General Principles. it would be worth while to proceed further in the cause. And the like expression in summing up any cause to the jury, must be understood by them merely as a strong exposition of the facts, not designed to overrule their verdict, but to assist them in forming it. And there is the less objection to this course in the English practice; because, if the summing up has had an undue influence, the mistake is put right by a new trial, upon an application to the discretion of the whole court. This is so familiarly known, that it needs only to be stated, to be at once admitted. Ibid. 190. 34. Courts of justice are not obliged to modify the propositions submitted by counsel in the course of a trial, so as to make them fit the cause. If they are not pertinent to the cause, that is enough for their rejection. Elliott et al. v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 338. 35. Courts which originate in the common law, possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by that law, until changed by some statute. But it is otherwise with courts established by written law; they cannot transcend the jurisdiction given by the law of their creation. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; 2 Cond. Rep. 33. 36. Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the cause; and, whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgments, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered in law as trespassers. Elliott v. Piersel, 1 Peters, 340. 37. The jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject, may be inquired into in every other court, when the proceedings of the former are relied on, and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. Ibid. 340. matters so peculiarly addressed to the sound discretion of the courts of original jurisdiction, as to be fit for their decision only, under their own rules and modes of practice. The supreme court has always declined interfering in such cases. Wright v. Hollingsworth's Lessee, 1 Peters, 165. 40. If either party considers any point presented by the evidence omitted in the charge of the court, it is competent for such party to require an opinion from the court upon that point. The court cannot be presumed to do more, in ordinary cases, than to express its opinion upon questions which the parties themselves have raised on the trial. Pennock et al. v. Dialogue, 2 Peters, 16. 41. A court cannot be required to give any instruction to the jury, as to the relation, right and credibility of the testimony, adduced by the parties in a cause. Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Peters, 149. 42. In a controversy between two nations concerning national boundary, it is scarcely possible that the courts of either should refuse to abide by the measures adopted by its own government. There being no common tribunal to decide between them, each determines for itself on its own rights; and if they cannot adjust their differences peaceably, the right remains with the strongest. The judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided; and its duty commonly is to decide upon individual rights, according to those principles which the. political departments of the nation have established. If the course of the nation has been a plain one, its courts would hesitate to pronounce it erroneous. Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 307. 43. The power of the inferior court of a state to make an order at one term as of another, is of a character so peculiarly local, a proceeding so necessarily dependent on the judgment of the revising tribunal, that the judgment of the same is considered authority, and the supreme court is disposed to conform to it. The Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Heirs, 2 Peters, 522. 38. The course of prudence and duty in judicial proceedings in the United States courts, 44. That a court of record, whose proceedings when cases of difficult distribution as to power are to be proved by the record alone, should, at and right present themselves, is to yield, rather a subsequent term, determine that an order was than encroach. The duty is reciprocal, and will made at a previous term, of which no trace could no doubt be met in the spirit of moderation and be found on its records, and that too, after the comity. In the conflicts of power and opinion, repeal of the law which gave authority to make inseparable from our very peculiar relations, such an order, is a proceeding of so much delicases may occur in which the maintenance of cacy and danger, which is liable to so much principles, and the administration of justice, ac-abuse, that some of the courts question the excording to its innate and inseparable attributes, istence of the power. Ibid. 522. may require a different course; and when such cases do occur, our courts must do their duty; but until then, it is administering justice in the spirit of the constitution, to conform as nearly as possible to the administration of justice in the courts of the several states. Fullerton et al. v. The Bank of the United States, 1 Peters, 614. 39. The allowance and refusal of amendments in the pleadings, the granting and refusing new trials, and most of the other incidental orders made in the progress of a cause, before trial, are 45. The judicial department of every government is the rightful expositor of its laws, and emphatically of its supreme law. If, in a case depending before any court, a legislative act shall conflict with the constitution, it is admitted that the court must exercise its judgment on both, and that the constitution must control the act. The court must determine whether a repugnancy does, or does not exist, and in making this determination must construe both instruments. That its construction of one is authority, General Principles. while its construction of the other is to be diere- | in law or equity, did not take away the jurisdic garded, is a proposition for which the supreme court can perceive no reason. Ibid. 524. 46. Admitting that the legislature of Ohio can give an occupant claimant a right to the value of his improvements, and authorize him to retain possession of the land he has improved until he shall have received that value; and assuming that they may annex conditions to the change of possession, which, so far as they are constitutional, must be respected in all courts; still, the legislature cannot change radically the mode of proceeding prescribed for the courts of the United States; or direct those courts in a trial at common law, to appoint commissioners for the decision of questions which a court of common law must submit to a jury. Ibid. 47. The courts of the United States have equity jurisdiction to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud, after one of the parties to it has been proceeded against on the law side of the court, and a judgment has been obtained against him for a part of the money stipulated to be paid by the contract. Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210. 48. It is not enough that there is a remedy at law it must be plain and adequate, or in other words, as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration, as the remedy in equity. Ibid. 215. 49. There is no principle better established and more uniformly adhered to in the supreme court, than that the circuit courts, in deciding on titles to real property in the different states, are bound to decide precisely as the state courts ought to do. The rules of property and of evidence, whether derived from the laws or adjudications of the judicial tribunals of the state, furnish the guides and rules of decision in those of the Union, in all cases to which they apply, where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States do not otherwise provide. Hinde et ux. v. Vattier, 5 Peters, 398. 50. No court is bound, at the mere instance of the party, to repeat over to the jury the same substantial proposition of law, in every variety of form, which the ingenuity of counsel may suggest. It is sufficient if it is once laid down in an intelligible and unexceptionable manner. Kelly v. Jackson et al., 6 Peters, 622. 51. Juan Madrazzo, a subject of the king of Spain, filed a libel praying admiralty process against the state of Georgia, alleging that the state was in possession of a certain sum of money, the proceeds of the sale of certain slaves, which had been seized as illegally brought into the state of Georgia, and which seizure had been subsequently, under admiralty proceedings, adjudged to have been illegal, and the right of Madrazzo to the slaves, and the money arising from the sale thereof, established by the decision of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Georgia. The counsellor for the petitioner claimed that the supreme court had jurisdiction of the case, alleging that the eleventh amendment of the constitution of the United States, which declares that the judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suits tion of the courts of the United States in suits in the admiralty against a state. Held, that is not a case where property is in custody of a court of admiralty, or brought within its jurisdiction, and in the possession of any private person. It is a mere personal suit against a state to recover proceeds in its possession, and such a suit cannot be commenced in the supreme court against a state. Ex parte Juan Madrazzo, 7 Peters, 627. 52. It is an admitted principle that a court of law has concurrent jurisdiction with a court of chancery in cases of fraud. But when matters alleged to be fraudulent are investigated in a court of law, it is the province of a jury to find the facts and determine their character. Gregg v. The Lessee of Sayre and Wife, 8 Peters, 244. 53. The courts of the United States will not sustain a suit to enforce an agreement entered into in fraud of the laws of the United States, although at the time it was made the parties to it were enemies of the United States, and its object being a stratagem of war. Hannay v. Eve, 3 Cranch, 242; 1 Cond. Rep. 512. 54. Where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide any question which occurs in the cause; and whether its decision be correct, or otherwise, its judgments, until reversed, are regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a remedy sought in opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered in law as trespassers. Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 340. 55. The jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in every other court, when the proceedings of the former are relied on, and brought before the lat ter, by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings. Ibid. 56. The laws of the several states, as to rights, furnish rules of decision for the courts of the United States, under certain qualifications; but as to remedies, they have no binding force in those courts. Campbell v. Claudius, 1 Peters, C. C. R. 484. 57. The courts of the United States having equity as well as legal jurisdiction, the practice of the courts of Pennsylvania, in which state there is no court of chancery, which permits a jury to find a conditional verdict, where the equity of the case may require, it does not apply. Conn et al. v. Penn, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 497. 58. The courts of the United States, and the justices thereof, are only authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in jail, under, or by colour of the laws of the United States; or committed by some court of the United States, or required to testify in a cause depending in a court of the United States. Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 232. 59. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is limited, and the inferior courts can ex General Principles. ercise it only in cases in which it is conferred | diction, operating directly on the thing itself, is by an act of congress. Ibid. 60. The court have a right to instruct the jury as to all questions of law, growing out of the facts of the cause. Ibid. 61. The construction of a bill of sale is a question of law. If the court, in their direction, should undertake to give a decided opinion as to the truth of an alleged fact, which is contested, it would be undoubtedly wrong, from its probable influence on a jury; though the right of the jury, notwithstanding this direction, would remain unimpaired. Nason v. The United States, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 53. conclusive between the parties upon the same matter coming in any manner before another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction; not only of the right which it establishes, but of the fact which it has decided. Armroyd et al. v. Williams et al., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 508. 70. The laws of the several states, constitutionally passed since 1789, are binding on the courts of the United States, held within the states which have passed the same. Aliter, as to rules of practice. Every court possesses the power of making its own rules of practice, unless forbidden by law; and the 17th section of the judiciary act, vests in the courts of the United States the power to establish rules of practice. Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 313. 71. The courts of common law have a concurrent jurisdiction, with those of the admiralty, over maritime contracts. De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 398. 62. The laws of the several states of the United States are to be regarded as rules of decision, in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases in which they apply; but they are not exclusive and peremptory injunctions. There must be some limitation to this provision of the judiciary act; and this limitation must arise whenever the subject of the 72. In cases of maritime torts, a court of adsuit is extra-territorial. In controversies be- miralty will sustain the jurisdiction, when either tween citizens of a state, as to rights derived the person or any of his property is within the under that state, and in controversies respecting territory. It may arrest the person or the proterritorial interests, in which, by the law of na-perty; or by a foreign attachment, the choses tions, the lex rei sitæ governs, there can be little in action of the offending party. The Invincible, doubt that the regulations of the statute must | 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 41. apply. But in controversies, affecting citizens of other states, and in no degree arising from local regulations, as for instance, foreign contracts of a commercial nature, it can hardly be maintained, that the laws of a state to which they have no reference, however narrow, injudicious, and inconvenient they may be, are to be the exclusive guides for judicial decision. Reimsdyke v. Kane et al., 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 371. 63. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction over all prizes made in ports, as well as on the high seas. The Grotius, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 503. 73. The trial of prizes, and of all incidents to the question of prize, and the awarding of damages for an illegal capture by a commissioned cruiser, belong exclusively to the courts of the capturing power. Ibid. 74. The tribunals of one sovereign cannot revise acts done under the authority of another. Ibid. 75. A court of common law cannot, even incidentally, decide a question of prize. Maissonnaire v. Keating, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 325. 76. A court is not bound to give an opinion upon a point of law which the evidence does not raise. Gardner v. Collins, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 398. 64. The court has jurisdiction in revenue cases, although the property seized may never have come into the possession of its officers. 77. The courts of the United States are bound The Bolina and Cargo, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 75. to take judicial cognizance of the laws of the 65. A deed, executed for the purpose of giv-different states. Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Sumner's ing jurisdiction to the federal court, will not be C. C. R. 404. countenanced, so as to sustain the jurisdiction. Hurst v. M'Neil, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 70. 66. Upon a special verdict, the court has only to decide the law upon the facts stated, where a difficulty is expressed by the jury on the facts. But if the jury express a doubt as to a particular point of law, the court can only decide the law on that point. Peterson v. The United States, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 36. 67. Where the jury assume the right to draw conclusions, which are exclusively the province of the court, they will be disregarded by the court. King v. The Delaware Ins. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 300. 68. It is a power which essentially belongs to every court to superintend the conduct of its officers, and to see by what authority they act; and that its process shall not be vexatiously employed. The King of Spain v. Oliver, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 429. 69. The sentence of a court of exclusive juris 78. The courts of the United States are not concluded in a matter of general equity jurisdiction, by a decision of the state court. Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 487. 79. The judgment of a state court, where jurisdiction was acquired, not by the common law, but by a statute of the state, which, before the rendition of the judgment, had been virtually repealed by the adoption of a treaty, was held not voidable, but void. Denn. Ex. dem. of Fisher v. Harnden, Paine's C. C. R. 55. 80. Where a matter is adjudicated by a court of peculiar and exclusive jurisdiction, the sentence is conclusive when the same matter comes incidentally before another court, as to the matter decided; not only between the same parties, but strangers: unless it can be impeached for fraud. Lessee of Rhoades v. Snyder & Selin et al., 4 Wash. C. C. R. 715. 81. Where the intention of the legislature, by the words of the statute, is improbable, the General Principles. court will give a construction to the law. The by proper authority. Snell et al. v. Fousatt, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 271. 88. In the United States, courts of admiralty and of chancery are courts of record. De Lovie v. Boit et al., 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 398, 459. 89. Parties entitled to sue in the courts of the United States, are, in general, entitled to pursue in such courts, all the remedies for the vindication of their rights, which the local laws of the state authorize to be pursued in its own courts. Ex parte Biddle, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 472. 90. The jurisdiction of the French courts, as to seizures, is not confined to seizures made within two leagues of the coast. Hudson et al. v. Guestier, 6 Cranch, 281; 2 Cond. Rep. 374. 91. The acts of a tribunal, not within its jurisdiction, are void. Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cranch, 84. The proviso in the act of congress of May 26, 1824, ch. 181, demonstrates that it was not the intention of congress to give an absolute and imperative force to the state modes of proceeding in civil causes in Louisiana, in the courts of the United States; for it authorizes the judge to modify them so as to adapt them to the organzation of his own courts; and it further demon-9; 3 Cond. Rep. 1. strates that no absolute repeal was intended of the antecedent modes of proceeding, authorized in the courts of the United States, under former acts of congress; for it leaves the judge at liberty to make rules, by which discrepancy between the state laws and the laws of the United States may be avoided. Parsons v. Bedford et al., 3 Peters, 444. 85. The constitution declares that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under it, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The constitution certainly contemplates these as three distinct classes of cases; and if they are distinct, the grant of jurisdiction over one of them, does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other two. The discrimination made between them is conclusive against their identity. The American Ins. Co. v. Three hundred and fifty-six Bales of Cotton, 1 Peters, 545. 86. It was necessarily left to the legislative power to organize the supreme court, to define its powers consistently with the constitution as to its original jurisdiction, and to distribute the residue of the judicial powers between the supreme court and the inferior courts, which it was bound to ordain and establish; defining their respective powers, whether original or appellate, by which and how it should be exercised. In obedience to the injunction of the constitution, congress exercised their power so far as they thought it necessary and proper, under the seventeenth clause of the eighth section, and first article, for carrying into execution the powers vested by the constitution in the judicial, as well as in all other departments and officers of the government of the United States. The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 12 Peters. 87. Where a condemnation is by a foreign court, it will be presumed to be a legal one, if the constitution of it be not known. But where this is known, it is proper for the court to examine into it; and if it has been constituted by a different authority from what is usual in civilized nations, it becomes him who would support its jurisdiction, to prove it was erected 92. If the point of jurisdiction be raised by the pleadings, the circuit court is competent to decide it; and, therefore, the cause cannot be removed with the supreme court, previously to the decision, as to the jurisdiction. To remove a cause from one court to another, in such a case, is a judicial proceeding. Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411; 1 Cond. Rep. 193. 93. It is a general rule that the trial of captures, made on the high seas, jure belli, by a duly commissioned vessel of war, whether from an enemy or neutral, belongs exclusively to the courts of the nation of the captors. To this rule there are exceptions, which are as firmly esta blished as the rule itself. If the capture be made within the territorial limits of a neutral country, into which the prize is brought, or by a privateer which had been illegally equipped in such neutral country, the prize courts of such neutral country, not only possess the power, but it is their duty to restore the property, so illegally captured, to the owner. The Alerta v. Blas Moran, Claimant, 9 Cranch, 359; 3 Cond. Rep. 425. 94. When a seizure is made for the violation of a municipal law, the mode of proceeding must be exclusively regulated by the sovereign power of the country, and no foreign power can ques tion the correctness of what is done, unless the court, passing the sentence, loses its jurisdiction by some circumstance which the law of nations can notice. Hudson et al. v. Guestier, 4 Cranch, 293; 2 Cond. Rep. 109. 95. A state court cannot issue a mandamus to an officer of the United States. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598; 5 Cond. Rep. 197. 96. The ground of the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal must appear on the face of the proceedings; and if it do not, they will be considered as coram non judice. Den ex dem. Walker v. Turner, 9 Wheat. 541; 5 Cond. Rep. 668. 97. In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject must decide it. Smith v. M'Iver, 9 Wheat. 532; 5 Cond. Rep. 662. 98. A question decided at law cannot be reviewed in a court of equity, without the suggestion of some equitable circumstance, of which the party could not avail himself at law. Ibid. 99. In cases of concurrent authority, where General Principles. the laws of the states and of the Union are in courts, because the subject-matter is not examidirect and manifest collision on the same sub-nable in them; but in the same court they are ject, those of the Union, being the supreme law of the land, are of paramount authority, and the state laws, so far, and so far only, as such incompatibility exists, must necessarily yield. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. no further conclusive than judgments and decrees of courts of common law and equity; they bind the subject-matter as between parties and privies. The Mary, Stafford, Master, 9 Cranch, 126; 3 Cond. Rep. 306. 100. The construction of written evidence is 109. The principle of retaliation upon the subexclusively for the court, and the court have ex-jects of a foreign state for its unjust proceedings clusively the power to decide whether a contract is usurious. Levy v. Gadsby, 3 Cranch, 180; 1 Cond. Rep. 486. 101. An act of congress may transfer a cause from one inferior court to another. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; 1 Cond. Rep. 316. 102. It is for the government of the United States to decide whether they will consider a colony, which has separated herself from the mother country, an independent nation. Until such decision shall be made, or the mother country shall relinquish her claim to the colony, courts of justice must consider the original state of things as remaining. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 291; 2 Cond. Rep. 98. 103. The court is bound to give an opinion to the jury on a question of law, upon request, if it be pertinent to the issue; but not so, if it involve a question of fact. Smith v. Carrington et al., 4 Cranch, 62; 2 Cond. Rep. 26. 104. The court is not bound to give an opinion as to the meaning or construction of a written deposition read in evidence on the trial of the cause. The Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Young, 5 Cranch, 187; 2 Cond. Rep. 227. 105. If the court has unguardedly permitted a person to prosecute, who has not given satisfactory evidence of his right so to do, it possesses the means of preventing any mischief from the inadvertence, and will undoubtedly employ those means. Wilson v. Codman's Executor, 3 Cranch, 193; 1 Cond. Rep. 493. 106. The court, upon a jury trial, is bound to give an opinion, if required, upon any point relevant to the issue. Douglass and Mandeville v. M Allister, 3 Cranch, 298; 1 Cond. Rep. 537. towards our citizens, is a political, not a judicial measure. It is for the consideration of the government, but is not a rule of decision in courts of justice. The Nereide, Bennet, Master, 9 Cranch, 338; 3 Cond. Rep. 439. 110. The reason of the doctrine that the whole world are parties in an admiralty cause, and therefore bound by the decision, determines its extent. Every person may make himself a party, and appeal from the sentence: but notice of the controversy is necessary in order to become a party; and before the rights of an individual are bound by a judicial sentence, he must have notice, either actual or implied, of the proceedings. When those proceedings are against the person, notice is served personally, or by publication; when they are in rem, notice is served upon the thing itself. This is necessarily notice to all those who have any interest in the thing; and it is reasonable, because it is necessary, and because it is the part of common prudence for all who have an interest, to guard it by persons in a situation to protect it. Ibid. 111. The amendment of the constitution of the United States, which declared that the judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against a state, by citizens of another state, or subjects of any foreign government, did not affect suits by a state against another state; and the mode of proceeding in such suits is not affected by that amendment. The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 12 Peters. 112. The practice seems to be well settled, that in suits against a state, if the state shall refuse or neglect to appear, upon due service of process, no coercive measures will be taken to compel appearance, but the complainant or plaintiff will be allowed to proceed ex parte. Ibid. 113. The court is not bound to give any hypothetical direction to a jury, and to leave them to find a fact, where no evidence of such fact is offered, nor any evidence from which it can be inferred. M'Neil v. Holbrook, 12 Peters, 84. 107. The right of a state to assert, as plaintiff, any interest it may have in a subject which forms the matter in controversy between individuals in one of the courts of the United States, is not affected by the amendment to the constitution, which declares that the judicial power of the courts of the United States shall not extend to snits commenced or prosecuted against one of the states by citizens or others; nor can it be so 114. Where the items of an account stated construed as to oust the court of its jurisdiction, were not disputed, but were admitted, and payshould such claim be suggested. The amendment of the same demanded, it was not taking ment simply provides that no suit shall be commenced or prosecuted against a state. The state cannot be made a defendant to a suit brought by an individual; but it remains the duty of the courts of the United States to decide all cases brought before them by citizens of one state against citizens of a different state, where a state is not necessarily a defendant. The United States v. Judge Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; 2 Cond. Rep. 202. 108. The decisions of a court of exclusive jurisdiction are necessarily conclusive on all other the question of fact, whether the account was a stated account, from the jury, for the court to instruct the jury that the account was a stated account. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Peters, 300. 115. The presumption is that the judgment of the circuit court is proper; and it lies on the plaintiff in error to show the contrary. Bagnell et al v. Broderick, 13 Peters, 436. 116. The grantor in the deed was David Carrick Buchanan; and he declares in it that he is the same person who was formerly David Buchanan. The circuit court were required to |