Conveyances, in Fraud of Creditors. will not be held responsible to the prior creditors | a grantee, to whom property has been conveyed of the father, for the money actually received in to defraud creditors, is entitled to hold the same payment, in whole or in part, of the bond; such against the creditors of the grantor. Ibid. voluntary bond not being within the statute of frauds. Ibid. 37. If several voluntary conveyances are made to different individuals, which are fraudulent as to creditors, the donees will not be held liable only for the proportions which their respective gifts bear to the debts of the donor, but the whole of every such gift will be subject to the payment of the debts of the donor. Ibid. 38. T. R. conveyed lands to his three sons, without valuable consideration, who conveyed them away to third persons. Query, Are the lands, in the hands of a purchaser, liable to the claim of a creditor of the father? However this may be, the creditor cannot be compelled to proceed against such purchaser; and no decree would be rendered against him, in aid of a volunteer, who was able to pay the debt. Ibid. 39. The statute of frauds avoids all covinous conveyances made with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, but does not extend to conveyances made on valuable consideration, and in good faith; therefore, where husband and wife made a conveyance of land to trustees, for the use and benefit of the wife, in consideration of the wife's relinquishing her right of dower in other lands, for the payment of her husband's debts; although the value of the right of dower was only about a third of the value of the land conveyed for her benefit, yet such conveyance is not absolutely void, but, in a court of law, must be adjudged to be valid. Wright and Cooke v. Stanard, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 311. 40. The circuit court, notwithstanding the restrictive clause in the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 11, has jurisdiction in a suit in equity brought by a judgment creditor against his debtor and others (they being citizens of different states), to set aside conveyances made in fraud of creditors, although the ground of the judgment was a negotiable chose in action, on which, before judgment, a suit could not have been maintained in such court. Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 252. 41. Where, in Rhode Island, a judgment debtor had conveyed his real estate to defraud his creditors, and had afterwards been committed to jail, and been discharged from imprisonment on taking the poor debtor's oath under the laws of that state, which could only be obtained by a person having no property to support himself in jail, or to pay prison charges; it was held, that a bill in equity being to set aside the fraudulent conveyance, and to charge the real estate with the judgment debt, notwithstanding, by the laws of that state, while the debtor was alive, and lived within that state, such real estate would not be directly liable to be taken in execution. Ibid. 42. Where a conveyance has been made with the meditated intent to defraud creditors, it should not be permitted to stand as security in the hands of the grantee, for advances made on account of such conveyance to the grantor. Ibid. 43. A bona fide purchaser, without notice from 44. A bill in equity lies in the circuit court, to set aside conveyances made in fraud of creditors, (the parties being citizens of different states;) for there is not, in the proper sense of the term, "a plain, adequate, and complete remedy" at law, within the meaning of the 16th section of the judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, which is merely affirmative of the general doctrines of courts of equity. Ibid. 45. Notwithstanding a judgment, the court will, where the judgment creditor asks relief against a fraudulent conveyance, look into the original consideration, and give the creditor only what, on the whole, appears due to him. Ibid. 46. A bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, without notice of any fraud in the grant to his vendor, shall hold the estate against the original grantor and his heirs. Dexter v. Harris, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 531. 47. The declarations of the debtor are not evidence to defeat the title of the grantor, under a conveyance alleged to be fraudulent. Magniac & Co. v. Thompson, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 357. 48. A contract or conveyance, in consideration of a future marriage, is within the sixth section of the statute of 13 Elizabeth, if bona fide, and without notice of fraud. Marriage is a consideration as valuable as money, if bona fide, &c. Ibid. 49. If a contract before marriage could be enforced at law or in equity, the voluntary performance by the husband is as valid as if done under a judgment or decree, and is as good against creditors who have no lien. Ibid. 50. Where, by the marriage articles, the husband was to erect a house and furnish it as he thought fit, an indiscreet expenditure for furniture is not, per se, fraudulent against creditors, unless it is so extravagant as at first blush to indicate a fraudulent motive. The creditors of the husband may take the excess. lbid. 364. 51. Where the sum stipulated by articles before marriage has not been made up, the husband may do it afterwards, on the eve of a judgment against him, if done in performance of the articles, or so accepted by the trustee. Ibid. 52. A receives goods from B and C, on an agreement that A should take them, for sale, from place to place, to pay the invoice price for such as were sold, to return those unsold, and be credited with the amount at the prices charged; A to receive the surplus of what was sold over the invoice price. Held, that such agreement is not fraudulent in law, if not so in fact. B and C could recover in trover for taking them, if the contract was fraudulent. Merrill and Foster v. Rinker, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 529. 58. Possession of goods by any other than the real owner, is neither fraudulent nor a badge of fraud, if the want of possession is fairly accounted for, and there is no fraud in fact. Ibid. 54. A conveyance had been made of certain lands, on the 7th of May, 1829. Before it could be properly recorded, the defendant attached these lands, to secure a note signed by the gran Copy. Copyright. tors, on the 8th of May, 1829, the day following the execution of the conveyance, and payable in thirty days, but which was antedated, as of the 3d of April preceding, being the time when the goods, which formed the consideration of it, had been sold on a credit of six months. Held, that the antedating the note, and creating a present debt, on which the attachment of the lands was made, was a fraud upon the grantees, and did not disturb their rights under the conveyance, whatever might be the validity of the proceeding, as between the parties. Briggs v. French, 3 Sumner's C. C. R. 251. 55. A conveyance, which purports to be bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, will be taken to be so until the contrary is shown. Ibid. 56. A conveyance made by a citizen of one state to a citizen of another state, for the purpose of enabling the latter to maintain a suit on it, in a court of the United States, vests a legal title as between the parties; and a stranger, not claiming under either of the parties, has no right to inquire into the motives of the conveyance. Query, If the grantee would hold his title subject to the equities it had in the hands of the grantor. Ibid. 57. Query, If an attachment by a creditor will overreach the title of a prior grantee from the debtor, unless he has been guilty of laches in recording his deed? If he records it in a reasonable time, can it be defeated by an intermediate attachment? Ibid. 58. Query, Where a conveyance is made by one partner of his separate property to his private creditors, can a creditor of the firm, by an attachment laid before the deed of conveyance is recorded, defeat the prior title of such private creditor? If he may at law, can he in equity? Ibid. 59. Query, As to the effect, both in law and equity, of an attachment made after the execution of a bona fide conveyance, and before the recording of it. Ibid. 60. The act of Maine of the 20th of February, 1821, ch. 36, declares that all deeds shall be good, as against third persons, only when "acknowledged by the grantor before a justice of the peace in this state, (Maine,) or before a justice of the peace or magistrate in some other state, &c." Held, that an alderman of the city of Philadelphia is a magistrate within the sense of the statute, and that an acknowledgment before him will be sufficient. Gordon v. Hobart, 2 Suinner's C. C. R. 401. 61. Query, If this statute will protect mere strangers, who claim no title under the grantor, such as a disseisor, or no title in conflict with that held by the grantee, such as a mortgagee against a grantee, claiming the estate or equity of redemption by an unacknowledged or unregistered deed. Ibid. 62. If a deed is found in the possession of the grantee, there is a presumption of the due delivery thereof, because then, and not otherwise, it would be in the proper custody. Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 487. 63. A deed can never be delivered as an escrow to the grantee himself. Ibid. 64. Where two persons are in possession of lands by an imperfect or tortious title, as by dis seisin, a release to one of them will enure to the benefit of both. Ibid. 65. A disseisor in possession has a lawful estate, which he may alien, and his alienee will have a good title as against all persons not having a paramount title. Ibid. See DEEDS. COPY. The defendant served a notice on the plaintiff's attorney to furnish him with copies of all deeds, records of judgments, decrees in chancery, and all other evidence which he intended to use on the trial. Order refused. Copperthwait v. M'Cord, 2 M'Lean, 143. COPYRIGHT. 1. From the authorities cited in the opinion of the court, and others which might be referred to, the law appears to be well settled in England, that since the statute of 8 Anne, the literary property of an author, in his works, can only be asserted under the statute; and that, notwithstanding the opinion of a majority of the judges, in the great case of Miller v. Taylor, was in favour of the common law right before the statute, it is still considered in England as a ques tion by no means free from doubt. Wheaton and Donaldson v. Peters and Grigg, 8 Peters, 591. 2. That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or, by obtaining a copy, endeavours to realize a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted: but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future publication of a work, after the author shall have published it to the world. Ibid. 3. The argument, that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be controverted. And the answer is, that he realizes this product in the sale of his works, when first published. Ibid. 4. In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an individual who has invented a most useful and valuable machine? In the production of this, his mind has been as intensely engaged, as long and perhaps as usefully to the public, as any distinguished author in the composition of his book. The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society; and, in their respective spheres, they may be alike distinguished for mental vigour. Does the common law give a perpetual right to the author, and withhold it from the inventor? And yet it has never been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any property in his inven tion, after he shall have sold it publicly. It would seem, therefore, that the existence of a principle which operates so unequally, may well be doubted. This is not a characteristic of the Copyright. common law. It is said to be founded on prin- | law, in his manuscript, which would be prociples of justice, and that all its rules must con-tected by a court of chancery; and this protecform to sound reason. Ibid. tion was given, as well to books published under the provisions of the law, as to manuscript copies. Ibid. 5. That a man is entitled to the fruits of his own labours must be admitted; but he can enjoy them only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of property which regulate society, and which define the rights of things in general. Ibid. 6. It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent states, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and common law. There is no principle which pervades the Union, and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union. The common law could be made a part of our system by legislative adoption. Ibid. 7. When a common law right is asserted, we look to the state in which the controversy originated. Ibid. 8. When the ancestors of the citizens of the United States migrated to this country, they brought with them, to a limited extent, the English common law, as part of their heritage. No one will contend that the common law, as it existed in England, has ever been in force, in all its provisions, in any state in this Union. It was adopted only so far as its principles were suited to the condition of the colonies: and from this circumstance we see, what is the common law in one state, is not so considered in another. The judicial decisions, the usages and customs of the respective states, must determine how far the common law has been introduced, and sanctioned in each. Ibid. 9. If the common law, in all its provisions, has not been introduced into Pennsylvania, to what extent has it been adopted? Must not this court have some evidence on the subject? If no copyright of an author, in his work, has been heretofore asserted there, no custom or usage established, no judicial decisions been given, can the conclusion be justified, that, by the common law of Pennsylvania, an author has a perpetual property in the copyright of his works? These considerations might well lead the court to doubt the existence of this law; but there are others of a more conclusive character. Ibid. 10. In the eighth section of the first article of the constitution of the United States, it is declared, that congress shall have power "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and inventions." The word "secure," as used in the constitution, could not mean the protection of an acknowledged legal right. It refers to inventors as well as authors; and it has never been pretended by any one, either in this country or in England, that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented. Ibid. 12. Congress, by the act of 1790, instead of sanctioning an existing perpetual right in an author, in his works, created the right secured, for a limited time, by the provisions of that law. Ibid. 13. The right of an author to a perpetual copyright, does not exist by the common law of Pennsylvania. Ibid. 14. No one can deny, that where the legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in an author, or in an inventor, they have the power to provide the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed; and that no one can avail him self of such right, who does not substantially comply with the requisites of the law. This principle is familiar as it regards patent rights; and it is the same in relation to the copyright of a book. If any difference should be made, as respects a strict conformity to the law, it would seem to be more reasonable to make the require ment of the author, rather than of the inventor. | Ibid. 15. The acts required by the laws of the United States, to be done by an author to secure his copyright, are in the order in which they must naturally transpire. First, the title of the book must be deposited with the clerk, and the record he makes must be inserted in the first or second page; then the public notice in the newspapers is to be given; and within six months after the publication of the book, a copy must be deposited in the department of state. Ibid. 16. It has been said, these are unimportant acts. If they are indeed wholly unimportant, congress acted unwisely in requiring them to be done. But whether they are unimportant or not, is not for the court to determine, but the legislature; and in what light they were considered by the legislature, the court can only know by their official acts. Judging of those acts, by this rule, the court are not at liberty to say they are unimportant, and may be dispensed with. They are acts which the law requires to be done; and may the supreme court dispense with their performance? Ibid. 17. The security of a copyright to an author, by the acts of congress, is not a technical grant of precedent and subsequent conditions. All the conditions are important; the law requires them to be performed; and, consequently, their performance is essential to a perfect title. On the performance of a part of them, the right vests; and this was essential to its protection under the statute: but other acts are to be done, unless congress have legislated in vain, to render this right perfect. The notice could not be published until after the entry with the clerk; nor could the book be deposited with the secretary of state until it was published. But they are acts not 11. It is presumed, that the copyright recog-less important than those which are required to nised in the act of congress, and which was intended to be protected by its provisions, was the property which an author has, by the common be done previously. They form a part of the title; and until they are performed the title is not perfect. Ibid. Copyright. 18. Every requisite, under both the acts of congress, relative to copyrights, is essential to the title. Ibid. et al. v. Coxe and Carey & Lea, 4 Wash. C. C. R. will not grant him an injunction to prevent the 19. The acts of congress authorizing the ap-right secured according to law, a court of equity pointment of a Reporter of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, require the delivery of eighty copies of each volume of the reports to the department of state. The delivery of these copies does not exonerate the reporter from the deposite of a copy in the department of state, required under the copyright act of congress of 1790. The eighty copies delivered under the reporter's act, are delivered for a differ- 29. The act of congress of the 29th of April, ent purpose, and cannot excuse the deposite of 1802, declares that, in addition to the requisites one volume as especially required by the copy-enjoined in the third and fourth sections of the right acts. act of 1790, and before the person claiming a copyright shall be entitled to the benefits of the same act, he shall perform all the new requisites, and that he must perform the whole before he shall be entitled to the benefits of the act. The act will admit of no other construction. Ibid. Ibid. 20. No reporter of the decisions of the supreme court has, nor can he have, any copyright in the written opinions delivered by the court; and the judges of the court cannot confer on any reporter any such right. Ibid. 21. The circuit court of the United States has no jurisdiction in a case of copyright, where the parties are citizens of the same state. The act of congress, May 1st, 1790, ch. 42, refers the party injured to any court of record of the United States, wherein the same is cognizable; but no jurisdiction is given to either the circuit or district courts. Binns v. Woodruff, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 48. 22. The person described in the second section of the act of congress of April 29th, 1802, ch. 296, as the proprietor of a copyright in an engraving, is one who shall not only invent and design, but who shall also engrave, etch, or work the print in which the right is claimed; or who, from his own works and invention, shall cause the print to be designed and engraved, etched or worked. Ibid. 30. The meaning of the act could not have been more clearly expressed, if the act had declared that "the proprietor, before he shall be entitled to the benefit of the act of 1790, should cause a copy of the record of the title to be published, and shall deliver a copy of the book to the secretary of state, as directed by the third and fourth sections of that act; and shall also cause a copy of the said record to be inserted at full length in the title page," &c. Ibid. 31. Any compilation may be the subject of a copyright, provided the plan, arrangement, and combination of the materials be new. Gray v. Russell, 1 Story, 11. 32. Though the original sources of informa tion are open to the use of all persons, the particular compilation is not. As if a person prepare a map from original surveys, he cannot supersede the right of another person to make similar surveys to accomplish the same end; but no one, without such surveys, has a right to copy the map. Ibid. 23. In the first instance, the inventor and designer is identified with the engraver, &c.; or, in other words, the entire work or subject of the copyright is executed by the same person. In the latter, the invention is designed or embodied by the person in whom the right is vested; and 33. It is of no consequence in what form the the form and completion of the work is the exe-works of another author are used, whether it be cution of another. Ibid. by a simple reprint, or by incorporating the whole, or a large portion thereof, in some larger work. Ibid. 24. In neither case can a copyright be claimed by one for a mere invention, existing in a form not visible to others: he must not only have invented, but he must have designed or represented the subject in some visible form. Ibid. 25. Where a party conceived the idea of an engraving of a particular subject; but the drawings, the design, or arrangement of the print, as well as of the parts which compose it, were the invention and work of others, though by his procurement, he is not entitled to a copyright. Ibid. 26. To entitle the author of a book to a copy right, he must not only deposit a printed copy of the title of such book in the clerk's office; But he must also publish a copy of the record of the title within the period, and for the length of time, prescribed by the third section of the act of 1790; and must also deposit a copy of the book in the secretary of state's office, within six months after the publication of the book. Ewer 34. The question of violation of copyright may depend upon the value, rather than the quantity of the selected materials; as where, in an abridgement, only the unimportant parts are omitted, or, under pretence of a review, the substance of an original work is given. Ibid. 35. The author of an addition of Adams' Latin Grammar made certain additions and alterations in that work, and also prepared notes to it, which the author of a subsequent edition of the same work adopted. Held, That such adoption was an infringement of copyright, inasmuch as the notes, though not new, had never before been collected and embodied.' Ibid. 36. Query, in what cases an abridgement will be regarded as a piracy of an original copyright. A reporter has a copyright in his marginal notes and in the arguments of counsel, as prepared and arranged in his work, though he has none in General Principles. the opinions of the court, published under the authority of congress. Ibid. 37. An abridgement, in which there is a substantial condensation of the materials of the original work, and which requires intellectual labour and judgment, does not constitute a piracy of copyright; but an abridgement consisting of the essential or most valuable portions of the original work, is a piracy. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story's C. C. R. 100. 1. A corporation aggregate cannot be a party, 38. An author of letters or papers of whatever and cannot litigate in the courts of the United kind, whether they be letters of business, or States, unless in consequence of the character private letters, or literary compositions, has a of the individuals who compose the body politic, property and an exclusive copyright therein, un- which character must appear by proper averless he unequivocally dedicate them to the pub-ments on the record. The Hope Insurance Co. lic, or to some private person; and no person has of Providence v. Boardman et al., 5 Cranch, 57; any right to publish them without his consent, 2 Cond. Rep. 189. unless such publication be required to establish 2. A corporation aggregate cannot, in its cora personal right or claim, or to vindicate charac-porate capacity, be a citizen. The Bank of the ter. Ibid. United States v. Deveaux et al., 5 Cranch, 61; 2 Cond. Rep. 189. 39. The government has, perhaps, a right to publish official letters addressed to it, or to any of its departments, by public officers; but no private person has such a right, without the sanction of the government. Ibid. 3. A corporation aggregate, composed of citizens of one state, may sue a citizen of another state in the circuit court of the United States. Ibid. 40. To constitute a piracy of an original work, 4. A corporation being the mere creature of it is not necessary that the whole, or the larger law, possesses only those properties which the part of it, should be taken; but it is only neces-charter of its creation confers upon it, either exsary that so much should be taken as sensibly to pressly, or as incidental to its very existence. diminish the value of the original work, or sub- Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 stantially to appropriate the labours of the author. Wheat. 518; 4 Cond. Rep. 526. Ibid. 41. Where A. published a "Life of Washington," containing eight hundred and sixty-six pages, of which three hundred and fifty-three pages were copied from Sparks' "Life and Writings of Washington," sixty-four pages being official letters and documents, and two hundred and fifty-five pages being private letters of Washington, originally published by Mr. Sparks, under a contract with the owners of the original papers of Washington; it was held, that the work by A. was an invasion of the copyright of Mr. Sparks. Ibid. 42. Any new and original plan, arrangement, or combination of materials, will entitle the author to a copyright therein, whether the materials themselves be new or old. Emerson v. Davis, 3 Story's C. C. R. 768. 43. Whosoever, by his own skill, labour, and judgment, writes a new work, may have a copyright therein, unless it be directly copied or evasively imitated from another work. Ibid. 44. Where the plaintiff wrote an arithmetic, the plan, arrangement, and illustration of which he claimed to be new; it was held, that the taking thereof was a violation of his copyright, although the materials and the several particulars of his plan had existed before in separate forms and in separate works, inasmuch as they had never before been united in one combination in the same manner. Ibid. 45. To constitute a piracy of copyright, it must be shown that the original work has been either substantially copied, or has been so imitated as to be a mere evasion of the copyright. Ibid. See CONSTRUCTION. 5. A subsequent board of directors of a bank is to be considered as knowing all the circumstances communicated or known to a previous board. The Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria v. Louisa and Maria Seton, 1 Peters, 309. 6. Before any act of a corporation can be given in evidence, its charter must be produced. The United States v. Johns, 4 Dall. 442. 7. The act of incorporation gives to the body all the powers it possesses; it enables it to contract; and, when it prescribes a mode of contracting, that mode must be observed, or the instrument creates no contract with the body. Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 127; 1 Cond. Rep. 371. 8. All the members of a corporation are bound by the acts of the majority; nor can a member divest himself of his obligation, as such, but according to the rules of the corporation. Korn v. The Mutual Assurance Society, 6 Cranch, 192; 2 Cond. Rep. 347. 9. A private corporation, created by the legis lature, may lose its franchises by a misuser or nonuser of them; and they may be resumed by the government, under a judicial judgment, upon a quo warranto, to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture. This is the common law of the land, and is a tacit condition annexed to the creation of every such corporation. Terret et al. v. Taylor et al., 9 Cranch, 43; 3 Cond. Rep. 254. 10. If an act of incorporation be a grant of political power, or if it create a civil institution to be employed in the administration of government; or if the funds of a college be public property; or if a state, as a government, be alone interested in its transactions; the subject is one of which the legislature of the state may act |