143. The power of laying duties on imports or exports, is considered, in the constitution, as a branch of the taxing power, and not of the power to regulate commerce. Ibid. 201.

137. An act of the legislature of New Hampshire, altering the charter in a material respect, without the consent of the corporation, is an act impairing the obligation of a contract, and is unconstitutional and void. Ibid.

138. An act of a state legislature, which discharges a debtor from all liability for debts contracted previous to his discharge, on his surrendering his property for the benefit of his creditors, is a law impairing the obligation of a contract, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States; and it is immaterial that the suit was brought in a state court of a state of which both parties were citizens, where the contract was made, and the discharge obtained; and where they continued to reside until the suit was brought. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of Pennsylvania v. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; 5 Cond. Rep. 35.

139. The act of the legislature of Vermont, of October 30th, 1794, declaring that the rights to land in that state, granted under the authority of the British government, previous to the revolution, to The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, were thereby granted severally to the several towns in which such lands lay, and to their use for ever, is in contravention of the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, and consequently void. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, &c. v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464; 5 Cond. Rep. 489.

140. The act of Kentucky, of February 27th, 1797, concerning occupying claimants of land, while it was in force, was repugnant to the constitution of the United States. It was, however, repealed by a subsequent act of January 31st, 1812. This last is also repugnant to the constitution of the United States, being in violation of the compact between the states of Virginia and Kentucky, contained in the act of the legislature of Virginia, of December 18th, 1789, and incorporated into the constitution of Kentucky. Green et al. v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; 5 Cond. Rep. 369.

141. The several acts of the legislature of the state of New York, granting and securing to Robert R. Livingston, and Robert Fulton, the exclusive right of navigating the waters within the jurisdiction of that state, by boats moved by VOL. I.-35

those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are not, in the exercise of a power to regulate commerce, within the language of the constitution. Ibid. 203.

145. Although congress cannot enable a state to legislate, it may adopt the provisions of a state on any subject. Ibid. 207.

146. A state bankrupt or insolvent law, which discharges both the person of the debtor and his future acquisitions of property, is not "a law impairing the obligation of contracts," so far as respects debts contracted subsequent to the passage of such law. Ibid.

147. The states have a right to regulate or abolish imprisonment for debt, as a part of the remedy for enforcing the performance of contracts. Mason v. Haile, 12 Wheat. 370; 6 Cond. Rep. 535.

148. An act of a state legislature, requiring all importers of foreign goods by the bale or package, &c., and other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale, or package, &c., to take out a license, for which they shall pay fifty dollars, and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, subjecting them to certain forfeitures and penalties, is repugnant to that provision of the constitution of the United States which declares, that "no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any impost or duty on imports and exports, excepting what may be absolutely necessary for executing its own inspection laws;" and also, to that which declares that congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. Brown et al. v. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; 6 Cond. Rep. 557.

149. The act of New Hampshire of June 19th, 1805, which allows to tenants the value of improvements, &c., on recoveries against them, if it applies to improvements before the act, is so far unconstitutional and void. Society for the Propagation, &c. v. Wheeler et al., 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 105.

150. The ninth section of the first article of the constitution of the United States, which restrained congress from forbidding the migration or importation of slaves, prior to the year 1808, did not apply to state legislatures, who might at any time prohibit the introduction of such persous. Butler v. Hopper, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 499.

151. The laws of a state, affecting contracts,

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152. With respect to rules of practice for transacting the business of the courts: These rules form the law of the court, and it is in relation to the federal courts, a law arising under the constitution of the United States, and consequently not subject to state regulations. It is in reference to this principle, that the seventeenth section of the judicial act authorizes the courts of the United States to make all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business in the said courts, provided the same are not repugnant to the laws of the United States; and under this power, the different circuit courts, at their first session, adopted the state practice as it then existed, which continues to this day in all the states; except so far as the courts have thought proper, from time to time, to alter or amend it. Ibid.

153. The insolvent act of Rhode Island extends to discharge the party from debts and contracts not yet due; and it bars the remedy, as well in a court of the United States, as in a state court. Shieffelin v. Wheaton, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 441.

154. A discharge of the person, and present estate of a debtor, under the insolvent laws of Maryland, cannot be pleaded in bar of a suit in the circuit court in Massachusetts, so as to discharge the defendant from the common execution. Hinkley v. Marean, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 88. 155. A law of a state, which declares that a debtor by delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditors, shall be for ever discharged from the payment of his debts, due and contracted before the passage of the law, whether the creditor do an act or not in aid of the law, cannot be set up to bar the right of such creditor to recover his debt, either in a federal or state court. Such law impairs the obligation of the contract. Ibid.

156. A law which authorizes the discharge of a contract, by the payment of a smaller sum, or at a different time, or in a different manner than the parties have stipulated, impairs its obligation, by substituting for the contract of the parties, one which they never entered into, and to the performance of which, of course, they never have consented. Ibid.

157. If the local ordinances of a city are in collision with an act of congress, the former must give way. The laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution of the United States, are the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of a state to the contrary notwithstanding. United States v. Hart, Peters' C. C. R. 390.

158. The powers of the territorial legislature of Florida extend to all rightful objects of legislation, subject to the restriction, that their laws shall not be "inconsistent with the laws and

159. The act of the state of New York, of the 3d April, 1811, is an insolvent and not a bankrupt law. Adams v. Storey, 1 Paine's C. C. R. 79.

160. If the act in question had been a bankrupt law, it would not have been void, as repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Ibid.

161. The adoption of a treaty, with the stipulations of which the provisions of a state law are inconsistent, is equivalent to a repeal of such laws. Den ex dem. Fisher v. Harnden, 1 Paine's | C. C. R. 55.

162. A judgment of a state court in a case where jurisdiction was acquired, not by the common law, but by a statute of the state, which, before the rendition of the judgment, had been virtually repealed by the adoption of a treaty, was held not voidable, but void. Ibid.

163. In 1780, the ancestor of the lessors of the plaintiff, a British subject, was indicted in the supreme court of the city of New York, under the act entitled "an act for the forfeiture and sale of the estates of persons who have adhered to the enemies of this state," &c.; and in October, 1783, a judgment of forfeiture against his estates was rendered. The treaty of peace, stipulating against any subsequent confiscation, was signed in September preceding: Held, that the proceedings were coram non judice, and void. Ibid.

164. The stipulations in a treaty between the United States and a foreign nation, are paramount to the provisions of the constitution of a particular state of the confederacy. Gordon v. Kerr et al., 1 Wash. C. C. R. 322.

165. All the laws which were in force in Florida, while a province of Spain, those excepted which were political in their character, which concerned the relations between the people and their sovereign, remained in force until altered by the government of the United States. Congress recognises this principle, by using the words "laws of the territory now in force therein." No laws could, then, have been in force but those enacted by the Spanish govern. ment. If among them there existed a law on the subject of salvage, and it is scarcely pos sible there should not have been such a law, jurisdiction over it was conferred by the act of congress relative to the territory of Florida, in the superior court; but jurisdiction was not exclusive. A territorial act, conferring jurisdic tion over the same cases as an inferior court, would not have been inconsistent with the seventh section of the act, vesting the whole judicial power of the territory in two superior courts, and in such inferior courts, and justices of the peace, as the legislative council of the territory may from time to time establish. The American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Peters, 544.

166. The judges of the supreme courts of Florida hold their offices for four years. These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial powers conferred by the constitution on the general government can be de

167. The act of the assembly of the state of Delaware, by which the construction of the dam erected by the plaintiffs was authorized, shows plainly that this is one of those many creeks passing through a deep level marsh, adjoining the Delaware, up which the tide flows for some distance. The value of the property on its banks, must be enhanced by excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce these objects, provided they do not come in collision with the powers of the general government to regulate commerce, are, undoubtedly, within those which are reserved to the states. The measure authorized by this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it. But this abridgment, unless it comes in conflict with the constitution, or a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens; of which the supreme court can take no cognizance. Wilson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company, 2 Peters, 251.

168. S. and M. held land in Luzerne county, Pennsylvania, in common, under a Connecticut title. A division of the land was made between them, and S. became the tenant of M. of his part of the land thus set off in severalty, under a lease, to be terminated on a notice of one year. S. afterwards obtained a Pennsylvania title to the land leased to him by M., and on a trial in an ejectment for the land, brought by M. against S., the court of common pleas of Bradford county, Pennsylvania, held, that S., having held the land as tenant of M., could not set up a title against his landlord. Upon a writ of error to the supreme court of Pennsylvania, in 1825, it was held, that "the relation between landlord and tenant could not exist between persons holding under a Connecticut title." The legislature of Pennsylvania, on the 8th of April, 1826, passed an act declaring that "the relation of landlord and tenant should exist and be held as fully and effectually between Connecticut settlers and Pennsylvania claimants, as between citizens of the commonwealth." The case came again before the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and the judgment of the court of common pleas of Bradford county in favour of M., the landlord, was affirmed; that court having decided that the act of assembly of the 8th of April, 1826, was a constitutional act, and did not impair the validity of any contract. S. brought a writ of error to the supreme court, claiming that the act of the assembly of Pennsylvania, of the 8th of

169. A tax imposed by a law of any state of the United States, or under the authority of such a law, on stock issued for loans made to the United States, is unconstitutional. Weston et al. v. The City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters, 449. 170. It is not the want of original power in an independent sovereign state to prohibit loans to a foreign government, which restrains the state legislatures from direct opposition to those made by the United States. The restraint is imposed by the constitution. The American people have conferred the power of borrowing money on the government, and by making that government supreme, have shielded its action in the exercise of that power, from the action of the local governments. The grant of the power, and the declaration of supremacy, are a declaration that no such restraining or controlling power shall be exercised. Ibid. 468.

171. The lands of an intestate descend not to the administrator, but to the heir; they vest in him, liable to the debts of his ancestor, and subject to be sold for those debts. The adminis trator has no estate in the land, but a power to sell under the authority of the common pleas. This is not an independent power, to be exercised at discretion, when the exigency in his opinion may require it; but it is conferred by the court, in a state of things prescribed by the law. The order of the court is a pre-requisite, indispensable to the very existence of the power; and if the law which authorizes the court to make the order, be repealed, the power to sell can never come into existence. The repeal of such a law divests no vested estate, but it is the exercise of a legislative power, which every legislature possesses. The mode of subjecting the property of a debtor to the demands of a creditor, must always depend on the wisdom of the legislature. The Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Heirs, 2 Peters, 523.

172. J. J. died in New Hampshire, seised of real estate in Rhode Island, having devised the same to his daughter, an infant. His executrix proved the will in New Hampshire, and obtained a license from a probate court, in that state, to sell the real estate of the testator for the payment of debts. She sold the real estate in Rhode Island for that purpose, and conveyed the same by deed; giving a bond to procure a confirmation of the conveyance by the legis lature of Rhode Island. The proceeds of the sale were appropriated to pay the debts of the intestate. Held, that the act of the legislature of Rhode Island, which confirmed the title of the purchasers, was valid. Wilkinson v. Leland et al., 2 Peters, 657.

173. The occupant claimant law of Ohio, which declares that an occupying claimant shall not be turned out of possession until he shall be paid for lasting and valuable improvements made by him, and directs the court in a suit at law, to appoint commissioners to value the same; is repugnant to the seventh amendment of the constitution of the United States, which declares,

523.

174. Admitting that the legislature of Ohio can give an occupant claimant a right to the value of his improvements, and authorize him to retain possession of the land he has improved, until he shall have received that value; and assuming that they may annex conditions to the change of possession, which, so far as they are constitutional, must be respected in all courts; still, the legislature cannot change radically the mode of proceeding prescribed for the courts of the United States; or direct those courts in a trial at common law to appoint commissioners for the decision of questions which a court of law must submit to a jury. Ibid. 526.

175. The plaintiff in error claimed to recover the land in controversy, having derived his title under a patent granted by the state of New York to John Cornelius. He insisted that the patent created a contract between the state and the patentee, his heirs and assigns, that they should enjoy the land free from any legislative regulations to be made in violation of the constitution of the state, and that an act passed by the legislature of New York, subsequent to the patent, did violate that contract. Under that act commissioners were appointed to investigate the contending titles to all lands held under such patents as that granted to John Cornelius; and by their proceedings, without the aid of a jury, the title of the defendants in error was established against, and defeating the title under a deed made by John Cornelius, the patentee, and which deed was executed under the patent. By the supreme court:-This is not a case within the clause of the constitution of the United States, which prohibits a state from passing laws which shall impair the obligation of contracts. The only contract made by the state is a grant to John Cornelius, his heirs and assigns, of the land. The patent contains no covenant to do or not to do any further act in relation to the land; and the court are not inclined to create a contract by implication. The act of the legislature of New York does not attempt to take the land from the patentee; the grant remains in full effect, and the proceedings of the commissioners under the law, operated upon titles derived under, and not adversely to the patent. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Peters, 289.

176. It is within the undoubted powers of state Legislatures, to pass recording acts by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded within a limited time and the power is the same whether the deed is dated before or after the recording act. Though the effect of such a deed is to render the prior deed fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser, it is not a law violating the obligation of contracts. So, too, is the power to pass limitation laws. Reasons of sound policy have led to the general adoption of laws of this

description, and their validity cannot be ques tioned. The time and manner of their operation, the exceptions to them, and the acts from which the time limited shall begin to run, will generally depend on the sound discretion of the legislature, according to the nature of the titles, the situa tion of the country, and the emergency which leads to their enactment. Cases may occur, where the provisions of a law on these subjects may be so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of a right, and to call for the interposition of the supreme court. Ibid. 290.

177. On the 27th day of June, 1821, the legislature of the state of Missouri passed an act, entitled "an act for the establishment of loan offices;" by the third section of which, the officers of the treasury of the state, under the direction of the governor, were required to issue certificates to the amount of two hundred thousand dollars, of denominations not exceeding ten dollars, nor less than fifty cents, in the following form: "This certificate shall be receivable at the treasury of any of the loan offices in the state of Missouri, in discharge of taxes or debts due to the state, for the sum of dollars, with interest for the same, at the rate of two per centum per annum from this date." These certificates were to be receivable at the treasury, and by tax gatherers and other public officers, in payment of taxes, or moneys due or to become due to the state, or to any town or county therein, and by all officers, civil and military, in the state, in discharge of salaries and fees of office; and in payment for salt made at the salt springs owned by the state, and to be afterwards leased by the authority of the legislature. The twentythird section of the act pledges certain property of the state for the redemption of these certificates; and the law authorizes the governor to negotiate a loan of silver or gold for the same purpose. A provision is made in the law for the gradual withdrawal of the certificates from circulation; and all the certificates have since been redeemed. The commissioners of the loan offices were authorized to make loans of the certificates to citizens of the state; assigning to each district a proportion to the amount of the certificates, to be secured by mortgage or personal security: the loans to bear interest not exceeding six per cent. per annum, and the loans on personal property to be for less than two hundred dollars. Held, by the supreme court, that the certificates issued under the authority of the law of Missouri were "bills of credit; and that their emission was prohibited by the constitution of the United States, which declares that no state shall emit bills of credit." Craig v. The State of Missouri, 4 Peters, 431.

178. In 1791, the legislature of Rhode Island granted a charter of incorporation to certain individuals who had associated for the purpose of banking. They were incorporated by the name of "The President, Directors, and Company of the Providence Bank," with the ordinary pow ers of such associations. In 1822, the legislature passed an act imposing a tax on every bank in the state, except the Bank of the United States. The Providence Bank refused the payment of

179. The act of the legislature of Georgia, passed 22d of December, 1830, entitled "an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power by all persons, under pretext of Lathority from the Cherokee Indians," &c., is void. Worcester v. The State of Georgia, 6 Peters, 515.

180. The act of 22d December, 1830, and the act passed by the legislature of Georgia, on the 19th of December, 1829, entitled "an act to add the territory lying within the chartered limits of Georgia, and now in the occupancy of the Cherokee Indians, to the counties of Carroll, De Kalb, Gwinnett, Hall and Habersham, and to extend the laws of this state over the same, and to annul all laws and ordinances made by the Cherokee nation of Indians, and to provide for the compensation of officers serving legal process in the said territory, and to regulate the testimony of Indians, and to repeal the ninth section of the act of 1828, upon this subject," interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of the constitution of the United States, is committed exclusively to the government of the Union. They are in direct hostility with treaties, repeated in a succession of years, which mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia, guaranty to them all the land within their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and recognise the pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself. They are in equal hostility with the acts of congress for regulating this intercourse and giving effect to the treaties. Ibid.

181. The effect of a discharge under an insolvent law of a state is at rest, so far as it depends on the antecedent decisions made by the supreme court. The ultimate opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Johnson, in the case of Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 258, was concurred in and adopted by the three judges, who were in the minority on the general question of the constitutionality of state insolvent laws. So far then as decisions upon the subject of state insolvent laws have been made by the supreme court, hey are to be deemed final and conclusive. Boyle v. Zacharie and Turner, 6 Peters, 348.

182. In 1785, M. and wife executed a deed, conveying certain lands of the will to T., who immediately reconveyed them to M. The object of the conveyance was to vest the lands of the wife in the husband. The deed of M. and wife to T. was not acknowledged, according to the forms established by the law of Pennsylvania, of 20th February, 1770, to pass the estates of femes covert; and after the death of the wife of M., the

183. The act of Pennsylvania of 1826 does not violate any contract, either in its terms or its principles. It does not even affect to touch any title acquired by a patent or any other grant. It supposes the title of the femes covert to be good, however acquired; and even provides that deeds of conveyance made by them shall not be void, because there is a defective acknowledgment of the deeds, by which they have sought to transfer title. So far, then, as it has any legal operation, it goes to confirm and not to impair the contract of the femes covert. It gives the very effect to their acts and contracts which they intended to give; and which, from mistake or accident, has not been effected. Ibid.

184. In February, 1824, the legislature of New York passed "an act concerning passengers in vessels arriving in the port of New York." By one of the provisions of the law, the master of every vessel arriving in New York from any foreign port, or from a port of any of the states of the United States, other than New York, is required under certain penalties prescribed in the law, within twenty-four hours after his arrival, to make a report in writing, containing the names, ages, and last legal settlement of every person who shall have been on board the vessel commanded by him during the voyage; and if any of the passengers shall have gone on board any other vessel, or shall, during the voyage, have been landed at any place with a view to proceed to New York, the same shall be stated in the report. The corporation of the city of New York instituted an action of debt under this law, against the master of the ship Emily, for the recovery of certain penalties imposed by this act and the declaration alleged, that the Emily, of which William Thompson was the master, arrived in New York, in August, 1829, from a country out of the United States; and that one hundred passengers were brought in the ship, in the voyage, and the master did not make the report required by the statute referred to. The defendant demurred to the declaration, and the judges of the circuit court being divided in opinion. on the following point, it was certified to the supreme court: "That the act of the legislature of