentence is not conclusive evidence in an action brought in another court; the members of the court-martial, and the officer who executes its sentence, are all trespassers. Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331; 1 Cond. Rep. 552.

COURTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED

STATES.

588. If the court of a state had jurisdiction of a matter, its decision would be conclusive; bnt the supreme court cannot yield assent to the proposition, that the jurisdiction of a state court cannot be questioned, where its proceedings were brought collaterally before the circuit court of the United States. Elliott et al. v. Piersol et al., 1 Peters, 340.

589. Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the cause; and, whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgments, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a re medy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute no justification, and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered in law as trespassers. Ibid.

580. Trespass lies against a collector of militia fines, who distrains for a fine imposed by a courtmartial, upon a person not liable to be enrolled 590. The jurisdiction of any court exercising in the militia; the court-martial having no juris-authority over a subject, may be inquired into diction of the case. Ibid. in every other court, when the proceedings of the former are relied on, and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. Ibid.

581. The number of officers who shall compose a court-martial for the trial of delinquent militia-men, is to be regulated according to the general usage of the military service, or what may not unfitly be called the customary military law. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; 6 Cond. Rep. 422.

582. Courts martial, when duly organized, are bound to execute their duties and regulate their modes of proceeding, in the absence of positive enactments, according to the customary military law. Upon any other principle, such courts would be left without any adequate means to exercise the authority confided to them; for there could scarcely be framed a positive code to provide for the infinite variety of incidents applicable to them. Ibid.

583. A court-martial regularly called under the act of 1795, does not expire with the termination of the war then existing; nor is its jurisdiction to try offences in any shape dependent upon the fact of war or peace. Ibid.

591. The jurisdiction and authority of the courts of Kentucky are derived wholly from the statute law of the state. Ibid. 341.

592. The clerk of Woodford county court has no authority to alter the record of the acknowledgment of a deed, at any time after the record is made. Ibid.

593. A decree of the supreme court of Ohio ordered that the patentee of a certain tract of land should within six months make a deed, &c., with covenants of warranty, conveying a portion of the land held under a patent to the complainants in that suit; and on the failure of A. to make the said deed, &c., "that then and in that case the complainant shall hold, possess and enjoy the said portion of land, in as full and ample a manner as if the same had been conveyed to him." The decree of the supreme court of Ohio, by which a conveyance of land is directed to be made, the decree being according to the laws of Ohio, vested in those to whom the deed was ordered to be made, such a legal title to the land to have been conveyed by the deed as would have been vested by a deed of equal date; and the registry act of Ohio applies as well to a title under such a decree, as it would do if the party held under a bona fide deed of the same date with the patent of the land; and the decree gives a legal title as ample as a deed. Steele's Lessec v. Spencer et al., 1 Peters, 558. 586. A court of inquiry is the proper tribunal 594. It has been the uniform course of the for assessing fines against delinquent militia- | supreme court, with respect to titles to real pro

584. The approval of the sentence of a courtmartial for the trial of delinquent militia-men, by the president of the United States, is sufficient. Ibid.

585. It seems that a court-martial, organized under the authority of a state, has no power to assess fines upon delinquent militia-men, for failing to obey a requisition to enter the service, emanating from the secretary of war. Meade v. Deputy Marshal of Virginia District, 1 Brockenb. C. C. R. 324.

Courts of the several States of the United States.

perty, to apply the same rule that is applied by the state tribunals in like cases. Waring v. Jackson et al., 1 Peters, 571.

595. Where, by the established practice of courts in particular states, the courts in actions of ejectment look beyond the grant, and examine the progressive stages of the title, from its incipient state until its consummation; such a practice will form the law of cases decided under the same in those states; and the supreme court of the United States regard those rules of decision in cases brought up from such states, provided that in so doing they do not suffer the provisions of any statute of the United States to be violated. Ross v. Barland et al., 1 Peters, 664.

596. Where the question upon the construction of the statute of a state relative to real property, has been settled by any judicial decision in the state where the land lies, the supreme court, upon the uniform principles adopted by it, would recognise that decision as a part of the local law. Gardner v. Collins, 2 Peters, 58.

laws of Maryland, has a general power to administer justice in all matters relative to the affairs of deceased persons, according to law. The commission to be allowed to an executor or administrator, is submitted to the discretion of the court, and is to be not under five per cent., nor exceeding ten per cent., on the amount of the inventory. Nicholls et al. v. Hodges' Ex., 1 Peters, 565.

604. This being a suit upon a local statute, giving a particular remedy in the nature of a foreign attachment against garnishees who possess goods, effects or credits of the principal debtor; the decisions which have been made on the construction of that statute by the state court of Massachusetts, are entitled to great respect, and ought, in conformity to the uniform practice of the supreme court, to govern its decisions. Beach v. Viles, 2 Peters, 678.

605. The questions which grow out of the language of the act of the legislature of North Carolina concerning the registration of deeds, passed in 1715, so far as they have been settled 597. The statute of limitations in Kentucky is by judicial decisions of the state, cannot be dissubstantially the same with the statute of 21 turbed by the supreme court. Whatever might James 2, ch. 16, with the exception that it sub- have been their opinion in this case, had it restitutes the term of five years instead of six. mained open for consideration, the peace of soThe English decisions have, therefore, been re-ciety and the security of titles require that the sorted to in this case, in the construction of the statute of Kentucky, and are entitled to great consideration. They cannot be considered as conclusive upon the construction of a statute passed by a state upon a like subject; for this belongs to the local state tribunals, whose rules of interpretation must be presumed to be founded upon a more just and accurate view of their own jurisprudence. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters,

359.

598. If the doctrines of the Kentucky courts, in the construction of a statute of that state, are irreconcilable with the English decisions upon a statute in similar terms; the supreme court, in conformity with its general practice, will follow the local law, and administer the same justice which the state court would administer between the same parties. Ibid. 360.

599. The decisions of the court of New York on the construction of its own statute of frauds, and the extent of the rules deduced from it, present to the supreme court a guide in its decisions upon the construction of their statute. D'Wolf v. Rabaud et al., 1 Peters, 501.

600. In an action of ejectment to recover land in Kentucky, the law of real estate in Kentucky is the law of the supreme court of the United States, in deciding the rights of the parties. Davis v. Mason, 1 Peters, 503.

601. Under the law of the state of Kentucky, and the decisions of their courts upon it, a will with two witnesses is sufficient to pass real estate; and the copy of such a will, duly proved and recorded in another state, is good evidence of the execution of the will. Ibid. 508.

602. It is a settled rule in Kentucky, that al- | though more than one witness is required to subscribe a will disposing of lands, the evidence of one may be sufficient to prove it. Ibid.

603. The orphans' court, by the testamentary

court should conform to the construction which has been made in the courts of the state, if it can discover what that construction is. Ross v. M'Lung, 6 Peters, 283.

606. The rule of law being once established by the highest tribunal of a state, courts which propose to administer the law as they find it, are ordinarily bound in limine to presume, that, whether it appears from the reports or not, all the reasons which might have been urged pro or con upon the point under consideration, had been examined and disposed of judicially. Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 7 Peters, 469.

607. There is no principle better established and more uniformly adhered to in the supreme court, than that the circuit courts, in deciding on titles to real property in the different states, are bound to decide precisely as the state courts ought to do. The rules of property and of evidence, whether derived from the laws or adjudications of the judicial tribunals of the state, furnish the guides and rules of decision in those of the Union, in all the cases to which they apply; where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States do not otherwise provide. Hinde et ux. v. Vattier, 5 Peters, 398.

608. The judgment of a state court, where jurisdiction was acquired, not by the common law, but by a statute of the state, which before the rendition of the judgment, had been virtually repealed by the adoption of a treaty, was held not voidable, but void. Denn, ex dem. of Fisher v. Harnden, Paine's C. C. R. 55.

609. The circuit courts of the United States are created by congress, not for the purpose of administering the local law of a single state alone, but to administer the laws of all the states in the Union, in cases to which they respectively apply. The judicial power conferred on the general government by the constitution, extends to

Courts of the several States of the United States.

many cases arising under the laws of the different states; and the supreme court is called upon, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, constantly to take notice of and administer the jurisprudence of all the states. That jurisprudence is then in no just sense a foreign jurisprudence to be proved in the courts of the United States, by the ordinary modes of proof by which the laws of a foreign country are to be established; but it is to be judicially taken notice of in the same manner as the laws of the United States are taken notice of in those courts. Owings v. Hull, 9 Peters, 607.

610. The supreme court of the United States adopts the decisions of the state courts, when applicable to titles to lands; but when such titles depend on compacts between the states of the Union, the rule of decision is not to be collected from the decisions of the courts of either state, but is one of an international character. Marlatt v. Silk, 11 Peters, 1.

611. In construing the statutes of a state, infinite mischief would ensue should the federal courts observe a different rule from that which has been long established in the state. M'Keen v. Delancy's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 22; 2 Cond. Rep.

*179.

612. In cases depending on the statute of a state, and more especially in those respecting titles to land, the federal courts adopt the construction of the state, where that construction is settled and can be ascertained. Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; 3 Cond. Rep. 286.

613. The power of the inferior court of a state to make an order at one term as of another, is of a character so peculiarly local, a proceeding so necessarily dependent on the judgment of the revising tribunal, that the judgment of the same is considered authority, and the supreme court is disposed to conform to it. The Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Heirs, 2 Peters, 522.

614. The supreme court uniformly acts under a desire to conform its decisions to those of the state courts on their local laws. Mutual Assurance Society v. Walls, 1 Wheat. 279; 3 Cond. Rep. 570. 615. The supreme court holds in the highest respect decisions of state courts upon local laws, forming rules of property. Shipp et al. v. Miller's Heirs, 2 Wheat. 316; 4 Cond. Rep. 132.

616. It is an acknowledged principle of law, that the title and disposition of real property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country where it is situated, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title to it can pass from one person to another. No title therefore to real estate will pass by law, unless the same is executed, proved and registered conformably to the law of the place where the property is situated. M'Cormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192; 6 Cond. Rep. 71.

617. In construing local statutes respecting real property, the courts of the Union are governed by the decisions of the state tribunals. Thatcher et al. v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; 5 Cond. Rep. 28.

618. Under the 34th section of the judiciary act of 1789, the acts of limitations of the several states, where no special provision has been made

by congress, form a rule of decision in the courts of the United States, and the same effect is given to them as is given in the state courts. M·Čluny v. Silliman, 3 Peters, 277.

619. The supreme court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases depending on the laws of a particular state, to adopt the construction which has been given by the courts of the state to those laws. This course is founded upon the principle supposed to be universally recog nised, that the judicial department of every government where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government. Elmendorf v. Taylor et al., 10 Wheat. 152; 6 Cond. Rep. 47.

620. On this principle, the construction given by the supreme court of the United States to the constitution and laws of the United States, will be received by the states as their true construction. Ibid.

621. The statute laws of the states must furnish the rule of decision to the federal courts, as far as they comport with the constitution of the United States, in all cases arising within the respective states; and a fixed and received construction of their respective statute laws, in their own courts, makes a part of such statute law. Shelby et al. v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; 6 Cond. Rep. 345.

622. The supreme court adopts the local law of real property as ascertained by the decisions of the state courts, whether these decisions are grounded on the construction of the statutes of the state, or form a part of the unwritten law of the state, which has become a fixed rule of property. Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153; 6 Cond. Rep. 489.

623. The true exposition of the thirty-fourth section of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, which provides that "the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, where they apply," is, that the rights of persons and rules of property, as settled in the states, shall be guides to the courts of the United States, in controversies depending before such courts. United States v. Wonson, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 5.

624. Soon after the decision of a case in the circuit court for the district of East Virginia, a case was decided in the court of appeals of the state, in which the question on the execution law of the state of Virginia was elaborately argued and deliberately decided. That decision was, that the right to take out an elegit is not suspended by suing out a writ of fieri facias, and consequently, that the lien of the judgment continues pending the proceedings on that writ. The supreme court, according to its uniform course, adopts the construction of the act, which is made by the highest court of the state. The United States v. Morrison, 4 Peters, 127.

625. The supreme court of the state of South Carolina having decided that the act of the legislature of that state of 1744, relative to the commencement, within two years, of actions of eject

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