185. The act of the legislature of New York is not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and, being so, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the state. The state of New York possessed the power to pass this law, before the adoption of the constitution of the United States. The law was in tended to prevent the state being burdened with an influx of foreigners, and to prevent their becoming paupers, and who would be chargeable as such. The end and means here used are within the competency of the states, since a portion of their powers were surrendered to the federal government. Ibid.

186. Persons are not the subjects of commerce; and not being imported goods, they do not fall within the reasoning founded upon the constitution, of a power given to congress to regulate commerce, and the prohibition of the states from imposing a duty on imported goods. Ibid.

187. The legislature of Massachusetts granted to Harvard College the liberty and power to dispose of a ferry, from Charlestown, over Charles river, to Boston, and to receive a rent for the same. Afterwards the legislature incorporated a company to erect a bridge over Charles river, in the place where the ferry had been set up and was in use, the company paying annually to the college the sum of two hundred pounds. The charter gave the company the right to take tolls for forty years, and afterwards extended the same to seventy years. Before the forty years expired, the legislature authorized the erection of another bridge, from Boston to Charlestown, on Charles river, so near the first bridge as injuriously to affect the tolls of the same, and this bridge afterwards became free. The proprietors of the first bridge applied to the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts to restrain, by an injunction, the construction of the second bridge; and, subsequently, for the payment of the tolls taken, and for general relief. The court of Massachusetts dismissed the bill, and the case was brought up, by writ of error, to the supreme court of the United States, under the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789, on the ground that the first charter granted was a contract, and that the grant of the second was a violation of it. The court affirmed the decree of the superior court of Massachusetts. The Proprietors of the Charles_River Bridge v. The Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 11 Peters, 420.

188. A state law may be retrospective in its character, and may divest vested rights, and yet

189. On the 28th of November, 1820, the legislature of Kentucky passed an act establishing a bank, by the name of "The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky." The first section of the act declares the bank shall be established "in the name and behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky," under the direction of a president and twelve directors, to be chosen by the legis lature. The second section enacts, that the president and directors shall be a corporation capable of suing and being sued, and of purchasing and selling every description of property. The third section declares the bank to be, exclusively, the property of the commonwealth. The fourth section authorizes the issuing of notes; and the fifth declares the capital to be two millions of dollars, to be paid by all moneys afterwards paid into the treasury for the vacant lands of the state, and so much of the capital stock as was owned by the state in the Bank of Kentucky; and as the treasurer of the state received those moneys, he was required to pay them into the bank. The bank had authority to receive money on deposite, to make loans on good personal security, or on mortgage, and was prohibited increasing its debts beyond its capital. Limitations were imposed on loans; and the accommodations of the bank were apportioned among the different counties of the state. The bank was, by a subsequent act, authorized to issue three millions of dollars, and the dividends of the bank were to be paid to the treasurer of the state. The notes of the bank were issued in the common form of bank notes, in which the bank promised to pay to the bearer, on demand. the sum stated on the face of the note. The pleadings excluded the court from considering that any part of the capital had been paid by the state; but on the argument of the case, it was stated and not denied, that all the notes which had been issued, and payment of which had been demanded, had been redeemed by the bank. By an act of the legislature of Kentucky, it was required that the notes of the bank should be received on all executions by plaintiffs, and if they failed to endorse on such execution, that they would be so received, further proceedings on the judgment were delayed for two years. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky instituted a suit against the plaintiffs in error, on a promissory note, for which the notes of the bank had been given, as a loan to the drawers of the note. The defendants in the suit claimed that the note given by them was void, as the same was given for the notes of the bank, which were "bills of credit," issued by the state of Kentucky, against the provisions of the constitution of the United States, which prohibits the issuing of "bills of credit the states of the United States; and that the act of the legisla ture of Kentucky, which established the bank, was unconstitutional and void. By the supreme court:-The act incorporating the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky was a constitutional exercise of power by the state of Kentucky

191. At the time of the adoption of the constitution, the "Bank of North America," and the "Massachusetts Bank," and some others, were in operation. It cannot, therefore, be supposed that the notes of these banks were intended to be inhibited by the constitution, or that they were considered as "bills of credit," within the meaning of that instrument. In many of their most distinguishing characteristics, they were essentially different from bills of credit, in any one of the various forms in which they were issued. If then the powers not delegated to the federal government, nor denied to the states, are retained by the states or the people, and by a fair construction of the terms "bills of credit," as used in the constitution, they do not include ordinary bank notes: it follows, that the power to incorporate banks to issue these notes may be exercised by a state. Ibid.

192. A state cannot do that which the federal constitution declares it shall not do. It cannot "coin money." Here is an act inhibited in terms so precise that they cannot be mistaken. They are susceptible but of one construction. And it is certain that a state cannot incorporate any number of individuals and authorize them to coin money. Such an act would be as much a violation of the constitution, as if money were coined by an officer of the state under its authority. The act being prohibited cannot be done by a state, directly or indirectly. The same rule applies to bills of credit issued by a state. Ibid. 193. The case of Craig v. The State of Missouri, 4 Peters, 410, is not authority to sustain the claim that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky were bills of credit. The decisions in that case applied to obligations of an entirely different character. Ibid.

194. There is no principle decided by the supreme court, in the case of Craig v. The State of Missouri, which at all conflicts with the views presented by the court in the case of Briscoe v. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Indeed, the views of the court are sustained and strengthened by contrasting the present case with that. Ibid.

195. An action was instituted in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Alabama, by the bank of Augusta, Georgia, against the defendant, a citizen of Alabama, on bills of

York, which had been protested for non-payment, and returned to Mobile. The bill was made and endorsed for the purpose of being discounted by the agent of the bank, who had funds in his hands belonging to the plaintiffs for the purpose of purchasing bills of exchange, which funds were derived from bills and notes discounted by the bank in Georgia. The bills were discounted by the agent of the bank in Mobile, for the benefit of the bank, with their funds, to remit the said funds to the bank. The defendant defended the suit on the facts that the bank of Augusta is a corporation incorporated by an act of the legislature of Georgia, and have such power as is usually conferred on banking institutions, such as to purchase bills of exchange, &c. The circuit court held that the plaintiffs could not recover on the bills of exchange, and that the purchase of the bills by the agent of the plaintiffs was prohibited by the laws of Alabama, and gave judgment for the defendant. In the case of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania v. Primrose, the plaintiffs, a corporation by virtue of a law of the state of Pennsylvania, authorized by its charter to sue and be sued in the name of the corporation, and to deal in bills of exchange, and composed of citizens of Pennsylvania, and of the states of the United States, other than the state of Alabama; the agent of the bank resident in Mobile, and in possession of funds belonging to the bank, and intrusted with them for the sole purpose of purchasing bills of exchange, purchased a bill of exchange, and paid for the same in notes of the branch of the Bank of Alabama, at Mobile. The bill was protested for non-payment, and a suit was instituted in the circuit court against the payee, the endorser of the bill. The question for the opinion of the circuit court was, whether the purchaser of the bill of exchange by the United States Bank was a valid contract, under the laws of Alabama. The circuit court decided that the contract was void, and gave judgment for the defendant. The case of the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company v. Joseph B. Earle was similar to that of the Bank of Augusta v. Joseph B. Earle. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in the three cases, and held the contracts for the purchase of the bills valid, and that the plaintiffs acquired a legal title to the bills by the purchase. The Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519.

196. The plaintiffs, merchants of New York, instituted a suit in the circuit court of Alabama, against the administrators of the drawer of a note, dated in New York, and payable in New York. The act of the assembly of Alabama provides, that the estate of a deceased person, which is declared to be insolvent, shall be distributed by the executors or administrators, according to the provisions of the statute, among the creditors į and that no suit or action shall be commenced or sustained against any executor or administrator, after the estate of the deceased has been represented as insolvent, except in certain cases not of the description of that on which this suit was instituted. Held, that the insolvency of the

See BOUNDARIES OF STATES; JURISDICTION; SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

206. A discharge from imprisonment, by a judge of a state court, of a person who is in confinement as an insolvent debtor, under process from the circuit court, is not a defence in an action for an escape by the plaintiff at whose suit the party discharged was imprisoned. (Cited, Darst v. Duncan, 1 Howard, 304.) Ibid.

207. The constitution of the United States makes gold and silver a legal tender; and if the marshal has received bank notes in satisfaction of a judgment process, which is in his hands, the plaintiff may insist on gold or silver. Given v. Breedlove, 2 Howard, 29.

208. If a bank has paid a sum of money for its charter, it is exempted from taxation under the authority of the state. Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 Howard, 133.

209. This exemption does not extend to the corporate property of the bank, but operates only in favour of its franchise. Ibid.

CONSTRUCTION OF BONDS AND WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.

1. The general rule is well settled in controversies arising on the construction of bonds, with conditions for the performance of duties prece ded by recitals, that where the undertaking is general, it shall be restrained, and its obligatory force limited within the recitals. Bell v. Bruen, 17 Peters, 161.

2. The courts of the United States are not bound, in the interpretation of deeds, by the local adjudications of a particular state. Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumner's Ĉ. C. R. 170.

3. Deeds are always construed according to the force of the language used by the grantor, and the apparent intentions of the parties de ducible therefrom. Ibid.

211. A carriage conveying the mail of the United States was exempted from tolls on the Cumberland road, although the United States had ceded the parts of the Cumberland road on which the carriage passed. This exemption did not apply to other property in the carriage, or to the persons who were passengers. Scaright v. Stokes, 3 Howard, 151.

212. The provision in the act of the state of Maryland, incorporating the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, declaring that if the road should not pass through Washington county, one million of dollars should be paid to the county, was repealable by the legislature of Maryland. State of Maryland v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 3 Howard, 534.

213. Real property was sold under an execution by the sheriff, without its having been appraised according to the act of the legislature of Indiana. The deed for the property was not void. Gaulley's Lessee v. Ewing, 3 Howard, 707. 214. A toll charged on passengers travelling in the mail-coach on the Cumberland road, ceded by the United States to the state of Ohio, when, by the same act of the legislature of Ohio, no toll was charged on passengers in other travelling coaches, was illegal. Neil, Moore & Co. v. The State of Ohio, 3 Howard, 720.

215. The act of the legislature of Illinois, which provides that a sale of real property levied upon shall not be made, unless the property bring two-thirds of the appraised value, is uncon

Held, that the grantor conveyed nothing in the excepted parcels, but five undivided eighths in the remainder of the tract. Ibid.

5. A boundary "on a stream," or "by a stream," or "to a stream," includes the flats, at least to low-water mark; and in many cases to the middle thread of the river. Query, How it would be where the boundary was "on the bank" of a river. Ibid.

6. A boundary on the bank of a river, referring to fixed monuments on the bank, limits the grant to the bank, and excludes the flat. Ibid.

7. Where there was a deed from the state, conveying all the right, title, and interest of the state, unto a "lot of land numbered ten, as was surveyed by Park Holland, in the year 1801," which deed, in the specific boundaries, bounded the lot on one side to a stake, and thence "to the bank of the river, thence by the bank of the river to the first mentioned bounds;" and in the plan the lot was laid down, bounded on the river. Query, Whether, taking the whole description together, it did not convey the lot to the stream, and include the flats? Ibid.

8. If a plan is referred to in a deed, and the land, according to that plan, is bounded on a river, with no other specific boundaries than the river; Semble, that the flats will pass, by operation of law, with the upland. Ibid.

9. A plan of a tract of land, which is referred to in a deed, for purposes of description, is to be treated as if it were annexed to, and made part of a deed. Ibid.

10. In the construction of penal statutes, the

proper course is to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense, which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. United States v. Winn, 3 Sumner's C. C. R. 208.

19. In the construction of written instruments, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained, not by parol evidence thereof, nor by mere conjecture, but by the application of certain rules of interpretation to the instrument itself. Cleveland v. Smith, 2 Story's C. C. R. 278.

12. No mere misnomer in the name of a person, or a corporation named in the act, is fatal, if the person or corporation really intended can be collected from the terms of the act. Ibid.

13. But where the descriptive words constitute the very essence of the act, unless the description is so clear and accurate as to refer to the particular subject intended, and to be incapable of being applied to any other, the mistake is fatal. Ibid.

14. There is no case where a court, in the construction of a statute, has substituted other words and other dates in order to maintain an act, making erroneous references to things aliunde. Ibid.

15. By act of congress of the 30th of January, 1834, it was enacted, "That there be granted, &c., unto Thomas Blanchard, &c., for the term of fourteen years from the twelfth day of January, 1837, the exclusive privilege of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, his invention of a machine for turning or cutting irregular forms, a description of which is given in schedule or specification annexed to letters-patent, granted to the said T. B., for the said invention, on the twelfth day of January, 1820." Now, there were no such letters-patent of the 12th of January, 1820, as are referred to in this act; but letters-patent of the 20th of January, 1820; and the words of description therein were, an engine for turning or cutting irregular forms," instead of "a machine for turning or cutting irregular forms." Held, that the court could not correct this variance, so as to give validity to the letters-patent, under the act of 1834. Ibid.

16. An act of congress ought to be construed so as not to operate retrospectively, or ex post facto, unless that construction is unavoidable. Ibid. 535.

17. Conversations between parties, at the time of making a contract, are competent evidence to show the sense which they attached to a particular term used in the contract. Gray v. Harper, 1 Story's C. C. R. 574.

to pay

strument taken as a whole, and effect given thereto cy pres, and whatever is inconsistent therewith is to be rejected. Ibid.

21. The general rule, in the interpretation of the descriptive words of deeds and grants, is, that courses, distances, admeasurements, and ideal lines, must yield to known and fixed monuments upon the ground itself, whether they be natural or artificial. Ibid.

22. Where, in a grant of land from the commonwealth of Massachusetts, to the towns of Taunton and Raynham, the land was described as "beginning on the north line of the million acres, at a yellow birch-tree, six miles east from the south-east corner," &c. (the said birch-tree being marked as a monument in the original survey of the land); whereas the said birch-tree did not, in fact, stand upon the said north line, as supposed, but was so situated that a gore of land was left between it and the said north line; it was held, that the said birch-tree, and not the said north line, was to be taken as the boundary of the land granted. Ibid.

23. Penal statutes must be strictly construed, and are never extended by implication. Andrews v. U. S. 2 Story's C. Č. R. 203.

24. Statutes levying taxes or duties on subjects or citizens, are to be construed most strongly against the government, and in favour of the subjects or citizens, and their provisions are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. U. S. v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story's C. C. R. 369.

25. Statutes are to be interpreted so as to give effect to all the words therein, if such an interpretation be reasonable, and be neither repugnant to the provisions, nor inconsistent with the objects of the statute; but the rule is otherwise, if such an interpretation requires the introduction of new provisions and clauses to render it sensible or practicable. U. S. v. Bassel, 2 Story's C. C. R. 389.